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ABSTRACT
Both Pneumatology and the doctrine of the Trinity have 
been the subject of renewed interest in recent theology. 
This study relates these two themes through a critical 
examination of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in contem­
porary Trinitarian theology.
Chapter I examines the major factors which have raised 
the question of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in recent 
theology. New Testament scholarship on the Spirit, develop­
ments in ecclesiology, and the filioaue doctrine in modern 
ecumenical theology are discussed.
Chapter II provides an account of the basic principle 
underlying recent Trinitarian theology, the idea of the 
unity of the economic with the immanent Trinity. This 
account involves a treatment of the development of the 
distinction between the two in patristic theology, and of 
the contemporary idea of their identity. Barth's doctrine 
of election and its Trinitarian implications, Rahner's 
Trinitarian Grundaxiom, and the doctrine of the Trinity 
conceived "between theism and atheism" are thus considered.
In Chapter III, four recent "models" of Trinitarian 
Pneumatology are assessed through representative theo­
logians: the "revealedness model," focused on the epistemo- 
logical role of the Spirit (Barth); the "atonement model," 
drawn from the theology of the cross (aspects of Moltmann, 
Jiingel) ; the "anointing model," where the idea of the 
anointing of Jesus with the Spirit is made thematic 
(Miihlen, Kasper, Coffey, Balthasar, Congar) ; and the 
"eschatological model," in which the Spirit's orientation 
to the future consummation of the kingdom of God is central 
(Pannenberg, Moltmann).
Chapter IV provides a more general philosophical and 
theological critique of contemporary Trinitarian Pneuma­
tology. First, the idea of "dialectical Trinitarianism" is 
introduced in order to define the theological ontology 
involved here. This dialectical conception is then criti­
cally compared to Hegel's philosophy of the Trinity. 
Second, the four models of Chapter III are discussed in the 
light of the diversity of the economy of salvation. The 
conclusion is that the character of the economic basis 
requires a careful qualification of the idea of economic- 
immanent Trinitarian identity, through a recognition of the 
kenotic quality of the economic Trinity, the apophatic 
quality of the immanent Trinity, and the analogical quality 
of Trinitarian theology in general.
In Chapter V, finally, an attempt is made to explore 
possible directions for future development in Trinitarian 
Pneumatology. The factors discussed in Chapter I, together 
with the diversity of the economic basis, suggest first of 
all that a theology of Spirit-Son reciprocity might be 
developed. This possibility is then considered more fully 
in connection with the doctrine of the immanent Trinity. A 
broadly social doctrine of the Trinity is thus advocated, 
drawing on Eastern and Victorine Trinitarian themes as well 
as on the contemporary Trinitarian tradition.
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Two of the prominent tendencies of recent Trinitarian 
theology underlie the following study. The first is the 
conviction that in classical forms of Trinitarian theology, 
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is deficient in certain 
respects, and that, particularly in view of further 
contemporary theological problems, the doctrine requires 
fresh treatment. The second is the basic principle common 
to a variety of contemporary reformulations of the doctrine 
of the Trinity, deriving from Karl Rahner and ultimately 
from Karl Barth, that 'the "economic" Trinity is the
"immanent" Trinity and the "immanent" Trinity is the
"economic" Trinity.'1 The intention of this study is to 
relate these two themes by providing a critical account of 
the main ways in which the doctrine of the Holy Spirit has 
been developed in contemporary Trinitarian theology, and to 
suggest certain possibilities for further development. This 
will serve to illuminate the doctrines both of the Holy
Spirit and of the Trinity in themselves, and help to fill
a significant lacuna in recent theological literature.
It should be stated at the outset that no attempt can 
be made within the limitations of this study to provide a 
full-scale apology for Trinitarian Pneumatology as such. In 
what follows, we will be concerned more simply with the
1Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (London: 
Burns & Oates, 1970), p. 22, italics deleted. Rahner's "basic 
Trinitarian axiom" corresponds to the Barthian thesis that the 
being of God is to be understood in his acts, and his acts in his 
being. On the similarity between Barth and Rahner on this point, 
see, e.g., John J. O'Donnell, The Mvsterv of the Triune God 
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1988), pp. 35ff.
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tradition of Trinitarian Pneumatology which has developed 
in recent years on the basis of the idea of the unity of 
the economic with the immanent Trinity, where the attempt 
is not to defend the doctrine of the Trinity so much as to 
restate it in these terms. In post-Barthian theology in 
particular, the idea of unity involved here becomes such a 
central presupposition of theological thought that the 
apologetic question of the possibility of a Trinitarian 
theology is effectively by-passed. Although the apologetic 
approach to the problems of Trinitarian theology is of 
obvious importance, therefore, the contemporary Trinitarian 
tradition responds to a different set of questions, and it 
is mainly with these, as they are reflected in
Pneumatology, that we will be concerned in what follows.
Christian theology in general is inherently 
Christocentric in character, being by nature orientated to 
the saving act of God in Jesus Christ. The doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit is no exception. Historically, as, for example, 
Hendrikus Berkhof argues in The Doctrine of the Holv 
Spirit, the work of the Spirit has been understood to be 
hidden in the work of Christ, following John 14-16, with 
the result, however, that the "person" of the Spirit has
not received the degree of sustained treatment in the
history of theology as has the "person" of Christ.2 The
"hiddenness" of the Spirit in Christ has been accentuated, 
moreover, for historical reasons involving the reaction of 
the Church to Montanism and to similar subsequent Pneumatic 
movements, which have traditionally resulted in the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit being closely tied to the 
doctrine of Christ, of Scripture, or of the Church.3 As 
Berkhof argues, however, the problem here is that, as a
2
2Hendrikus Berkhof, The Doctrine of the Holv Spirit (London: 
The Epworth Press, 1965), pp. 9-12.
3See, e.g., Jaroslav Pelikan, "Montanism and Its Trinitarian 
Significance," Church History. 25 (1956), 99-109.
result, the Lordship of the Spirit is effectively 
compromised, not because of any strictly positive attack 
upon his person and work, but rather by default, i.e., 
because the person and work of the Spirit as such has been 
insufficiently emphasized and clarified theologically.
There can be no doubt that the central focus of 
Christian theology, as of Christian faith, is Jesus Christ 
as Saviour and Lord. At the same time, however, any 
"Christomonism" in theology needs to be avoided; according 
to strict Christian teaching, God the Father indeed reveals 
himself and accomplishes his saving work through Jesus 
Christ, but also in the Holy Spirit. Jesus Christ is the 
central theme in, but by no means the whole content of, 
Christian theology. While, therefore, the fact is that 
God's saving work in the Holy Spirit cannot be detached 
artificially from the Christ-event, in which it has its 
ultimate focus, it remains that the Pneumatological aspect 
of the Christian faith ought not to be neglected.
The plea for a revitalized theology of the Spirit who 
"blows where he wills" has been a common feature of 
Pneumatological theology for a very long time.4 As we shall 
see in Chapter I, however, a variety of contemporary 
theological and ecclesial factors have currently forced a 
reassessment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit from the 
Trinitarian perspective. In particular, New Testament 
theology has revealed that, corresponding to the 
Christocentric focus of Pneumatology in the New Testament, 
we need also to recognize the strongly Pneumatological 
aspect of Christology itself in the New Testament. At the 
same time, ecclesial movements in recent years have 
challenged the usual domestication of the Holy Spirit to
3
On this theme in the medieval and modern period, see Yves 
Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, trans. David Smith (London: 
Geoffrey Chapman and New York: The Seabury Press, 1983), I, pp. 
93-150.
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ecclesial structures, while the ecumenical movement is 
currently pressing the question of the dogmatic definition 
of the Holy Spirit's relation to the Son in the Trinity in 
connection with the disputed filioaue doctrine.
In the older Trinitarian conception, three related 
concepts govern the understanding of the Holy Spirit: the 
homoousion, the procession of the Spirit, and, in the West, 
the related filioaue doctrine. As a basic summary of the 
content and development of these concepts, it can be said 
that the homoousion in general establishes that the Trinity 
is in view in Pneumatology, while the idea of procession 
(and its elaboration in the filiocrue) is an attempt to 
account for the Trinitarian structure involved. The frame 
of reference in each case is at once Christological and 
Pneumatological. The homoousion as understood of the Spirit 
was taken over into Pneumatology from Nicene Christology, 
on comparable grounds, while the idea of the procession of 
the Spirit, nominally derived from John 15: 26, came to be 
understood analogously to the idea of "begottenness" in the 
Nicene Christological definition.5 All these concepts serve 
in their way to ground the mission of the Holy Spirit ad 
extra in the understanding of the divinity of the Spirit ad 
intra. the underlying principle being that the Spirit who 
is Saviour and Lord in the economy of salvation is also, 
for that reason, one God with the Father and the Son in the 
immanent being of the divinity.6 In the correlation between 
the mission and the procession of the Spirit which comes to
This was, of course, chiefly the Pneumatological 
achievement of Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers. The 
consubstantiality and begottenness of the Son are defined 
in the Creed of Nicea as follows: "We believe ... in one
Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father 
as Only-Begotten, that is, from the essence of the Father 
[ek tes ousias tou patrosl , God from God, Light from Light, 
true God from true God, begotten not created, of one 
substance with the Father ihomoousion to oatril...."
6T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T. 
&. T. Clark, 1988), pp. 191-251.
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precise expression in the medieval period, this principle 
is extended to include the idea that the explicit form of 
the mission has its basis in the divine form of the 
procession.7
The Christian theological tradition has thus never 
maintained that the immanent Trinity is to be dissociated 
from the economy of salvation. On the contrary, it is 
united in its conviction both that God truly gives himself 
in the saving activity of the Son and Spirit, and, 
correspondingly, that the only access to the doctrine of 
the Trinity is through the economy of salvation. The 
doctrine of the Trinity is thus universally regarded as 
revealed. The economic Trinity, therefore, is not kept from 
view in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity in 
the theological tradition; indeed, insofar as the ad intra. 
eternal definitions and distinctions posited have temporal 
repercussions for the doctrines of salvation, the economic 
implications of the doctrine provide both the motivation 
and the criteria for the development of the doctrine of the 
immanent Trinity. At the same time, however, as we shall 
see more fully in Chapter II, for historical and 
theological reasons the doctrine of the Trinity in its 
traditional systematic content has been overwhelmingly a 
doctrine of the immanent Trinity. In it we are effectively 
concerned with the triune God as he is in himself, sub 
specie aeternitatis. removed from the exigencies of 
finitude and history, and abstracted even from the economy 
of salvation.8
7A. Michel, "Trinité (Missions et Habitation des 
Personnes de la)," in A. Vacant et al. . eds., Dictionnaire 
de Théologie Catholique (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 
1946), 15, cols. 1831-1832: "[La] mission divine comporte
essentiellement une procession et une origine éternelle, à 
laquelle se rattache un terme temporel . . . , " (citing Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theolooiae. la. 43, 2).
8This can be seen from even a cursory examination of 
the main stages, both historical and logical, in the 
development of the older Trinitarian theology. The most
The new development of the doctrine of the Trinity in 
recent years, for its part, working as it does from the 
premise that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity 
and vice versa, makes possible a radical reorientation of 
the doctrine of the immanent Trinity to the economy of 
salvation, thus offering the potential for the development 
of a new approach to the problem of a Trinitarian doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit. This is so first of all for the simple 
reason that, to date, most of the developments in 
contemporary Trinitarian theology have been Christological 
in character; the Pneumatological implications of what I 
shall call here the "contemporary Trinitarian thesis" 
remain to be fully explored. More than this, however, in 
the contemporary tradition of Trinitarian theology with 
which we are concerned, the attempt is made to understand 
the immanent Trinity explicitly in its unity with the 
economic Trinity. From the point of view of the form and 
content of the doctrine of the Trinity, what is involved 
here is not just the impossibility of the doctrine of the 
immanent Trinity except in the closest possible connection 
with the economic Trinity, but also the formal and material 
unity of the revelation of the triune God and the being of 
the triune God in his transcendent reality.
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basic summary of this development would have to include, 
first of all, the association of the heavenly Christ of the 
Pauline and Johannine writings with the Logos of Greek 
philosophy; secondly, the development of the doctrine of 
the eternal generation of the Logos; thirdly, the evolution 
of the homoousios dogma; fourthly, the positing of the 
distinction between the one divine essence and the three 
divine hvoostaseis: and fifthly, the unfolding of the idea 
of the procession of the Holy Spirit, culminating in the 
dispute between East and West concerning the Western 
filioque clause. These stages do not by any means present 
the development of the doctrine of the Trinity 
exhaustively, but they are sufficient to reveal something 
of the extent to which the older doctrine of the Trinity as 
such is a doctrine of the immanent Trinity. Cf. W. Fulton, 
"Trinity," in James Hastings, ed. , Encyclopaedia of 
Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921), XII, 
p. 458.
7
The reorientation of contemporary Trinitarian theology 
to the economy of salvation was largely the achievement of 
Karl Barth. Barth's specific thesis, however, is that the 
Christian concept of God as Trinity must directly 
correspond to and reflect God's own self-revelation in 
Jesus Christ, without recourse to an alien metaphysical
9 • •standard. As such, Barth's position has been of decisive 
importance for subsequent Trinitarian theology. Robert 
Jenson, for example, characterizes the development of the 
doctrine of the Trinity after Barth as a series of attempts 
"to pursue the metaphysical enterprise, intentionally as 
explication of the gospel's talk about God and on the 
explicit assumption that traditional metaphysical doctrines 
... have no inherent authority."10
While acknowledging the contribution of Barth, 
however, one would have to look also beyond Barth's 
theology as such in order to understand the contemporary 
development of Trinitarian theology. Thus, for example, in 
a recent article, "Problems of a Trinitarian Doctrine of 
God," Wolf hart Pannenberg argues that since the work of 
Rahner, the doctrine of the Trinity has increasingly been 
linked to a polemic against the traditional metaphysical 
doctrine of God, carried out from the standpoint of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, but specifically constructed also 
in connection with the critique of traditional metaphysics 
in modern thought.11 The critique of traditional metaphysics 
and of older metaphysical presuppositions in Christian
See, e.g., Barth's discussion of the vestigium 
trinitatis. in Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. 
Bromiley and T. F. Torrance; trans. G. W. Bromiley (2nd 
ed.; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), 1/1, pp. 333-347.
10Robert W. Jenson, "The Logic of the Doctrine of the 
Trinity," Dialog. 26 (1987), p. 249.
11Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Problems of a Trinitarian 
Doctrine of God," trans. Philip Clayton, Dialog. 26 (1987), 
250-257.
theology is already implicit in Barth's theology, of 
course, but in post-Barthian doctrines of the Trinity, the 
philosophical problem comes to be of direct importance for 
the substance of Trinitarian theology. As Pannenberg 
writes, "A considerable number of contemporary theologians 
... converge in looking at the doctrine of the Trinity as 
an inexhaustible resource which allows Christian theology 
to make constructive use of antimetaphysical and atheistic 
criticisms of the concept of God...."12 Of particular 
significance in this context is the fact that the doctrine 
of the Trinity thus becomes the locus of a critique, often 
ostensibly relying on the philosophy of Hegel, of the 
traditional contrast between an eternal and in himself 
immutable God and the changes of time and history, or, in 
Trinitarian terms, between the immanent and the economic 
Trinity.13 As we shall see, this development has indeed been 
of central importance to recent theologies of the Trinity, 
and to recent Trinitarian theologies of the Holy Spirit. In 
Pannenberg1s view, the result has been "a deeper 
appropriation of the specifically Christian concept of God 
contained in the revelation of Christ."14 This general 
claim, certainly, will have to be taken up in what follows. 
Against Pannenberg, and others, however, I shall argue that 
there are problems inherent in this approach, and that, 
both from the point of view of the doctrine of the Trinity 
and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, a careful assessment 
of this aspect of the new Trinitarian position is required.
Within the limits of this study, of course, there can 
be no question of directly taking up this philosophical 
problem at length. The philosophical movement which 
underlies the modern development in Trinitarian thought can
8
12Ibid. . p. 250.
13Ibid. . p. 251.
14Ibid.
only be discussed here in the context of the doctrine of 
the Trinity itself. The ultimate justification for 
proceeding to consider the problem of the relation between 
the economic and the immanent Trinity will not, therefore, 
come from a critical appropriation of the philosophical 
foundations of the contemporary approach to the Trinity, 
although this might be possible in principle. Instead, the 
justification comes from the fact that the doctrine of the 
Trinity has become the subject of renewed interest in 
contemporary theology, and from the fact that the economic 
and the immanent Trinity constitute the key terms of the 
debate: the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and 
vice versa. Or again, as Jiingel says more enigmatically, 
"God's being is discussed."15 It is above all with this 
tradition, and with its implications for Pneumatology, that 
we will be concerned.
According to Rahner's axiom, the economic Trinity is 
the immanent Trinity, and the immanent Trinity is the 
economic Trinity. The most general implication of the axiom 
for the development of a Trinitarian theology is clear: the 
immanent and the economic Trinity cannot be considered in 
abstract isolation, but rather, each is to be understood in 
unity with the other. This marks an important departure 
from the older form of Trinitarian theology, where the idea 
of the immanent Trinity, indeed, was developed self­
consciously from revelation, but where also two levels of 
discourse are to be clearly differentiated, the one 
"theology" proper, referring to the immanent Trinity, and 
the other, "economy." In the one case we are concerned in 
principle with the eternal Trinity in its self-relatedness, 
and in the other with its historical condescension and 
manifestation in the incarnation and grace. While from the 
point of view of its material content there are various
9
15Eberhard Jiingel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, trans. 
Horton Harris (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Academic
Press, 1976), p. xi.
assessments of what can be known of the immanent Trinity in 
the history of Trinitarian theology - ranging, for example, 
from a tentative analogical understanding of the eternal 
innertrinitarian begetting of the Son and procession of the 
Spirit to a total apophaticism - it remains that formally, 
if not materially, we are concerned in the one with the 
Trinity sub specie aeternitatis. and in the other with the 
Trinity sub specie temooris.
In the contemporary Trinitarian tradition, the idea of 
the Trinity sub specie aeternitatis. however, has become 
problematic, with the older metaphysical theism which to a 
great extent underlies it, whereas the idea of the immanent 
Trinity survives and is reasserted. The survival of the 
idea of the immanent Trinity in contemporary theology, in 
other words, depends upon a considerable qualification of 
its form and content. What emerges from Rahner’s axiom, and 
from the tradition I have taken it to represent, is that a 
theology of the immanent Trinity is possible to the extent 
that it is itself explicitly constructed sub specie 
temooris. based, clearly, on the presupposition that a 
doctrine of the Trinity sub soecie temporis can and does 
yield a doctrine of the immanent Trinity. The Trinity in 
itself is. the revealed Trinity, in short, and vice versa, 
so that God in his own self-relatedness is in some sense to 
be identified also with his condescension in creation and 
redemption.
What this might mean in principle, and what its 
implications are for concrete Trinitarian theologies of the 
Holy Spirit, is the primary subject-matter to be explored 
further in subsequent Chapters. By way of anticipation, 
however, it is possible to say that when the doctrines of 
the immanent and the economic Trinity are thus conceived, 
there follow from the economic basis certain clear 
implications for the understanding of the Holy Spirit in 
the Trinity. The resulting theology is in some ways quite 
different from the traditional Pneumatological position
10
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determined by the ideas of the homoousion, of procession, 
and of the flliocrue. While, as we shall see, there are 
certain gains to be made from the contemporary approach, it 
will also emerge in the course of our investigation that 
there are certain weaknesses in the approach as a whole 
which require critical assessment, and which issue in 
questionable implications for the Trinitarian theology of 
the Holy Spirit.
In what follows, we will discuss first of all in 
Chapter I the main factors which have raised the question 
of the place of the Holy Spirit in the doctrine of the 
Trinity anew in contemporary theology. In Chapter II, the 
idea of the identity of the economic with the immanent 
Trinity, as the systematic principle of contemporary 
Trinitarian theology, will be examined critically and in 
detail. Chapter III will be concerned more concretely with 
four theological "models" drawn from this theology which 
deal with the place of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity: what 
will here be called the revealedness model, the atonement 
model, the anointing model, and the eschatological model. 
In Chapter IV, critical philosophical and theological 
questions will be raised concerning the contemporary 
Trinitarian position, and Chapter V, finally, will take up 
the question of future directions for Trinitarian 
Pneumatology in the light of the critical assessment 
provided in earlier Chapters.
CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT
I
A number of factors have combined to raise the 
question of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in contemporary 
theology, and therefore also reflect on the question of a 
contemporary Trinitarian doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Three 
developments have been of particular importance in this 
respect. New Testament scholarship on the Spirit, first of 
all, has raised central questions of relevance to a 
Trinitarian Pneumatology; since one of the primary points 
of departure in Pneumatology is the witness of scripture, 
these questions will need to be taken into account in what 
follows. Secondly, contemporary ecclesiological concerns, 
relating to the rise of the pentecostalist and charismatic 
movements as a "third force" in contemporary Christianity, 
and to the wider ecclesiological concerns of the ecumenical 
movement, have forced a theological reassessment of 
traditional Pneumatology. Thirdly, the renewed discussion 
of the ecumenical problem of the f iliocrue doctrine in 
recent theology has clearly been an important factor in 
heightening the significance of the doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit in the Trinity in contemporary theology. In order to 
be sensitive to the wider results of recent theological 
scholarship on the Holy Spirit in subsequent Chapters, we 
need first of all to take account of these developments.
1. New Testament Scholarship 
The main achievement of recent New Testament 
scholarship on the Spirit has been the recovery of the
12
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concept of Spirit as a New Testament Christological 
category, both in the synoptic gospels and in the Pauline 
corpus. C. K. Barrett, for example, argues in his book, The 
Holv Spirit and the Gospel Tradition, that despite the 
relative infrequency of references to the Spirit in the 
synoptic tradition over against the Pauline and Johannine 
traditions, the synoptics present the endowment of Jesus 
with the Holy Spirit at his baptism as the event which 
marks the installation of Jesus as Messiah.1 "It is 
essentially the solemn appointment of the Messiah to his 
office, the installation of the Son of God, and it stands 
in the Gospel tradition as an indication of how the 
ministry, in the form given to it by that tradition, was 
to be understood."2 Eduard Schweizer adds to this the 
qualification that in Matthew and Mark, Jesus is the Man 
of the Spirit, whereas in Luke he is more explicitly Lord 
of the Spirit,3 but Schweizer agrees that Spirit is a 
Christological concept in the synoptics.4
1C. K. Barrett, The Holv Spirit and the Gospel 
Tradition (2nd ed.; London: S.P.C.K., 1966), p. 44.
2Ibid., p . 115.
3Eduard Schweizer, "fPneuma. Pneumatikosl," in Gerhard 
Friedrich, ed. , Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament. trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968), VI, 404-405.
4Ibid.. p. 406. Cf. also, however, I. de la Potterie, 
"L'Onction du Christ," Nouvelle Revue Theoloqiaue. 80 
(1958), 225-252. De la Potterie argues that the New
Testament writers at no point make a connection between the 
name (or title) "Christ" and the anointing of Jesus by the 
Spirit. The baptism narratives of the synoptics refer to a 
prophetic anointing; Lk. 4: 24 contains, for example, a
prophetic self-designation by Jesus which is at the same 
time an interpretation of his baptismal experience narrated 
earlier (ibid.. pp. 231-234). Acts 4: 27 presents Jesus as 
the one anointed by God to be the Servant (ibid.. pp. 239- 
246) . Within the Christological conception of the New 
Testament writers, de la Potterie concedes, Jesus is 
understood both as the eschatological prophet (Deut. 18: 
15, 18; Acts 3:22, 7: 37; Jn. 1: 21, 25) and as the Servant 
of the Father (Is. 42: Iff.; Mt. 12: 18-21; Acts 3: 13,
New Testament scholars argue that the earliest form of 
this Spirit Christology appears in the pre-Pauline formula 
cited in Rom. 1: 3-4, where Christ is characterized as "the 
one who was born of the seed of David according to the 
flesh and designated Son of God in power according to the 
Spirit of holiness from the resurrection from the dead."5 
The general tendency of contemporary New Testament 
scholarship is to trace belief in Jesus' divine Sonship 
back from its origins in the resurrection through Jesus' 
life until finally we arrive at a clear pre-existence 
doctrine; consistent with this, scholars argue that, over
14
26) , these being related to the anointing theme. But 
nowhere does the New Testament explicitly relate the title 
"Christ" to his anointing by the Spirit, despite the 
etymological relation obvious to us and presumably also to 
them. De la Potterie suggests that this was because Jesus 
himself resisted the designation "Messiah" or "Christ" 
throughout his lifetime, and because he was not understood 
by his followers to be the Messiah until after his 
ascension (Acts 2: 36). (ibid.. p. 238). The Messianic
secret (Wrede), however, raises problems for de la 
Potterie's thesis. The synoptic gospels everywhere 
presuppose from the standpoint of faith that Jesus is the 
Christ while not allowing the fact to be openly known. With 
Jesus, in his teachings and his actions, the Messianic Age 
was already present, though in hiddenness; as W. G. Kummel 
argues in his, Theology of the New Testament, trans. John
E. Steely (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1974), pp. 107-108, the 
earliest Christian community gathered Jesus' sayings and 
preserved the traditions of his life on this basis, while 
his death was understood to be a Messianic fulfilment of 
Scripture from the earliest times (Lk. 24: 26; Acts 4:
27-28) . The ascension of Jesus was therefore not the 
beginning of Jesus' Messiahship for the earliest 
Christians, but the exaltation of the one already 
designated Messiah to his heavenly glory, in order to 
appear again shortly as the Messiah of the end time (ibid.. 
p. 108) . It follows from this that it is entirely 
appropriate and even necessary to understand the anointing 
of Jesus by the Spirit at his baptism Christologically.
5Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke (I- 
IX) (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981), 
pp. 340 ff.; Raymond E. Brown, The Birth of the Messiah 
(London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1977), pp. 311-316; and James 
D.G. Dunn, Christology in the Making (London: SCM Press
Ltd, 1980), pp. 34-35, 136-149.
time, the primitive pneuma-sarx Christology associated with 
the resurrection and represented in Rom. 1: 3-4 was pushed 
further and further back into the history of Jesus. Mark, 
the earliest of our gospels, reflects the stage at which 
Jesus was understood to be Son of God kata pneuma at his 
baptism; Matthew and Luke both independently attribute 
Jesus' divine Sonship to his special relationship to the 
Holy Spirit from his conception (see especially Lk. 1: 
35b) .6 This movement, it is argued, represents a sustained 
attempt to deal with Jesus' divine Sonship without the 
concepts of pre-existence and incarnation.7 The main 
evidence for this is found in the synoptic gospels 
themselves, which bear witness to a time and a place where 
this level of Christological articulation - a Spirit 
Christology as opposed to a Logos Christology - had been 
achieved.8
Although certain exegetical points may well be 
disputed, there is no doubt that Christological thought is 
pervasively related to Pneumatological thought in the New 
Testament as a whole. This fact undoubtedly represents a 
sustained attempt within the primitive Church to deal with 
Messianic expectations concerning the previously 
unparalleled activity of the Holy Spirit in the Messianic 
Age (Joel 2: 28-30).9 As James Dunn has argued, it is also
15
6Barrett, o p . c i t ., pp. 5-24; Brown, pp. cit.. pp. 108,
156.
7Dunn, o p . cit.. pp. 139-141.
8Fitzmyer, o p . cit.. p. 340.
9The roots of the early Christian movement in Judaism
made such a Christological conception inevitable. In this 
connection, the expectation of the contemporary Judaism 
which produced the book of 1 Enoch might be cited. It
relied heavily on Messianic oracles like Is. 11: 2 in its 
understanding of the Messiah; see, e.g., 1 Enoch 49: 2b-3, 
trans. M. A. Knibb, in H. F. D. Sparkes, ed., The
Apocryphal Old Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 
p. 230: "... iniquity will pass away like a shadow, and
will have [no place to stand] ; for the Chosen One stands
16
almost certainly grounded in the history of Jesus of 
Nazareth, who apparently underwent a significant religious 
experience at the Jordan, and in whose preserved sayings 
are found traces of a highly Pneumatic consciousness of 
God.10 Dunn goes so far as to argue for a renewal, although 
within stricter limits, of the nineteenth century attempt 
to reconstruct Jesus' inner life - the feature of the older 
"quest of the historical Jesus" which was singled out for 
particular criticism by Albert Schweitzer.11 Dunn admits 
that a biography of Jesus is indeed impossible, but argues 
that this does not mean that we have no access to Jesus' 
self-consciousness at any point. "On the contrary," he 
writes, "it is my contention that we are in a position to 
see fairly deeply into Jesus' experience of God at certain 
points, and so may begin to understand how he conceived of 
his relation to God."12
before the Lord of Spirits, and his glory is. for ever and 
ever, and his power for all generations. And in him dwells 
the spirit of wisdom, and the spirit which gives 
understanding, and the spirit of knowledge and of power, 
and the spirit of those who sleep in righteousness."
10James D.G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (London: SCM 
Press Ltd, 1975), pp. 41-92.
11Ibid. . p. 12.
12lbid.. p. 13. Against Dunn, however, it must be said 
that the same characteristics of the synoptic narratives 
vihich make a biography of Jesus impossible must be taken 
also to render the attempt to reconstruct the psychological 
life of Jesus futile. The theological concerns of the 
Church in the preservation and redaction of the sources 
have conditioned the form and content of the traditions 
about Jesus which have thus survived. At the same time, 
however, this does not mean that Dunn's position is to be 
ignored; rather, the close connection between Christology 
and Pneumatology in the New Testament presentation of Jesus 
is related to the character of the primitive Christian 
movement, in which, according to all the sources we 
possess, the miraculous presence and activity of the 
eschatological Spirit of God was considered to be a 
demonstrable fact (e.g., Rom. 15: 18-19). That presence and 
activity was considered to have been made possible by the 
saving life, death, and resurrection of Jesus (Jn. 7: 39),
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Paul's view of the Holy Spirit perhaps represents the 
most important example of this process of theological 
reflection. Although Paul can argue that the Spirit is the 
Spirit of God which searches the deep things of God (= the 
Father: 1 Cor. 2: lOff.),13 his characteristic position is 
that the Spirit is the Spirit of [God's] Son (Gal. 4: 6), 
the Spirit of Christ (Rom. 8: 9), or even the Spirit of 
Jesus Christ (Phil. 1: 19), so that the Spirit is also the 
Spirit of sonship in the religious life of the believer 
(Rom. 8: 15; Gal. 4: 6). In the crucial Pauline
Pneumatological texts 1 Cor. 15: 45 and 2 Cor. 3: 17,
furthermore, a Pauline version of Spirit Christology 
appears: the Spirit is here the earthly presence of the
and to be the specific gift of Jesus as the risen and 
exalted Saviour (Acts 2: 33), to provide for the
continuation of his work in and through the Church (Jn. 
14-16; Acts). The attempt of New Testament writers to 
articulate the relation between their Lord and the Spirit 
can only be interpreted, from this point of view, as a 
necessary reflective response to the individual and
collective life of the primitive Church.
13Schweizer, o p . cit. . p. 425 argues that "the deep 
things of God" are here exclusively Jesus Christ and him 
crucified, after 1 Cor. 1: 17ff., but this conclusion is 
somewhat forced. For a different view, cf. C. F. D. Moule, 
The Holy Spirit (Oxford: Mowbrays, 1978), pp. 7-17, who 
argues that 1 Cor. 2: lOff. presupposes a kinship between 
God and humanity, in that the two pneumas mentioned, the
divine and the human, are spoken of analogously, and that
this theme is central to Pauline Pneumatology. Moule holds 
that Paul's usage here parallels the thought of Ps. 51: 10- 
12, 17, where ruach is seen by the Psalmist as something
within and part of him, and yet as belonging to God also. 
The argument is that in both cases, what is in view is the 
Hebraic notion of Spirit as a mediating power between God 
and the creation. Moule, however, in his interpretation of 
the Corinthians passage, misses the eschatological, 
Messianic point Paul makes: the Spirit is not here simply 
a mediating concept, understood in continuity with the Old 
Testament tradition, but rather a divine gift of the new, 
Messianic age.
exalted Lord, such that, in the Spirit the resurrected Lord 
is active and manifested in his resurrection power.14
The work, of Ingo Hermann on the relation between 
Pauline Pneumatology and Christology in Kurios und Pneuma 
has been particularly influential in this respect.15 
Hermann's central argument is that the resurrected Christ 
of the Pauline letters is not only the one once delivered 
over to death for our sake, and a divine figure who is 
destined to come at the end to "bring to light the things 
now hidden in darkness" (1 Cor. 4: 5), but the one who
presents himself to us in the here and now as life-giving 
Spirit. The recognition of this fact, he argues, is 
essential to the full understanding of Pauline theology.16
Hermann's study of Pauline Pneumatology is focused on 
2 Cor. 3: 17a, "ho de kurios to pneuma estin." which he
regards as the key to and a summary of the relationship 
between Christ and the Spirit in Paul.17 Hermann argues that 
this important text identifies the pneuma with the risen 
Christ; kurios here, as in the whole of the passage from 2 
Cor. 3: 1 to 4: 6, where Paul defends his Apostleship
against those who challenge his authority, refers to
18
14Ernst Käsemann, "Geist und Geistgaben im NT," in H.
F. von Campenhausen et al.. eds., Die Religion in
Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1958), II, col. 1274.
15Ingo Hermann, Kurios und Pneuma (München: Kösel-
Verlag, 1961).
16Hermann writes, ibid., p. 14: "...die Fülle der
paulinischen Theologie wird erst sichtbar, wenn im Bild des 
erhöten Kyrios die Züge des Pneuma-Mächtigen hervortreten 
und dadurch begreifbar wird, wie der Herr der Kirche unter 
den Seinen wirksam gegenwärtig ist, bis er wiederkommt."
17Ibid.. pp. 17-66. Hermann goes on, however, ibid., 
pp. 69ff., to argue with particular reference to 1 Cor. 12-
15 that the relation posited here between Christ and the 
Spirit is also essential to a proper understanding of 
Pauline ecclesiology and his wider understanding of the 
economy of salvation.
Christ.18 Paul's thought, however, is not metaphysical at 
this point, and no speculative identification of essence 
is strictly intended; rather, according to Hermann, Spirit 
in Paul is more correctly conceived firstly as a 
Funktionsbegriff. indicating the means by which Christ is 
operative in the Church (thus the Church at Corinth becomes 
the "letter" of Christ), and secondly as an 
Erfahrungsqegebenheit. which is experienced as a power 
operating in the heart, differentiating the New from the 
Old Covenant (which appeared merely as the gramma written 
on tablets of stone).19 The phrase "ho de kurios to pneuma 
estin" in 2 Cor. 3: 17, therefore, means that the life-
giving Spirit, who gives Paul his Apostolic authority and 
who glorifies and liberates the Church in Corinth, is none 
other than the resurrected Christ.20 The point is that in 
reference to the experience of Paul and the Corinthian 
Church, Christ is the Spirit, and the Spirit who is at work 
is Christ, so that both the authority of the Apostle and 
the glory of the New Covenant derives immediately from the 
risen Lord.
Hermann's treatment of Pauline Pneumatology follows in 
the tradition of Albert Schweitzer. Since Schweitzer's Die 
Mvstik des Aoostels Paulus (1930), there has been a strong 
tendency to understand the Spirit in Paul as a field of 
divine power which determines the life of the believer.21 
Schweitzer’s work was part of a wider reaction earlier in 
this century to the liberal-idealist tradition of the 
nineteenth century, which understood Spirit as that which 
gives the dual capacity for self-consciousness and for a
18Ibid. . pp. 17-25.
19Ibid. , pp. 26-31.
20Ibid. , pp. 43-45.
21Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, 
trans. W. Montgomery (London: A. & C. Black, 1931), pp. 
425-426, 433.
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rational penetration of the world of experience, and 
interpreted Paul largely along these lines.22
Schweitzer argues that for Paul, being "in Christ" is 
to be understood eschatologically as a corporate solidarity 
of believers with Christ and with one another,23 through 
baptism,24 and ultimately as a corporate sharing in the 
eschatological event of the resurrection.25 For Schweitzer, 
therefore, Paul's "mysticism" is a "Christ-mysticism" and 
not a "God-mysticism," the participation in the 
eschatological event of salvation rather than a Hellenistic 
sharing in the divine life.26 The Spirit of Christ, in 
keeping with this, is the principle of the state of 
existence characteristic of the Messianic kingdom, i.e., of 
the resurrection. Life in the Spirit, similarly, is entry 
into the new, eschatological mode of existence as opposed 
to the life of the "old man" in the flesh, and thus the 
beginning in the here and now of the process of
20
22Ernst Kasemann, "The Spirit and the Letter," in 
Kasemann, Perspectives on Paul. trans. Margaret Kohl 
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1971), p. 139. The Pauline life in 
the Spirit was understood here as the "spiritual life" of 
moral inwardness. According to Kasemann, this 
interpretation broke down when it became clear that for 
Paul and for primitive Christianity in general "Spirit" 
means the divine energy of miracle and ecstasy. Cf. also 
Rudolf Bultmann, Theolocrv of the New Testament, trans. 
Kendrick Grobel (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1952), I, p. 155, 
who distinguishes between "animistic" and "dynamistic" 
thinking in New Testament Pneumatology: in animistic
thinking, the Spirit is conceived as an independent power 
which can fall on a person unexpectedly, enabling 
supernatural manifestations of power; in dynamistic 
thinking, the Spirit is an impersonal force which fills a 
person like a fluid.
23Schweitzer, o p . cit. . p. 111.
24Ibid. , p. 19.
25Ibid. , p . 110.
26Ibid. , pp. 5-25.
resurrection.27 It is for this reason that the end-time gift 
of the Spirit follows the resurrection of Christ; the 
Spirit is "the form of manifestation of the powers of the 
resurrection. "28
James Dunn, also, who has made one of the most recent 
sustained attempts to address the question of Pauline 
Pneumatology, belongs with Hermann to this theological and 
exegetical tradition. Like Schweitzer, Dunn, in Jesus and 
the Spirit, speaks of Paul's Christ-mysticism.29 For Dunn, 
as for Schweitzer, the Spirit is "the future good which has 
become present for the man of faith," and thus a 
fundamental dimension of the already / not yet tension 
which lies at the centre of Pauline eschatology.30 Both Dunn 
and Schweitzer conceive of the Spirit in Paul as the sphere 
of divine power into which one enters when initiated into 
the life of the new age, and, as such, as a sphere which is 
consistently determined or defined by its 
"Jesus-character."31 Dunn, however, together with Hermann, 
differs from Schweitzer in laying less emphasis on the 
importance of eschatology as such in shaping Paul's 
theology, and more on the centrality of religious 
experience for Paul.32
While it is possible, according to Dunn, to define the 
Spirit in Paul in ecstatic, ethical, or eschatological 
categories,33 his main argument, like Hermann's, is that the
27Ibid. . pp. 160, 167.
28Ibid. . p. 166.
29Dunn, o p . cit.. p. 201.
30Ibid. . p. 310.
31Ibid. . p. 319.
32Ibid. . p. 200.
33Dunn takes us through three levels of the Pauline 
consciousness of the Spirit. First, he discusses the 
charismatic Spirit, by which he means the Spirit which
21
Pauline theology of the Spirit reaches its climax in the 
idea that the Spirit is "no more and no less than the 
Spirit of Jesus."34 In a sense, Paul was forced to this 
definition out of pastoral necessity, because of the 
ambiguity, and, in a sense, the religious banality, of 
charismatic experience and of the related claims of some of 
his opponents. In order to state what authentic Christian 
experience of the Spirit is, Paul appeals to the content of 
the gospel: Christ crucified and risen. The Spirit of God, 
the eschatological Spirit, is indistinguishable in Paul, 
according to Dunn, from the Spirit of Jesus, of the Son, or 
of sonship.35 To be in the Spirit is to be in Christ, and 
therefore involves sharing both in Christ's sufferings and 
in his resurrection (2 Cor. 10-13) ,36
Again, however, the question of the basis of this 
teaching in Paul must be raised. At one level, Dunn argues 
that there is an analogy between Jesus' relation to God and 
that of the Christian in the one Spirit: the Spirit of the 
Son is the Spirit of sonship (Rom. 8: 9-17; Gal. 4: 6),37 
But Dunn's central thesis is that Paul "equates the risen
70Jesus with the Spirit who makes alive." The argument here
22
operates through various gifts in the Church and the 
presence and activity of which is understood by Paul to be 
a mark of God's own eschatological activity (ibid.. pp. 
205-258). Second, the charismatic community, the Church, is 
discussed with particular reference to the controversial 
question of charism and office. Dunn sees an ongoing 
dialectic in Paul between the two, with the rule of thumb 
being unity in diversity (ibid.■ pp. 259-300). Third, Dunn 
treats the matter of the character of authentic Christian 
experience of the Spirit as a question of the 
Jesus-character of such experience (ibid., pp. 301-342).
34Ibid. . p. 325.
35Ibid. . pp. 302-307, 319-320.
36Ibid. . pp. 326-342.
37Ibid. . p. 320.
38Ibid. ■ p. 322, italics deleted.
is based on 1 Cor. 15: 45, where it is said that the Last 
Adam, Jesus Christ, "became life-giving Spirit." Dunn's 
language is significant:
23
[Paul] does not say that Jesus by his 
resurrection became a spiritual body 
(though that is implied in the 
context) . He does not say that Jesus 
by his resurrection became a living 
Spirit (though that would have made a 
better parallelism in v. 45). He 
deliberately says that Jesus by his 
resurrection became that Spirit which 
believers experience as the source and 
power of their new life and new 
relationship with God. As from his 
resurrection Jesus may be known by men 
only as life-giving Spirit.39
Dunn immediately goes on to add that this also means, 
conversely, that the pre-existent Spirit has taken on, as 
of the resurrection, the character of Christ, and to point 
out that Paul "is both describing the mode of existence now 
enjoyed by Jesus, and ... specifying the character of 
Christian experience. . . .1,40
The central point made here is that after the 
resurrection, Jesus becomes the definition, in some sense, 
of the Spirit's activity in the life of the believer; it is 
this which makes this experience distinctively Christian. 
The Spirit and the risen Jesus are, therefore, for Dunn, 
identified in Paul so far as Christian experience is 
concerned.41 The eschatological Spirit, promised by the 
prophets, has somehow taken on the character both the 
earthly (Rom. 8: 15 ff.) and the exalted Christ (Rom. 8:
39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Ibid.. p. 323. Dunn puts the point in more reserved 
terms again in his later book, Christology in the Making, 
pp. 145-147, where the Spirit is said to be the medium of 
union between Christ and the Christian.
29; 1 Cor. 15: 49) .42 According to Dunn, the chief reason 
for this was Christological: Jesus was the eschatological 
revelation of God, and hence the older words for the 
revelatory activity of God in the Old Testament - Wisdom, 
Word, and Spirit - had to take on the character of Jesus.43 
The clear implication is that since, for Paul, the Spirit 
is the basis of the new life, the eschatological life of 
the resurrection, the character of that life must be 
determined by Jesus.
It is not possible within present constraints to 
comment in detail on the Trinitarian significance of the 
material we have surveyed. It must suffice to say for the 
moment that none of these studies is specifically addressed 
to the question of a Trinitarian Pneumatology, and in fact 
both Hermann44 and Dunn45 go out of their way to maintain 
that the questions addressed in Trinitarian theology are of 
a different order from and are later than those addressed 
in their treatment of biblical material. This is 
undoubtedly correct. However, it remains the case that the 
Spirit within and the risen Christ beyond are not one but 
two, and that unless we are prepared to admit that Christ 
fills the whole sphere of deity in Paul's thought, a 
plurality in Paul's God and certainly in Paul's religious 
experience must be admitted. With reference to the thesis 
of Hermann and Dunn, furthermore, it must be said that in 
the benediction of 2 Cor. 13: 14, Paul adopts a triadic 
formula and sees no need, after 2 Cor. 3: 17, not to 
mention the Spirit because he has already mentioned Christ. 
The possibility of an abstraction from the content of the 
Pauline corpus in a Trinitarian theology of the Holy Spirit
24
42Ibid.
43Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit, p. 325.
44Hermann, o p  . cit. . pp. 13-14.
45Dunn, o p . cit. , pp. 325-326.
must therefore be left open, even if, as is generally 
accepted, the arbitrary dogmatic methods of "quarry 
exegesis" must be firmly rejected.
The New Testament witness thus presents a great 
challenge to Trinitarian theology, both regarding the 
differentiation of the Son and the Spirit and regarding 
their unity in the economy of salvation. Both the synoptic 
presentation of the Holy Spirit as a Christological 
category and the Pauline view of life in Christ as life in 
the Spirit and vice versa reveal the close connection 
between Pneumatology and Christology in the New Testament. 
After the coming of Christ, the Spirit cannot be understood 
apart from its relation to him, but also, correspondingly, 
Christ himself is understood in Pneumatic terms. This is 
particularly clear from the Pauline letters, where the 
canon of authentic experience of the Spirit is defined 
Christologically, precisely because the new existence in 
Christ is Pneumatological. If dogmatic theology must take 
its departure from the Scriptures, then it follows that the 
questions relating to Trinitarian Pneumatology cannot be 
discussed in abstraction from Christology, and vice versa. 
This conclusion reflects also the judgment of Yves Congar: 
"If I were to draw but one conclusion from the whole of my 
work on the Holy Spirit, I would express it in these words: 
no Christology without pneumatology and no pneumatology 
without Christology."46 We now turn to the second of the 
factors which have made Pneumatology of particular 
significance in contemporary theology, and to this same 
idea again as it emerges in the context of ecclesiology.
2. Ecclesioloav
Two ecclesiological factors have also raised the 
question of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in contemporary
25
46Yves Congar, The Word and the Spirit, trans. David 
Smith (London: Geoffrey Chapman and San Francisco: Harper 
& Row Publishers, 1986), p. 1.
theology. The first of these is the pentecostalist or 
charismatic movement, and the second, and more important, 
is the ecumenical movement. The rise of the pentecostalist 
movement in this century, first of all, and the development 
in the last three decades of the charismatic movement 
within the institutional Churches, both as world-wide 
phenomena of explosive growth and enormous proportions, lie 
very much in the background in recent Pneumatology. The two 
movements have presented a challenge on many fronts to 
traditional theology and Church practice, and can be 
understood as a living critique, mostly from the pews, of 
the Church's thinking about the Spirit.47
The modern pentecostal movement can be traced to its 
origins in the American holiness revival of the nineteenth 
century, and specifically to an obscure Bible school in 
Kansas run by Charles Parham, who taught that the mark of 
baptism in the Holy Spirit is the gift of tongues.48 This 
teaching was taken up by Parham's followers and developed 
in the years following up to the Second World War into what 
Hollenweger has called "classic pentecostalism.1,49 The marks 
of the movement include highly spontaneous worship, an 
expectation of the miraculous, ethical rigorism, biblical 
literalism, a certain amount of theological diversity (on 
questions of sanctification and the Trinity in particular), 
and the distinctive teaching that the initial evidence of 
baptism in the Spirit is the gift of tongues. Through its 
highly-motivated converts, the movement spread not only 
through the United States, but effectively world-wide, so
26
47In this respect, of course, the movement is similar 
to numerous ecclesial movements in the past: the challenge 
of the Franciscans to the medieval Western Church, for 
example, or the work of John Wesley and his followers in 
eighteenth century England might be called to mind.
48Walter J. Hollenweger, The Pentecostals. trans. R. A. 
Wilson (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1972), p. 22.
49Ibid. . pp. 21-62.
that today the various Pentecostal Churches are a very 
significant force in global Christianity.50
Within the institutional Churches, the charismatic 
renewal movement is generally traced to the experience of 
the American Episcopalian priest Dennis Bennett and to his 
congregation in California in 1959.51 Bennett's experience 
and that of his followers was understood along classic 
pentecostalist lines, so that it can be assumed that there 
was dependence on the earlier movement.52 Within the Roman 
Catholic Church, the phenomenon has been traced to a group 
of Catholic lay academics at Duquesne University in 
Pittsburgh, who met for prayer and who again were 
acquainted with classic pentecostalism.53 Their subsequent 
experience, made known largely through the writing of two 
of the original members of the group, Kevin and Dorothy 
Ranaghan, and certainly encouraged by the reforms of 
Vatican II, rapidly became a popular movement in the 
American Roman Catholic Church and subsequently spread to 
other countries.54
Hollenweger noted in 1969 that Protestant charismatics 
had largely failed to break away from the classic 
pentecostalist understanding of the work of the Spirit, 
whereas in Roman Catholic charismatic circles, a more 
profound integration of the new experience with the 
sacramental and liturgical life of the Church, and with
27
50Ibid. . pp. 63-74.
51Peter Hocker, "A Survey of the Worldwide Charismatic 
Movement," in Arnold Bittlinger, ed., The Church is 
Charismatic (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981), p. 
117.
52Hollenweger, oo. cit. , pp. 9-14.
53Ibid. . pp. 8-9.
^Ldon Joseph Suenens, A New Pentecost? . trans. Francis 
Martin (London: Fount Paperbacks, 1977), pp. 72-76.
social concerns, had been achieved.55 As the movement 
continued to develop within the older, institutional 
Churches, however, it came to be more integrated with 
traditional forms of worship and theology on all sides. 
This process is reflected in the Roman Catholic Church, for 
example, in the work of Cardinal Suenens, A New Pentecost?, 
which explicitly attempts to draw together the 
institutional and charismatic dimensions of the Church. 
Suenens offers Roman Catholic charismatics a wide vision of 
the Spirit's activity, and opens up questions, not just of 
individual religious experience, but of the wider Christian 
presence in the world in social activity, and of 
ecumenism.56 Within the Anglican Church, Bishop Michael 
Ramsey's book, Holy Spirit, showed that the charismatic 
movement need not be fundamentalist in its use of the Bible 
or narrowly pietistic in its ethic.57 Again, the Reformed 
charismatic theologian Thomas Smail has argued along 
classical Reformed lines in his book, Reflected Glory, that 
the Spirit's work must be understood in Christological 
terms: since God's saving work is indivisible, the role of 
the Spirit can only be to make real in the life of the 
believer the victories of the incarnate Son in his 
humiliation and exaltation.58
It remains the case, however, that the Pentecostal and 
charismatic movements remain ecclesial outsiders, 
exercising a predominantly critical function within the 
wider Christian community. The challenge presented, 
however, by the movements to contemporary theology is their 
claim to have returned to the primitive Christian outlook
55Hollenweger, o p . cit. . pp. 9-15.
56Suenens, o p . cit. . pp. 89-195.
57Michael Ramsey, Holv Spirit (London: SPCK, 1977) , pp. 
117-131.
COThomas Smail, Reflected Glory (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1975), pp. 37-51, 104-118.
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in which the kingdom of God may still be anticipated, but 
in which it is all the same breaking through into our midst 
in the present by the power of the Spirit in signs and 
wonders and in the fulfilment of religious expectation.59 In 
the developing world in particular, where the Christian 
Church is currently growing at enormous rates, such highly 
Pneumatic expectations are often the norm rather than the 
exception, whereas the tendency of Western institutional 
Churches towards a more stable, rationally-definable 
ecclesial life ordered through ecclesial office, the 
sacraments, and the centrality of the Word is to a great 
extent regarded as culturally alien and religiously 
undesirable.60
The concerns of the ecumenical movement, secondly, 
have been another key ecclesiological factor underlying 
recent Pneumatology. George S. Hendry noted this in 1956 in
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59Suenens, o p . cit. . pp. 216-217.
60Ben Lenturut, a minister from Papua-New Guinea writes 
as follows ("Charismatic Renewal in Papua-New Guinea," in 
Bittlinger, pp. cit. , p. 180): 'This is how I saw the
church in [Papua-New Guinea] ... before the Charismatic 
Renewal.... We faithfully went to church every Sunday, sang 
hymns, said prayer, heard preaching and gave our offerings. 
However, this "form of religion" did nothing to change 
lives and to meet people's needs.... Add to this picture 
the cultural things of PNG society - e.g. magic for 
healing, to attract women, to influence people for pay 
back, in gardens and so on. People within the church were 
involved.... Why were they involved? Because they could see 
the power that was there and the church was doing nothing 
to either challenge or replace these things. In most 
circles the types of things being done were not even 
recognized as evil and yet people were held in fear by the 
men and women able to use this magic.' The theological 
problem for the writer lies not in the faith and practice 
of his own Church, but in the neglect of the Holy Spirit in 
the missionary teaching of the Western, mother Church: "As 
I look back I remember the large emphasis placed on 
teaching about God the Father and Jesus his Son being our 
Saviour. That was fine, but the third person of the 
Trinity, i.e. Holy Spirit, was largely ignored and unknown. 
Yet Jesus had said quite clearly that the power we need 
will come from the Holy Spirit...."
his book, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, where he 
argued that the modern ecumenical movement has decisively 
raised the question of the Holy Spirit at the theological 
level for the Church in the twentieth century.61 Hendry 
points out that different ecclesiologies are rooted in 
different Pneumatologies, and himself provides an analysis 
and critique of the (pre-Vatican II) Roman Catholic, 
Reformation, and Radical Reformation or "Enthusiastic" 
views of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Church.62 
Hendry also refers to two Faith and Order Reports of the 
early 19 50's, in which it was concluded that it is of 
fundamental importance for the Church that ecclesiology be 
understood in the closest possible connection with the 
question of the relations between the Holy Spirit and 
Christ, the Word, and the Church.63 One of these, the Report 
of the Lund conference of 1952, contained the following 
recommendation:
30
In our work we have been led to the 
conviction that it is of decisive 
importance for the advance of 
ecumenical work that the doctrine of 
the Church be treated in close relation 
both to the doctrine of Christ and to 
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. We 
believe that this must occupy a primary 
place in the future work of this
61George S. Hendry, The Holv Spirit in Christian 
Theology. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), p. 
11.
62Ibid. . pp. 53-71.
63Ibid.. p. 53. The Reports cited are: World Council of 
Churches, Commission on Faith and Order, The Church: 
Report of a Theological Commission on Faith and Order. 1951 
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1951); and World Council of
Churches, Commission on Faith and Order, The Report of the 
Third World Conference at Lund. Sweden. August 15-28. 1952
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1952).
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movement, and so we recommend to the 
Faith and Order Commission,. . .^
Konrad Raiser has recently pointed out how 
fundamentally the Pneumatological standpoint of the Faith 
and Order Commission was shifted in its development after 
Lund; whereas previous ecumenical reports understand the 
Holy Spirit in terms of his work in the Church and in the 
individual Christian, Lund focuses attention explicitly on 
the problem of a Trinitarian economy of the Holy Spirit.65 
Here the impact of the Eastern Orthodox Churches on the 
development of the Faith and Order movement has been 
crucial, according to Raiser, in expanding the basis of 
study.66
At Uppsala in 1968, the Lund recommendation was 
carried forward in the report, "The Holy Spirit and the 
Catholicity of the Church."67 This Report formed part of a 
broader project of the Faith and Order Commission from 
1964-1967 under the title, "Spirit, Order and 
Organization,"68 which was intended to deal from a dogmatic 
perspective with the question how the Holy Spirit is
64Commission on Faith and Order, Lund. 1952. p. 11.
65Konrad Raiser, "The Holy Spirit in Modern Ecumenical 
Thought," The Ecumenical Review. 41 (1989), pp. 376-378.
66Raiser, ibid.. notes that following Lund, the Third 
Assembly of the World Council of Churches at New Delhi in 
1961 in particular was a landmark of Orthodox participation 
in the ecumenical process, and was of particular importance 
for the future of ecumenical debate on the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit within the World Council of Churches; from then 
on, the wider Trinitarian context of Pneumatology could no 
longer ultimately be resisted.
67In World Council of Churches, Commission on Faith and 
Order, The Uppsala Report 1968. ed. Norman Goodall (Geneva: 
World Council of Churches, 1971), pp. 11-19.
68World Council of Churches, Commission on Faith and 
Order, Louvain 1971 (Geneva: World Council of Churches,
1971), pp. 116-117.
involved in the Church's one mission to the contemporary 
world and in proclamation, baptism, and the eucharist.69 
Catholicity is treated in this context as the gift of God 
to the Church, and thereby also as a demand by God upon the 
Church. The Holy Spirit is likewise the basis of the 
communion of saints, on the one hand, and the power by 
which the Church reaches out to the suffering, divided, and 
sinful world on the other.70
Unfortunately, the project was hampered by a lack of 
funds,71 with the result that its scope was limited. The 
character of the succeeding report was also altered as the 
thinking of the committees developed. Whereas the earlier 
reports had been almost exclusively dogmatic in character, 
the report of Louvain in 1971 was largely sociological in 
method and in content.72 This was not without its own value, 
naturally, but the result was of significantly less 
ecumenical significance, and represented a loosening of the 
constraints of the recommendation of Lund quoted above.
At its meeting in Nairobi in 1975, however, a return 
to the Trinitarian basis of Pneumatology and ecclesiology 
is signalled in the following recommendation:
We ask the churches to undertake a 
common effort to receive, reappropriate 
and confess together, as contemporary 
occasion requires, the Christian truth 
and faith, delivered through the 
apostles and handed down through the 
centuries. Such common action, arising 
from free and inclusive discussion 
under the commonly acknowledged 
authority of God's word, must aim both
32
69Commission on Faith and Order, The Uppsala Report 
1968. p. 12.
70Ibid. . pp. 14-15.
71 Ibid. . pp. 17-18.
72"Spirit, Order and Organization," Commission on Faith 
and Order, Louvain 1971, pp. 116-132.
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to clarify and to embody the unity and 
the diversity which are proper to the 
church's life and mission.73
This was carried forward through the meeting of the Plenary 
Commission on Faith and Order in Bangalore in 1978 to Lima 
in 1982, as a result of which the document "Towards the 
Common Expression of the Apostolic Faith Today" was 
produced.74 This document recommends as one of the main 
projects of Faith and Order that the Nicene- 
Constantinopolitan Creed be studied as the basis for this 
common expression of faith because of its theological 
importance75 and that the Creed be expounded both 
dogmatically and in terms of its practical implications for 
the Churches.76 The project continued through international 
theological consultations in 1984, through the Faith and 
Order meeting at Stavanger in 1985, to the production in 
1987 of the important study document, Confessing One 
Faith.77
In its Pneumatology, Confessing One Faith seeks to 
hold together the second and third articles of the Creed. 
Some attention is given to the relation between the first 
and third articles in the discussion of the Creator Spirit78
^World Council of Churches, Commission on Faith and 
Order, "Towards a Common Expression of the Apostolic Faith 
Today," in Commission on Faith and Order, Apostolic Faith 
Today. ed. Hans-Georg Link (Geneva: World Council of
Churches, 1985), p. 216.
74Ibid. . p. 215.
75Ibid. . § 3.
76Ibid.. §§ 17-25 and Recommendation I.
^World Council of Churches, Commission on Faith and 
Order, Confessing One Faith (Geneva: World Council of
Churches, 1987), p. 1.
78Ibid. . § 184.
and of the Spirit's procession from the Father.79 The 
Spirit, however, is seen in the document primarily in terms 
of his work in the Church in the economy of salvation. 
Christology remains of central importance, while the 
Spirit's role is regarded as one of empowering the Church 
for the continuing mission of the Son.80 The Christological 
definition of the work of the Spirit is clear in the 
following section:
The Holy Spirit of God "together with 
the Father and the Son, is worshipped 
and glorified". So it is that the most 
basic Christian prayer is glory and 
praise of the Triune God. Spirituality 
is only fully and maturely Christian 
when it is trinitarian. So Christians 
in their daily life and especially in 
their worship pray that the Father send 
his Spirit that they might be more 
completely conformed to the life of 
Christ the Son. . . ,81
The Commission on Faith and Order is currently revising the 
document on the basis of suggestions made at its meeting in 
Budapest in August of 1989.82
The ecumenical movement as a whole is now looking 
ahead to the 1991 Seventh Assembly of the World Council of 
Churches in Canberra, with the Pneumatological theme, 
"Come, Holy Spirit - Renew the Whole Creation." While it 
is impossible to predict what the outcome of the Assembly 
is likely to be, it is, perhaps, worth noting that a 
sustained treatment of the problems of Pneumatology is 
bound to be directly on the agenda of the ecumenical
34
79Ibid. . §§ 188-189.
80Ibid. . § 195.
81 Ibid. . § 190.
82World Council of Churches, Ecumenical Press Service. 
Year 56/ Issue 28, 89.08.64.
movement for some time to come, well beyond 1991. The basic 
reason for this is the fact that, as Albert Outler has 
recently argued, ecumenism itself depends upon a conciliar 
view of the Church, in which Pneumatology is of crucial
07importance. If this is correct, however, then it follows 
also that it is with Pneumatology that the best prospect 
for - and the greatest risks to - a new vitality in the 
ecumenical enterprise lies.84
3. The Filiooue 
Recent ecumenical discussion of the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit has been concerned above all, however, with the 
longstanding problem of the Western filiocrue doctrine, by 
which the Holy Spirit is understood to proceed 
hypostatically both from the Father and from the Son. The 
roots of this position extend far back into the theology of 
the Western Church, and in particular into the theology of 
Augustine, upon whose work the characteristic Western 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity is largely
85based. Since the time of the Patriarch Photius of 
Constantinople (c. 810 - c. 895), the filioaue has been the 
chief point of attack on the West by the Eastern Church,
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83Albert C. Outler, "Pneumatology as an Ecumenical 
Frontier," The Ecumenical Review. 41 (1989), 363-374.
^ Ibid.. p. 363.
850n the general development of the filioaue doctrine 
in Western theology, see H. B. Swete, On the History of the 
Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit, from the 
Apostolic Aae to the Death of Charlemagne (Cambridge: 
Deighton, Bell, and Co., 1876; for an excellent systematic 
treatment, see also J.-M. Garrigues, L*Esprit qui dit 
«Père» et le problem du filiocrue (Paris: Téqui, 1982).
and since 1054 the chief dogmatic point officially dividing 
East and West.86
The historical and theological problems surrounding 
the filioaue dispute are extremely complex and of such far- 
reaching consequences for Trinitarian theology that no more 
than a brief summary can be attempted here. What follows, 
therefore, is more an orientation to the contemporary 
ecumenical problem than a contribution to the debate, the 
goal being in large measure to discuss the filioaue in the 
light of contemporary Trinitarian theologies of the Holy 
Spirit rather than vice versa, and thus, so far as 
possible, to by-pass the filioaue dispute as the "main" way 
into the question of the Spirit in the Trinity. The problem 
of the filioaue as such will not be taken up again directly 
until Chapter V. In this section, therefore, I propose to 
deal first of all with ecumenical discussion of the 
filioaue over approximately the past century, and secondly 
to discuss briefly certain of the main theological 
"landmarks" of treatment of the filioaue doctrine in recent 
scholarship.
Modern ecumenical discussion of the filioaue clause 
began with the "Bonn Reunion Conferences" of 1874-1875, 
which involved representatives of various Churches, 
including Old Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox
87theologians. One of the important documents to emerge from 
these discussions was a series of theses concerning the
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86"Orthodox Church, The," in F. L. Cross and E. A. 
Livingstone, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church 
(2nd ed., revised; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 
p. 1013.
87Kurt Stadler, "The Filioque Clause in the Old 
Catholic Churches: The Chief Phases of Theological
Reflection and Church Pronouncements," in World Council of 
Churches, Commission on Faith and Order, Spirit of God, 
Spirit of Christ, ed. Lukas Vischer (Geneva: World Council 
of Churches and London: SPCK, 1981), p. 97.
filiocrue by the Russian Orthodox theologian B. Bolotov.88 
Bolotov's most significant arguments are that both the 
Orthodox (Photian) view that the Spirit proceeds "from the 
Father alone" and the Western formula "from the Father and 
the Son" are properly theoloaoumena: that the doctrine that 
the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son is 
likewise a theoloqoumenon. but of greater authority than 
the Western filioaue because of its antiquity and because 
it reflects more accurately the inner-trinitarian taxis 
whereby the Spirit is the third and the Son the second 
person of the Trinity; and that because the Eastern and 
Western Churches lived in communion down to 1054, long 
after the filioquist understanding of the Trinity had 
become normative in the West, and long after even Photius' 
attack on the filioaue in the East, the filiocrue neither 
caused the schism of 1054, nor should it be considered an 
impediment, as a theological opinion, to the reunion of the 
Churches (Bolotov refers only to Orthodox and Old Catholics 
in this context). Bolotov's theses have since been of 
considerable importance in the internal debate concerning 
the filiocrue in the Russian Orthodox Church in particular, 
with, for example, Vladimir Lossky's harsh rejection of
89Bolotov's position and Paul Evdokimov's acceptance of the
^Originally published anonymously as "Thesen über das 
Filioque (von einen russischen Theologen)," in Revue 
internationale de Théologie, 7, No. 24 (1898), 681-712; 
more recently reprinted, in French translation, B. Bolotov, 
"Thèses sur le «Filioque»," Istina, 17 (1972), 261-289 (to 
which I have referred) ; the text of the most significant 
theses is also available in Congar, I Believe in the Holy 
Spirit. III, pp. 194-195.
89Vladimir Lossky, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit 
in the Orthodox Triadology," trans. Edward Every, The 
Eastern Churches Quarterly, 7, Supplementary Issue 2 
(1948), 31-53.
theses as an important ecumenical and theological starting- 
point90 serving as the representative poles of the debate.91
In the Report produced by the Bonn Conference, 
however, another tentative series of theses concerning the 
filioque appeared, which contain the seed of much later 
ecumenical discussions.92 These included the acknowledgement 
that the addition of the f ilioaue to the text of the 
Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed in the West was made in an 
illegitimate way, and a rejection of the idea that there 
are "two principles" in the Trinity, serving as the eternal 
origin of the Spirit. A range of further affirmations, 
drawn from the theology of John Damascene, was attached to 
these, largely to support the first point and to stress 
also at the same time that though the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from the Father as the source of the Godhead, it is 
nevertheless necessary to speak of the Spirit as eternally 
the Spirit of the Son. In particular, attention is drawn to 
John Damascene's contention that the Spirit proceeds not 
from the Son, according to the f ilioaue paradigm, but 
rather from the Father through the Son, or per Filium. It 
is thus that the Spirit is the image of the Son, just as 
also the Son is the image of the Father.
Of more ecumenical and theological significance is the 
attention given to the problem of the filioaue in the work 
of the World Council of Churches, in particular in the 
context of the increasing encounter in the past three 
decades between the Eastern and Western Churches in the 
Faith and Order movement. Berkhof looked forward to the 
fruit of this discussion in 1965 in The Doctrine of the
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90Paul Evdokimov, L'Esprit Saint dans la tradition 
orthodoxe (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1969), pp. 74-75.
91So Congar, o p . cit. , pp. 193-194.
92Report of the Reunion Conference at Bonn, 10-16 
August 1875, cited by Stadler, o p . cit., pp. 98-99.
Holy Spirit,95 while today the important 1981 Faith and 
Order Paper Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ, is the direct 
product of this ecumenical dialogue.94 Genuine theological 
dialogue between the Churches cannot take place as long as 
the different and differing theologies remain contentedly 
self-enclosed, and the encounter at the ecumenical level 
has naturally lent a certain urgency to the theological 
problem. Spirit of God. Spirit of Christ is, in keeping 
with this, at once a new confrontation of filioquist 
Pneumatology with non-filioquist Pneumatology, and an 
attempt to show how and where attempts have been made or 
might be made to mediate between the two positions.95
The Faith and Order consultations of 1978 to 1979 
which were the basis for Spirit of God. Spirit of Christ, 
produced an important memorandum for the Churches on the 
filioaue dispute, "The Filioque Clause in Ecumenical 
Perspective."96 This document recommends that the Churches 
today return to the original wording of the Nicene- 
Constantinopolitan Creed, omitting the filioaue as a later 
theological interpretation.97 The report goes beyond this, 
however, to argue that the problem of the relation between
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95Berkhof, o p . cit. . p. 12.
94Commission on Faith and Order, Spirit of God, Spirit 
of Christ, pp. v-vi.
95See, e.g., the contributions to Spirit of God. Spirit 
of Christ by André de Halleux, "Towards an Ecumenical 
Agreement on the Procession of the Holy Spirit and the 
Addition of the Filioque to the Creed," pp. 69-84; Herwig 
Aldenhoven, "The Question of the Procession of the Holy 
Spirit and its Connection with the Life of the Church," pp.
121-132; Boris Bobrinskoy, "The Filioque Yesterday and 
Today," pp. 133-148; and Dumitru Staniloae, "The Procession 
of the Holy Spirit from the Father and His Relation to the 
Son, as the Basis of our Deification and Adoption," pp. 
174-186.
96Commission on Faith and Order, "The Filioque Clause 
in Ecumenical Perspective," ibid.. pp. 3-18.
97Ibid. . § VI.
the Son and the Spirit, which the filioaue can be taken to 
address, requires a new theological treatment, and 
recommends that this task be taken up by the Churches.98
The argument of the report is based primarily on the 
fact that the New Testament presents Jesus as both 
Spirit-filled and Spirit-giving, and that the fundamental 
reciprocity which is thus given in the New Testament 
requires dogmatic explication. It argues that this 
reciprocity is fully expressed neither in the filioaue 
doctrine nor in the Eastern (Photian) doctrine that the
, 99Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. A new treatment of 
the question, which amounts to a new thrust forward in 
Pneumatology and Trinitarian doctrine from an ecumenical 
perspective, is therefore recommended.
The second main point made by the report is that such 
a new and constructive approach to the problem will only be 
possible to the extent that theology acknowledges both that 
its references to the Trinity are doxological rather than 
definitive, and that the living God who is encountered in 
historical revelation as the "economic Trinity" is not 
something other in his own being from eternity to eternity 
as the "immanent Trinity. "10° Thus the communion of the 
Church with and within the Trinity in the mystery of 
salvation and the doctrine of the Trinity in itself cannot 
be separated (although a logical, formal distinction is 
possible) .101
The memorandum, "The Filioque Clause in Ecumenical 
Perspective," appears to offer different grounds for 
ecumenical consensus in Pneumatology than the later Faith 
and Order report, Confessing One Faith. It upholds the
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reciprocity of Son and Spirit both in the history of Jesus 
Christ, in the Church, and in the Trinity to be of 
fundamental importance, and thus, in intention at least, 
makes room for both sides in the debate.102 At the same time, 
like Confessing One Faith, it does not allow that the 
person and work of the Spirit can be separated from the 
person and work of Christ, this time, however, because of 
the reciprocity between them. Just as the Spirit is not to 
be subordinated to Christ, so Christ is not to be 
subordinated to the Spirit; just as the Spirit is 
inseparable from Christ, so Christ is inseparable from the 
Spirit.103
The vision of the report, finally, is that a new 
ecumenical formula for the procession of the Spirit is both 
required and possible. Its provisional preference is for a 
formula reflecting the view that the Spirit proceeds from 
the Father of the Son, and not from the Father conceived in 
abstract isolation.10A The report also addresses the question 
whether the generation of the Son logically precedes the 
spiration of the Spirit (the preference of Western 
theology) or takes place eternally in logical simultaneity 
with spiration (the preference of Eastern theology).105 It 
does not, however, offer an answer to this question. What 
it does do, finally, is to offer for the consideration of 
the Churches a number of older, established formulae:
- the Spirit proceeds from the Father 
of the Son; - the Spirit proceeds from 
the Father through the Son; - the 
Spirit proceeds from the Father and 
receives from the Son; - the Spirit 
proceeds from the Father and rests on
102Ibid. . § III, B.
103Ibid.
10AIbid. . § IV, B, 2.
1Q5Ibid. . § IV, B, 2, d.
41
the Son; - the Spirit proceeds from the 
Father and shines out through the 
Son.106
Without further elaboration, however, none of these are
either capable of reflecting the reciprocity of the Son and
Spirit which the memorandum earlier seeks to establish, or
likely to serve as the point of convergence for the
Churches. A more thoroughgoing penetration of the third
article, in the context of the doctrines of the Trinity
and God, on the one hand, and of salvation and the Church
on the other, would still appear to be required.
The efforts of individual theologians in this area has
also been extremely important for the ecumenical
enterprise, and a brief survey of this material is also
necessary. This work has led to an important clarification
of the positions of the separate theological traditions,
particularly on the part of the East.107 One of the key
works here is Vladimir Lossky's, The Mystical Theology of
the Eastern Church, which is an attempt to re-state for
Western ears what is distinctive about the spirituality,
ecclesial life, and Trinitarian doctrine of the Eastern 
108Church. For Lossky, the difference between Eastern and 
Western ecclesiology has its root in the disputed Western 
filioaue doctrine: as we have seen, Eastern theology
unambiguously understands the procession of the Holy Spirit
109 •to be from the Father alone. The implication of this is 
that Eastern theology, in contrast to Western theology, can
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Eastern Orthodoxy, trans. Lydia W. Kesich (London: Harvill 
Press, 1963) , p. v, writes: "Without exaggeration the
twentieth century may be called the century of the 
discovery of the Christian East by the Christian West."
108Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern 
Church, trans. Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius 
(Cambridge: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1957).
109Ibid. . pp. 44-66, 169-170.
abstract the work of the Spirit and the Spirit himself from 
the work of the Son and the Son himself. The result is that 
the East, for Lossky, avoids the Western error of drawing 
Pneumatology into Christology, and further that Eastern 
ecclesiology is more firmly rooted in both Christology and 
Pneumatology than is Western ecclesiology.
Lossky makes an important distinction in his 
discussion between two gifts of the Spirit in the New 
Testament.110 The first is ecclesial, and referred to Jn. 
20: 19-23, and the second is personal, and referred to the 
Pentecost account in Acts 2. According to Lossky, it is 
precisely the hypostatic independence of the Holy Spirit 
from the Son which makes this personal gift of the Spirit, 
and therefore Pentecost itself, possible. The ecclesial 
gift of the Spirit to the Church is Christocentric in 
character. The personal gift of the Holy Spirit, however, 
manifests in the individual not just Christ but the common 
divinity of the three Persons. The Spirit is here 
abstracted from Christ as such, and serves the function of 
enabling, by grace, the human participation in the divine 
nature (2 Peter 1: 4) which is central to the Eastern
understanding of the economy of salvation.111 This 
distinction, in turn, is the basis of the separation of 
baptism and chrism in the Eastern rite; in the first, the 
Spirit incorporates us into Christ and the Church, whereas 
the second is a sign of our lifelong deification by the 
Spirit according to the divine energies.112
Lossky's argument is therefore that the Church in 
Eastern theology is rooted in both Christology and 
Pneumatology. In its Christological aspect, the Church 
enters into union with God in the hypostasis of the Son,
43
110Ibid. ■ pp. 167-170.
111Ibid. . pp. 69-87.
112Ibid., p . 17 0.
through union with him in his humanity.113 This is effected 
by the Spirit in baptism and maintained by the Spirit's 
presence in the Church. This side of the Church has a 
certain objectivity in that here the grace of Christ is 
mediated through the sacramental life of the Church, by the 
power of the Spirit.114 In its Pneumatological aspect, 
however, the Church is more dynamic in character, for here 
separate individuals are in question in their union with 
God through the personal gift of the Holy Spirit and 
through their consequent mystical return to God.115 Here the 
Holy Spirit does not mediate the incarnate Son to the 
Church, but rather the individual appears as the throne of 
the whole Trinity in its divinizing energies.
Lossky summarizes his view of the relation between 
East and West in one astonishing passage which it would be 
worthwhile to quote in full:
The cult of the humanity of Christ is 
foreign to Eastern tradition; or, 
rather, this deified humanity always 
assumes for the Orthodox Christian that 
same glorious form under which it 
appeared to the disciples on Mount 
Tabor: the humanity of the Son,
manifesting forth that deity which is 
common to the Father and the Spirit. 
The way of the imitation of Christ is 
never practiced in the spiritual life 
of the Eastern Church. ... For Eastern 
spirituality the only way which makes 
us conformable to Christ is that of the 
acquisition of the grace which the Holy 
Spirit confers. No saint of the Eastern 
Church has ever born the stigmata.. . . 
But, by contrast, Eastern saints have 
very frequently been transfigured by 
the inward light of uncreated grace, 
and have appeared resplendent, like
113Ibid. . pp. 181-182.
114Ibid. . pp. 181-187.
115Ibid. . pp. 186-195.
Christ on the mount of Transfigu­
ration. 116
Lossky's claim here is that Eastern spirituality is 
primarily Pneumatocentric and that since Pneumatology is 
liberated in the East from Christology, Eastern 
spirituality can be abstracted from the humanity of Jesus 
as Son. Instead, we share in the glorification of humanity 
by virtue of the gift of the Spirit, and thus, by the gift 
of the Spirit rather than by incorporation into Christ, 
become like Christ in his transfiguration, deified by the 
divine Spirit.
It must be said that Lossky's argument, and especially 
his distinction between the two gifts of the Spirit in the 
New Testament, the ecclesial and the personal, is 
constructed on doubtful exegetical foundations. The even 
more obvious objection to Lossky's position, however, is 
that theology and spirituality can only by-pass the 
humanity of Jesus at their peril. As we have seen from our 
previous survey of recent Pauline scholarship on the 
Spirit, the cross is the central Pauline canon of authentic 
experience of the Spirit: Jesus' life of lowly service,
obedience, and self-sacrificial love which leads to his 
death serves as the measure of authentic human existence 
under God. It would have to be asked of Lossky whether or 
not the New Testament picture of Jesus is not, for him, too 
human. Paul's scathing attack on the Corinthian 
"super-apostles" (2 Cor. 10-13) might be called to mind at 
this point, whom Paul charged precisely with leaving aside 
the cross of Christ.117 It was, for Paul, his own life of 
suffering obedience which validated his claim to be a true 
apostle. Paul's theology and spirituality in 2 Cor. 10-13
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116Ibid. . p. 243.
117C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the Second Epistle to 
the Corinthians (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973) , pp. 
36-50, 243ff.
thus appears as a theologia crucis. but for this theology 
and spirituality Lossky apparently has little or no room.118
It is true at the same time, however, that a theology 
of the cross without a theology of glory is itself too 
limited and that it itself by-passes the definite note of 
glory which is sounded in the New Testament, including the 
Pauline corpus. Lossky's position is therefore also 
something of a corrective to the strangely enthusiastic 
emphasis on suffering which characterizes some Western 
theology. Clearly also, Lossky1s confrontation of the 
Western Church with the vision of the relation between the 
Spirit and the Son in the life of the Eastern Church is a 
challenge to Western theology and ecclesial life, and 
provides in itself an ecumenical critique of Western 
patterns of thought in these areas.
Yves Congar addresses Lossky's argument and this 
general question in I Believe in the Holy Spirit, where he 
argues that the effective difference between the Eastern 
and the Western Churches is in fact minimal, and dismisses 
Lossky's thesis about the filiocrue as exaggerated.119 In 
both the East and the West, he argues, there is an attempt 
made to complement Christology with Pneumatology and 
Pneumatology with Christology. Congar argues through a 
careful analysis of the Eucharistic theologies and rites of 
the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic traditions, for 
example, that the mediation of grace through the sacraments 
has a Christological and a Pneumatological basis in both 
communions.120 Nevertheless, as Congar concedes, Western 
Eucharistic theology since Augustine has been characterized
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l18Lossky ' s insistence that the East knows no 
spirituality of the imitation of Christ can also be 
questioned on the grounds that it is contradicted at least 
by the existence of the "holy fools" of Russian Orthodoxy.
119Congar, o p . cit. , III, pp. 208-212.
12QIbid. . pp. 228-274.
by the central role of the words of institution, the 
verbum, whereas Eastern theology places its accent upon the 
epiclesis.
The question raised by this debate is extremely
complex and raises a number of important questions. It can
be asked, for example, whether or not the mediation by the
Spirit of the saving humanity of Christ to the Church has
its basis in the Spirit's relation to the human or to the
divine nature of Christ, or to both. It can further be
asked whether or not the history of the human Jesus in his
relation to the Spirit through his birth, baptism,
ministry, death, resurrection, and exaltation has any
bearing on this question. Congar, for one, holds that it
does: in keeping with his suggestions for a Pneumatological
Christology and his overall ecumenical intention, Congar
suggests that the Christ we receive (in the Eucharist) is
the "pneumatized Christ," the Christ who received the
Spirit and who returned to the Father in the power of the
121Spirit to become, as man, the Son of God. We shall return 
to this position again later in this study.
Congar also attempts to mediate directly between the 
Eastern and Western theological traditions in his 
discussion of the problem of the filioaue. Congar argues 
that the Eastern and Western views are best seen as 
complementary rather than as contradictory, and that the 
way into the future lies in recognizing that the formulae 
dia tou huiou and filioaue amount to much the same thing 
within the competing Trinitarian theologies of East and 
West.122 As we have seen, there are internal disputes within 
the Eastern Church over the dia tou huiou formula, and 
Congar does not ignore this problem. At issue here is the 
question of the Eastern differentiation of the divine ousia 
from the divine eneraeia; Lossky, for example, makes this
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point with particular force in his discussion of the 
f ilioque controversy.123 Lossky argues, against Bolotov, 
that the Eastern doctrine of the procession of the Spirit 
is unambiguously from the Father alone, while agreeing at 
the same time with Bolotov's view124 that the expression dia 
tou huiou as used of the Holy Spirit in Eastern patristic 
texts cannot be understood simply to refer to the Spirit's 
temporal mission. Lossky reconciles these views 
systematically by appealing to the Eastern distinction 
between the essence and eternal energies of the Trinity; 
Bolotov, as we have seen, had argued more simply that the 
dia tou huiou is an Eastern theologoumenon. For Lossky, the 
dia tou huiou refers to more than the temporal 
manifestation of the Trinity, but to something other than 
the divine essence. On the latter level, since the three 
persons, as consubstantial, are in a sense the divine 
essence,125 the "personal" procession of the Spirit is from 
the Father alone; on the former level, however, the Spirit 
is eternally manifested in his "energetic" procession as 
from the Father, through the Son (dia tou huiou) ,126
Congar does not think that it is possible for the 
Eastern and Western positions to converge entirely on this 
point.127 Congar argues, however, that since in the Eastern
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123Lossky, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit," pp. 46-
52.
124Bolotov, o p . cit. . thesis 3.
125Lossky, o p . cit. , p. 40.
126Ibid. . pp. 48-49.
127Congar, o p . cit. . Ill, p. 201: "What we have to aim 
at and what can, in fact, be reached is a recognition both 
of the unity of faith on both sides of Catholicity and of 
the legitimate difference between the two dogmatic 
expressions of this mystery. Each expression is consistent 
in itself, and each is impossible in the categories and
vocabulary of the other side. In the course of ten
centuries of discussion, neither side has succeeded in 
convincing the other or in persuading it to accept its
doctrine of the divine energies, we are dealing, not with 
a created effect, but rather with God, both East and West 
do relate the Spirit to the Son in the immanent Trinity, in 
an analogous way within the different terms of the two 
overall Trinitarian positions.128 The particular problem, as 
he sees it, is that the Latin understanding of the Trinity 
is less differentiated than the Eastern, and so the 
theology of divine ousia and eneraeia is foreign to the 
West, and often misunderstood. In addition, the East 
differentiates between the ekooreusis and prolenai of the 
Spirit, corresponding to the incommunicable hypostatic 
existence of the Spirit and the Spirit's perichoretic 
existence in the eternal divine energeia with the Father 
and the Spirit; whereas the West speaks only of the 
procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, the 
East speaks of an ekooreusis from the Father alone, and a
129orolenai from the Father and the Son. It is possible, 
particularly in view of the difficulties which, as we shall 
see, emerge in contemporary Trinitarian theology regarding 
the being of God in itself in relation to the economy, and 
the sheer diversity of the economic material with which we 
have to deal, that a more differentiated theology of God in 
himself in the West is in fact required.
Congar's general recognition that Eastern and Western 
Pneumatology must be understood in the context of the 
divergent characteristic Trinitarian emphases of the 
respective Churches, rather than in isolation, is an 
important insight. The view that within these divergent 
wider Trinitarian theologies, the two formulae, whether 
"theoloaoumena" or no, serve to tie the Spirit to the Son
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point of view. There is no chance that this goal will be 
reached in the future. In fact, we may say quite 
unambiguously that this is not a goal to be pursued."
128Ibid. , p . 213.
129Ibid. . pp. 199-201.
both in the economy and in the Trinity itself, must also be 
seen as an opportunity for further ecumenical reflection.
In keeping with this, Congar argues for intelligent 
recourse to the Council of Florence, for although the 
outcome of the Council was unnecessarily one-sided, the 
proceedings of the Council show that its debate was perhaps 
the most open and important between East and West on this 
subject in theological history, and that considerable 
theological common ground emerged between the two sides.130 
This common ground was, Congar argues, that the ex Filio 
and the dia tou huiou are equivalent within the broader 
competing theologies, so long as the Western position is 
understood in the light of the tanauam ab uno principio 
qualification.131 The monarchy of the Father is thus 
preserved, there is only one principle or arche of the 
Spirit in the Godhead, and the Son is nevertheless truly 
and completely involved in the Spirit's procession. Congar 
is, however, almost alone in arguing that the Council of 
Florence can have any role to play in discussion of the 
filioaue in the contemporary ecumenical context, since
132Florence is universally renounced by the Eastern Church.
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130Ibid. . pp. 184-191, 214.
131Cf. also Alasdair Heron, "’Who Proceedeth from the 
Father and the Son': the Problem of the Filioque," Scottish 
Journal of Theology. 24 (1971), 149-166.
132Schmemann, e.g., o p . cit. , p. 254, writes: 'The
celebration by Catholics in 1939 of the jubilee of the 
union in Florence is evidence of profound misunderstanding 
of the real ecclesiastical conception of the Orthodox 
Church. Pope Eugene IV showed greater penetration at the 
time when he asked, on being joyfully informed by his 
bishops that all the Greeks had signed the union, "Did Mark 
of Ephesus sign, too?" Receiving an answer in the negative, 
he is traditionally supposed to have said, "Well, that 
means we have achieved nothing." In fact, all signed except 
one, but that one, St. Mark of Ephesus, became the 
expression of faith, experience, and tradition for the 
Eastern Church. When the Greeks returned to Byzantium, they 
immediately repudiated ... the union that had been forced 
upon them.1
From the Eastern side, Dumitru Staniloae makes a 
further important attempt to develop the potential 
significance for the filioaue controversy of the 
distinction between the essence and energies of God in 
Eastern Trinitarian theology.133 Staniloae constructs his 
thesis in explicit connection with the Western objection to 
this feature of Eastern Trinitarian theology. The danger 
here, for the West, is one of introducing a rift between 
God in himself and God in his revelation - a rift which 
easily slips over into what is, from the Western point of 
view, a soteriologically suspect, quasi-docetic view of the 
economy of salvation. Staniloae's argument is that this 
accusation is quite false: "In the East the trinitarian
relations are seen as the basis for the relation of the 
Trinity to creation and for the salvation of creation."134
In effect, Staniloae reverses the accusation, arguing 
that it is Western (i.e., Roman Catholic) theology which 
keeps God at a distance by speaking of "created grace" 
rather than of the uncreated energies as the basis for 
human life in fellowship with God in Christ.135 He develops 
his argument by appealing to the Eastern Pneumatological 
tradition which speaks of the Son as the resting-place of 
the Spirit, and of the Son as the eternal "Treasurer" of 
the "Treasure" of the Spirit (Gregory Nazianzen) .136 The 
Byzantine theologians of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, and especially Gregory Palamas and Gregory of 
Cyprus, developed this theology through their doctrine of 
the eternal divine energies to make it clear that there 
does exist an eternal, theologically definite relationship
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133Staniloae, o p . cit. . pp. 178-184. 
134Ibid. . p. 178.
135Ibid. . pp. 178-179.
136Ibid. . p. 179.
between the Son and the Holy Spirit which, although not one 
of procession, is the basis for the temporal economy.
Thus Eastern theology, according to Staniloae, insists 
both that the Father is the principle of the Godhead, but 
at the same time that the Son and Spirit are eternally 
related as Treasurer and Treasure.137 Staniloae is 
particularly concerned to draw attention to the 
implications of this for the work of salvation:
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In this perspective, the sending of the 
Spirit by the Son to men ... signifies 
that the Spirit rests in those who have 
been united with the Son, since he 
rests in the Son. The Spirit does not 
go beyond the Son, even when we say 
improperly that he is sent to men. The 
Son is the only and ultimate 
resting-place of the Spirit. The Spirit 
dwells in us insofar as we are raised 
up in the Son. This safeguards us from 
a theological rationalism on the one 
side and a purely sentimental 
enthusiasm on the other.138
At the level of Trinitarian formulae, Staniloae argues, 
language about the Spirit as hypostatically "proceeding" 
from the Father and "going out from," "shining out from," 
or being "manifested by" the Son according to the divine 
energies could thus form the basis of a reconciliation of 
the West with the East, since it clearly makes the Spirit 
the Spirit of the Son, both eternally and in the economy, 
while at the same time preserving the monarchy of the 
Father. Staniloae's argument that the boldness of Byzantine 
theology in this respect has not been taken with full 
seriousness in the West (and, it might be added, in the 
East) is an important argument which adds another dimension
157Ibid. . p. 184.
138Ibid. . p. 179.
to the claim of Congar that both East and West attempt to 
express the same mystery in different ways.
Neither Eastern nor Western theology, however, have 
traditionally advocated the idea of reciprocity between the 
Son and the Spirit in the economy of salvation and in the 
immanent Trinity which the Faith and Order memorandum "The 
Filioque Clause in Ecumenical Perspective" supports. As we 
shall see, contemporary Trinitarian theologies of the Holy 
Spirit have not generally attempted to develop this idea 
either. In this sense, the recommendation of Faith and 
Order, if it were to be developed, would demand a radical 
reassessment of Trinitarian Pneumatology. In view of the 
witness of the New Testament, however, along with the 
contemporary problems of ecclesiology, the theological 
recommendations of the Faith and Order movement, and the 
principle that the economic Trinity is the immanent 
Trinity, and vice versa, such a procedure may well be 
precisely what is required. In Chapter V, we will return to 
consider this possibility. We turn first, however, to the 
question of the unity of the economic with the immanent 
Trinity.
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THE ECONOMIC AND THE IMMANENT TRINITY
II
In the Introduction, I noted the fact that the 
doctrine of the Trinity in the theological tradition is in 
character and content a doctrine primarily of the immanent 
Trinity. Positive knowledge is traditionally claimed of the 
Trinity sub specie aeternitatis. in the sense that this 
knowledge, though derived from revelation, is asserted of 
the Trinity in itself from all eternity, in abstraction 
from the question of its economic outreach to the world. As 
it relates specifically to the Holy Spirit, the traditional 
doctrine can thus be summarized in terms of the three 
related ideas of the homoousion. procession, and the 
disputed flliocrue. The older doctrine in this respect 
contrasts sharply with contemporary Trinitarian theology, 
which is characterized by an attempt to orientate the 
doctrine more directly to the economy of salvation, and 
which yields what I have called a doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity sub specie temooris.
Two related themes underlie the contemporary approach. 
First of all, it presupposes the soteriological thesis that 
unless God truly has given himself in his revelation, the 
economy is left with no adequate theological basis, and so 
can no longer be regarded as unquestionably the "economy 
of salvation." This theme has been taken over directly from 
the theological tradition into contemporary Trinitarian 
theology, although it is interpreted more radically in the 
latter than in the former. Secondly, there is a related, 
more clearly modern argument which develops the doctrine of 
the Trinity in conjunction with a philosophical critique of
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the idea of the immutable, atemporal, and impassible God.1 
This ultimately opens the way to a doctrine of Trinitarian 
temporality and suffering, taking the divine outreach to 
the finite world through Christ and in the Spirit to be 
essential to the Trinity in itself.
The contemporary Trinitarian thesis that the economic 
Trinity is the immanent Trinity, in fact, has deep roots 
in the overall movement of thought in the modern era. This 
is an important point, for it could be argued, as indeed it 
has been argued, for example by Emil Brunner, that the 
contemporary thesis concerning the economic Trinity, and 
the co-ordinate rejection of much traditional talk about 
the immanent Trinity, represents a pure return to 
revelation.2 In part, of course, this is true. However, in 
a more fundamental sense the contemporary position is also 
conditioned by the thought-forms of nineteenth and 
twentieth century philosophy and theology. Rather than 
constituting a return to a pure reliance on the data of 
revelation and a rejection of the categories of philosophy, 
therefore, contemporary Trinitarian theology can be seen to 
be broadly related to the development of modern philosophy 
and to be, in particular, part of the wider intellectual 
reaction to the Western tradition which is, one might say, 
constitutive of contemporary thought.3 While, therefore, the 
contemporary Trinitarian standpoint is characterized by the 
turn to the economy of salvation, and thus by its treatment 
of the doctrine of the Trinity as "a mystery of salvation, "A 
what is involved here is not simply a return to revelation;
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Pannenberg, loc. cit.
2Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. 
Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949), pp. 137ff.
3See, e.g., Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the. 
World. trans. Darrell L. Guder (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
Ltd., 1983), pp. 14Iff.
ARahner, o p . cit., p. 21.
rather, contemporary Trinitarian theology is rooted also in 
the broader problems of modern philosophy.
In this Chapter, I propose to provide a critical 
account of the idea of the unity of the economic and the 
immanent Trinity which is thus asserted in recent theology. 
Since, however, the distinction between the two which 
emerges in the theological tradition is the presupposition 
of this assertion of unity, we begin with an account of the 
development of the distinction in patristic theology. We 
then move on to discuss the main arguments which support 
the idea of the unity of the economic with the immanent 
Trinity in contemporary theology. This will serve as a 
critical introduction and orientation to the treatment of 
the various specific Trinitarian theologies of the Holy 
Spirit with which we shall be concerned in Chapter III.
1. Patristic Background
The technical theological distinction between the 
"economic" and "immanent" Trinity derives chiefly from 
modern historical scholarship, and the attempt to 
differentiate between the different types of Trinitarian 
speculation characteristic of the pre-Nicene and post- 
Nicene eras.5 The Fathers themselves do not, in other words, 
draw the distinction at the level of Trinitarian theology 
as neatly as we do. At the same time, however, the 
distinction between God as experienced in the economy and 
God in himself is implicit in Christian theology from a 
very early stage. The term "economy," for example, has a 
long history in Christian theology which can be traced as
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5AdoIf Harnack, for example, summed up the development 
of the doctrine of the Trinity in the patristic era in his 
History of Dogma, trans. James Millar (London: Williams & 
Norgate, 1897), III, p. 8, as "the history of the 
substitution of the immanent and absolute trinity for the 
economic and relative," and judged the result to be, from 
the standpoint of modern consciousness, a piece of 
"complicated and artificial speculation."
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far back as Ephesians 3: 9 in the New Testament, which
refers to the "oikonomia" of the mystery hidden in God for 
ages but now made known in Jesus Christ and preached by 
Paul.6 Although there is a variety of usage in the New
6The precise meaning of the term in the context of 
Ephesians is disputed, as a variety of meanings for 
oikonomia in the New Testament can be adduced: for example, 
the management of a household, as in Lk. 16: 2, and as a 
metaphor for the apostolic office, as in 1 Cor. 9: 17. In 
Ephesians, however, it seems probable that already, the 
"economy" refers in some sense to a temporal realization of 
the eternal plan or purpose of God. Markus Barth, however, 
in his Ephesians 1-3 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 342-343, 86-88, has taken
exception to this position, arguing that on lexical and 
theological grounds, such an interpretation must be 
excluded from the thought of Ephesians, and the idea of the 
"administration" of God's grace by the Apostle alone 
accepted. Barth adduces five arguments in support of his 
position. First, the textual parallel in Ephesians 1: 10
(which is where Barth's main comment on oikonomia in
Ephesians is located) speaks of an uncompleted performance 
rather than of an eternal blueprint; the latter would 
require the reading "according to the oikonomia." which is 
not supported in the manuscript tradition. Second, no
indication is ever given in Ephesians of the idea of a 
revelation of the oikonomia. Third, there is no evidence 
from the Septuagint or from anywhere in the Pauline corpus 
that any meaning other than "administration" could have 
served as the precedent for the use of the idea of
oikonomia in the deutero-Pauline Ephesians. Fourth, the 
parallel in Col. 1: 25 clearly requires the translation
"administration" rather than plan. Fifth, oikonomia as a 
temporal realization of God's eternal purpose tends to rob 
Christ of his active, personal agency in the Christology of 
Ephesians, and to reduce it to the carrying out of an 
impersonal plan. Barth's five points, however, fail to
address the proper question, for what is in dispute is not 
whether or not oikonomia refers to such an "impersonal
plan," but rather whether or not it refers to a divine 
"dispensation" in time. The latter is the sense of 
oikonomia in the Ephesians passage, and actually includes 
the sense accepted by Barth (the "administration" of God's
grace by the Apostle). But that the oikonomia referred to
should not be primarily Christological is inconceivable in 
view of the Christological and predestinarian themes of 
Ephesians 1. Barth's arguments, therefore, are not 
conclusive; even if he is correct in his thesis that the 
word "economy" itself cannot be taken here to refer 
specifically or technically to a projection into time of 
the eternal plan of God, it still must be admitted that
Testament and in the patristic tradition,7 the word 
"economy" was associated in Christian theology from a very 
early stage with God as revealed and experienced in 
salvation history, and specifically in the sending of his 
Son and the giving of the Holy Spirit. This specific use of 
the word reflects a concern even within the New Testament 
itself to distinguish the divine "dispensation of grace" in 
its concrete historical manifestation from the God who acts 
out of grace in this history.
The concept of the "economic Trinity," and of 
"economic Trinitarianism," can be understood as a basic 
extension of this usage in Christian theology to connote 
the fact that this concrete manifestation of grace in the 
economy is broadly triadic in character, involving the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The evolution of this 
economic Trinitarianism in the history of early Christian 
theology has been treated by a number of historians of 
doctrine, and is a complex subject, so that no more than a 
brief treatment of this development can be expected here.8
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just such a projection into time of the plan of God is 
presupposed throughout Ephesians, not least in its 
Christological and predestinarían themes. Although the word 
refers in secular and New Testament usage to 
"administration," it has also other New Testament 
connotations and cannot be taken in its context in 
Ephesians to exclude the idea of "God's plan of salvation 
which He has undertaken to execute in the fullness of 
times," and which is currently being fulfilled (Otto 
Michel, "OIKONOMIA," in Friedrich, o p . cit. ■ V, pp. 151- 
153) .
7"OIKONOMIA, " in G. W. H. Lampe, ed., A Patristic Greek 
Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 940-943; and 
W. Gass, "Das patristische Wort OIKONOMIA," Zeitschrift für 
Wissenschaftliche Theologie, 17 (1874), 465-504.
8Cf., e.g., G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, 
2nd ed. (London: S.P.C.K., 1952), pp. 57ff., 62f., 98-102; 
J. N. D. Kelly, Earlv Christian Doctrines, 5th ed. (London: 
Adam & Charles Black, 1977), pp. 83-108; and R. A. Markus, 
"Trinitarian Theology and the Economy," Journal of 
Theological Studies. 9 (1958), 89-102.
As, however, J. N. D. Kelly argues in Earlv Christian 
Doctrines, early economic Trinitarianism developed largely 
out of the early Church's Christological reflection.9 (The 
word "Trinity" is generally used in this context, although 
the preponderance of discourse concerning the Father and 
the Son or the Word, and the relative absence of talk about 
the Spirit, suggests that a "Binity" is often what is 
effectively in view.10) While, for example, the Apologists 
and Irenaeus are able to distinguish between the Father who 
has his Word (and Spirit) and the Father who works by his 
Word (and Spirit) in the world, the accent in their 
theologies falls very much on the latter, while the former 
remains largely undeveloped.
This concern for the economic aspect of the divinity 
stems from both major hermeneutical schemes to which appeal 
was made. On the one hand, the primitive Palestinian 
Judaeo-Christian religious tradition by its very nature 
dealt with God in what we would call salvation-historical 
or economic categories. On the other hand, when the 
Hellenistic impulse led to the posing of metaphysical 
questions, there lay at the disposal of early Church 
theologians, as already for the Hellenistic Judaism of the 
book of Wisdom11 and the Hellenistic Jew Philo,12 the whole
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9Kelly, loc cit.
10Cf., however, R. S. Franks, The Doctrine of the 
Trinity (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1953) , pp. 
71-72: "The Apologists do little for Pneumatology. All
stand on the baptismal confession, and all regard the Holy 
Spirit as pre-existent. Athenagoras calls him an effluence 
from God (Lea.. 10), while Theophilus identifying the
Spirit with Wisdom, clearly distinguishes Him from the 
Logos (Ad. Autolvcum. , 1,7, 11,15): in 11.15 [sic] he
speaks of the Triad ... God, His Logos, and His Wisdom. 
This is the first definite theological mention of a 
Trinity."
11Wisdom 6:9 - 9:18.
12James P. Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as 
Trinity (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1983), pp. 116-118.
wealth of the philosophical and theological achievement of 
pagan antiquity. Middle Platonism in particular provided a 
key hermeneutical tool for early Christian speculative 
thought. From it, and perhaps in the light of the precedent 
set by the book of Wisdom and by Philo in relation to the 
earlier Hellenistic tradition, Christian theologians were 
able to derive the idea that God is one (or the One), that 
this God is utterly immutable and unknowable, and that 
insofar as human beings can approach the one God, it can 
only be by way of mediation through the divine logos.13 This 
logos. which was called a "second God" in Middle 
Platonism,14 was understood specifically to mediate between 
divine and worldly reality in the concrete metaphysical 
scheme of things* In contrast to the One, the second God 
was conceived to be polymorphous, changing in relation to 
the world.15 Given the axiomatic immutability and hiddenness 
of God, the logos of necessity was understood to belong to 
a lower level of reality in the divine being than the One; 
it was still divine, admittedly, but it was clearly 
subordinate. Logos in this tradition, as in certain of its 
early Christian adaptations, including those of the 
Apologists and Irenaeus, refers primarily to "that of God 
which in and through his creative and ruling powers is 
active in the world and makes sense of it to rational 
creatures. "16
Consistent with this, the binitarian and increasingly 
trinitarian schemes of Middle Platonism are to be 
understood in our terms as "economic" philosophical and 
theological systems. They are intended to make sense both
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13Ibid. . pp. 105-134.
14Ibid. , p. 115.
15Christopher Stead, Divine Substance (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 106-107.
16Mackey, o p . cit. . p. 119.
of the absoluteness of God on the one hand, and, on the
other, of the fact that there is a divine approach to the
world which is the basis of the world's return to God - the 
basis of the whole rational order of the cosmos and 
therefore the foundation of the rational spirituality of 
the characteristically Platonic world-view. While God is 
thus, in principle, recognized here to be the One 
immanently in himself, the accent falls very much on the 
economic aspect, since it is from the One, out of the 
intrinsic goodness of the One, that the whole of the
differentiated economic order, the "many," emanates.
The influence of the philosophical systems which
loosely comprise Middle Platonism (and later, of 
Neoplatonism) on pre-Nicene Christian theologians was 
undoubtedly profound. While the New Testament provided the 
language of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and while the 
overall Christian soteriological scheme and the baptismal 
formula in particular enshrined the idea of salvation as a 
Trinitarian reality, it was this philosophical outlook 
which provided them with a conceptuality enabling an 
intelligible articulation of the broadly triadic structure 
of God. At the same time, however, the philosophical 
conceptuality in question prevented them from understanding 
this internal structure of the Godhead in a strictly 
Trinitarian way, at least as it was later to be conceived. 
The Godhead, for the Apologists and Irenaeus, for example, 
is the Father, who has his Word and Wisdom, not as equals 
with himself in the fellowship of the divine life, but as 
subordinate levels of his own being which serve different 
functions in his economic approach to the world. It is one 
person who is in question and not three; in itself, the 
divine reality is fundamentally a self-sufficient monad 
(the One). Following the insights of Middle Platonism, the 
Apologists and Irenaeus primarily conceive of the Trinity 
economically, in terms of the approach of God to what is 
not himself in creation and redemption.
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At the same time, however, it would be fair to say 
that the basis for this economic Trinitarianism is a series 
of real distinctions in God himself, so that, to use the 
later category, the ground is already prepared in the 
Apologists and Irenaeus for a non-modalistic view of the 
Trinity. Justin Martyr, for instance, understands the Logos 
on the one hand as the Father's immanent intelligence, and 
on the other as generated by the Father in the beginning 
with a view to creation and redemption.17 Tatian, Justin’s 
disciple, made a more definite distinction between the 
Logos immanent in God before the creation and the Logos as 
the firstborn of all creation, generated from the Father as
1 ftthe mediator between him and the created order. In the 
background here lies the Stoic distinction between the
logos endiathetos and the logos proohorikos. which had 
already taken the relation between the human faculty of 
reason and its external expression in language over 
analogously into theology, and which was assumed by the 
Apologists.19 It is the Father's "expressed Word," however, 
with which we are concerned as creatures set historically 
in the economy of creation and salvation; the "immanent 
Word," as such, would appear to belong to the Father alone, 
prior to his economic outreach.
Irenaeus in particular lays a more explicit basis for
the distinction. Irenaeus' achievement was to consolidate
the theology of the Apologists and to improve upon it,
particularly by adopting a more strictly triadic
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17Justin Martyr, Dial. . 61, 1; cf. Kelly, op^ cit. ,
pp. 96-98.
18Tatian, Or^, 5, If.; 7, If.; cf. Kelly, op. cit., p.
98.
19The Stoic terms themselves were, according to Kelly, 
ibid.. p. 99, taken up and used explicitly in this way for 
the first time by Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autol., 2, 10; 
2 , 2 2 .
understanding of God in the economy.20 Irenaeus also 
actually employs the word "economy" in a technical way to 
distinguish God as he exists in his intrinsic being from 
God as he manifests himself in the ordered process of his 
self-disclosure.21 From one point of view, God is the 
Father, containing within himself eternally his Word and 
his Wisdom; from the economic point of view, in creation 
and redemption, God, as Kelly says, "extrapolates" or 
"manifests" these as the Son and the Spirit: hence
Irenaeus' vivid image of the Son and the Spirit as the two 
"hands" of God.22
The doctrine of the immanent Trinity, as it is called, 
which was later to emerge in Christian theology is 
certainly indebted to this tradition, but it arose more 
particularly out of the polemical struggle against Arianism 
in the fourth century, and its resolution at Nicea.23 The
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20Kelly, o p . cit. . pp. 104-108.
2iIrenaeus, Haer. .d.gp.̂ wc: cf. Kelly, o p . cit. . p. 104; 
and Markus, o p . cit.. pp. 92-97.
22Irenaeus, o p . cit.. 5,1,3; 5,5,1; 5,6,1; cf. Kelly, 
op. cit., pp. 104-105.
23In certain respects, however, this understanding was 
already achieved, in outline at least, in the work of 
Tertullian. In his Contra Praxeas. Tertullian develops the 
notion of a distinction between the "monarchy" and the 
"economy." The monarchy, he argues, is the oneness of God 
which is rooted in the oneness of God the Father; this 
monarchy, however, is in no way compromised by the
threefoldness of God in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. One
authority remains, because the Son and the Spirit exercise 
the one authority of the Father. So far, Tertullian's 
argument is thoroughly economic. However, Tertullian goes 
on to develop an important and unique understanding of the 
economy in this context. The economy, he argues, is not 
simply expressive of the data of revelation, and therefore 
of the divine approach to the world in Jesus Christ and in 
the gift of the Spirit; rather, the economy refers to the 
eternal relations of the Father, the Word, and the Spirit 
in the life of the Godhead. Tertullian still is unable to 
admit that the Word exists as the Son before the
Incarnation, but there is in his theology a developed idea
of an internal order of transmission within the divine
development of the Nicene doctrine of the homoousion in 
this respect marks a decisive shift in the development of 
the doctrine of the Trinity, in that a new emphasis on what 
God is in himself is now discernable, over against what he 
is in his economic outreach. As Pelikan notes, the 
distinction, via the homoousion. is clearly implicit in the 
Creed of Nicea itself:
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The Creed . . . followed its statement of 
the "divinity" [the homoousion and its 
attendant clauses] with one about 
"economy" (God in his plan of 
salvation) in the confession that "for 
the sake of us men and for the purpose 
of our salvation" Christ had come down, 
had become incarnate, had suffered and 
risen again on the third day, had 
ascended to the heavens, and would come 
again to judge the living and the 
dead.24
There can be little doubt, of course, that the 
immediate intention of the Nicene Fathers was to shield the 
economy of salvation itself from the implications of a 
deficient (Arian) Christological ontology. In so doing, 
however, they also effectively accepted the conclusion that 
a Christological ontology, by which the relation of the Son 
to the Father was dealt with in terms of the divine ousia. 
could not be avoided.25 This conclusion, and the homoousiite
life, by which the divine "substance" is communicated among 
the "persons," and not just an order of transmission 
indicative of the divine outreach to the world. Cf. 
Prestige, o p . cit.. pp. 98-106; Kelly, op. cit., pp. 110- 
115.
24Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), I, pp. 
228-229 .
25With the homoousion. the Arian controversy was thus 
resolved for the orthodox party, but only, as Mackey 
argues, o p . cit. . p. 169, at great cost to them as well. 
The homoousiite solution, first of all, jeopardized the 
previous Christian (and pagan) theological consensus which
solution to the problem which was defined at Nicea, 
transformed the subsequent character of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, rendering it in character and in content a
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allowed the Father, Son, and Spirit to be distinguished 
intelligibly on the basis of the order of transmission in 
the divine approach to the world. The emanationist 
tradition had been the common inheritance of both the Arian 
and the Orthodox parties, but its limitation was that 
theological discourse was effectively restricted to the 
divine outreach to the world. For that very reason, 
however, the danger of subordinationism was a constant 
feature of Christian appropriations of the emanationist 
tradition (ibid., pp. 123-172). Christian theologians had 
to reckon both with a doctrine of creation in which God is 
more obviously distinct from the universe, and, more 
importantly, with the independent persona of Jesus, the 
incarnate Word and Saviour. Even leaving aside the doctrine 
of creation, the philosophical system, framed as it was in 
terms of the outreach of the invisible God to the world in 
successively decreasing levels of divinity, thus threatened 
to translate in a Christian reinterpretation into a 
subordinationist theology. For the Greek philosopher, the 
emanation of the divine ousia led to no queries about 
subordinationism, since the whole systematic conception 
involved a divine emanation in which successively 
diminishing levels of the divine being reach out, as it 
were, beyond God in himself to the farthest edges of being 
in the material world. (On this question, cf., e.g., A. H. 
Armstrong, '"Emanation" in Plotinus,1 Mind. 46 (1937), 61- 
66; Philip Merlan, "Emanationism," in Paul Edwards et al.■ 
eds., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Collier
Macmillan Limited and New York: The Macmillan Company & The 
Free Press, 1967), II, pp. 473-474; and R. T. Wallis, Neo- 
Platonism (London: Duckworth, 1972), pp. 61-72.) All of
this ultimately forced its rejection. The problem therefore 
arose again how one is to distinguish the three. More 
importantly, however, as Mackey, loc. cit. . points out, the 
net result of the Arian controversy was that the doctrine 
of the Trinity became increasingly remote from the actual 
historical content of the economy of salvation. Mackey's 
judgement is therefore that as a result of the Arian 
controversy "the relationship of a 'pre-existent' Word (and 
Spirit) to the Father . . . displaced from the centre of 
Christian theology that relationship of Jesus (and his co­
heirs) to the Father with which the Christian Bible is 
concerned and which is revealed in the life and death of 
the same Jesus." One might wish to emend this statement 
slightly to take account of the fact that the 
"displacement" mentioned was already well under way before 
the advent of Arius, but the substance of Mackey's 
conclusion is nevertheless difficult to resist.
doctrine, admittedly not exclusively, but certainly 
primarily of the immanent Trinity. The further theological 
and philosophical presuppositions of this shift in 
perspective, particularly as they relate to the problem of 
intelligent access to the immanent Trinity, remain to be 
considered.
In fact, the historical development of the doctrine of 
the immanent Trinity is problematic. The perennial problem 
which Trinitarian theology faces is whether or not and how 
it is possible to move from the economic level of the 
divine outreach to the world, however this is conceived, to 
the divine in itself. In short, do the Trinitarian 
distinctions which are discerned in the economy between the 
Father of Jesus Christ and the Creator of the world, Jesus 
Christ his Son who redeems the world, and the Holy Spirit 
who indwells and sanctifies the creation, obtain also in 
some sense in God immanently?
The question of the possibility of this movement is 
bound up with the theological meaningfulness and the 
epistemological and metaphysical basis of the attempt to 
enter into rational discourse about God in himself over 
against God as he is for us. If the idea of the immanent 
Trinity were metaphysically, epistemologically, and 
theologically meaningless, then the whole enterprise of 
Trinitarian dogmatics as known in the tradition would be of 
no more than antiquarian interest. If, on the other hand, 
it is admitted that a movement towards the eternity of the 
eternal God must be made, then the question of the 
theoretical possibility of this movement must be raised. 
This is basically a question of theological epistemology, 
but it is, as such - as we shall see - also deeply rootea 
in a doctrine of salvation which seeks to trace the saving 
act of God retrospectively into God in himself. The issue 
at stake here is therefore of considerable theological 
importance, and requires careful treatment.
Lying behind the new emphasis which entered into the
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development of the doctrine of the Trinity after Nicea is 
the fact that the Arian controversy and its resolution in 
the homoousion formula decisively shifted Christian 
theology from its close reliance on the emanationist 
tradition of Greek, philosophy, and established for the 
first time a doctrine of God in which, on the basis of 
revelation, God is truly asserted to be known in himself.26 
In the ensuing development, by which the homoousion came to 
be referred finally to the Holy Spirit through the work of 
Athanasius, Didymus, Epiphanius, and the Cappadocians,27 the 
doctrine of the Trinity became primarily a doctrine of the
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? 6Ghislain Lafont, Peut-on connaître Dieu en Jésus- 
Christ? (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1969), p. 17, writes: 
"Par sa proclamation solennelle de 1'homoousios ... le 
Concile de Nicée a en effet orienté pratiquement la 
spéculation théologique vers le Mystère intra-trinitaire: 
en affirmant la pleine identité de nature entre le Père et 
le Fils ... il posait à la théologie la question du 
«comment» de cette identité; il était alors logique que la 
réflexion, d'une part se détournât de la notion du Verbe 
comme médiateur de la création et du salut (car l'idée de 
médiation enveloppe quasi naturellement celle de 
subordination, qu'il fallait précisément rejeter) et, 
d'autre part, s'appliquât à trouver les termes susceptibles 
de signifier en Dieu la parfaite égalité du Père et du 
Fils. ...la tendence immanente aux précisions de foi qui 
. . . caractérisent [le Symbole de Nicée] en propre allait 
pousser la réflexion dans le sens d'une distinction 
toujours plus accusée entre la «Théologie» doctrine de Dieu 
contemplé en lui-même, et 1'«Economie», doctrine du salut 
en Jésus-Christ.... Il y a là un paradoxe qui vaut d'être 
souligné: la formule de Nicée, dans la contexte historique 
et théologique où elle a été rédigée, était (et demeure) 
une nécessaire clef de lecture de l'Evangile; 1'arianisme, 
en effet, prétendait établir entre le Père et son Verbe une 
distinction essentielle, ne tendait finalement à rien 
d'autre qu'à ruiner la réalité du salut.... En ce sens, la 
formule de Nicée a jalonné la seule perspective selon 
laquelle une évaluation fidèle de 1'«Economie» est 
possible."
27H. B. Swete, The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church 
(London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1912), pp. 211-254.
"immanent" Trinity. Just as Christian theology thus 
committed itself to the view that the immanent Trinity is 
in some sense accessible to faith and thought, so too it 
effectively became convinced that the locus of questions of 
real theological importance is the being of God in himself. 
This was the result, not of any programmatic devaluation of 
the notion of the economic Trinity, but rather of the 
theological conviction which emerged from the Arian
controversy that the events of salvation history either 
have their basis in the eternal being of God or else they 
have no specifically saving basis at all.29 In other words, 
just as the doctrine of the economic Trinity here becomes 
a projection into time of the God who saves and who in
himself is a Trinity, so also the "immanent" Trinity 
becomes the necessary eternal basis of the temporal events 
of the Christian revelation. The immanent Trinity becomes, 
in short, a necessary presupposition because otherwise the 
economy of salvation would no longer be an economy of
salvation; without such an eternal basis in God himself, it
could no longer be seen with sufficient clarity to be a 
truly saving event.
The effect of the new Nicene theology, in consequence, 
was to reduce significantly the importance of the economic 
Trinity. Because the economic Trinitarianism of the third 
century had been tied to the Greek emanationist model of
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^Correspondingly, a shift in the understanding of the 
threefoldness of God as apprehended in the economy of 
salvation takes place; whereas earlier the doctrine of the 
economic Trinity appeared as an articulation of the twofold 
outreach of the Father to the world by means of his two 
"hands," now it became more strictly a reflection in time 
of the eternal being of God. As I have argued, the sense of 
a projection into time of the inherent threefoldness of God 
was not altogether foreign to the earlier theological 
tradition, but it was only now that a doctrine of the 
immanent Trinity had been developed through the Arian 
controversy that such a clear understanding of the economic 
Trinity as a revelation of the eternal became possible.
29Torrance, o p . cit. , pp. 110-145.
the divine life, and because the latter was effectively 
abandoned in the wake of Arius, economic Trinitarianism of 
the old sort was likewise effectively abandoned. In the 
subsequent theology of the post-Nicene era, indeed, the 
word "theology" itself came to be referred technically to 
what we would call the doctrine of the immanent Trinity.50 
Of course, the actual economy of salvation as portrayed in 
the message of the Scriptures was not set aside in all of 
this, any more or - it needs to be said - any less than it 
already had been in the older emanationist Trinitarianism. 
It was, however, given a rather different theological 
interpretation through the new doctrine of the (immanent) 
Trinity.
In keeping with what was said earlier about the 
content of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity as it 
relates to the Holy Spirit, it is possible to treat the 
doctrine of the Spirit in the older tradition and the 
general problem of its basis in terms of the two poles 
within this conception, namely, the homoousion on the one 
hand and the procession of the Spirit (with the related 
filioaue doctrine) on the other. These correspond to some 
extent to the twin concepts under which the doctrine of the 
Trinity emerges in the patristic period down to the 
Cappadocian Fathers, and which determines the content of 
subsequent theology: one ousia, three hypostaseis.31 In the
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30M.-J. Congar, "Théologie," Dictionnaire de Théologie 
Catholique. 15, cols. 343-345.
31The two-sidedness of this formula is constitutive of 
the final patristic Trinitarian position. Since the work of 
T. de Régnon in the nineteenth century, it has been 
customary to distinguish the characteristically Western 
from the characteristically Eastern doctrine of the Trinity 
according to which side of this duality is most prominent 
in the Trinitarian system: ousia in the West and
hypostaseis in the East (T. de Régnon, Études du théologie 
positive sur la Sainte Trinité (Paris: Retaux, 1892), I,
pp. 433-434; cited by Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 
III, p . xvi).
case of the Nicene homoousion, there is presupposed, first 
of all, a long and extremely varied history of the concept 
of ousia (and even of homoousios) in the philosophical and 
theological traditions of pagan antiquity.32 It was, of 
course, largely this complex history which led to the 
variety of interpretations given to the homoousion in the 
early years of its reception.33 Furthermore, the lack of a
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32Stead, o p . cit. . passim.
330n the question of the understanding of the 
homoousion in the Nicene and post-Nicene eras, cf. Bernard 
Lonergan, The Wav to Nicea. trans. Conn O'Donovan (London: 
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976), pp. 88-104. Lonergan notes 
not only that the ideas of ousia and homoousios had a 
varied philosophical history before Nicea, but also that a 
profound development in the understanding of the ideas was 
required within Christian theology in the aftermath of 
Nicea. In the Creed of Nicea, the homoousion is already 
understood in terms of the mode of the generation of the 
Son by the Father ("begotten ... ek tes ousias tou patros. 
God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, 
begotten not created"). The Nicene Fathers thus commonly 
understand the homoousion on the analogy of, e.g., the 
brightness emanating from the sun, where one and the same 
light is in the sun and in its brightness. Thus Athanasius, 
De decretis nic. svn.. 20, as cited by Lonergan, o p . cit., 
p. 99, following in an older tradition of Alexandrian 
theology, writes: "...not only is [the Word] similar to the 
Father's substance, but he cannot be divided from it; for 
he and the Father are one, and the Word is always in the 
Father, and the Father in the Word; so that Son is related 
to the Father as its brightness is related to the Son...." 
According to Lonergan, ibid.. pp. 102-104, however, in the 
Nicene era itself the homoousion is "comprehended" 
apophatically, i.e., in the consciousness that one has
finally to prescind from the images and concepts with which 
one began, whereas in subsequent theology, a more strictly 
metaphysical interpretation appears. According to Lonergan, 
the "terminal notion of consubstantiality" in the Nicene 
era, formulated by Athanasius, is more regulative than 
strictly ontological. Here the idea comes to mean that 
"what is said of the Father is also to be said of the Son, 
except that the Son is Son and not Father" (ibid., p. 103). 
Increasingly, he argues, this rule comes to be elaborated 
after Athanasius himself in terms of ontological 
considerations. However, it is questionable whether or not 
the regulative definition of the homoousion involved in 
Athanasius' principle could ever have been developed, or 
ever be understood, without reference to ontological
developed and commonly-accepted understanding of both the 
homoousion and the hypostaseis within a single Trinitarian 
conception led to considerable opposition to the Nicene 
position; opponents feared that the homoousion prejudiced 
the distinct character of Father and Son (and later, of 
Spirit as well) , and so opened the way to a new form of 
Sabellianism.34 It was for this reason, both historically 
and logically, that the form in which the homoousion came 
to be codified was the doctrine of the Trinity, in the 
sense that the doctrine of the Trinity finally drew 
together the various strands of soteriological and 
metaphysical concern into the relatively coherent position 
embodied in the linguistic formula of the one ousia and the 
three hvpostaseis.55
If the historical development of the concept of the 
homoousion is thus complex, it is nevertheless the case 
that the meaning it came to be given in the tradition, and 
the reasons for its ultimate triumph, are relatively clear. 
The sheer fact that, for example, Christ was worshipped in 
the liturgy as Saviour and Lord, and that in baptism the
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considerations about the identity of ousia between the 
Father and the Son, since this is what the rule 
presupposes. What Lonergan understands to be the later 
ontological understanding of the homoousion. therefore, by 
which "it is given a systematic grounding and a technical 
expression: in God there is the one ousia, the one
divinity, the one power and the one operation, but there 
are three divine persons ... distinguished from each other 
by their personal properties of relationship," (ibid., p. 
103) is in fact already implicit in the Nicene conception 
itself. At the same time, however, it is clear that the 
understanding of the homoousion in the Nicene era itself 
and in its later systematic elaboration, e.g., in medieval 
theology, do differ: in the earlier theology, we deal with 
the homoousion and with its interpretation as the final 
conclusion of the whole, whereas in later theology, it is 
often presupposed and developed as the starting-point of 
the dogmatic enterprise.
34Pelikan, o p . cit. , pp. 208-209.
35Ibid. , pp. 211, 219-220.
Holy Spirit was honoured as the agent of regeneration, 
meant that underlying the concern for theological formulae 
was a profound concern for the ultimate character and basis 
of human salvation. Pelikan, for example, writes:
The faith confessed at Nicea, both in 
its own original formulation and in its 
interpretation by its defenders, was a 
cosmological confession and a 
soteriological confession simulta­
neously. Underlying it was the 
conviction that only he who had created 
the universe could save man, and that 
to do either or both of these he 
himself had to be divine and not a 
creature.36
Indeed, it is precisely because the homoousion formula 
embodied this central conviction among its supporters that 
a consensus on its meaning as a formula became possible - 
a consensus which otherwise would certainly have been 
evasive in view of the ambiguous philosophical history of 
the word and its cognates.
In formal terms, the argument which establishes the 
homoousion here is the same as the characteristically 
Platonic move from, for example, the human consciousness of 
the true, the good, and the beautiful as universally 
binding on the human mind, to the True, the Good, and the 
Beautiful themselves, as the absolute basis of our finite 
but distinctively rational consciousness. It is, of course, 
true that to a considerable extent, the homoousion doctrine 
draws on the biblical witness for support, particularly in 
its underlying insistence that it is God who saves. 
However, the biblical tradition itself does not attempt to 
achieve what the homoousion explicitly does; at no point 
does it seek to trace an economic reality into eternity on 
the grounds that the finite cannot ground itself in the
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36Ibid. . p. 203.
absolute sense. This, however, is precisely the move made 
in the argument for the homoousion. The point which lends 
support to the homoousion is not simply, in other words, 
that human beings can rely on God alone for salvation
rather than on flesh, or the law, or, as in the older 
biblical tradition, on another god; rather it is that,
intrinsically, there can be no other possible basis of the 
historical revelation of God in Christ, or of the salvation 
to be experienced by the saints, than God himself,
immediately intervening in the sphere of human existence. 
It is for this reason that the possibility of, for example, 
an angelic mediation of salvation is resisted. Given the 
reality of salvation through Jesus Christ, therefore, it is 
difficult to resist the inference, within the terms of this 
formal principle, that the Son and Holy Spirit who are
active in the economy are also of one substance with the 
Father.
In the case of the idea of the procession of the Holy 
Spirit, a rather different question is in view and, 
correspondingly, a rather different foundation underlies 
the answer given. The problem, of course, is how to 
reconcile the threefoldness of the economic manifestation 
with the unity of substance, in such a way as to present 
the divinity as in itself both three and one. The danger of 
the loss of the distinction in a new Sabellianism was very 
real in the aftermath of Nicea, and in the case of the Holy 
Spirit, the problem (which arose only because the question 
of the homoousion of the Spirit had already been raised) 
was both to distinguish the Spirit from the spiritual 
nature of divinity ("God is spirit" - Jn. 4: 24), and in 
particular to distinguish the Spirit from the Son, the two 
being closely associated in the economy. The idea of the 
Spirit's procession, nominally derived from Jn. 15: 25,
developed in relation to the idea of the eternal begetting 
of the Son which already had been developed through the 
Arian crisis; its passage into the formal theological
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position of the Church was thus somewhat smoothed, while at 
the same time the intellectual labour required for its 
formulation was enormously reduced.
What is important for our purposes, however, is the 
foundations on which Pneumatological speculation concerning 
the procession is established. This, again, had already 
been provided by Christology, where the identification of 
the divine Son with the Logos of Greek philosophy, already 
to some extent at least foreshadowed if not explicitly 
formulated by the Fourth Gospel, provided the model. 
Clearly, the Greek philosophical tradition had a profound 
influence on the interpretation of this text and on the 
development of this theology, but the biblical 
understanding was also of decisive importance here. The 
idea of the Logos itself, as expressed in the Fourth Gospel 
in particular, already had firmly established the whole 
question of analogy in the centre of Trinitarian 
speculation, while at the same time the Christology which 
had worked with the biblical category of Wisdom from the 
very earliest period provided a theological precedent to 
the new understanding. What is particularly significant in 
this conception is the fact that if the Father can be said 
to have his Logos. or Wisdom in the binitarian sense, then 
already the immanent divine being has been understood 
analogously to the human being who has his reason. 
Analogous knowledge of this sort may be a weak form of 
knowledge, but a form of knowledge it is all the same.
In this sense, one has to regard with suspicion the 
attempt to argue that the procession of the Holy Spirit is 
incomprehensible, expressed classically by Gregory 
Nazianzen, who argues that while the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from the Father, it is no more possible to say what this 
procession is than it is possible to define the Father's 
agennesia or the Son's begottenness.37 Even in the East,
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37Gregory Nazianzen, Or. , 31, 8.
where the Augustinian analogical procedure is regarded with 
distrust, alternative analogies are presented: the idea of 
the Holy Spirit as the eternal "unction" of the Son, which 
appears in certain Eastern Trinitarian theologies,38 for 
example, makes a temporal image derived from the economy 
into an eternal inner-trinitarian relation. Certainly it is 
possible to place in question the attempt made in the 
Western (Augustinian) theological tradition to comprehend 
the procession of the Holy Spirit, given its basis in a 
particular psychological theory (that the two 
characteristic acts of a spiritual substance are knowing 
and willing)39 rather than in the events of the biblical 
economy as such.40 However, in the older theological
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7QCf., e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, C. Maced.. 18; C. 
Eunom.. II, 2; and John of Damascus, De fid, orth.. I, 7-8.
39Augustine, De Trin.. VIII, 5; and Thomas Aquinas, 
op. cit. , la. 27, 4 & ad 1; 30, 2 ad 2; and 35, 2. See also 
Michael Schmaus, Die Psychologische Trinitätslehre des Hl. 
Augustinus (Münster: Aschendorffsehe Verlagsbuch-handlund, 
1927) .
40Augustine1s "psychological analogy," however, is at 
the same time to be understood in terms of his rejection of 
the emanationist model, which had helped to differentiate 
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in pre-Nicene theology. 
The problem Augustine took up in the De Trinitate (I, 4) 
was how to distinguish the three within the context of the 
Nicene homoousion. The Arians were able to differentiate 
the Father from the Son, and the Son from the Spirit, on 
the basis of the emanationist model: for them, the three
terms represent different levels in a hierarchy of 
divinity, which, in turn, represent three different agents. 
Such a hierarchical understanding, of course, was precisely 
what the Nicene position was framed to avoid; Augustine, 
consequently, was forced to take up the remaining problem 
of how one actually does distinguish the three. Driven by 
the rejection of the emanationist model, for example, he 
addresses in Books II-III of the De Trinitate the problem 
of how it is that the three, though of one substance and 
being one agent, are not all sent. While the Father has an 
economic role as the creator and saviour of the world, and 
indeed can appear in the various theophanies with which 
Augustine is concerned in Books II-III, only the Son and 
the Spirit can be said to have been sent into the world for 
the sake of our salvation. As the Arians knew well, this
tradition, it would appear that there is in the end no such 
thing as a doctrine of the immanent Trinity drawn entirely 
from the economy of salvation; rather, metaphysical 
assumptions of various sorts have been brought to bear upon 
the economic data in developing doctrines of the immanent
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raises the question how the three are equal, or, to use the 
language of Nicea, of the same ousia. if two are sent and 
one is the sender. Augustine treats this problem in Book 
IV, where he argues that in order to be sent, the divine 
person has to proceed; only the Son and the Spirit proceed, 
therefore only they are sent. According to Augustine, 
therefore, the apparent subordinationist element here is to 
be referred to the processions of the persons, which we see 
immediately in Book V to be a problem of relational 
predication rather than of substantial predication. His 
answer to the problem of the distinction of the persons, 
therefore, is that the three are distinct, not by virtue of 
substance, for the three are of one substance, and not by 
virtue of accidents, for there is nothing accidental in 
God, but are distinct by virtue of their different mutual 
relations. It is here that Augustine locates not only the 
terms "Father," "Son," and "Spirit," but also the 
corresponding terms, "Unbegotten," "Begotten," and, with 
much more difficulty, the Spirit as "Gift" and as "Love." 
The Arians had treated the terms "Unbegotten" and 
"Begotten" in particular as distinctly substantial 
categories, connoting the ousiai involved in the two cases; 
in considering the terms "Unbegotten" and "Begotten," they 
worked with the Aristotelian distinction of substance and 
accidents, arguing that the terms must be understood either 
in one sense or the other. Since God has no accidents, they 
claimed, the terms are substantial (Kelly, op. cit., pp. 
274-275). Augustine's innovation in Trinitarian theology 
was to adopt the notion of real subsistent relations and to 
treat these terms accordingly as relational categories. The 
psychological analogy, which is developed as an aid for the 
understanding of the previously-developed theory of the 
relations of the persons (Augustine, op. cit., VIII, 5), is 
thus intended more as an explication of these relations 
than as a purely abstract theory of the Trinity developed 
"out of the blue," so that it must be seen in its context 
as a response to one of the central problems thrown up by 
Nicea. In the East, the Cappadocians responded to the same 
problem by stressing the relations of origin, where the 
principle of distinction lies in the eternal origin of the 
Son and the Holy Spirit in the hypostasis of the Father; 
Augustine, on the other hand, determines the course of 
Western Trinitarian theology by emphasizing the relations 
of the persons as such.
Trinity. It is these assumptions which set up, explicitly 
or implicitly, the kind of analogical relation within which 
the movement from the economy to the immanent Trinity is 
made possible and intelligible.
Despite all of this, however, it is striking that the
development of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity in the
patristic era coincides with an elaboration of the idea
that God in himself is unknowable. Athanasius, for example,
states of the unity of substance between the Father and the
Son that it would have been better to remain silent about
it had not the heretics compelled him to speak.41 Likewise,
one of the basic presuppositions of the Cappadocian Fathers
in their discussion of the Trinitarian relations is that
the mysteries of the inner-divine processions remain
undisclosed to us, in the sense that we do not and cannot
know what they are. Gregory Nazianzen's dictum on the
incomprehensibility of the procession of the Holy Spirit
could similarly be cited.42 This insight was evidently taken
over into Christian theology from the Middle and
Neoplatonic traditions, where it was considered axiomatic,
but it received authentically Christian theological
elaboration, once assumed, and became a major influence on
43the whole subsequent development of Christian theology.
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41Athanasius, Ad Ser. . I, 16.
4iSee above, p. 74.
43It is difficult to isolate the occasion precisely, 
particularly because the whole movement of thought from the 
origins of the doctrine of the Trinity through the Arian 
crisis is presupposed. However, one of the main moments in 
the explicit formulation of this thesis in the context of 
the doctrine of the Trinity was the conflict with late 
Arianism, and specifically with Eunomius, who held a 
linguistic theory in which names, including those referring 
to the divinity, express the essence of the reality named 
(Roberta C. Bondi, "Apophatic Theology," in Alan Richardson 
& John Bowden, eds., A New Dictionary of Christian Theology 
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1983), p. 32; Kelly, pp. cit,, PP- 
249, 487). His critics derided this as a "technology," and 
against it, the Cappadocians Basil the Great and Gregory of
The basic approach to the mystery of God here rests, 
essentially, on the conviction that the immanent being of 
God remains hidden from finite, fallen humanity in a way 
that the economic outreach of God to the world does not.
In the ancient tradition of Christian Platonism, 
therefore, the incomprehensibility of God is presupposed as 
a prime datum of theology. In the Pseudo-Dionysius, for 
example, in which this tradition reaches its supreme 
expression, every determination of the divine is taken to 
be a limit, which, in view of the divine transcendence, is 
therefore in the strictest sense inadmissable. The 
knowledge of God is here to be understood as the knowledge 
of what God is not - in-finite, im-passible, a-temporal, 
in-comprehensible, and so on.w The Pseudo-Dionysius, 
therefore, relying on a long tradition of theological 
speculation in Middle and Neoplatonism, articulates and 
establishes a tradition of Trinitarian theology which still 
dominates Eastern theology and which prevailed at least 
down to the end of the medieval period in the West, the 
tradition of the via neaativa which permeates even the 
Christian Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas.45
While it is possible to distinguish broadly between an 
apophaticism of the divine ousia in the Trinitarian 
tradition, and an apophaticism of the immanent Trinity as 
such,46 the latter is the mainstream form of Trinitarian 
apophaticism, to which we can therefore limit ourselves 
here. The paradox in the development of the doctrine of the
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Nyssa argued that the essence not only of God, but also of 
creatures, is unknowable.
44Lossky, o p . cit. , pp. 23-43.
45Thomas Aquinas, o p . cit., la. 12-13. For a recent 
study of the Neoplatonic influences on Thomas' doctrine of 
God and of the Trinity, see W. J. Hankey, God in Himself 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) .
46Mackey, op . cit. , pp. 173-180.
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immanent Trinity is that it did in fact develop precisely 
in the context of this apophaticism. Of course, all 
apophaticism as such presupposes that there is that which 
one cannot speak, intelligibly about - because it is more 
than our language and thought can accommodate, and not 
because it is less than real - so that in Christian 
theology it does not of itself exclude the idea of the 
immanent Trinity. But the apophatic restriction is 
problematic; in the Trinitarian tradition, knowledge of the 
immanent Trinity is most certainly asserted, however much 
it may be qualified through apophatic restrictions. 
Precisely this knowledge constitutes the fundamental shape 
of the doctrine of the Trinity in the tradition, and what 
is thus known cannot be strictly unknowable.
In fact, therefore, the incomprehensibility motif 
appears to be exaggerated, in view of the extensive 
development of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity which 
effectively constitutes the Trinitarian tradition.47 We are
47Walter Kasper notes this in The God of Jesus Christ, 
trans. Matthew J. 0"Connell (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1984), 
pp. 126-130, where he argues, following Rahner, that in 
maintaining the presupposition of divine incomprev- 
hensibility while at the same time developing an 
understanding of the divine mystery, the theological 
tradition effectively adopts the view that the human mind 
does in some way reach beyond itself into that mystery (cf. 
Karl Rahner, "The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology," 
in his Theological Investigations, ed. and trans. Kevin 
Smyth (Baltimore, Helicon Press and London: Darton, Longman 
& Todd, 1966) , IV, pp. 36-73) . Kasper, with Rahner, 
attempts to make what he regards as the hidden 
epistemological structure of the traditional approach into 
an explicit theological presupposition. In doing so, 
however, he significantly alters the sense in which God is 
to be seen as unknowable. The point, for Kasper, is no 
longer that God is strictly incomprehensible in the non- 
rational or supra-rational sense, but rather that God is 
hidden in what he understands to be the biblical sense: in 
his very revelation of himself, God is a mystery in that he 
is a personal freedom which, in a manner analogous to that 
commonly experienced in human intersubjectivity, is not 
within our grasp or control. Here Kasper echoes also Karl 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. 
Torrance; trans. T. H. L. Parker et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T.
in this sense, therefore, obliged to regard it with 
suspicion. At one point Hegel notes the contradiction here: 
in the Christian religion, God cannot be unknown, for its 
content is precisely that God is revealed to human beings. 
Hegel's philosophy undoubtedly lays too much emphasis at 
this point on the knowledge given in revelation, since the 
events of revelation have more to do with, for example, the 
overcoming of sin and death than they do with the question 
of rational access to God, but his point nevertheless has 
to be taken seriously. God loses nothing by communicating 
himself, and "is not jealous to the point of not
/ Qcommunicating himself"; moreover, if there is literally no 
sense in which the received doctrine of the Trinity can be 
understood rationally, however provisionally, then there 
can be, by definition, no sense in which it can be grasped 
as true.
The strength and the weakness, finally, of the 
traditional theology of the Trinity lies in the specific 
form of dualism which it presupposes. This dualism is 
admittedly Hellenistic or "philosophical," as the word is 
often used in this connection in the pejorative sense, but 
it is also drawn from Hebraic sources in the Old Testament.
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Clark, 1957), II/l, pp. 181-184, 283-284.
a8G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson; trans. R. F. Brown et al. 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California 
Press, 1984-1985), I, p. 382.
49Ibid.. pp. 382-383. Cf. also, G. W. F. Hegel,
Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), § 564: "The old conception
— due to a one-sided survey of human life - of Nemesis,
which made the divinity and its action in the world only a 
levelling power, dashing to pieces everything high and 
great - was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the 
doctrine that God is not envious. The same answer may be 
given to the modern assertions that man cannot ascertain 
God. These assertions (and more than assertions they are 
not) are the more illogical, because made within a religion 
which is expressly called the revealed...."
On the one hand, therefore, it is allied with the typically 
"Platonic" view that the true = the eternal = the heavenly 
(in which, however, the finite world and the finite 
intellect participate) with the implication that the true 
Trinity = the eternal Trinity = the heavenly Trinity;50 on 
the other hand, it is also allied with the Old Testament 
distinction between the Creator and his creation, who is at 
once both transcendent to and immanent in the created 
order. The transcendence of Yahweh in this sense is 
integral to the later Old Testament world-view in 
particular, and constitutes there the theological basis, 
for example, of the polemic against idolatry.51 This, 
however, raises the question of the philosophical and 
theological basis of the contemporary approach to the
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50To the extent that the development of the doctrine of 
the Trinity in the patristic and medieval periods does rely 
on such a philosophical outlook, furthermore, it is an open 
question whether or not the latter can be taken as an 
adequate philosophical starting-point. Certainly it in 
insufficient simply to assume, without further ado, that 
the Platonic position is antiquated, as this begs the 
philosophical and theological question. One cannot proceed 
here merely by assumption and a philosophically uncritical 
faith in contemporary forms of thought.
51Traditional dogmatics understands the transcendence 
of Yahweh in relation to nature in the Old Testament to be 
one of the prime data of Old Testament revelation. This 
view is reflected in, e.g., Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of 
God, trans. William Hendriksen (Edinburgh: The Banner of
Truth Trust, 1977), p. 15: "By virtue of this revelation it 
is first of all established that God is ... not shut in by 
the narrow confines of this universe but highly exalted 
above nature." Yahweh's transcendence is taken here to be 
a fundamental tenet of Hebrew monotheism. Bavinck notes 
that this traditional thesis has been challenged to some 
extent by the Religionscreschichte school, which treats Old 
Testament monotheism from an evolutionary point of view 
(ibid. . pp. 15-16) , but in the end there can be no doubt 
that a transcendent monotheism is finally established in 
Hebrew thought as represented in the Old Testament. On the 
twin ideas of Yahweh's transcendence to and involvement 
with his creation in the Old Testament, see, e.g., Walther 
Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, trans. John Baker 
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1967), II, pp. 98-117.
doctrine of the Trinity, in which the unity of the economic 
with the immanent Trinity is asserted. This is all the more 
so because of the fact that the traditional Trinitarian and 
Pneumatological concepts of the homoousion. procession, and 
the filiocrue reappear in the contemporary context. It is 
with this in mind that we turn now, beginning with the 
theology of Barth, to contemporary Trinitarian theology.
2. Karl Barth: The Trinity and Election
The importance of Karl Barth's treatment of the 
doctrine of the Trinity for the contemporary renewal of 
interest in Trinitarian theology can hardly be 
overestimated. As G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance 
maintain, it was Barth above all who forced theological 
thinking in the twentieth century back to the Trinity; 
Barth's doctrine of the Trinity in Church Dogmatics 1/1, 
they argue, when studied in connection with his later 
doctrine of God, can be regarded as the greatest 
contribution to Trinitarian theology since Augustine's De 
Trinitate.52 We will find that Barthian themes recur 
constantly in subsequent Trinitarian theology, and that, 
from this point of view, there is a great deal to justify 
Bromiley and Torrance's judgment. There can be no doubt 
also that Barth's theology has in fact led to a deepening 
of the doctrine of the Trinity. As we will see, however, 
Barth's position is also problematic in a number of 
important respects, while many of the weaknesses of 
subsequent Trinitarian theology stem from problematic 
themes taken over from his theology.
Commentators on Barth's Trinitarian theology commonly 
focus on one of these two central themes: either the idea 
of the Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness itself which
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52G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, in their editorial 
Preface to Barth, o p . cit., 1/1, pp. viii-ix.
appears as the basis of the Trinitarian theology of Church 
Dogmatics 1/1; or the doctrine of election, which is the 
central expression of Barth's doctrine of God in Church 
Dogmatics Il/i and II/2, and which underlies the deepening 
of Barth’s Christology in later volumes, and, implicitly, 
of his Trinitarian theology.53 Both are clearly of central 
significance for Barth's overall position. Barth's
treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in Church
Dogmatics 1/1, for example, determines the fundamental 
content of the "revealedness model" of Trinitarian 
Pneumatology to which Barth is committed, and will serve as 
the basis of our discussion of Barth in Chapter III. 
Barth's doctrine of election, on the other hand, has proven 
to be of greater importance for post-Barthian Trinitarian 
Pneumatology, as the revealedness paradigm has tended to be 
abandoned.
Unlike Rahner (who, however, in many ways follows 
Barth), Barth does not provide an explicit discussion of 
the problem of the relation of the economic and the 
immanent Trinity as such; rather, he formulates his 
position in his discussion of these theological themes.
From this point of view, however, it is Barth's doctrine
of election which is of primary importance for us in this 
section, since it reveals how, for Barth, the economic and 
the immanent Trinity are concretely related in the 
Trinitarian life of God. Although we will begin with 
Barth's formal treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in 
Church Dogmatics 1/1 in what immediately follows, and 
return to it again in Chapter III, the main focus of our 
discussion in this section will be the doctrine of
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530n the former, see, e.g., R. D. Williams, "Barth on 
the Triune God," in S. W. Sykes, ed., Karl Barth - Studies 
of His Theological Method (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 
pp. 147-193; on the latter, Jüngel, The Doctrine of the
Trinity, pp. 61ff.; and R. W. Jenson, God after God
(Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
1969), pp. 95ff.
election, and the accompanying doctrines of God as "event" 
and of divine choice.
The doctrine of the Trinity in Church Dogmatics 1/1 
begins with a discussion of its basis in what Barth 
understands to be the biblical idea of revelation.54 Barth's 
claim is that the doctrine is rooted in the sheer fact that 
God has spoken his Word, and that men and women hear and 
give witness to it. The crucial point for Barth is that in 
the notion of the Word of God in Christian revelation, we 
deal with something utterly authoritative, precisely 
because it is not simply God's revelation, but the presence 
ad extra of God himself.55
Not only does the biblical idea of revelation involve 
the notion of the self-grounded authority of the Word as 
such, but also, for Barth, the determination by the Word of 
the existence of those men and women who miraculously hear 
the Word of God and obey it.56 Taken together, these factors 
constitute the peculiar character of Christian revelation, 
in which, according to Barth, the doctrine of the Trinity 
has its root. Trinitarian theology, for Barth, is in 
essence an exegesis of these factors, in the sense that, in 
Christian revelation, the question, "Who is the God who 
reveals himself?" is inseparable from two further 
questions, "What is he doing?" and "What does he effect?" 
As Barth puts it, "God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself 
through Himself. He reveals Himself. "57 Hence the 
fundamental Barthian Trinitarian paradigm of the Revealer,
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54Barth, op. cit. . 1 /1 , pp. 2 9 5-3 0 4 .
55Ibid.. pp. 3 0 4-3 0 6 , 3 2 0-3 2 4 . According to Barth, this 
authority can be seen in the notion of the prophetic word 
of the Old Testament, or again in the exousia of Jesus in 
the New, and once more, significantly, in the authority of 
the Holy Spirit in decisions taken by the Apostles and the 
primitive Church (ibid., p. 3 0 6).
56Ibid. . pp. 3 2 4 - 3 3 2 .
57Ibid. . p. 296.
his Revelation, and its Revealedness.
In a sense, the basis of the unity of the economic and 
the immanent Trinity is already present in this idea of 
revelation, being determined by the movement of thought 
from what Barth understands to be the actuality of God's 
revelation to its ground or possibility in God in himself.58 
Robert Jenson argues that the principle involved here, that 
where the actuality exists the possibility of that 
actuality must also be presupposed, is fundamental to 
Barth's entire theological enterprise.59 The point is that 
while Barth begins with the datum of what God has already 
done in Jesus Christ, he poses the further question what 
God is "antecedently in himself" in order for him also to 
be what he is in the economy. The importance of this idea 
can be seen from the three theses with which he begins his 
discussion of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively 
in Church Dogmatics 1/1: "The one God reveals Himself
according to Scripture as the Creator, that is, as the Lord 
of our existence. As such, He is God our Father because He 
is so antecedently in Himself as the Father of the Son."60 
"The one God reveals Himself according to Scripture as the 
reconciler, i.e., as the Lord in the midst of our enmity 
towards Him. As such He is the Son of God who has come to 
us or the Word of God that has been spoken to us, because 
He is so antecedently in Himself as the Son or Word of God 
the Father."61 "The one God reveals Himself according to 
Scripture as the Redeemer, i.e., as the Lord who sets us
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58A parallel movement of thought will be seen in 
Rahner's later "transcendental theological deduction" in 
Trinitarian theology, which similarly asks about the 
conditions of the possibility of the incarnation and 
Pentecost.
59Jenson, o p . cit. . p. 103.
60Barth, o p . cit. . 1/1, p. 384.
61Ibid. . p. 399.
free. As such He is the Holy Spirit, by receiving whom we 
become the children of God, because, as the Spirit of the 
love of God the Father and the Son, He is so antecedently 
in Himself."62
The presupposition of the whole procedure, of course, 
is that God has indeed truly given himself in the economy, 
and that, in some sense, it is possible and necessary to 
move from the economy to the immanent Trinity. The fact 
that Barth not only considers it possible to move from the 
economy to the immanent Trinity, but also necessary, helps 
us to understand what Barth must mean at this point by the 
claim that God truly "gives himself" in the economy. There 
must be, in effect, a level of divine being "behind 
revelation" for Barth, so that God in himself is different 
from his revelation as such; the point seems to be simply 
that this God is emphatically not, for Barth, another God. 
This, however, as we will see shortly, appears to be 
inconsistent with what is often asserted of Barth's 
doctrine of the Trinity, and, moreover, with what 
apparently can be legitimately asserted of the doctrine of 
the Trinity, on the basis of the doctrine of election.
The clearest expression of Barth's position on the 
relation between the economic and immanent Trinity in 
Church Dogmatics 1/1 appears in the context of his defence 
of the filiooue doctrine63 and is worth quoting at some 
length:
. . .we have consistently followed the 
rule, which we regard as basic, that 
statements about the divine modes of 
being antecedently in themselves cannot 
be different in content from those that
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62Ibid. , p. 448.
63Barth's central defence of the filioque is that the 
Spirit who is the Spirit of the Father and the Son in the 
economy must also be the Spirit of both in the immanent 
Trinity; the latter is the condition of the possibility of 
the former. See below, Chapter III, section 1.
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are to be made about their reality in 
revelation. All our statements 
concerning what is called the immanent 
Trinity have been reached simply as 
confirmations or underlinings or, 
materially, as the indispensable 
premises of the economic Trinity. ... 
The reality of God in His revelation 
cannot be bracketed by an "only," as 
though somewhere behind his revelation 
there stood another reality of God; the 
reality of God which encounters us in 
His revelation is His reality in all 
the depths of eternity. This is why we 
have to take it so seriously precisely 
in His revelation.
Barth repeatedly insists that we must not allow 
ourselves to go beyond revelation in theology. This does 
not mean, however, that it is only appropriate to ask the 
question about what God is ad extra, or for us. Rather, 
revelation itself, according to Barth, indicates that in 
himself, God is precisely "for us"; the latter, therefore, 
cannot be understood in its reality apart from the former. 
Not going beyond revelation, therefore, means for Barth to 
take the reality of revelation itself with full 
seriousness, in the precise sense that we cannot suppose 
that God hides behind his revelation, for in it, according 
to Barth, God truly gives us himself. The thoroughgoing way 
in which Barth works out this principle in his theology has 
led T. F. Torrance to characterize Barth's central 
contribution to modern theology as a reassertion, within 
the terms of Trinitarian theology, of the homoousion: what 
God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is in his revelation 
is, as it were, consubstantial with what he is in himself.65
If it is his understanding of revelation which leads 
Barth to posit the root of the doctrine of the Trinity as
64Ibid.
65Thomas F. Torrance, "The Legacy of Karl Barth (1886- 
1986)," Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986), 289-308.
the idea of God as the Revealer, his Revelation, and its 
Revealedness, it is Barth's doctrine of God and especially 
his doctrine of election in Church Dogmatics II/1-2 which 
constitutes Barth's concrete development of the unity of 
the economic and the immanent Trinity. In his doctrine of 
election, Barth breaks with the Reformed dogmatic 
tradition, which understands election more generally as 
God's choice of human beings in general on the basis of his 
absolute decree, to understand election as the eternal 
choice of God to be our God in Jesus Christ.66 According to 
Barth, it is Jesus Christ in the biblical witness who is 
the true chosen one from among the chosen people of Israel. 
It is he who is the covenant partner of God, by God's own 
eternal choice to be God in him, while the rest of humanity 
is chosen in him, i.e., as God chooses himself, the Son, in 
the man Jesus.
This understanding of election deepened Barth's 
Christological views over time, and implicitly, his overall 
doctrine of the Trinity as well. In the doctrine of 
election, Barth effectively presents the immanent Trinity 
as containing within itself the economic Trinity, since he 
understands the election of Jesus Christ as an 
innertrinitarian act which provides the basis for both 
creation and of reconciliation, i.e., the economic outreach 
of God to what is not himself in its twofold aspect.
Barth's central argument in his development of the 
doctrine of the Trinity in Church Dogmatics 1/1 is that God 
is who he in his triune being in his act of revelation. In 
his doctrine of God in Church Dogmatics II/1-2, that act is 
understood more systematically to be his free decision of 
love to be God in Jesus Christ, and thus to be the God who 
chooses this definite relationship to the creature for
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66Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and 
T. F. Torrance; trans. G. W. Bromiley et al. (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1957), II/2, pp. 51-58.
himself.67 For Barth, God must be conceived both ad extra
and ad intra as the living God of the Bible, and his life
as "expressed and attested in concrete decision...."68 He 
therefore rejects all positions which do not allow such 
movement, life, or decision in God in himself, on the 
precise grounds that this movement is actually revealed in 
Jesus Christ. All of this is summed up in the conception of 
the being of God as "event":
We are dealing with the being of God:
but with regard to the being of God,
the word "event" is final. and cannot
be surpassed or compromised. To its
very deepest depths God's Godhead 
consists in the fact that it is an
event - not any event, not events in
general, but the event of his action, 
in which we have a share in God's 
revelation.69
Barth's position here has had a profound influence on 
the development of the doctrine of God in contemporary 
theology. His intention is to understand the being of God
from his act of revelation as such rather than from a
general concept of being.70 We are concerned, therefore, 
according to Barth, fundamentally with the "reality" of 
God, a concept which 'holds together being and act, instead
of tearing them apart like the idea of "essence."'71 Thus,
while Barth's theology is thoroughly ontological, his 
theological ontology is intended to be fundamentally
89
67Ibid. . pp. 6-7, 7 6-77.
68Ibid. . p. 79.
69Barth, o p . cit. , II/l, p. 263.
70Ibid. , pp. 260-261.
71Ibid. . p. 262. Jiingel, op. cit. , p. 64, footnote 
number 9, notes a similarity between Barth and Heidegger 
on this point.
structured by God's act in Jesus Christ.72 His understanding 
of God is therefore to be sharply distinguished from those 
deriving from abstract metaphysical ideas of, for example, 
supreme substance or absolute being. God's being, for 
Barth, is a "being in act,"73 the living event of God's 
decision to be God for us in Jesus Christ, so that God's 
being cannot be marked off and abstracted from what God 
does: God is who he is, therefore, not only for us but also 
for himself, in Jesus Christ. Thus God is not so much a 
substance with attributes for Barth as he is a deed: "God 
does his godhead. . . . "74
All of this means, however, that the doctrine of God 
in Barth's theology is Trinitarian: "there is no
possibility of reckoning with the being of any other God, 
or with any other being of God, than that of the Father, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit as it is in God's revelation 
and in eternity."75 Because the doctrine of God is drawn 
from the event of God's revelation, in other words, it 
cannot by definition be concerned with anything other than 
the God known in revelation as the Revealer, his 
Revelation, and its Revealedness. More than this, however, 
Barth's doctrine of God shows God to be relational, since 
God's act is relational, involving not only the concrete 
relation between the Father and the Son, but also God's 
relation to mankind, since from all eternity he has chosen 
to be related to us in Jesus Christ. Both relations are 
encompassed in the doctrine of God, with the result that, 
through the doctrine of election, God's very self­
relatedness is understood to involve his relatedness to
90
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73Barth, o p . cit. . II/l, pp. 257ff.
74Jenson, o p . cit. . p. 110.
75Ibid. , p . 261.
mankind.76
Barth's doctrine of God as event, therefore, and his 
corresponding doctrine of election, have clear implications 
for Trinitarian theology. The Trinitarian point made is 
that there is no Word of the Father other than Jesus 
Christ,77 in the sense that by the eternal divine election, 
Jesus Christ is in the beginning with God.78 On the basis of 
the Trinitarian principle of perichoresis. therefore, we 
can say that the election of Jesus Christ is an eternal act 
on the part of God the Father, Son, and Spirit which 
literally determines what the triune God is:
In the beginning it was the choice of 
the Father Himself to establish this 
covenant with man by giving up His Son 
for him, that He Himself might become 
man in the fulfilment of His grace. In 
the beginning it was the choice of the 
Son to be obedient to grace, and 
therefore to offer up Himself and to 
become man in order that this covenant 
might be made a reality. In the 
beginning it was the resolve of the 
Holy Spirit that the unity of God, of 
Father and Son, should not be disturbed 
or rent by this covenant with man, but 
that it should be made the more 
glorious, the deity of God, the 
divinity of His love and freedom, being 
confirmed and demonstrated by this 
offering of the Father and His self­
offering of the Son.79
The Pneumatological suggestion in this passage in 
particular is intriguing; it is that the role of the Holy 
Spirit in the life of the immanent Trinity is from all
76Jungel, o p . cit. . pp. 99-101.
^Barth, o p . cit., II/2, pp. 94-99.
78Ibid. . p. 104.
79Ibid. , pp. 101-102
eternity deepened by the eternal election of Jesus Christ,
that the Spirit's role in uniting the Father and the Son in
love - as the hypostasis of their mutual love80 - is made
more profound by the eternal decision for the incarnation,
where God determines that it should include also the man of
the covenant. The divine function of the Spirit in the life
of the Trinity is thus, as Barth presents it here, made
more inclusive, as God the Father and God the Son from the
beginning now confront one another, in principle, across
the divide which separates the Creator from Jesus Christ as
man in the incarnation. Unfortunately, however, Barth does
not develop this Pneumatological suggestion at length
either in his doctrine of election, which is primarily
Christological in content, nor, indeed, elsewhere in the
81later chapters of the Church Dogmatics.
Nevertheless, the importance of Barth's doctrine of
election for the problem of the relation of the economic
and the immanent Trinity is clear, since it serves to draw
the two together: in it the humanity of Jesus which was
assumed by the Word in the incarnation is brought into
connection with the Trinity in itself, for because of the
eternal election of Jesus Christ the eternal Word must be
82understood already in himself as the incarnate Word. It is 
true that this eternal decision is made on behalf of the
92
80Barth's understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit 
in the immanent life of the Trinity in Church Dogmatics, 
1/1 is here presupposed. See above, footnote 12 and the 
discussion of the filioaue in Barth in Chapter III, section 
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81The only possible exception I have been able to find 
is Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. 
Torrance; trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1956), IV/1, pp. 306-9, where the resurrection of Jesus is 
treated as the work of the Spirit overcoming the chasm 
represented by the cross. For a more detailed development 
of the latter theme, see Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the 
World, pp. 374-376, and below, Chapter III, section 2.
82Barth, o p . cit. , II/2, pp. 100-104.
human creature, and therefore that the election of Jesus 
Christ is specifically characterized by Barth as the 
beginning of all the ways and works of God ad extra.83 But 
for Barth, this cannot be taken to mean anything other than 
that "eternal election which as it concerns man God made 
within Himself in his pre-temporal eternity,n8A and which 
is, as such, not itself an act ad extra but an act ad intra 
which constitutes the basis of all God's work ad extra.83
If one asks, therefore, on what principle one is able 
to relate the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity in 
Barth's wider theology, and to affirm the unity of the two, 
then the answer is that the economic Trinity is what the 
Trinity is determined in the divine freedom and choice from 
all eternity to be, not merely "economically," as if the 
divine choice could be detached from what God is in 
himself, but also "immanently." There is, Barth will later 
argue, no "Logos asarkos";86 in himself, God is already in 
a quite literal sense the one who has determined himself to 
be who he is in Jesus Christ.
Barth's doctrines of God and election, therefore, are 
of profound importance to the idea of the unity of the 
economic with the immanent Trinity. Jiingel, for example, in 
his adaptation of Barth's doctrine of the Trinity, is able 
on this basis to minimize the distinction between the two:
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83Ibid.. pp. 94-95: "...it is God's free grace that in 
Him He elects to be man and to have dealings with man and 
to join Himself to man. He, Jesus Christ, is the free grace 
of God as not content simply to remain identical with the 
inward and eternal being of God, but operating ad extra in 
the ways and works of God."
^ Ibid.. p. 104.
85Ibid. , p. 94; cf. also pp. 100-104. Thus Jiingel, The 
Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 69, characterizes the election 
of Jesus Christ in Barth as at once an "opus Dei ad extra 
externum" and an "opus Dei ad extra internum."
86Barth, o p . cit. , IV/1, p. 52.
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...because for Barth God’s work and 
essence are not of two different kinds, 
it is for him impossible that the 
reality of God and the reality which 
owes its existence to God's work should 
be related to each other as two 
different ontological strata and even 
less that they should fall apart as two 
worlds separated through a rchorismosl 
(division) . If one wanted to let the 
reality of God 'be tacked on to earthly 
reality as an additional reality', then 
all talk of God could then be only 
supplementary and therefore superfluous 
talk. And it would then be again time 
to remember Schleiermacher' s criticism: 
'But whoever makes a distinction 
between this and that world deludes 
himself.'
Jiingel, together with a number of other theologians, goes 
so far as to develop a theology of the suffering of God on 
the basis of the Barthian doctrine of God: the specific act 
in which the intrinsic being of God "is" in this sense 
comes to be seen as the act of giving himself over to
QOsuffering and death.
The question which needs to be raised here, however, 
concerns the theological meaningfulness of the category of 
divine freedom or decision which underlies the whole of 
Barth's doctrine of God, and which relates to the 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity in post-Barthian 
theology. It is because the immanent Trinity "chooses" to 
be the economic Trinity of the Christian revelation, in 
effect, that the economic and the immanent Trinity 
constitute a unity in Barth's theology; the divine
87Ibid. . p. 33.
^ Ibid. . pp. 83-88; and Jiingel, God as the Mystery of 
the World, pp. 218-221. See also below, Chapter III, 
section 2. For Barth, on the other hand, the crucifixion of 
Jesus is understood in more straightforwardly traditional 
terms. Cf., e.g., Barth, op. cit. , IV/1, p. 254, over
against Jiingel's highly selective reference to the passage 
in The Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 85.
decision, according to Barth, determines what God is. The 
language of "decision," however, is problematic. The divine 
being, according to Barth, is a "being in act", and so is 
not to be understood as an abstract absolute essence
89removed from movement and change. The latter, as Barth 
understands it, is a philosophical notion of deity quite 
distinct from that of the biblical God. Barth's position is 
that the divine being is fundamentally characterized by 
activity, and that this activity is a movement which can 
only adequately be understood as self-movement; it is not 
caused in any sense by anything other than or external to 
God himself, else God's divine freedom, his Lordship, would
90be called in question: God, in short, would not be God. 
Such self-movement, for Barth, denotes the spontaneity and 
freedom of personality, and thus excludes the notion of a 
static determinacy from the being of God; what God is must 
instead be God's own "decision:"
The fact that God's being is event, the 
event of God's act, necessarily ... 
means that it is His own conscious, 
willed and executed decision.... It is 
His conscious decision, and therefore 
not the mechanical outcome of a process 
of rationality of which, in so far as 
we can speak of such a thing, will have 
to be sought outside himself. It is 
executed once for all in eternity, and 
anew in every second of our time....
Barth's language of decision can even find more extreme 
expression, as his position tends more and more to present 
God in such exclusively existential terms: "No other being
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9QIbid.. pp. 268, 297-321. Barth thus implicitly
excludes the central thesis of process philosophy and 
theology.
91Ibid. . p. 271.
exists absolutely in its act. No other being is absolutely 
its own, conscious, willed and executed decision."92
Certainly, there is no novelty in the idea that God 
is pure act, but Barth's understanding of that act is 
problematic. Expressed in philosophical terms, his position 
is that God's existence precedes his essence, where God's 
existence, God's being, is characterized by the personal 
qualities of free self-movement, of decision, while his 
essence, the "what" of his being, does not determine the 
former but rather follows from it. Barth's position here 
cannot be qualified by any claim that the language of 
decision is necessary for our sake or from our point of 
view, and is intended merely to preserve God from any 
necessity to be God in Jesus Christ. Such qualifications 
are inadequate theologically at the best of times, but in 
Barth's case the argument cannot be raised in principle, 
since the language of choice in his theology does far more 
than preserve the freedom of God in the eyes of the 
creature. It rather is specifically intended to express the 
reality of the being of God himself, the being of the 
living God which is, he claims, known to be such in 
revelation.
I do not propose at this point to enter into a 
discussion of the general problem of the active God of 
Barth versus the allegedly static, unmoved, philosophical 
absolute essence of the tradition. Rather, I wish only at 
this point to note certain of the difficulties which inhere 
in Barth's general position, and then to move on to the 
discussion of Rahner. The most basic problem, perhaps, is 
the fact that the idea of decision is a strictly 
existential category which requires a real "before" and 
"after" in time to be meaningful. The capacity for decision 
in the strict sense presupposes temporality, which cannot 
be asserted of God without either raising the question of
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the limitations of human language in theology or else 
calling into doubt the divine transcendence. The divine 
election cannot simply involve divine decision. understood 
as such without further ado; at best, the concept of 
election can only be a metaphor or analogy for a divine act 
which we are unable to understand directly.
The second difficulty is closely related to the first, 
but relates to the specifically philosophical implication 
of Barth's position, outlined above, that God's existence, 
or his freedom, logically precedes His essence. The problem 
here is that to assert, as Barth does, that God is 
"absolutely [his] own, conscious, willed and executed 
decision," and to attempt to detach this decision, as Barth 
seems to do, from any rational necessity, appears to allow 
that God can choose the irrational, that God's decision can 
be reduced to mere impulse, and in principle, that the 
divine decision from all eternity for fellowship with 
mankind in Jesus Christ might have been a capricious, 
irrational act of sheer will - a capricious choice of love 
and the covenant which, however, might just as easily have 
been a decision for damnation.
It is clear that Barth does not wish to maintain this; 
according to Barth, "God's freedom is not merely unlimited 
possibility or formal majesty and omnipotence, that is to 
say empty, naked sovereignty."93 He does not, therefore, 
admit that his view of divine freedom can be reduced to 
caprice. Furthermore, Barth would undoubtedly resist the 
inference drawn in the above criticism that God could have 
decided for something other than the salvation of mankind 
through the incarnation, death and resurrection of his Son. 
Since God has in fact acted as he has in Jesus Christ, all 
such speculation is in Barth's view irrelevant and 
unwarranted, in particular because we only know of the
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Weiser, in Barth, The Humanity of God (London; Collins, 
1961), p. 71.
divine freedom, of election, and of God's being in act 
through Jesus Christ and no other.
In spite of this, however, it is difficult to see how 
Barth can avoid the criticism made. One is surely entitled 
to ask whether or not the doctrine of God developed on the 
basis of revelation is intelligible in itself, and not 
simply whether or not it corresponds in some sense to 
revelation. The idea that the divine being itself is 
determined by divine choice in the existential sense 
clearly has implications extending beyond how we understand 
the economy; what we are concerned with here is a 
fundamental metaphysical principle which is predicated of 
no less than God and is intended to serve as the basis for 
a whole theology. As such, it will have systematic 
implications extending beyond the doctrine of God into the 
whole of our theological system, including, for example, 
theological anthropology. The question whether or not it 
can be sustained in the metaphysical sense cannot be 
avoided so easily.
The fact is, therefore, that if God shows himself to 
be love, and so is. love in himself, then the language of 
the divine decision should be abandoned, or at least 
qualified analogically, since there could have been no 
other alternative for God than love. As we have seen, 
however, Barth appears to hold that the idea of the divine 
decision obtains in a quite literal sense. On the other 
hand, Barth does treat the "perfections of the divine 
loving" prior to the "perfections of the divine freedom" in 
Church Dogmatics II/l, and makes the case that each is 
complete in itself, containing all the others.94 God's love, 
therefore, is his freedom, and his freedom is his love. 
However, if this is the case, again, then the language of 
decision is inappropriate; the conclusion is not that God 
simply chose to be "for us," but that - if Barth is right
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in suggesting that what God is ad extra he is ad intra - 
God's being "for us" is his being "for himself," so that 
God, in fact, made no choice at all. While the idea of the 
Word as the eternal man might still be able to survive, 
therefore, it could only do so by being divorced from the 
radical voluntarist conceptuality Barth employs.
These questions will be taken up in more detail in 
Chapter IV, where we shall see that Barth's understanding 
of the divine freedom, of God as event, and of election, 
together with its problematic nature, derives from his 
attempt to avoid the Hegelian view that the relation of the 
economic to the immanent Trinity can be apprehended in 
speculative logic. Despite the fact that Barth's position 
has questionable theological implications, however, it has 
been taken up extensively in post-Barthian Trinitarian 
theology. The problematic character of this theology of 
divine freedom is here, however, if anything, more obvious. 
This will become clear in our discussion of contemporary 
Trinitarian Pneumatology. For the moment, however, we turn 
to the second major source of the idea of the unity of the 
economic with the immanent Trinity in contemporary 
theology, the theology of Karl Rahner.
3. Rahner's Axiom
By way of further orientation to the development of 
the doctrine of the Trinity in contemporary theology, we 
turn now to Rahner's axiom that the economic is the 
immanent Trinity, and vice versa, which had considerable 
influence on subsequent Roman Catholic Trinitarian 
theology. Rahner's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity 
also reflects in many ways the central Trinitarian concerns 
of Barth's theology, so that his axiom serves as common 
ground in various contemporary Protestant treatments of the 
doctrine of the Trinity as well. In this sense, Rahner's 
position is representative of the specific Trinitarian
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theologies with which we will be concerned in Chapter III.95
The position against which Rahner's axiom is 
formulated is precisely the post-Nicene, and in particular, 
the Augustinian (Latin) understanding of the Trinity, where 
the distinction between the idea of the Trinity in itself, 
with three eternally consubstantial hvoostaseis. and the 
Trinity of the economy of salvation, is fundamental to the 
whole conception. Rahner's dictum is directed in particular 
against the idea that the immanent Trinity is by definition 
truly God as he is in himself, over against the God who 
creates and redeems ad extra, and who, because and to the 
extent that he is involved with what he is not by nature, 
is a more metaphysically ambiguous reality.
Rahner's axiom thus marks an attempt to unify what
traditional theology distinguishes. At the same time,
however, it also presupposes the distinction already drawn
in the older tradition, and therefore in some sense also
the validity of the distinction. In his Trinitarian axiom,
in other words, Rahner works within the terms of the
distinction in order to formulate, not an undifferentiated
view of the Trinity, but one in which two (still)
differentiated aspects are somehow held together. For this
reason, i.e., because Rahner's position is constructed in
the light of the post-Nicene theology of the Trinity, the
question arises whether or not Rahner's Trinitarian axiom
confuses the eternal and the temporal, and ultimately God's
own self-relatedness with his gracious condescension to
what he is not by nature. If what we see in God's gracious
acts in Jesus Christ is given only under the mode of
96kenosis. in other words, can Rahner's axiom be sustained?
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95It must be said, however, that Rahner's axiom can 
also be quoted in a variety of theologies for the simple 
reason that the logical force of the copula "is" in the 
formula "the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and 
vice versa." is ambiguous.
96Cf. Congar o p . cit. , III, pp. 3-17.
In this sense, Rahner's theology raises certain of the 
central problems which appear again in contemporary 
Trinitarian theologies of the Holy Spirit. If the 
distinction between the economic and the immanent Trinity 
is to be maintained, first of all, then one has to ask on 
what philosophical and theological basis. The problem here 
is that the older philosophical basis of the distinction, 
in particular, has largely disappeared in the philosophy of 
the modern era in general and of the past two centuries in 
particular. Secondly, the question of the precise meaning 
of the unity of the economic and the immanent Trinity which 
is asserted must be raised: what, in short, is the meaning 
of the "is" in Rahner's axiom and in its reinterpretation 
in the context of contemporary Trinitarian theologies?
Rahner's dictum must, therefore, be read as a 
polemical and radical thesis, directed against certain 
aspects of the older tradition of Trinitarian theology. His 
axiom states that the economic Trinity "is" the immanent 
Trinity, and vice versa, so that the point is in some sense 
to identify or to assert the fundamental unity of the 
economic and immanent aspects that the theological 
tradition, in effect, holds apart. The revolutionary 
character of Rahner's position in this sense is important 
to remember, and for this reason, its presuppositions and 
implications should be carefully examined.
Rahner's positive argument concerning the Trinity is 
essentially that the mysteries of grace or salvation and of 
God himself in his Trinitarian reality must be understood 
as one mystery, in such a way that the doctrine of the 
Trinity can be seen explicitly to live out of the 
existential concern for salvation.97 His understanding of 
this new approach is clearly formulated in the place where 
he first states his Trinitarian axiom, directly 
characterizing it as the "basic thesis which establishes
101
97Rahner, The Trinity, p. 39.
[the] connection between the treatises [on the doctrines of 
salvation and the Trinity] and presents the Trinity as a 
mystery of salvation (in its reality and not merely as a 
doctrine)...."98 To say that the economic is the immanent 
Trinity and vice versa is therefore to say, for Rahner, 
that the doctrine of the Trinity is to be understood as a 
basic and essential expression of the reality of salvation.
Rahner's axiom, as a result, is also negatively 
orientated to certain aspects of the metaphysical tradition 
underlying Roman Catholic theology. This can be seen when 
its polemical presuppositions and implications are brought 
into view. Rahner's thesis is a theological protest against 
what he sees as the tendency in Christian piety and 
specifically in the older textbook theology of the Roman 
Catholic tradition to monotheism at the expense of a fully
99developed Trinitarianism. The doctrine of the Trinity is 
here effectively isolated both from Christian spirituality 
and from the rest of the dogmatic system, with the result 
that, in the ordinary Christian consciousness, at least, 
the Trinity becomes simply a mystery which we know 
something about through revelation, but with little or no 
other relation to ourselves.100 The systematic expression of 
this doctrinal isolation of the Trinity, for Rahner - and 
the real symbol, as it were, of its grip on the theological 
imagination - is the customary (Thomist) theological 
separation between the dogmatic treatises De Deo Uno and De 
Deo Trino.101 Rahner observes that what is in question in the 
former is the divine essence common to the three persons, 
but abstracted from them and conceived in a metaphysical 
manner. He then distinguishes this from the biblical (and
102
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101Ibid. . pp. 15-21.
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Eastern) approach to the mystery of God which begins with 
the one unoriginate divinity, the Father; this one God is 
understood from salvation history as the God who begets, 
breathes forth, and sends his Son and his Spirit, thus 
introducing the basic content of the doctrine of the 
Trinity from the outset.102
Rahner's argument is that an analogous approach in the 
contemporary context is required in order to resolve the 
doctrinal isolation of the Trinity in Western theology. 
First, the doctrine of God would be given a basically 
Trinitarian structure from the beginning, thus mitigating 
the excessively metaphysical content of the traditional 
doctrine of God and orienting the doctrine more directly 
towards salvation history.103 Second, the doctrines of God
102Ibid. . pp. 17-18.
103ln The Trinity. Rahner does not explicitly address 
the question what should become of the metaphysical God of 
Thomas Aquinas and of the subsequent tradition within the 
new approach. The question is, however, taken up elsewhere, 
for example, in his essay, "Observations on the Doctrine of 
God in Catholic Dogmatics," in Karl Rahner, Theological 
Investigations. trans. Graham Harrison (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1972), IX, p. 133, where he argues that the 
traditional order of the treatises On the One God and 
the Triune God is to be maintained, but that the content of 
the former must be modified in such a way as "to include 
the experience of salvation history." Cf. also Rahner, 
"Trinity in Theology," in Rahner et al. . eds., Sacramentum 
Mundi (London: Burns & Oates, 1970), VI, p. 305: "For if
the treatise De Deo Uno is to be real theology and not mere 
metaphysics, it cannot speak of the one God and his nature 
without speaking of the God of history and of a historical 
experience of him, of the God of a possible revelation and 
self-communication. Hence it is already orientated to the 
treatise De Deo Trino, which deals with such a God in 
salvation history." Thus we arrive at a doctrine of God 
which, in intention at least, is less strictly 
metaphysically conceived, and which is instead constructed 
retrospectively from the event of revelation in Christ, 
from which the specifically Christian knowledge of God is 
taken to begin. In addressing the question of the oneness 
of God with which we are largely concerned in the De Deo 
Uno. therefore, we must in fact be concerned with the unity 
of the Trinity as such. That unity, Rahner argues, must be 
understood with the biblical and Greek tradition as founded
and of the Trinity could be constructed directly in 
relation to the doctrines of salvation, so that both the 
ordinary Christian consciousness of the mystery of God and 
its formal dogmatic elaboration as well would no longer be 
isolated from the basic Christian proclamation of God's 
grace.
Rahner's critique of the standard Thomist position is 
thus that the doctrine of God in himself is here 
insufficiently related to salvation history and to the
concrete life of faith. His claim is, in fact, that if the
doctrine of the Trinity were to be abandoned, very little
would have to change from a systematic point of view: in 
the ordinary Christian consciousness and in the "textbook 
theology" to which Rahner refers, it is, in effect, God who 
is understood to have become flesh in the incarnation
rather than the Logos specifically; indeed, according to 
Rahner:
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...starting from Augustine, and as 
opposed to the older tradition, it has 
been among theologians a more or less 
foregone conclusion that each of the 
divine persons (if God freely so 
decided) could have become man, so that 
the incarnation of precisely this 
person can tell us nothing about the
in the Father as the unoriginate source of the other two 
persons: "... if the title De Deo Uno is taken seriously, 
we are not dealing merely with the essence and attributes 
of God, but with the unity of the three divine persons. It 
is the unity of Father, Son and Spirit and not merely the 
unicity of the godhead, the mediated unity, of which the 
Trinity is the proper fulfilment, and not the immediate 
unicity of the divine nature which if considered as one 
numerically is of itself far from providing the foundation 
of the three-fold unitv in God. But if one begins with the 
treatise De Deo Uno and not with De Divinitate Una, one is 
concerned at once with the Father, the unoriginated origin 
of the Son and the Spirit. And it is then strictly 
impossible to place one treatise after the other in the 
disjointed fashion which is still so common today." (Karl 
Rahner, "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise 'De Trinitate'," 
in Rahner, Theological Investigations, IV, p. 102.)
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peculiar features of this person within 
the divinity.
What the Trinity is in itself thus appears in substance to 
be unrelated to the economy of salvation.
Against this, Rahner's thesis is that the Trinity is 
"a mystery of salvation, otherwise it would never have been 
revealed."105 Behind this lies Rahner's key soteriological 
thesis that the basis of human salvation is a real divine 
self-communication to men and women by which we come to 
share in the divine life: salvation has its basis in God, 
in the precise sense that the grace of salvation is not 
created grace, but rather God himself in his saving 
activity in the creation.106 The point is that if God has 
not communicated himself in the economy of salvation, then 
the whole economy breaks down as having no adequately 
theological basis. His argument here is essentially 
constructed on the model of the anti-Arian polemics of the 
patristic era, being specifically intended to exclude the 
idea that the Son and the Holy Spirit, the agents of the 
economy, are merely "provisional and incomplete mediations" 
between the Father and creation.107 A genuine self- 
communication of God, he argues, is therefore necessary for 
an adequate soteriology.
Two questions arise in this context, one concerning 
the meaning of the "self-communication" of God mentioned, 
and the other, its relation to the economic-immanent 
Trinitarian identity asserted in Rahner's axiom. To take 
the question of meaning first, it is possible, clearly, to 
exclude from Rahner's theology the idea of an economic
10ARahner, The Trinity, p. 11.
105Ibid. . p. 21, italics deleted.
106Ibid. , pp. 34-35.
107Rahner, "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise ' De 
Trinitate'," p. 97.
self-communication of the Father through the Son and in the 
Spirit along Middle or Neoplatonic lines (the path taken by- 
Augustine in the De Trinitate. which presupposes the theory 
of illumination and of the mind's participation in God108); 
Rahner explicitly restricts the idea of the economic 
Trinity to the biblical accounts of Jesus and the 
continuing life of grace in the Church, through the 
sacraments, etc. Rahner, therefore, clearly means by the 
divine self-communication in the economy the temporal 
coming of the Son of God in Jesus Christ and the gift of 
the Holy Spirit to the Church. Only thus can the doctrine 
be truly conceived as "a mystery of salvation," as we have 
seen.
Beyond this, however, problems remain. It is possible, 
for example, for God to reveal something without, strictly
106
10ftThe distinction between scientia and sapientia which 
occupies Augustine in Books XIII and XIV of the De 
Trinitate is important in this context; the theory of 
illumination is to be associated with the latter. Scientia. 
which is the first form of intellection in Augustine's 
theology of the Trinity, deals with the God of biblical 
revelation, and is characterized as the knowledge of 
temporal things pertaining to faith. In scientia the 
supreme grace is that mankind is united with God in the 
unity of one person, Jesus Christ, who has released us from 
death and opened the way to immortality. In sapientia. by 
contrast, we contemplate the eternal as eternal. Temporal 
knowledge of the incarnation, mediated through Scripture 
and tradition, therefore, is finite, whereas sapientia is 
knowledge of the eternal, the possibility of which is 
grounded in the fact that the mind is in essence a created 
being which already participates in God by virtue of an 
immediate illumination by the eternal Word. That the mind 
is such, of course, is a direct result of the creative 
activity of God, by which we are not only given existence, 
but are also given a glimpse of the eternal divine Wisdom, 
reaching out to the creation by virtue of the divine 
goodness. Here we meet, in effect, another economic Trinity 
beyond the God of biblical revelation in Augustine's 
theology, in which, at the level of sapientia, the Trinity 
is discerned in the mind itself, in its being, 
intelligibility, and love, which reveal something of the 
being, intelligibility, and love of the God in which the 
mind participates, and which is the very basis of the 
mind's own rational reality.
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speaking, revealing himself, much less communicating 
himself in the sense of literally passing over into a 
finite presence so that the latter can be truly designated 
as "God." One cannot, therefore, move immediately from the 
idea that Jesus Christ reveals God to the idea that God has 
communicated himself in Jesus Christ in this strict sense, 
although on other grounds, this view could be shown to be 
required. The idea of communication, in short, does not 
necessarily involve the idea of self-communication; human 
communication, at least, is not self-communication in the 
sense employed by Rahner, but is rather, in general, a 
linguistic or practical phenomenon which involves only the 
communication of an idea or attitude within a given shared 
framework of interpretation, or language. While there is, 
perhaps, a very partial revelation of the self in language, 
it remains the case that by my words I formulate and 
concretize my own thought and ensure that others understand 
what I have in mind in a particular situation, but in 
language I do not literally objectify my complete self or
109communicate what I literally am.
109Cf. also Karl Rahner, "The Theology of the Symbol," 
in Rahner, Theological Investigations. IV, p. 225, where 
Rahner defines symbolic representation as the "most 
primordial manner in which one reality can represent 
another," and continues: "...we call this supreme and
primal representation, in which one reality renders another 
present (primarily 'for itself' and only secondarily for 
others) a symbol: the representation which allows the other 
'to be there'." The humanity of Christ, Rahner argues, is 
such a symbol; it is that which renders the eternal Word of 
God present in the most immediate sense (ibid. , pp. 236- 
240). The presupposition of this, however, according to 
Rahner, is that the humanity cannot be considered to be 
merely something in which the Word "dresses up and
masquerades," but rather that "when God, expressing 
himself, exteriorizes himself, that very thing appears 
which we call the humanity of the Logos" (ibid., p. 239). 
In other words, the relation between the eternal Word of 
God and the humanity assumed in the hypostatic union cannot 
be simply external, as if the Word could have been
expressed perceptibly in any number of created realities; 
if this were so, Rahner argues, the humanity would be
merely a "signal" rather than a symbol in the sense
Despite these difficulties, however, it is clear that 
by "self-communication," Rahner means to denote the fact 
that God has given himself in a literal sense to human 
beings in the economy of salvation. The idea, as such, is 
drawn from the theological tradition, and is intended to 
represent the view that only such a real presence of God, 
through the Son and Spirit, in the saving economy is 
sufficient to guarantee its soteriological significance. 
From this point of view, the idea of self-communication 
would appear to be an attempt to express in more dynamic, 
relational terms, what is essentially given in the
homoousion: that the one who is present with mankind in
Jesus of Nazareth is true God, and not a lesser mediator 
between the Creator and his creation.
If, secondly, only a self-communication of God in the 
economy of salvation will do, it further follows for Rahner 
that there must also be a real self-communication in the 
immanent life of the Trinity. 'The Trinity ad extra and ad 
intra is identical, because one would not be speaking of a 
self-communication of God unless the two missions and the 
two persons thus there for us, in whom God comes to us, 
were "part" of God himself.'110 If the self-communication of 
the Father through the Son and in the Holy Spirit
constitutes the essential content of the Trinitarian 
dynamic of the economy of salvation, in other words, then 
this self-communication must also likewise be fundamental 
in the immanent Trinitarian life. Otherwise, Rahner argues, 
not only our sonship, but also the Sonship of the incarnate 
Son, would be unrelated to the immanent life of the
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defined, and thus an incomplete self-communication of the 
Word (ibid. . p. 237) . If, however, the idea of self­
communication as employed in Rahner is problematic, then 
Rahner's theology of the symbol, which depends upon that 
theory of interpersonal communication, is also put in 
question.
1l0Karl Rahner, "Trinity, Divine," Sacramentum Mundi, 
VI, p. 300.
Trinity, while our experience of grace in the Church, which 
is appropriated to the Holy Spirit in the economy, could 
not be understood to have its eternal grounding in the Holy 
Spirit in the Trinity itself.111
Within this conception, Rahner develops his 
understanding of the innertrinitarian processions of the 
Son and Spirit in terms of the modalities of the ad extra 
divine self-communication. The latter, according to Rahner, 
occurs in two distinct but related ways: insofar as it
happens in history, it occurs as "truth"; insofar as it 
opens this history to transcendence and towards the future 
kingdom, it occurs as "love."112 These two modalities are, 
of course, in a certain sense grounded in the 
anthropological conditions of the possibility of the divine 
self-communication, in the sense that they presuppose 
temporality and the existential historicity of human 
beings. But in the deeper sense, they correspond to the 
events of revelation: in Jesus, God's self-communication 
appears as truth in the sense that Jesus is the concrete 
historical revelation, objectively represented in human 
history, of the personal character of God; in the gift of 
the Holy Spirit, the moment of the subjective realization 
of this divine self-offering is in question, in the sense 
that it comes to determine the future in the existential 
sense. It is not, according to Rahner, that the divine 
self-communication only appears under these modes to us. 
Rather, they can only be understood as the self­
communication of God if they also belong, prior to their 
economic expression, to God in himself.
Thus a transcendental theological deduction, in which 
the immanent Trinity is posited as the condition of the 
possibility of the economic, yields, for Rahner, the 
following basic immanent Trinitarian structure. There is
109
111Rahner, The Trinity, p. 30.
112Ibid. . pp. 82-85; 98-99.
innertrinitarian distinction, in the sense that there is 
the unoriginate Father who mediates himself to himself, the 
Son who is uttered by the Father in existential fidelity to 
himself, and the Spirit who is the reception and love of 
the other for himself.113 There is a double procession 
corresponding to these distinctions, in which there is 
utterance and the reception of the utterance, while that 
which is communicated here can 'rightly be called the 
divinity, hence the "essence" of God.'m  The Holy Spirit, 
finally, is conceived as the relational bond between the 
unoriginate self-communicator and his utterance, or between 
the Father and the Son.
Walter Kasper, in his critique of Rahner in The God of 
Jesus Christ, notes the remarkable fact that the theology 
Rahner develops here effectively mirrors that of the 
Augustinian-Western Trinitarian tradition, in that Rahner's 
theology represents the two processions in terms of 
knowledge and love.115 Kasper writes:
110
In the final analysis, by means of this 
transcendental theological deduction 
Rahner has renewed the essentials of 
Augustine's trinitarian speculation, 
although in doing so he has proceeded 
not by way of the analogia entis but by 
way of a synoptic presentation of the 
history of salvation itself. ... We 
cannot but admire the coherent way in 
which with the economic Trinity as his 
starting point Rahner attempts a 
theology of the Trinity from within; 
how at the same time he theologizes on 
the Trinity in the context of the 
modern philosophy of subjectivity; and 
how, last but not least, he succeeds 
in doing justice to the meaning and 
formulas of the classical tradition. 
The result is undoubtedly a bold and
113Ibid. . pp. 101-103.
1uIbid.. p. 102.
115Kasper, o p . cit. , p. 301.
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successful design that can only be 
classed with other great productions of 
Christian theology and that can best be 
compared with Anselm's deduction of the 
doctrine of the Trinity from rationes 
necessariae.1 6
Kasper goes on immediately, however, to criticize 
Rahner on three principal grounds.117 First, the basic 
orientation of Rahner1s Trinitarian theology towards the 
doctrine of salvation means that the doctrine of the 
Trinity can no longer play a structural role within 
Rahner's wider theology. Instead, in Rahner the doctrine of 
the Trinity has "handed its structuring role over to 
theological anthropology and is now studied only as a
11ftcondition of the possibility of the doctrine of grace."
Second, the loss of its structuring role leads to certain
alterations in the internal meaning of the doctrine of the
Trinity, most notably in that it loses its doxological
character when it is developed entirely soteriologically.
Thus, according to Kasper, the otherness of God as "Thou"
is "in danger of being lost in Rahner's thematizing of the
119subjectivity of man in his theology of the Trinity." 
Third, Rahner places so much stress on the economic self­
communication of God that it is difficult to arrive from 
this at a real inner self-communication within the Trinity. 
But the further implication of this weakness, for Kasper, 
is that if there is a deficient doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity, then there will necessarily be also a deficient 
doctrine of the economic Trinity. If, in short, it is 
difficult to speak of the divine hvoostaseis as subjects in 
the divine eternity, then it is difficult to see how it
116Ibid.
117Ibid. . pp. 302-303.
118Ibid. . p. 302.
119Ibid.
will be possible to speak of them as subjects in the 
history of salvation. This shows up, according to Kasper, 
in Rahner's Christology, where it is not clear that it is 
the Logos in whom the humanity of Christ subsists. In fact, 
Kasper argues, Rahner sees the hypostatic union as an 
unsurpassable mode of a self-communication in principle 
promised to everyone.120
All of this, however, misses what is perhaps the 
fundamental problem inherent in Rahner's position. Rahner's 
theology of the Trinity is intended as an attempt to 
construct the doctrine in explicit relation to the economy 
of salvation as such, without external philosophical 
presupposition or prejudice. While, as Rahner admits, 
philosophical and metaphysical thinking can never be by­
passed in theology (for any thinking which is 
systematically self-critical is philosophical and any which 
poses fundamental questions concerning what is ultimately 
real is metaphysical),121 his Trinitarian theology is 
nevertheless an attempt to by-pass the philosophical 
presuppositions of the tradition in order to establish the 
doctrine on separate, soteriological, ostensibly economic 
grounds. Kasper accepts this claim, which is, as we have 
seen, partly substantiated by Rahner's discussion of the 
treatises De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino.
The problem is, however, that Rahner's soteriological 
presuppositions are themselves highly metaphysical. The 
view, for example, that partial or incomplete mediations of 
the divine serve as an inadequate basis for salvation is an 
exact representation, although expressed materially in 
terms of the modern idea of the self-communicating subject, 
of the formal basis of the homoousion in the tradition - 
which is, as we have seen, anything but non-metaphysical.
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12QIbid. , pp. 302-303.
121Rahner, "Observations on the Doctrine of God," pp. 
143-144.
Secondly, the view that the doctrine of the Trinity must be 
formulated on the basis of the historical revelation of God 
in Jesus Christ and in the sending of the Spirit to the 
Church, rests upon the view that God is in himself 
something other than this historical revelation, for only 
in this way can he be understood to be revealed in it. And 
finally, the modes under which Rahner understands the 
generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit 
cannot be said to be directly drawn from the economy 
itself. Contrary to what Kasper argues, the analoqia entis 
is not abandoned; the "transcendental theological 
deduction" of the immanent Trinity from the economic is 
only rendered possible by the presupposition of an analogy 
of being (or perhaps, better, of an "analogy of existence") 
in the sense that the modes under which we experience God's 
self-communication - "truth" and "love" - could not be 
inferred to hold for God also in himself without the 
presupposition of an analogical relation. This is clear 
above all from the fact that Rahner's notions of truth as 
existential fidelity and of love as an opening towards 
transcendence and the future cannot, in themselves, apply 
to God in a literal sense, but only analogically - else the 
divine is reduced to temporal existentiality. The idea of 
the immanent Trinity as the exemplar of the economic, so 
central to the whole analogical procedure, has been 
retained; indeed, only in this way has the immanent / 
economic Trinitarian structure been sustained.
Ghislain Lafont's detailed critique of Rahner in Peut- 
on connafcre Dieu en Ousus-Christ? raises a further 
question about Rahner's Trinitarian Grundaxiom. concerning 
the general meaning of the assertion that the economic 
Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and vice versa.122 Lafont 
argues that while Rahner's Trinitarian axiom recognizes the 
necessity of a duality in language used of the Trinity, in
113
122Lafont, oo. cit. , pp. 190-228.
that it distinguishes between the economy and the Trinity 
in itself, Rahner's theology as a whole is insufficiently 
self-critical about such language, and as a result lacks 
conceptual precision.123 Lafont, for example, argues that 
while Rahner attempts to return to a Greek model of the 
Trinity by conceiving of the Father as the principle of 
Trinitarian unity, he unfortunately does not take account 
of the difference between pre-Nicene and post-Nicene Greek 
Trinitarian theologies; in fact, according to Lafont, 
Rahner effectively conflates a post-Nicene homoousiite 
position, in which the three Subsistenzweisen are seen as 
perfectly equal, with a characteristically pre-Nicene 
"linear" understanding of the relation between the internal 
and external unfolding of God, in which a certain 
subordinationism is inevitable.124 In the latter, what God 
is in his outreach to the world is taken to be simply an 
overflow of the internal relations between the Father and 
the Son and Spirit. The homoousion, by contrast, involves 
a clearer dualism than either the pre-Nicenes or Rahner 
allow between the economic and the immanent Trinity, since 
in principle it focuses theological attention on the 
immanent Trinity abstracted from the economy of 
salvation.125
The conceptual imprecision here, according to Lafont, 
leads to fundamental ambiguities in Rahner's view of the 
economic-immanent Trinitarian unity as such, with the 
result that the Trinitarian axiom itself is not fully
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123Ibid. . p. 226.
124Ibid. . pp. 190-197. According to Lafont, ibid. , pp.
191-192, Rahner in effect adopts the pre-Nicene concepts of 
the logos endiathentos and the logos prophorikos in his 
view of the identity of the immanent and the economic 
Trinity.
125Ibid. . pp. 23-24.
justified.126 Lafont argues that while the statement that 
the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity can be 
accepted, so long as the economic Trinity is understood in 
terms of the historical economy of the Christ-event and 
Pentecost, the vice versa which accompanies this in the 
Rahnerian axiom cannot be sustained. To affirm that the 
immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity would be, for 
Lafont, to jeopardize the freedom of God, and so the grace 
of God, by introducing the idea that the self-communication 
of the Father to the Son and in the Spirit necessarily 
issues in the creation of the world, and finally in the 
incarnation and Pentecost. According to Lafont, the great 
weakness which is implicit in this is that it would seem to 
be impossible that God, by nature, should do or be anything 
other than what he does and is in the economy.127 As we have 
already seen, this also appears to be implied by Barth's 
doctrine of election. We will return to this question more 
formally in Chapter IV.
4. The Trinity "Between Theism and Atheism"
The contemporary Trinitarian thesis has also been 
increasingly linked in recent theology with the critique in 
modern philosophy of traditional metaphysical 
presuppositions.128 This has resulted in a critique of the 
older Christian doctrine of God as immutable and
129impassible, which dates from the patristic era, in favour
126Ibid. . p. 226.
127Ibid. . pp. 217-220.
128Pannenberg, loc. cit.
129Pelikan, e.g., o p . cit., p. 229, writes: "...the
early Christian picture of God was controlled by the self- 
evident axiom, accepted by all, of the absoluteness and the 
impassibility of the divine nature. Nowhere in all of 
Christian doctrine was this axiom more influential than in 
christology, with the result that the content of the divine
115
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of what is intended to be a more explicitly Trinitarian 
doctrine of God, at once encompassing and geared to the 
economic events of the incarnation and Pentecost. This 
results in the common theme in contemporary theology of a 
doctrine of the Trinity which no longer relies on the older 
tradition of Christian theism - since this has become 
philosophically suspect, and has led, in fact, to 
philosophical atheism over the past two centuries - but 
which is constructed "between theism and atheism," as 
another current Trinitarian slogan puts it.130
John O'Donnell notes that there are two main types of
atheism in view in this overall position.131 The first is
protest atheism, which stems largely from the problem of
theodicy and the critical philosophy of, for example, Ernst
Bloch, while the second, and, I shall argue, the more
important, is the atheism of human freedom, deriving more
generally from the broad development of thought in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These draw upon the two
major movements of thought in the latter half of the
nineteenth and arguably the whole of the twentieth century:
humanism on the one hand and existentialism on the other,
or what John Macquarrie speaks of in Twentieth Century
Religious Thought as the Hegel-Marx-Bloch and the
132Kierkegaard-Nietzsche-Heidegger lines of thought. In what
as revealed in Christ was itself regulated by the 
axiomatically given definition of the deity of God. No one 
wanted to be understood as setting forth a view of Christ 
in which this definition was in any way compromised or 
j eopardized."
130Cf. Kasper, o p . cit. . pp. 3-64; Jüngel, op. cit, , pp. 
3-104; and Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, trans. R. A. 
Wilson and John Bowden (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1974), pp. 
200-207 .
1310 ' Donnell, o p . cit. , pp. 11-15.
132John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 378-379. Macquarrie's 
inclusion of Hegel in the humanist line, however, is 
questionable, since Hegel's own philosophy of "subjective
follows, I shall be concerned for the most part with the 
latter rather than with the former, since, while the 
distinction remains valid, the underlying idea in both 
streams which is of concern to us is the idea of freedom, 
so that the movement of thought in protest atheism can for 
our purposes here be broadly reduced to that underlying the 
atheism of freedom.
In the theological appropriation of protest atheism, 
the claim is sometimes made that contemporary theology must 
be developed as a "theology after Auschwitz," and thus that 
the Christian understanding of God can no longer be 
abstracted from the problem of suffering in human history.132 
The alternative, it is argued, would be for theology to 
lose relevance and credibility in the modern world: God
cannot be isolated from the finite by means of a via 
negativa, for example, in a world where the evil of 
Auschwitz occurred and is a continuing possibility, without 
himself becoming irrelevant to the needs of the world. 
This, it is argued, is precisely the weakness of 
traditional Christian theism; by positing a God who is in 
himself impassible, it insulates the divinity from the pain 
of the world, and in so doing, isolates the world from God.
Over against protest atheism, which rejects the God of 
Christian theism in the face of human suffering, one of the 
prominent tendencies of recent theology has been the 
development of a theology of the suffering of God, "between 
theism and atheism."13̂ The basic presupposition of this 
theology is derived from Barth: that God is to be
understood in himself as the God who chooses fellowship
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spirit" arguably underlies the existentialist tradition as 
much as his philosophy of "objective spirit" underlies the 
humanist tradition.
133Moltmann, o p . cit. , pp. 1-6.
134Cf., e.g., ibid. . pp. 249-252; and Paul Fiddes, The 
Creative Buffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 
pp. 1-45.
with his creation.135 This choice, however, is understood to 
entail suffering, not as a choice of suffering for its own 
sake, as it were, but because the choice of fellowship with 
the creation involves suffering with the creation. At the 
centre of this theology stands the cross, since this
reveals what the choice of fellowship entails for God 
himself, and since it is here, for Christian theology, that 
God is most fully revealed. In Moltmann's words. "A God who 
is conceived of in his omnipotence, perfection and infinity 
at man's expense cannot be the God who is love in the cross
of Jesus ... who 'became poor to make many rich'."136
Significantly, the specific form in which this
doctrine has appeared has been as a doctrine of the 
Trinity; its foundations in the event of the cross requires 
such a differentiated view of God in the "persons" of the 
Father and the Son at least. (We shall see in Chapter III 
how the Holy Spirit also appears in this theology.) 
According to Moltmann, for example:
With a trinitarian theology of the 
cross faith escapes the dispute between 
and the alternative of theism and 
atheism; God is not only other-worldly 
by also this-worldly; he is not only 
God, but also man; he is not only rule, 
authority and law but the event of 
suffering, liberating love.137
The argument is that what God is in his immanent 
Trinitarian being cannot be isolated from what he is in the 
economy of salvation. This leads, as we shall see later in 
this study, to a basically "dipolar," or better, 
"dialectical" doctrine of God, and to a specifically 
Trinitarian doctrine of God, where the idea of the unity of
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135Ibid. . pp. 100-109.
136Moltmann, o p . cit. , p. 250.
137Ibid. . p. 252.
the economic with the immanent Trinity is fundamental. In 
this way, an attempt is made to reconcile God with 
suffering, so that an answer can be given to protest 
atheism, and so that God, in fact, can be specifically 
understood as the triune God who, in his gracious 
condescension to us in Jesus Christ, takes the part of the 
suffering and who is thus himself a partisan in the human 
struggle against suffering.
In the theological tradition, of course, God does 
indeed suffer on the cross, but only as man, i.e., through 
the communicatio idiomatum in the incarnation. The conflict 
with Arianism, within the terms of the classical 
presupposition that God in his ousia is impassible, forced 
this conclusion, for the Arians argued that the Son who 
suffered could not be equal in divine status and being to 
the Father, who did not suffer.138 The Greek idea of the 
divine as the immutable and of the non-divine as the 
mutable was the shared presupposition of both the Arian and 
the orthodox parties. When translated into Christological 
terms, this meant either that the Son of God suffered on 
the cross and was not divine, or at least not divine in the 
same sense as the Father, or else that the Son in himself 
also did not suffer on the cross, and so can still be God 
in the full sense - despite, as it were, the cross.
While, therefore, the development of the doctrine of 
the Trinity in the light of protest atheism in contemporary 
Trinitarian theology proceeds from the point of view of 
God's own condescension to mankind in Jesus Christ, and 
above all in the cross, it also depends upon the collapse 
of the older metaphysical view which upholds the idea of 
divine immutability. Just as patristic Trinitarian theology 
was conceived in terms of philosophical concepts such as 
divine immutability and ousia which were the common 
inheritance of all Christian theologians, so the very
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collapse of the philosophical conceptions underlying the 
patristic doctrine has made the development of a new 
Trinitarian theology inevitable. Indeed, from this point of 
view, it is the same philosophical movement underlying the 
collapse of those older categories which also underlies the 
contemporary concern to assert the unity of the economic 
with the immanent Trinity.
This, in effect, introduces the atheism of human 
freedom, which even more directly rests upon the collapse 
of the older metaphysics as appropriated in the Christian 
theological tradition. The metaphysical tradition is 
tremendously varied in its emphases, of course, but in 
general, it was united in the basic conviction that truths 
and values are absolute in some sense, and that it is only 
by virtue of a rational or spiritual relation to those 
absolutes, and ultimately to God, in whom all such truths 
and values are summed up, that our distinctive humanity is 
realized. Even the rise of modern philosophy in the 
seventeenth century and in its subsequent development can 
be seen to have left this presupposition essentially 
intact, although it must be said that it attempted to 
establish it on a new foundation, namely, the Cartesian 
cooito.139
It would no doubt be possible to trace the development 
of the atheism of human freedom from the origins of modern 
philosophy in Descartes140 through the Enlightenment down to
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139This is certainly true in the case of Rationalism. 
Empiricism, particularly as represented in the philosophy 
of Hume, does challenge this thesis, but even so remains a 
relatively minor phenomenon over against the wider 
philosophical development of post-Cartesian philosophy. 
This is seen in the fact that the Kantian philosophy is the 
overcoming of Hume, and the establishing again of the 
possibility of a priori knowledge, even if more rigorously 
on the basis of the subjective consciousness.
140A number of theologians argue that the philosophy of 
Descartes marks the beginning of the development of modern 
atheism, in the sense that Descartes' achievement in 
founding a system of philosophy and science on the sheer
Kant, and finally into the more radical existential and 
humanist philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This has, however, been done at length by 
others, and there is no need here to rehearse the familiar 
material.141 What is, after all, of particular significance 
in all of this is relatively simple: contemporary cultural 
thinking about God in the post-Christian era presents a 
profound crisis to Christian theology. The so-called "death 
of God," which refers primarily to the death of the 
cultural significance of God, but which has, as such, deep 
intellectual roots in the course of modern thought, raises 
questions of the significance of God also for contemporary 
Christian theology, which shares the same cultural 
traditions.
Jungel's starting-point in God as the Mystery of the 
World. for example, is the assumption that the God of 
Christian theism is indeed dead.142 In this, he follows not 
only Hegel, who spoke in his own day of the cultural death 
of God (and fought against it) , but also Nietzsche, and 
Heidegger, who hold that the Christian metaphysical 
tradition reached its logical conclusion with the death of 
God; the idea of God as transcendent, absolute, impassible, 
timeless, and, in a word, "over us," has simply come to be 
seen in this tradition as a dangerous abstraction on the 
one hand and as a philosophical absurdity on the other, in
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act of thought as such issued, albeit unintentionally, in 
the development of the anthropocentric philosophy and 
theology of the Enlightenment. Chief among these is Jiingel, 
o p . cit.. pp. 111-126, whose judgment on Descartes is 
extremely severe: that in his philosophy God is totally
relativized by man. This judgment can, however, be 
questioned from the point of view of the Cartesian 
philosophy itself.
141Probably the best account in the context of 
Trinitarian theology is given by Kasper, op..— cit. , pp. 
16f f.
142Jiingel, o p . cit. , pp. 3ff.
view of the sheer finitude of human thought.143 Here we 
have, in essence, a denial of the metaphysical idea of the 
transcendent God of the Western tradition, carried out in 
the name of the metaphysical primacy and ultimacy of this- 
worldly life, taken as the starting-point of Trinitarian 
theology.144
From the point of view of the history of ideas, the 
crucial period in this whole development was undoubtedly 
the nineteenth century, when the idea of the necessity of 
a rational or spiritual human relation to the transcendent 
was put in question. This occurred on a cultural level 
largely as a result of factors such as the achievements of 
nineteenth century empirical science, the positing of the 
theory of evolution by Darwin, and the remarkable sense of 
confidence in humanity which emerged as a result of rapid 
technological development. More importantly, however, it 
occurred specifically in the nineteenth century 
philosophical tradition.
Karl Lowith, for example, has traced this development 
in his study of nineteenth century philosophy, From Hegel 
to Nietzsche.145 Lowith begins his discussion with the 
philosophy of Hegel, for whom essentially the human destiny 
of freedom is still realized only in the context of the 
human relationship with God.146 Thus, for Hegel the truth of 
mankind does not merely lie in ethical or bourgeois 
political life, and much less in individual sensuous 
existence, but rather in God: the truth of mankind is
spirit, and spirit is a theological category of
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143Ibid. . pp. 45-49, with reference to Martin Heidegger, 
"Nietzsche's Wort 'Gott ist tot'," in his Holzwege (4th 
ed.; Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1963), pp. 193ff.
144Jüngel, o p . cit. , pp. 49-55.
145Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. David
E. Green (London: Constable, 1965).
146Ibid. . pp. 19-20.
relationship.147 It is the anthropological understanding 
which is important to grasp here, for although Lowith notes 
that the radical philosophers of the nineteenth century- 
regarded Hegel's philosophy as the end of metaphysics in 
the old sense, what was important to them was not the end 
of traditional metaphysical thought per se. but that the 
end of metaphysics in this sense must herald a decisively 
new, and radical, understanding of what human nature is, 
and so of what it is to be distinctively human:
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Hegel [in the interpretation of the 
radicals of nineteenth century 
philosophy] brings to an end the truly 
metaphysical definitions of man, which 
define him from the standpoint of 
something absolute. Starting with 
Feuerbach, man was considered 
anthropologically, from the conditional 
standpoint of the finite individual. 
Only this individual man, based upon 
himself, gives rise to an actual 
problem of man.14
The importance of Lowith's analysis lies in particular 
in his understanding of the distinctively anti-Hegelian 
and, via Hegel, the anti-metaphysical character of the 
philosophical revolution of the nineteenth century. Lowith 
notes, for example, the fact that the rejection of the 
traditional notion of humanness, defined in Christian 
theology in terms of the human relation to God, meant also 
that the idea of humanness itself was effectively called 
into question once its older theological foundation had 
been lost:
At first, the nineteenth century 
believed it possible to replace
Christianity with humanity and humanism 
(Feuerbach, Ruge, Marx), but with the
147Ibid. . pp. 307-308.
148Ibid. . pp. 308-309.
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result that faith was finally lost in 
humanity (Stirner, Kierkegaard,
Nietzsche). A further consequence of 
the doubt in a humanity emancipated 
from Christianity is the present 
"dehumanization" of man. The inner 
logic of this development can be traced 
step by step in the characteristic 
representatives of the historical 
movement of the nineteenth century.149
Over against the older metaphysical anthropology 
represented by Hegel (and which Lowith understands, 
significantly, as the "Christian" view in the above 
quotation), which understands humanity primarily in 
relation to the Absolute, the nineteenth century revolution 
begins with the assumption that what is distinctively human 
- human spirituality and human freedom in all its concrete 
associations - is indeed a purely human reality, grounded, 
not in a transcendent divine being or order of existence, 
but rather in finite human existence as such. But this is 
to say also that the old, supposedly "absolute" order of 
truth and value is fully given in the finite. As the 
philosophical revolution proceeds, therefore, the sense of 
literally absolute truth and value is lost, while the 
absoluteness. as it were, of sheer human facticity is 
preserved. It is this problem which continues to haunt 
Western philosophy, Western culture, and Western theology, 
and as a cultural phenomenon, it is precisely this which 
constitutes the atheism of human freedom.
The position represented here by Jiingel in particular 
in response to this movement is essentially an attempt to 
by-pass the atheistic critique of God in the name of 
freedom on two counts. First of all, it takes the content 
of the Christian faith itself as an implicit critique of 
the theistic God who is removed from the finitude of the 
world, by understanding the economy as integral to the
K9Ibid.. p. 310.
divine life. Secondly, it preserves the idea of the freedom 
of humanity as conceived philosophically by no longer 
making God a threat to it; it is, in short, no longer the 
case for Jiingel and for the theological tradition he 
represents, either that the true, the good, and the 
beautiful are absolutes which, in consequence, are 
theological in character in that sense, or that God himself 
is absolute as in the older tradition. From this point of 
view, rather, God is neither foreign to finite historicity, 
nor finite historicity foreign to God. The two, in fact, 
are brought together in the Christ-event, and, for Jiingel 
in particular, above all in the event of the cross, where 
the deity of God is defined.150 Here God's existential unity 
with finitude defines his own essential unity with 
finitude, so that to think of God no longer demands, for 
example, that one think of the supreme essence, "than which 
none greater can be conceived," which the finitude of human 
thought as now conceived cannot accommodate, but rather 
that God is found in the finitude which characterizes the 
totality of human being itself.
The idea of the unity of the economic and the immanent 
Trinity, from this point of view, is not merely an 
accidental by-product of this line of reasoning, but rather 
follows from the basic principle upon which the whole 
scheme rests. For it is not simply the case here that the 
immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity are separate, but 
correspond in some ill-defined sense; instead, what God is 
as immanent Trinity is what he is in the economy, in the 
sense that the unity of God with Jesus Christ and the 
continuing mission of Christ through his Spirit in the 
Church is. what God is. Thus, out of the rejection of 
classical Christian theism there springs a new direction in 
Trinitarian theology, Trinitarian theology itself being the
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150Jungel, o p . cit. , p. 202. See also below, Chapter 
III, section 2.
means by which the very concept of God is, as it were, 
"rehabilitated" after the collapse of the older 
metaphysical tradition. God not only cannot be conceived as 
the absolute "other," according to the atheism of freedom 
which finds the concept unthinkable, but God, in the 
Christian conception, according to the new line of 
theological thought, must not be thought as such, since God 
is revealed in Jesus Christ, not as the transcendent God of 
the older tradition, but rather as the God who "identifies 
himself" with the finite in Jesus Christ and in the Holy 
Spirit.
It is thus the doctrine of the Trinity itself, as a 
doctrine of the unity of the economic and immanent Trinity, 
which enables contemporary theology to find a way beyond 
both classical theism and contemporary atheism. Through the 
idea of the unity of God in himself and in his economic 
condescension, the isolation of God as metaphysically 
absolute and thus the view of God as philosophically 
inadmissable and culturally irrelevant can be banished, 
while this issues in a new form and role for the doctrine 
of the Trinity as such. Instead of serving as a guarantee 
of the saving efficacy of the work of the Son and Spirit, 
as in patristic theology, or an abstract doctrine of God 
in himself which is accepted on the basis of authority and 
which remains only to be logically clarified, as in later 
scholastic theology, the doctrine of the Trinity as such 
becomes the Christian concept of God in the face of the 
theological problem of contemporary atheism, and an 
expression of the idea that God is not to be conceived in 
glorious isolation from the world, but is himself in some 
sense one with the finite order of human experience, which 
is, for contemporary thought, the real locus of religious 
meaning, as of everything else that is practically and 
intellectually significant.
Very large theological and philosophical questions 
thus surround the development of the theology of the
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Trinity in the contemporary era. It would, for example, be 
possible to discuss the problem of the unity of the 
economic and the immanent Trinity in the context of the 
general theological and philosophical question of the 
concepts of time and eternity, or, again, with the concepts 
of passibility and impassibility explicitly in view in this 
sense. In fact, much of the development of the doctrine of 
the Trinity in the contemporary era is closely bound up 
with these specific problems. In the present context, 
however, certain limitations are obviously required, and 
for this reason, it is necessary to restrict discussion as 
much as possible to the idea of the unity of the economic 
with the immanent Trinity, as it appears in formal 
discussions of Trinitarian theology and in concrete 
contemporary Trinitarian theologies of the Holy Spirit.
We have seen that the contemporary attempt to 
reorientate the doctrine of the Trinity to the economy of 
salvation, and to develop the doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity from the economic, "sub specie temooris." as it was 
put in the Introduction, involves a radical reformulation 
of Trinitarian theology. By way of anticipation, we will 
see further in Chapter IV that contemporary Trinitarian 
theology can broadly be characterized as "dialectical," 
since the relatedness of the immanent Trinity to the 
economic is here held to be not only soteriologically 
necessary, but ontologically necessary to the very 
constitution of the Trinity as such. Certain of the 
problems involved in this conception will also be discussed 
in Chapter IV. First, however, we turn to the question of 
the place of the Holy Spirit in the doctrine of the Trinity 




THEOLOGIES OF THE HOLY SPIRIT
In this Chapter, four contemporary Trinitarian 
theologies of the Holy Spirit, drawn from the economy of 
salvation and developed on the basis of the idea of the 
unity of the economic with the immanent Trinity, will be 
considered. Since, in principle, any Pneumatological aspect 
of the economy might be developed in this way, the "models" 
to which we shall limit ourselves cannot be taken to be 
exhaustive of all the possibilities. Nevertheless, the four 
to be considered represent the main lines of the recent 
development of Trinitarian Pneumatology. There will, of 
course, be points at which the various theological 
positions overlap; since all are, in intention at least, 
derived from the economy of salvation and are developed in 
relation to the theological tradition, particular themes 
recur in the different models. However, as we shall see, 
the characteristic emphases of the various theologies 
justify the separate categorizations.
The first of our models, the "revealedness model," 
represents the Pneumatology of Barth himself, along with 
others, including Rahner. This theology of the Holy Spirit 
begins with the Pauline and Johannine understanding of the 
Spirit as the Spirit of Christ, who brings people to faith 
and who in some sense mediates the saving significance of 
Christ to the believer. The term "revealedness model" is 
derived from Barth's Pneumatology, in which the Spirit 
appears as the "Revealedness" of "Revelation," i.e., the 
Spirit of the subjective realization of the objective
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revelation which has occurred in the Christ-event.
I have called the second the "atonement model," since 
it is primarily concerned with the role of the Holy Spirit 
in the event of the crucifixion. The theology of the cross 
has recently come to the fore in a great deal of 
Trinitarian theology, raising questions, for example, of 
the suffering of God and the nature of the divine unity in 
face of the dereliction of the crucified Son of God. Here 
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the vinculum caritatis 
has been appropriated with new vigour in the new theology 
of the Trinity as the "atoning" principle both in the 
Trinity itself, and, by implication, also in the salvation 
of men and women.
The third, the "anointing model," takes up the 
Trinitarian significance of the anointing of Jesus with the 
Holy Spirit, and thus also, by implication, of the 
dependence of Jesus as man upon the Spirit in his life and 
ministry. This is in large measure a Christological 
question, of course, to the extent that it concerns the 
relation of the Holy Spirit together with that of the Logos 
to the human nature of Jesus. However, if the economic 
Trinity is the immanent Trinity, as contemporary 
Trinitarian theology asserts, then this aspect of the 
Trinitarian economy in the Christ-event itself must in some 
sense be susceptible to such a treatment.
The fourth Trinitarian model with which we shall be 
concerned can be called the "eschatological model." In this 
case, we are not concerned with the Trinitarian 
significance of a specific salvation-historical event, but 
rather more with the problem of the Trinity and salvation 
history as such. The Trinitarian theology in view here 
takes its rise from the fact that the economy of salvation, 
and thus the work of the Trinity ad extra, is not yet 
complete, but is orientated to the future consummation of 
the kingdom of God. The eschatological aspect of the 
economy of salvation can be associated particularly with
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the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. In the New Testament, and 
in particular in the Pauline literature, the Spirit appears 
as the "arrabon" which guarantees the future glorification 
of the children of God (2 Cor. 1: 22; Eph. 1: 13-14).1 In 
the theological tradition, correspondingly, the present and 
future work of salvation is appropriated to the Holy 
Spirit; in the classical Creeds, for example, the 
confession of faith in the Holy Spirit involves also the 
Church, the resurrection, and the life of the world to 
come. If, however, the economic basis of the doctrine of 
the Trinity, thus conceived, is in essence incomplete, and 
if the economic and the immanent Trinity are to be 
identified, then the question arises whether or not the 
immanent Trinity is in itself orientated to the eschaton. 
and is thus itself incomplete. Here the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit is of particular Trinitarian significance.
The four models thus represent four major theological 
problems which the attempt to develop a Trinitarian
doctrine of the Holy Spirit from the economy has to face, 
and bring into focus four crucial issues for contemporary 
Trinitarian theology: the role of the Spirit in theological 
epistemology; the role of the Spirit in the suffering of 
Jesus on the cross, together with its soteriological
significance; the relation of the Holy Spirit to the
humanity of Christ; and the Spirit's role in the
eschatological aspect of the economy of salvation.
1. The Revealedness Model
In Chapter II, Karl Barth's primary Trinitarian 
analogy of the Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness was 
examined briefly in connection with the idea of the unity 
of the economic and the immanent Trinity. In this section, 
the implications of this analogy for Trinitarian
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1See, e.g., Neill Q. Hamilton, The Holy Spirit and
Eschatoloav in Paul (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd Ltd.,
1957) .
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Pneumatology will be examined more fully. Barth is, of 
course, predominantly a theologian of the Word, whose main 
contribution to theology, and specifically to the doctrine 
of the Trinity, undoubtedly stems from his Christology. At 
the same time, however, Barth's theology is not 
"Christomonistic" in this sense; although Barth is not 
known for the strength of his Pneumatology, he is 
profoundly aware of the importance of the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit, and devotes long sections of the Church 
Dogmatics to its characteristic themes.2 The comparative 
Pneumatological weakness of Barth's theology does not 
represent so much a failure to examine the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit, therefore, as a failure on Barth’s part to 
develop as profound a Pneumatology as his Christology. 
Despite this Pneumatological weakness, however, Barth's 
position has been extremely influential, and represents a 
profound and important tendency in recent Trinitarian 
theologies of the Holy Spirit.2
Unfortunately, the Pneumatology of the Church 
Dogmatics remains materially incomplete, in that Barth's 
projected Pneumatological treatment of the "Doctrine of 
Redemption" in a volume V was never realized. However, even 
in its author's own estimation, the Church Dogmatics is not 
only materially, but also theologically incomplete. This 
can be seen above all from the well-known autobiographical 
article which Barth wrote near the end of his life, in 
which he speaks frankly of the possibility of a theology 
"predominantly and decisively of the Holy Spirit."4
2Philip J. Rosato, The Spirit as Lord (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1981), pp. 3-43, shows the extent to which 
Barth was concerned throughout his theological career with 
the problem of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.
3Cf., e.g., Claude Welch, "The Holy Spirit and the
Trinity," Theology Today, 8 (1951), 29-40.
4Karl Barth, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript on 
Schleiermacher," in Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 
ed. Dietrich Ritschl; trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T.
"Everything", he wrote, "which needs to be said, 
considered, and believed about God the Father and God the 
Son in an understanding of the first and second articles 
might be shown and illuminated in its foundations through 
God the Holy Spirit, the vinculum pacis inter Patrem et 
Filium."5 Barth's statement here is all the more remarkable 
for being set in an essay in which he characterizes his 
Christocentrism as directed against the subjectivism of 
Schleiermacher and the liberal tradition, and in which he 
argues that the new theology of the Spirit of which he 
speaks might, in fact, rehabilitate Schleiermacher's 
theology, although within the terms of Barth's 
Christological corrective. However, Barth did not himself 
succeed in developing such a theology of the Holy Spirit.6
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& T. Clark, 1982), pp. 277-278.
5Ibid.. p. 278.
6See Rosato, o p . cit. . pp. 47-128, for a survey of 
Barth's nonetheless important treatment of the doctrine of 
the Holy Spirit. Rosato argues that Barth's overall 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Church Dogmatics can be
outlined under four headings. The first is the idea of
Revealedness which appears in the context of Barth's 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity in Church 
Dogmatics 1/1. Here the Holy Spirit is understood as the 
divine ground of our subjective incorporation into the 
event of God's revelation in Christ, and an essentially 
soteriological argument (of the sort we have already seen) 
is presented for the classical Pneumatological doctrines of 
the homoousion and the filioquist understanding of the
procession. This lays the groundwork for the basic 
conception of the Holy Spirit in Barth's overall 
Pneumatology. Barth's position here, however, is deepened 
over time through the themes which follow, which requires 
that these be taken into account as well. The second,
according to Rosato, is the theme of God's ontic revelation 
in Christ assuming noetic form by the work of the Spirit in 
the Church, which Rosato treats as part of the problem of 
the Holy Spirit and the doctrine of election; this 
comprises Church Dogmatics 1/2 and II/1-2. Thirdly, there 
is the doctrine of the Spiritus Creator which appears in 
III/1-4 in the context of the problem of ethics and the 
question of human freedom, and fourthly, there is the 
Pneumatology of Church Dogmatics IV/1-4, in which Barth is 
primarily concerned with the Holy Spirit, the Church, and
Barth's primary paradigm for the work of the Holy 
Spirit in the Church Dogmatics is the idea of the
"Revealedness" of "Revelation." The Revealedness idea, as 
has been said, derives immediately from the central
Trinitarian analogy of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as 
the Revealer, his Revelation, and its Revealedness which 
appears in the first half-volume of the Church Dogmatics.7 
It also clearly and emphatically reflects his desire, 
carried out through subsequent volumes, to provide a 
Christological foundation and explication of the work of 
the Holy Spirit. These themes underlie the whole 
development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in Barth's 
theology, both in its economic aspect (to which the themes 
themselves immediately refer) and in respect of the
Pneumatological content of the doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity.
In what follows, two related aspects of the
Revealedness model, drawn from Barth but applicable to theoparadigm as a whole, will be discussed. First of all, Barth
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the question of sanctification.
7Barth, o p . cit.. 1/1, pp. 304-333.
8Rahner's Pneumatology, e.g., although more restricted 
in scope and less profound theologically than Barth’s, is 
comparable to Barth's on these points. Not only do Barth 
and Rahner operate in their Trinitarian theologies with a 
similar view of the relation between the economic and the 
immanent Trinity, but also with analogous models of the 
economic and the immanent Trinity themselves. (On Rahner's 
Pneumatology in general and its role in his wider theology 
of the Trinity, cf. also Barbara Ann Finan, "The Mission of 
the Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Rahner," (Ph.D.
dissertation, Marquette University, 1986), pp. 86-87, 229-
253.) On the one hand, we have in Barth the economic idea 
of the Revealer, the Revelation, and its Revealedness, and 
the filioquist model of the Father who begets himself as
Son from all eternity, who as Son is so begotten by the
Father, and who is also in that very distinction the 
negation of isolation, i.e., the Holy Spirit as the love 
which unites them. On the other hand, in Rahner we have the 
self-communication of the Father in history as truth and 
love, transposed into the Trinity ad intra as the movement
maintains the homoousion of the Spirit for soteriological 
reasons explicitly in connection with the Revealedness 
idea; the Revealedness of Revelation, according to Barth, 
is integral to the economy of salvation, and its absolute 
authority only explicable on the grounds that that 
Revealedness, i.e., the Holy Spirit in his work ad extra, 
is one in authority, glory, and being with the Father and 
the Son.9 Secondly, Barth maintains the Western view of the 
procession of the Spirit through the filioaue doctrine, 
which, in his view, provides the internal Trinitarian basis 
of the fact that, ad extra, the Holy Spirit is precisely 
the Spirit of Christ or the Revealedness of Revelation.10 
The question which will be posed here relates both to 
Barth's understanding of the Spirit as Revealedness and to 
the filioaue in themselves, and to the connection Barth
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from "the unoriginate who mediates himself to himself 
(Father) , the one who is in truth uttered for himself 
(Son), and the one who is received and accepted in love for 
himself (Spirit)...." (Rahner, The Trinity. p. 102). 
Rahner's central Pneumatological thesis is that the Holy 
Spirit ad extra is the reality of "uncreated grace" in the 
life of faith, making possible an immediate unity of the 
created spirit with God; this is both prior to and the 
presupposition of the love and knowledge of God which we 
have through the gifts of "created grace" in this life 
(William J. Hill, "Uncreated Grace - A Critique of Karl 
Rahner," Thomist. 26 (1963), 339). The Holy Spirit's
mission ad extra, therefore, is understood by Rahner to be 
the condition of the possibility of the graced union of the 
spiritual creature with the Triune God. Underlying this 
specific understanding of the work of the Spirit, however, 
is the basic self-communication model of the Trinitarian 
life ad extra and ad intra which we have already 
encountered, in which the Father communicates himself both 
eternally and temporally, in the economy, under the 
modalities of "truth" and "love" (Rahner, op. cit., p. 99). 
By the work of the Holy Spirit, and so under the modality 
of love, we are drawn into the divine life, to the "truth," 
and finally to the Father who is the source both of the 
divine self-unfolding in itself and of the Trinitarian 
outreach into which we are incorporated.
9Barth, o p . cit.. 1/1, pp. 469-473.
10Ibid. ■ pp. 473-487.
draws between the two themes. We shall see that both the 
Revealedness idea in Pneumatology, and the case for the 
filioaue on the basis of the idea of the Spirit as 
Revealedness, are problematic in significant respects.
Barth's treatment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit 
in terms of the Revealedness idea can be clarified and 
summarized by a brief survey of an early representative 
subsection on Pneumatology from Church Dogmatics 1/2. In 
"The Holy Spirit the Subjective Reality of Revelation,"11 
the basic Pneumatological problem is presented as the 
problem of how men and women can be the object of God's 
revelation, how God can be revealed to us, and how we can 
be free for God. The terms of the discussion, therefore, 
are how the revelation which is objectively real in Jesus 
Christ can become subjectively real in men and women. 
Barth's answer is that this subjective reality of 
revelation is based on the reality of the outpouring of the 
Holy Spirit. Because salvation is wholly the work of God, 
Barth argues, it can only be by an act of God that we 
become open to receive God's self-revelation in his Son, 
the Word. This revelation cannot be complete until it has 
been so received, and so its reception is properly to be 
conceived as a moment within the whole event of revelation 
rather than as an external response to it.12 According to 
Barth, "Not God alone, but God and man together constitute 
the content of the Word of God attested in Scripture."13
It is because the work of the Holy Spirit is thus to 
make men and women part of the one whole event of 
revelation that the work of the Spirit can never be
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1lBarth, o p . c i t .. 1/2, pp. 203-242.
12Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2, ed. G.W. Bromiley 
and T.F. Torrance; trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1958) , pp. 531-539 relates the work of the Spirit 
more concretely to a genuine freedom given to people to say 
"no" to sin and "yes" to the direction and calling of God.
13Barth, op. cit. , 1/2, p. 207.
divorced from the "objective reality and possibility of 
revelation," Jesus Christ the Word. It is in this event and 
no other that God and mankind meet; in Barth's subsequent 
treatment of the Church as the place where revelation has 
reached men and women to become subjective reality, 
therefore, the life of the Church is characterized entirely 
in terms of Christ, the Word.14 It can be no other way for 
Barth at this point: he has defined Pentecost
teleologically as the making subjectively real of the 
objective event of revelation in Christ - the awakening, 
confirming, and establishing of Christian faith in the 
subjective life of the Church. "Subjective revelation can 
only be the repetition, the impress, the sealing of 
objective revelation upon us; or, from our point of view, 
our discovery, acknowledgement and affirmation of it."15
Through the Revealedness idea, the Holy Spirit is, 
therefore, fundamentally conceived by Barth as the 
guarantor of the subjective reality and possibility of 
revelation. Barth can thus write: "The event of revelation 
has clarity and reality on its subjective side because the 
Holy Spirit, the subjective element in this event, is of 
the essence of God Himself."16 The point Barth makes here is 
epistemological as well as soteriological, since it is the 
work of the Spirit to reveal Christ and to awaken faith in 
the believer.17 The role of the Spirit here lies on the 
level of the subjective basis of the human relationship 
with God in faith, where the active agent is the Holy 
Spirit, and not men and women understood to be capable of 
making their own response to God's revelation of
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14Ibid. . pp. 214-232.
15Ibid. . p. 239.
16Ibid. . p. 466.
17Barth, o p . cit.. II/l, pp. 12-13, follows Calvin in 
understanding faith as a species of knowledge.
themselves. The Revealedness of Revelation is, and is not 
merely the external effect of, the Holy Spirit.
A number of criticisms have been made of the idea of 
Revealedness in Barth's Pneumatological conception. Philip 
Rosato, first of all, argues in The Spirit as Lord that 
Barth's view of the Holy Spirit ultimately involves too 
limited a role for the Spirit in Barth's soteriology and
1 Piecclesiology. Since everything of ontic significance has 
been done by Christ, and is essentially comprehended in the 
whole dynamic of the et homo factus est of the second 
article of the Creed, Barth's Pneumatology virtually 
becomes a subsidiary of his Christology. Rosato complains 
in particular that the Trinitarian notion of Revealedness 
restricts the Spirit of God to a merely noetic role in 
salvation and in the Church.19 According to Rosato, there 
is, for example, no room for eschatology in Barth's 
Pneumatology, because the Holy Spirit always points back to 
the decisive "then" of Jesus Christ, and that only in such 
a way as to confirm noetically the ontic accomplishment 
given in the mission of Jesus as the incarnate Word.20 
Against Barth, therefore, Rosato attempts to establish "a 
case for the ontic validity of the Spirit's mission,"21 and 
argues that the work of the Spirit must be seen to extend 
to the times before and after the incarnation, and to be 
life-giving in itself.22 Rosato argues that Barth's 
proscription against such an "ontic" role for the Holy 
Spirit in soteriology in particular militates against the
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criticism, however, conflicts with his own survey of 
Barth's Pneumatology, outlined above, footnote number 6.
19Ibid. . pp. 158-160.
20Ibid. , pp. 159, 161.
21Ibid. . pp. 160f f .
22Ibid. , p . 162.
divine freedom, and that, in Barth's theology, the Holy 
Spirit effectively no longer blows where he wills.23
George Hendry makes a similar criticism of Barth's 
Pneumatology in The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology.24 
Hendry again makes the point that the weakness of Barth's 
doctrine of the Creator Spirit is related to the 
predominance of the Revealedness idea in Barth's thought, 
since the former has nothing whatever to do with human 
subjectivity or the problem of faith. The sustaining 
activity of the Spirit in creation, Hendry maintains, is a 
movement from God to the world which takes place whether 
the world accepts it or not, and, on its anthropological 
side, whether people know or believe it or not. The 
Revealedness idea therefore effectively excludes the 
doctrine of the Creator Spirit from consideration, and 
narrows the scope of the work of the Spirit in Barth's 
conception.
These criticisms also reflect Gustaf Wingren's wider 
assessment of Barth's position in Theology in Conflict, 
where he argues that Barth's theology is fundamentally 
flawed in being concerned with the modern problem of 
knowledge rather than with the authentically biblical 
problem of sin and righteousness.25 Wingren complains in 
particular that Barth sees the incarnation as a 
manifestation, under the category of revelation, rather 
than as a dramatic conflict between God and evil. Barth 
does go some way towards correcting this imbalanced 
emphasis on manifestation in Church Dogmatics IV/1, he 
concedes, with his acknowledgement there that in his
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that the divine freedom is expressed precisely in the role 
he accords the Holy Spirit.
24Hendry, o p . cit. , pp. 42-52.
25Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict, trans. Eric H. 
Wahlstrom (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1958),
pp. 23-44.
obedience Christ perfects our failed obedience. 
Unfortunately, however, for Wingren, even here the emphasis 
is largely on how this obedience reveals an aspect of the
ad intra life of the Trinity, rather than on how it
vicariously rescues us from sin and death. Wingren thus 
concludes that Barth's theology ultimately remains 
determined by the modern problem of knowledge, and that, in 
sum, '"Revelation" stands in the place where 
"justification," or "forgiveness of sins," i.e., the gospel 
in the essential meaning of that word, ought to stand.'26
All of these criticisms derive from the fact that 
Barth's doctrine of the Trinity is structured by the 
problem of revelation. The result is that Barth's 
Pneumatology is formulated as an answer to the problem of 
how sinful mankind, which has no capacity for the Word of 
God, nevertheless does hear the Word and obey.27 According 
to Barth, not only does God speak his Word, but God is also 
the Word spoken, and thirdly himself again as the God who 
brings his revelation to fruition in its subjective 
realization in the faith of the believer. The fundamental 
importance of this Trinitarian thesis in Barth's theology 
leads to the idea that the Holy Spirit does not and cannot 
bring the revelation of anything independent of or beyond 
Christ, but is to be regarded "in every sense as the 
instruction, illumination and stimulation of man through 
the Word and for the Word.1,28
The noetic restriction in Barth's Pneumatology thus 
has deep roots in his wider Trinitarian and Christological 
thought. We have already seen the connection Barth made in 
his later years between a possible, future Pneumatology and 
the possibility of a rehabilitation of the theology of
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Schleiermacher. Hans Urs von Balthasar has argued that the 
basic framework of Schleiermacher's theology is already 
reflected in Barth's, and, in particular, that the "point 
of absolute intensity" in Schleiermacher, the feeling of 
absolute dependence, is transposed in Barth's theology to 
become the point of human contact with the Word of God, in 
faith, understood as a Pneumatological event.29 Balthasar's 
point needs to be taken seriously, for while the context of 
Barth's treatment of the Holy Spirit is the doctrine of the 
Trinity, its primary concern, particularly in the early 
volumes of the Church Dogmatics, is the problem of how it 
is that sinful mankind can hear the Word of God - a problem 
of theological anthropology.
As Rosato points out, Barth's Pneumatology is so 
conceived as a polemic against his main intellectual rivals 
in the old Liberal tradition, who, in Barth's view, 
effectively placed Pneumatology above Christology and 
eventually placed the human spirit, with which they 
confused the Holy Spirit, over the divine Word.30 But by 
framing his position in opposition to his understanding of 
the older position of the Liberal tradition, Barth did not 
alter the noetic terms of the older Pneumatological 
standpoint; he merely reversed the priority by setting 
Christology above Pneumatology, and by placing Christology 
and Pneumatology also above the human spirit in the whole 
question of the knowledge of faith. Indeed, from this point 
of view, the criticism of Barth that is often made, that he 
telescopes the whole of theology into Christology, appears 
to be mistaken. In fact, the dominance of the Word in 
Barth's Christology is such that the Holy Spirit is 
accorded little or no strictly Christological significance;
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trans. John Drury (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972),
pp. 160-161.
30Rosato, o p . cit. . p. 161.
rather, the Holy Spirit, because of the idea of 
Revealedness which determines the shape of Barth's 
Pneumatology, is orientated primarily to the problems of 
faith and the Church, so that the Pneumatological 
restriction is more properly designated as ecclesiological 
than Christological.
Barth's Pneumatology at this point, furthermore, 
appears to lead to the loss of a genuine human role, under 
the Holy Spirit, in salvation history. It is true that 
Barth attempts to hold God and mankind together in the 
event of revelation, but in fact Barth's Christology, as 
Rosato argues, is the one arena of true ontic significance. 
The difficulty here is not only that Barth adopts a 
doctrine of human depravity, but that Barth, consistent 
with his doctrine of election, regards Jesus Christ alone 
as the true man.31 The truth of our own existence is our 
reconciliation to God in him, by virtue of his reconciled 
humanity and our participation in him. Barth adopts here 
the characteristically Reformed theology of the 
particioatio Christi. but its implication is that only 
insofar as we do participate in Jesus Christ are we true 
men and women - in ourselves, in effect, we are docetic. 
Even under the Holy Spirit, therefore, we can in ourselves
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Barth's "objectivism" in Brunner, o p . cit.. pp. 346-352, 
where he argues that the fact that everything of importance 
for human salvation has already been decided in the divine 
eternity necessarily means that faith and the human 
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no decision we can make can be of any real importance. 
Barth at times attempted to move beyond such criticisms by 
asserting that the idea of the divine decision for mankind 
makes room for mankind and the whole sphere of human 
culture in theology. Cf. in particular Karl Barth, "The 
Humanity of God," trans. John Newton Thomas in Barth, The 
Humanity of God, pp. 35-65. The specific Pneumatological 
implications of this were, however, never worked out, and 
would, in fact, appear to belong not to Barth's own 
theology but to the new theology of the Holy Spirit for 
which he called at the end of his life.
have no positive role in salvation history, for it is, in 
the end, Jesus Christ alone who is the true human actor in 
the theatre of salvation, and not we ourselves, while even 
our response to him is in a quite literal sense the effect 
of the personal presence of the Holy Spirit. In Barth's 
theology, therefore, it is not so much we who hear the Word 
of God as it is the Holy Spirit as the Revealedness of 
Revelation. An authentic human response to the Word is 
precluded: homo peccator non caoax verbi divini.
The second of the points mentioned at the outset was 
the problem of the place of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity 
as such. As Rowan Williams has argued in this connection, 
Barth's Pneumatology raises certain specific problems for 
Trinitarian theology.52 In particular, while the idea of 
Revealedness is perfectly intelligible, if somewhat 
restrictive, when considered in relation to the economy, 
Barth is forced to move away from the Revealedness notion 
when he comes to discuss the immanent Trinity; here the 
emphasis shifts from Revealedness to the communion of the 
Spirit which is basically derived from the Augustinian view 
of the Spirit as vinculum.55 That God is the Father and the 
Son is simply established for Barth in that, for revelation 
to be revelation, God must be what he shows himself to be, 
and must be capable of such self-showing. But problems 
begin to appear when the idea that God is in himself what 
he is ad extra is applied to the work and person of the 
Holy Spirit, since it would appear to imply that the 
Spirit's role in the immanent Trinity should in some sense 
be understood as the Revealedness of Revelation. In fact, 
however, the linear understanding of the Trinity which is 
based on God's revelation to men and women begins to break 
down at this point in Barth's theology, while in its place 
there appears a view of the Trinity in which plurality,
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relationality, and fellowship features prominently.34 Here 
the Spirit's role is one of love, and not a form of inner- 
divine self-clarification or self-completion.
Barth himself, of course, would not wish to admit this 
criticism. According to Barth, what brings him to affirm 
the filioque doctrine is nothing less than the fundamental 
thrust of his entire Trinitarian theology,35 involving the 
principle basic to all his Pneumatological thought:
The event of revelation has clarity and 
reality on its subjective side because 
the Holy Spirit, the subjective element 
in this event, is of the essence of God 
Himself. What He is in revelation He is 
antecedently in Himself. And what He 
is antecedently in Himself He is in 
revelation.36
Barth's argument is that in the economy of salvation, the 
Holy Spirit appears as the Spirit of the Son, the Spirit 
of Christ, who mediates Christ to the Church. If this is 
so ad extra, however, then ad intra also the Spirit must 
be eternally the Spirit of the Son, who ex Patre Filioque 
procedit.37 Against the East, therefore, Barth argues that 
the denial of the filiocrue is formally defective in that 
it reflects an unwillingness to acknowledge that God gives 
us himself in his revelation.
The Trinitarian paradigm of the Revealer, Revelation, 
and Revealedness in Barth's thought means concretely that 
the God who speaks his Word, the Father, and the God who is 
his Word spoken, the Son, is also the God who makes the
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Word heard in men and women.38 According to Barth, however, 
it is precisely this paradigm which necessitates the 
filioaue:
[The filioaue1 means that not merely 
for us, but in God Himself, there is 
no possibility of an opening and 
readiness and capacity for God in man 
- for this is the work of the Holy 
Ghost in revelation - unless it comes 
from Him, the Father, who has revealed 
Himself in His Word, in Jesus Christ, 
and also, and no less necessarily, from 
Him who is His Word, from His Son, from 
Jesus Christ, who reveals the Father.39
It is, therefore, the question of revelation which is at 
stake in Barth's defence of the filioaue. the fundamental 
significance of God's act in Jesus Christ in mediating the 
human knowledge of God. Barth's express fear is that 
abandoning the filioaue would open the door to the idea of 
an immediate relation between the human spirit and the 
divine Spirit, by-passing Jesus Christ as the mediator of 
that relation, while he suspects that Eastern theology, at 
least in its less restrained moments, veers toward 
precisely such a position, thereby surrendering the primary 
content of the Christian gospel.40
Barth's basic argument concerning the filioaue, 
therefore, is that it alone provides an adequate foundation 
for the theology of grace, and that, if our reconciliation 
to God through Jesus Christ, by faith, is not to degenerate 
into a variation of a human subjective state, it must be 
grounded in the being of God himself. At the same time, 
however, one can justifiably argue that the linear 
understanding of the Trinity which is enshrined in the
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Trinitarian paradigm of Revealer, Revelation, and 
Revealedness is not easily reconciled with the filioaue 
doctrine Barth actually develops. What appears here is 
precisely the idea of the Holy Spirit as "the fellowship, 
the act of communion, of the Father and the Son" whereby he 
is "the act in which the Father is the Father of the Son or 
the Speaker of the Word and the Son is the Son of the 
Father or the Word of the Speaker."41 While Barth is 
critical of Augustine's attempt to provide an analogy of 
the relation between the Son and the Spirit in the relation 
of knowledge to will in the soul,42 therefore, he 
nevertheless preserves the Augustinian-Western theology of 
the Holy Spirit intact:
As God is in Himself Father from all 
eternity, He begets Himself as the Son 
from all eternity. As He is the Son 
from all eternity, He is begotten of 
Himself as the Father from all 
eternity. In this eternal begetting of 
Himself and being begotten of Himself,
He posits Himself a third time as the 
Holy Spirit, i.e., as the love which 
unites Him in Himself.43
The problem here is that the Holy Spirit's place in 
the Trinity is as a middle term between the Father and the 
Son, rather than as the third term in a divine self­
communication, bringing the process of self-communication 
in some sense to fulfilment. The earlier Trinitarian 
paradigm of the Revealer, his Revelation, and its 
Revealedness, therefore, appears to conflict with the
, 4 4Pneumatological position which is given in the f xliocrue.
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The Revealedness idea, in short, arguably should issue in 
an innertrinitarian version of the pre-Nicene Trinitarian 
taxis "from the Father, through the Son, in the Holy 
Spirit," which from the beginning connoted more than the 
order of transmission in the saving approach of God to the 
world. Here too the Spirit appears truly as the Spirit of 
the Son, but as the final moment of the divine outreach in 
the economic sense, and as the third moment of the divine 
overflow from the Father in the innertrinitarian sense. 
Barth, however, explicitly rejects this view in his account 
of the f ilioaue. arguing that it makes the Son merely a 
mediating principle, and falls short of the Pneumatological 
idea he wishes to defend: "the thought of the full
consubstantial fellowship between Father and Son as the 
essence of the Spirit."45 The limitation of the Revealedness 
idea, therefore, appears at the very point where Barth's 
fundamental theological principle comes into play: that we 
deal in revelation with God as he is in himself, that the 
economic and the immanent Trinities are one.
Williams thus argues that the filioaue. in which the 
idea of fellowship or love is of paramount Pneumatological 
importance, is inconsistent with the idea of Revealedness 
as Barth develops it elsewhere in his Trinitarian theology. 
This problem is made all the worse, for Williams, in view 
of Barth's profound development of the doctrine of the 
humanity of Christ in Church Dogmatics IV/1, largely on the 
basis of his earlier doctrine of election. Williams takes 
up the argument of Wingren at this point concerning the 
importance of epistemology in Barth's Pneumatology, and 
concludes that Wingren was right to argue that Barth, 
despite his emerging Christological understanding, failed 
to carry through with any decisive reformulation of his 
Pneumatological position between Church Dogmatics 1/1 and
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IV/1.46 The paradigm of the Revealer, his Revelation, and 
its Revealedness remains fully in place, therefore, even 
while Barth's developing Christology appears to require a 
significant degree of plurality and relationality - 
qualities absent from the original model. Williams' 
argument is that if the dynamic of the relation of Jesus 
Christ to the Father is to be taken seriously, God must be 
understood to confront himself across an enormous divide as 
he risks himself in the incarnation. It is this, as 
Williams sees it, which needed to be taken up into Barth's 
Trinitarian Pneumatology, but which was not.47
In defence of Barth's position, it needs to be said 
against both Wingren and Williams that the humanity of 
Christ in his forsakenness by the Father has a place from 
the beginning in Barth's Trinitarian theology, although 
perhaps in the wider sense its implications are not fully 
developed in the Church Dogmatics. Nevertheless, in Church 
Dogmatics 1/1, the Father is understood as the one who 
wills the death of man the sinner in his Son, Jesus
/ oChrist. Barth's original insight is also deepened over 
time, so that the history of Jesus as the eternally elect 
one in Church Dogmatics II/2 assumes considerable 
theological importance in Barth's later Christology. An 
example of this has already been noted, that Jesus' human 
obedience is taken to reveal an ad intra relation of 
subordination of the Son to the Father.49
This deepening of Barth's Christology is also 
reflected, significantly, in his later doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit. Having developed his Christology of the obedient 
Son in Church Dogmatics IV/1, Barth turns to consider the
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Pneumatological problem of "the subjective realization of 
the atonement" once again.50 Barth characteristically writes 
that the Holy Spirit in his work does not attest to us 
anything other than Christ, no higher wisdom or other 
righteousness than was found in the history of this one 
obedient man.51 "He attests to him the Son, who in obedience 
to the will of the Father took up and trod to the very end 
the way into the far country - his Judge who gave Himself 
to be judged in his place."52 Barth speaks here of an 
"actualizing" of the history of Jesus in our history as the 
Church, a work of the Holy Spirit which attests Jesus 
Christ to sinful men and women and which creates in them a 
genuine response and obedience to the God of the gospel.53
Thus Barth can consistently relate the work of the 
Holy Spirit to the history of Jesus, and can understand 
this work as bringing it about that we can and must find 
that our history is enclosed in the history of Jesus, and 
his in ours.54 The earlier purely noetic understanding of 
the Holy Spirit, whereby the work of the Spirit was to
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position which requires that one go beyond the noetic 
restriction. The sheer fact that the Revelation of which 
the Holy Spirit in the economy is the Revealedness is, in 
Barth, virtually synonymous with the Christ-event, which, 
clearly, is more than noetic in character. In this sense, 
the work of the Spirit, as the Revealedness of this 
Revelation, must comprise more than the subjective 
realization by faith in the Church of the saving 
significance of Christology proper, to include both the 
noetic recognition of Christ as Lord and Saviour, and the 
existential realization of his calling in the concrete life 
of the Church. As the Revealedness of Revelation, the Holy 
Spirit is to be understood as God the Redeemer, "the Lord 
who sets us free."
awaken faith as a species of knowledge, appears to have 
been significantly deepened through developments in Barth's 
Christology. An attempt has been made to treat Jesus' human 
history, in which he was obedient unto death, as 
theologically significant, and to relate the work of the 
Holy Spirit to the subjective realization of this history
in our own human histories, so that our history too becomes
theologically significant. But how exactly there is, by the 
Spirit's power, such an "actualizing of this history in 
other human histories,"55 Barth is not prepared to say: it 
is and must remain a mystery.
In the absence of such an account, however, and given 
the obvious ecclesial context of the discussion, the 
conclusion has to be again that Barth has not significantly 
altered the old Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness 
paradigm on which his earlier Pneumatology was based. 
Rather, it has survived intact and, despite its inherent 
problems, still dominates Barth's later Pneumatological 
reflection. The tendency is thus still for Barth to slip 
into specifically noetic language, even when speaking of 
the "actualizing" of Jesus' history in our histories, as 
for example in the following representative passage:
How can it really be - the question of
the Virgin in Lk. l3Zt - that there is an
actualizing of this history in other 
human histories? By what ways does God 
bring it about that in the perverted 
hearts, in the darkened knowledge and 
understanding, in the rebellious 
desires and strivings of sinful men . . . 
there takes place this awakening, in 
which they can know Jesus Christ as 
theirs and themselves as his?
The credo in Soiritum sanctum does not tell us how, Barth
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answers, but unquestionably, we are left with the old,
noetic Revealedness paradigm again, the mechanics of which 
remain hidden, but the predominance of which is finally 
unchallenged.
It is difficult to see, therefore, how the
Revealedness idea and the filioaue in Barth's Pneumatology 
can be reconciled, since the understanding of the Spirit 
posited in the two cases differs. In this sense, it appears 
that there is a profound inconsistency lying at the heart 
of Barth's Pneumatology; although the Revealedness doctrine 
and the filioaue are both clearly supported, the idea of 
the Spirit as the mediating vinculum in the one case and as 
the third term in a linear self-unfolding in the other is 
problematic. As we shall see in the next section, the idea 
of the Spirit as vinculum and of the filioaue would appear 
to be more sustainable from the point of view of a 
different Trinitarian theology, a theology which begins, 
not with the threefold event of revelation, but with the
interpersonal relation between the Father and the crucified
Christ.
Barth's revealedness model represents an important 
development in contemporary Trinitarian Pneumatology, 
reflecting a number of biblical and patristic themes which 
would have to be taken up in any adequate doctrine of the 
Trinity. The Pneumatological restriction which is 
introduced through the paradigm of the Revealer, 
Revelation, and Revealedness, however, can be questioned, 
while the specific difficulty involved in reconciling this 
conception with the filioaue doctrine renders Barth's 
version of it problematic. The revealedness idea could, 
therefore, be sustained, but only in the context of a more 
comprehensive Trinitarian Pneumatology, based on the total 
work of the Spirit in the economy and developed in a 
theology of the immanent Trinity in a more self-critical 
way. It may be, indeed, that this is what Barth's call for 
a new theology of the third article actually requires.
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Broadly speaking, however, subsequent Trinitarian 
theologies of the Holy Spirit which take up the problem of 
Pneumatology where Barth leaves off have simply 
concentrated less on the present moment of the realization 
of historical revelation and more on the primary event of 
the economy as such, the Christ-event. In this way, the 
role of the Spirit in the latter becomes the measure of the 
Spirit's present role in the economy, and, in a development 
of the formal Trinitarian principles of Barth and Rahner, 
the primary analogy from which a doctrine of the Spirit in 
the immanent Trinity can be developed.57 A strong criticism 
of the revealedness model is implicit in this, to the 
effect that, instead of having in view the problem of the 
knowledge of revelation in the Church, we need to have in 
view the problem of the relation between Jesus and the Holy 
Spirit which is a more basic Pneumatological datum, and 
which must, as such, serve as the presupposition of the 
noetic problem of faith (which is therefore secondary). The 
problem in Barth's Pneumatology, from this point of view, 
is, in fact, not that it is Christomonistic, but rather 
that it is insufficiently Christological in conception.
Whether or not subsequent Trinitarian theologies of 
the Spirit can be characterized in any sense as more 
adequately grounded in the economy remains to be seen; by 
way of anticipation, however, the general development of 
Trinitarian theology following Barth is unfortunately 
characterized by an even greater narrowing of vision with 
respect to the economy. Equally, because, as for Barth, the 
freedom of the immanent Trinity is its freedom to be the 
economic Trinity, and, as for Rahner, the economic Trinity 
is the immanent Trinity, and vice versa, there has been a
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"the miracle of Christmas," o p . cit.. 1/2, pp. 172-202.
corresponding shift of perspective in the understanding of 
the Holy Spirit in the immanent Trinity. The theologians 
whom we shall next discuss understand the Spirit more 
narrowly in terms of the particular events of the economy 
on which their theologies focus: the crucifixion and
resurrection, the anointing of Jesus, and the overall 
eschatological unfolding of the economy of salvation.
2. The Atonement Model 
After the revealedness model, the development of 
Trinitarian theology from the standpoint of the theology 
of the cross, or what I have called the "atonement model," 
can be considered. In a certain sense, the theology of the 
cross is the embodiment of the new perspective in 
Trinitarian theology par excellence, in that the cross 
decisively focuses the wider question of the relation 
between the Trinity in itself, and its economic Trinitarian 
presence through creation, the incarnation, and Pentecost 
in space and time. Along with this, in broad traditions of 
Christian doctrine - and in particular in the Protestant 
traditions in which the theology of the cross has been most 
prominent in recent theology - the cross is understood to 
be the focal point of the New Testament message and the 
central content of Christian faith, so that it stands 
paramount in the theological understanding of the economy 
of salvation. According to Jürgen Moltmann, for example, 
"The death of Jesus on the cross is the centre of all 
Christian theology. It is not the only theme of theology, 
but it is in effect the entry to its problems and answers 
on earth."58 Given the axiomatic character of the unity of 
the immanent and the economic Trinity in contemporary 
Trinitarian theology, it is hardly surprising that the 
cross has, in consequence, assumed tremendous significance
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for a number of recent theologies of the Trinity.59 
Moltmann, once again, writes, "The content of the doctrine 
of the Trinity is the real cross of Christ himself. The 
form of the crucified Christ is the Trinity."60
The Christological methodology which leads to such an 
ontology of the Trinity is derived in particular from the 
theology of Barth.61 Barth's entire Church Dogmatics can be 
read as an extended essay in a thoroughly Christological 
theological ontology.62 Barth himself does not, of course, 
develop his position from the sole standpoint of the 
theology of the cross, for he is concerned in his 
Christology above all with the whole dynamic of the Christ- 
event and of the doctrine of the incarnation as such; the 
cross, for Barth, is therefore to be located within the 
whole history of Jesus Christ and the broader problems of 
Christology rather than vice versa.65 However, Barth's 
position is that a theology must be constructed on the
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62Jenson, "The Logic of the Doctrine of the Trinity," 
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65Barth, o p . cit., IV/1, pp. 557-558, writes: "A
theoloaia aloriae. the magnifying of what Jesus Christ has 
received for us in His resurrection, of what He is for us 
as the risen One, can have no meaning unless it includes 
within itself a theoloaia crucis. the magnifying of what He 
has done for us in His death, of what He is for us as the 
Crucified. But an abstract theoloaia crucis cannot have any 
meaning either. We cannot properly magnify the passion and 
death of Jesus Christ unless this magnifying includes 
within itself the theoloaia aloriae - the magnifying of the 
One who in His resurrection is the recipient of our right 
and life, the One who has risen again from the dead for us.
... It can be a true confession only in this totality, in 
its application to the transition of the strictly coherent 
history which has taken place in Him."
basis of what God has actually done in Jesus Christ. His 
central contribution to the tradition of Trinitarian 
theology which attempts to conceive of the Trinity on the 
basis of the cross, in other words, is his sustained thesis 
that because the second person (in Barth's terminology, 
"mode of being") of the Trinity has become flesh in Jesus 
Christ, and because in Jesus Christ he has humbled himself 
and submitted to death on the cross, it must be proper to 
God in his own intrinsic essence to do this. We must, 
therefore, think of the divinity of God the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit in a manner which is precisely consistent 
with this fundamental datum of revelation if we are to 
think the God of revelation at all and not of an idol of 
our own making.64
The attempt to develop the theology of the cross into 
a Trinitarian hermeneutic in, for example, the theologies 
of Moltmann and Jiingel also amounts to an attempt to 
formulate such a Christological ontology of the Trinity. 
The basic axioms of the position are the Barthian 
presupposition that God is truly to be known from his 
revelation, and the understanding of the cross as the 
central event in the revelation of God; on the basis of 
these presuppositions, the word of the cross becomes, in 
Jiingel's words, "the place of the conceivability of God."65
In one decisive respect, however, Moltmann and Jiingel 
move beyond the Barthian thesis, in that they adopt a more 
radical approach to the question of the relation between 
the economic and the immanent Trinity than does Barth. The 
crucial difference arises in connection with the question 
of the mode of God's presence in the cross. Whereas, for 
Barth, God was "in" Christ under the conditions of the 
incarnation, submitting to death for the sake of our 
salvation, for Moltmann and Jiingel the crucified Christ is
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64Ibid. . pp. 186-188.
65Jiingel, o p . cit. . p. 152.
the second person of the Trinity in a much more immediate 
sense. For both, the economic and the immanent Trinity are 
more clearly identical in the literal sense than for Barth. 
Thus Moltmann, for example, writes of Barth's theologia 
crucis that it is insufficiently Trinitarian, meaning by 
this that the crucified Christ is not, in Barth, presented 
rigorously enough as the Son of God with whom we have to do 
in Christian faith and Trinitarian theology:
God's being is found [for Barth] in the 
history of the humiliation of the Son 
of God and in the exaltation of the Son 
of Man. Consequently we find in Barth 
many "theopaschite" statements about 
God's suffering and involvement in the 
cross of Christ. ... In my view Barth's 
limitations lie, strangely enough, in 
the fact that at these points he does 
not argue expressly enough in 
trinitarian terms. Because he always 
stresses - and rightly so - that God 
was in Christ, God lowered himself, God 
wanted to be the loser on the cross so 
that man might be the gainer, he uses 
the simple concept of God..., not yet 
a concept developed in trinitarian 
terms. That is why Barth, rather like 
Rahner, has to distinguish the God who 
in his primal decision proceeds from 
himself, from the God who is previously 
in himself "untouched by evil and 
death". This certainly makes it 
possible for us to conceive the very 
being of God as being present in the 
death of Jesus; but the converse is 
difficult; how can we conceive of 
Jesus' death on the cros|6as belonging 
within the being of God?
In a similar vein, Jiingel argues that God's intrinsic 
essence must be conceived in unity with God's actual 
existence in the place where God, for the Christian faith, 
is - and that is in Jesus Christ, and specifically in the
66Jürgen Moltmann, The Future of Creation, trans. 
Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1979), pp. 63-64.
cross of Jesus Christ.67 Any other procedure, and in 
particular the procedure from classical metaphysics which 
understands God as the highest essence, incapable of 
suffering and death, is to be rejected as inconsistent with 
the Christian revelation of God in the cross, and so as 
fundamentally anti-evangelical.68 Here the new "metaphysical 
enterprise" assumes the form of the construction of a 
theology of the suffering of God through the development 
of a doctrine of the Trinity, economic and immanent, 
explicitly on the basis of the cross itself.
In this way the theology of the cross has come to have 
a central place in the new theology of the Trinity. 
However, the theology of the cross appears for the most 
part to be primarily Christological rather than 
Pneumatological in orientation, being concerned, 
essentially, with two problems: first, with the dogmatic
problem of the relation between the two natures of the 
incarnate Logos and, second, in its specifically 
Trinitarian development, with the question of the personal 
relation between the Father and the Son. It is the latter 
which concerns us in this section. Here the role of the 
Holy Spirit in traditional Western Pneumatology is 
important, since it is in the light of the Western filiogue 
doctrine, which understands the Holy Spirit's personal 
character in terms of the relation of love bonding the 
Father and the Son, that the theology of the cross assumes 
a Pneumatological form. By way of a critical preface to 
what follows, however, it must be said that the 
appropriation to the Holy Spirit of the work of 
sanctification in the theological tradition, and the 
association of the Spirit with the Church and with the 
eschatological consummation in the creedal formulations of 
both East and West, means that it is doubtful that a
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67Jiingel, op. cit. . pp. 314-376.
68Ib i d. . p. 154.
developed doctrine of the Holy Spirit can, in principle, be 
drawn solely from the theology of the cross.69
In order to develop the atonement model, Jiingel's 
theology, as perhaps the most profound and consistent 
statement of the position available, can for our purposes 
be taken to be its main representative.70 Jiingel attempts, 
quite simply, to conceive of the Holy Spirit in his 
Trinitarian reality as the unity in love of the Father with 
the crucified Jesus.71 Jiingel' s consistency in conceiving 
the Holy Spirit in this way derives from his basic view 
that God has, in his words, "defined his deity" in the 
event of the cross, through his self-identification with 
the dead Jesus, so that the cross becomes the hermeneutical 
basis for the concept of God.72 The being of God must 
therefore be conceived as the event of his identification 
with the crucified man Jesus. God in his very Trinitarian 
being, Jiingel repeats again and again, is. his unity with
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69This is seen already, of course, in the theology of 
Moltmann, who develops his doctrine of the Holy Spirit more 
from the standpoint of eschatology (ecclesiological and 
Trinitarian) than from the standpoint of the theology of 
the cross. In this way, Moltmann's theology reflects the 
characteristically Reformed emphasis on sanctification to 
a much greater extent than does that of the Lutheran 
Jiingel. See Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the 
Spirit. trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1977); 
and Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, trans. 
Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1981). See also
below, Chapter III, section 4.
70Moltmann does not in the end develop his doctrine of 
the Trinity from the standpoint of the theology of the 
cross alone; although his contribution to the Trinitarian 
theology of the cross is significant, therefore, his is not 
the best example of the atonement model of the Trinity. See 
footnote number 69 above. Jüngel, on the other hand, 
focuses his Trinitarian theology more consistently on the 
cross, and for this reason will be treated as the primary 
spokesman for the approach in view here.
71Jüngel, o p . cit. . pp. 368-376.
72Ibid. . p. 219.
perishability in Jesus Christ; what God is in his essence 
is what God is in his existence in this event in such a way 
that the two, the divine essence and the divine existence 
in the event of the cross, can never be separated, or even 
abstracted conceptually.73 Jiingel, therefore, understands 
the being of God explicitly in the context of the union of 
God with perishability in the cross. In Christian theology, 
therefore, we are not concerned with the infinite and 
eternal and absolute God over against the finite and the 
temporal; rather, according to Jiingel:
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The God who is in heaven because he 
cannot be on earth is replaced by the 
Father who is in heaven in such a way 
that his heavenly kingdom has come into 
the world, that is, a God who is in 
heaven in such a wav that he can 
identify himself with the poverty of 
the man Jesus, with the existence of a 
man brought from life to death on the 
cross .74
Jiingel draws from this argument the radical conclusion 
that the old distinction between the economic and the 
immanent Trinity must be brought to an end in a doctrine of 
the Trinity which is explicitly formulated as an attempt to 
think the passion history of God. God is, for Jiingel, his 
relatedness to himself in the crucified Jesus.75 Within this 
understanding, Jiingel reformulates the doctrines of the
73 "In this unity of the divine essence with the 
existence of Jesus the man, God's existence must be thought 
in such a way that God's essence is understood as his 
existence. And this must be done in such a way that no 
'distinction of reason' can be made between the 'essence of 
God' and the 'existence of God' .... Accordingly, talk 
about God’s essence is to be replaced by a kind of talk 
which leaves that distinction behind itself: talk about the 
being of God." (Ibid.. p. 209.)
74Ibid.
75Ibid. . pp. 370-371.
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immanent and the economic Trinity: the doctrine of the
economic Trinity "speaks of God’s history with man," 
whereas the doctrine of the immanent Trinity "must speak of 
God's historicity. God's history is his coming to man. 
God's historicity is God's being as it comes ...," God’s 
"being in coming."76 By this, Jungel does not mean that 
God's being "becomes" in the sense current in process 
theology.77 Rather, his meaning is that, as the immanent 
Trinity, God is intrinsically a loving self-movement ad 
extra, towards his creation; since this self-movement 
requires a history in order to fulfil what it is, it can be 
spoken of abstractly as a historicity. It is, however, only 
made concrete in God's actual history with mankind, for 
which God makes space within himself.78 The immanent 
Trinity, therefore, "is" the economic Trinity, and vice
79versa.
76Ibid. . pp. 346-347.
^John J. O'Donnell, Trinity and Temporality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 87-88.
TPJüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 96.
79Cf. Jüngel's article, "Das Verhältnis von 
»ökonomischer« und »immanenter« Trinität," Zeitschrift für 
Theologie und Kirche. 72 (1975), 353-364, presented at a
colloquy of the Académie Internationale des Sciences
Religieuses in 1975. Cf. also the account of the consensus 
achieved at the meeting in Thomas F. Torrance, "Toward an 
Ecumenical Consensus on the Trinity," Theologische 
Zeitschrift. 31 (1975), 337-350. Jüngel, o p . cit., pp. 359- 
362, commenting in detail on Rahner's Trinitarian axiom, 
argues in basic sympathy with Rahner (and Barth) that the 
unity of the economic with the immanent Trinity implies an 
eternal orientation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to 
the economy of salvation. Jüngel clearly does not hold that 
this amounts to a reduction of the immanent to the economic 
Trinity; on the contrary, the distinction must be
maintained both in order to retain the category of grace, 
and in order that the kind of identity of immanent and 
economic Trinity given in Rahner's theology can be
sustained. He writes, ibid. . p. 364: "Die Einheit von
»immanenter« und »ökonomischer« Trinität zu behaupten ist 
theologisch nur dann legitim, wenn diese Einheit nicht in 
dem Sinne tautologisch verkannt wird, daß die Freiheit und
In many ways, Jüngel's theological programme as 
expressed here amounts to an intensification of the 
Barthian attempt to think of God exclusively on the basis 
of revelation. What is required, for Jüngel as for Barth, 
is a movement away from the God of Christian theism towards 
a consistently "evangelical" concept of God. In his 
theology, Jüngel carefully constructs a dual case for this 
shift, arguing specifically that what is required is an 
approach based on the evangelical theology of the cross.80 
In the first place, there is the theological necessity for 
this shift in theological thinking, deriving from the 
message of the gospel itself, which is at its heart, Jüngel 
argues, the message of the cross. Jüngel is rather 
uncritically dependent here upon the Pauline and Lutheran 
traditions, but he shares also the common and equally
Q Iuncritical contemporary conviction that the metaphysical 
God of Christian theism, who is by definition absolute and 
impassible, is theologically inconsistent with the God of 
the Christian gospel, who is revealed in the cross and 
suffering of Jesus. Thus dereliction theology, for Jüngel, 
requires a fundamental alteration in the idea of God in 
Christian theology.
This necessity is complemented, however, by the 
possibility of a shift in thought provided by the collapse 
in modern philosophy of the traditional metaphysical 
position underlying Christian theism. For Jüngel, the
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ungeschuldete Gnade der Selbstmitteilung Gottes und also 
deren Ereianishaftiakeit undenkbar wird. Es sollte deshalb, 
gerade um die reale Identität von »immanenter« und 
»ökonomischer« Trinität als Geheimnis aussagen zu können, 
die distinctio rationis von »ökonomischer« und »immanenter« 
Trinität theologisch beibehalten werden."
80Jüngel, God as the Mvsterv of the World, pp. 185-199.
81Unfortunately, Jüngel does not differentiate 
sufficiently between the various forms of Christian theism, 
or take into account the long and profound debate between 
them.
central expression of this collapse, and the real event 
which makes it inescapable for the Christian theologian, is 
the philosophical death of God in the context of modern
onthought. ‘ Because theology cannot ignore the intellectual 
context in which it is set - this, Jüngel argues, was one 
of the chief weaknesses of dialectical theology83 - both the 
necessity and the possibility of a shift in the doctrines 
of God and the Trinity belong together. Jüngel's doctrine 
of the Trinity is itself an attempt to reappropriate the 
doctrine of the Trinity in this light, based both on the 
perceived necessity for a truly "Christian" Trinitarian 
metaphysics, and on the opening within theology itself for 
such a metaphysics provided by the collapse of the older 
position.
Materially, this shift issues in Jüngel's theology in 
a theology of God in himself as event rather than as 
substance. Once again, Jüngel's indebtedness to Barth is 
apparent: like Barth, Jüngel attempts to understand God's
84being in his act of revelation in Jesus Christ, and, like
Barth, he understands the theistic conception to militate
against the "evangelical" conception.85 The metaphysics of
divine substance, which posits a fundamental distinction
86between divine and creaturely substance, and which 
attributes to the former such essential qualities as 
immutability and impassibility, requires the concept of a 
God who is removed in his intrinsic essence from the events 
of the economy of salvation. On the basis of these 
presuppositions, indeed, it is an intellectual offence that 
God should ever have become involved in the affairs of his
82Ibid. . pp. 201-202.
83Ibid. . p. 200.
^ Ibid.. p. 158.
85Ibid.. passim, and Barth, op. cit., II/l, p. 263.
86Augustine, o p . cit. , I, 6.
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creation. Jüngel, however, fundamentally rejects this 
disjunction of the divine and the creaturely; on the basis 
of revelation, he argues, it is necessary to think God in 
his unity with perishing existence.87 Specifically, for 
Jüngel, this means that it is necessary to think of God in 
his unity with Jesus in the event of the cross; to conceive 
of God as event is to conceive of God as this event.
I shall develop this conception at greater length in
the context of the doctrine of the Trinity shortly; first,
however, it is necessary to introduce the notion of the
divine love, which is central to Jüngel's theological
position, as it must arguably be to any possible
Trinitarian theology of the cross. He writes, "To think God
88as love is the task of theology," while he defines this 
task itself as derived from the centrality of the cross: 
'We are to read the statement "God is love" as an 
exposition of the self-identification of God with the
89crucified man Jesus.' From this, indeed, stems the 
characterization of his Trinitarian Pneumatology in terms 
of the atonement; without the divine love, on the other 
hand, this would be meaningless.
The concept of the divine love can be understood, 
however, in two ways: the first ontologically, in the
context of the doctrine of the divine being, and the second 
relationally, in the context of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. One of the ambiguities in Jüngel's position is 
that he does not sufficiently clarify the relation between 
the two senses in which the divine love can be understood: 
God is love, for Jüngel, both ontologically and as the Holy 
Spirit. In the first case, that God is love is comprehended 
through a reappropriation of the old idea of the divinity
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87Jüngel, op . cit. . pp. 188-189.
^ Ibid.. p. 315.
89Ibid. , p . 326.
as overflowing being.90 (For Jüngel, however, the divine 
emanation does not occur simply so that God may return to 
self-possession, as in the older theological tradition, but 
in order that he may overflow into nothingness, and only in 
his union with nothingness return to himself.91) Hence, for 
example, God redeems, and hence his redemptive act is his 
being: his being is redemptive being, his overflow into the 
finite. God's grace, therefore, is not something secondary 
to his intrinsic being; rather, his intrinsic being is his 
grace. "We draw these theological considerations together 
into their ontological concept". Jüngel writes, "when we 
grasp the being of God as a Going-Out-Of-Himself into 
nothingness."92 It is in this sense that the divine being 
is defined by Jüngel as love, in that God is in himself a 
turning towards what is outside of himself. "Because God 
is love, this is then God's being; to be related to 
nothingness."93 Thus, the idea of the divine overflow as an 
ontological characterization of the divine being explains 
how God's union with the crucified Jesus is possible: it is 
because God is love in his immanent being that he thus goes 
out of himself into his other, and in doing so, remains one 
with himself. In this context we might say, therefore, that 
the immanent reality of God is the economic reality, and
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90Ibid.. pp. 222-22 5. According to L. J. O'Donovan, 
"The Mystery of God as a History of Love. Eberhard Jüngel' s 
Doctrine of God," Theological Studies, 42 (1981), 265,
Jüngel's discussion of God as overflowing being constitutes 
a shift in his thought in God as the Mystery of the World 
from soteriological to ontological categories. The 
ontological significance of this reappropriation of 
emanationism certainly cannot be overlooked, but it is 
rather to be understood as another expression of the 
soteriological content which Jüngel already gives to his 
theological ontology than as a movement of thought 
involving a shift to a different conceptual level.
91 Jüngel, o p . cit. . p. 224.
92Ibid. , p . 22 3.
93Ibid. . p. 222.
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vice versa.
In the case of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, the 
concept of the divine love is again paramount, but in a 
more specific sense. Whereas in the case of the overflow 
of the divine being, the notion of love is an abstraction 
used to comprehend the being of the God who identifies 
himself with nothingness in the cross of Jesus, the concept 
of the Holy Spirit as love functions within the Trinitarian 
dynamic itself. In his recent study of Jungel's theology, 
J. B. Webster argues that Jiingel lacks a developed 
Pneumatology, and that this lack constitutes one of the 
chief inadequacies of his theological position.94 However,
94 John Bainbridge Webster, Eberhard Jünael: An
Introduction to his Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), pp. 73-77. Cf., however, Jüngel's 
modest contribution to Pneumatology as such in his essay, 
"Zur Lehre vom Heiligen Geist: Thesen," in Ulrich Luz and 
Hans Weder, eds., Die Mitte des Neuen Testaments 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), pp. 97-118.
Jüngel's treatment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit here 
is concerned with the work of the Spirit rather than with 
the specifically Trinitarian aspect of Pneumatology; thus 
the Spirit is approached primarily from the standpoint of 
the doctrines of faith and of the Church. The Holy Spirit 
is understood to complete the work of Christ by bringing 
men and women to faith: "Der zur Welt kommende Gott bringt 
den Glauben mit sich" (ibid.. § 13.22). As the Spirit who 
thus draws men and women into relationship with Christ 
through faith, however, the Spirit also creates new 
relationships among men and women themselves; the work of 
the Spirit in the present thus appears as an eschatological 
anticipation of the final reconciliation of all things in 
the kingdom of God (ibid.. §§ 8.5-8.53). In only two brief 
passages does Jüngel develop the Trinitarian implications 
of this. In the first (ibid. . § 4.1), the Spirit is the
inner-Trinitarian vinculum pacis. the communal bond within 
the Trinity through whom the Trinity is in itself a 
community of original peace, and the spring of the peace 
promised to the whole creation. In the second (ibid., §§
12.851-12.862), the Holy Spirit takes his own being from 
the Father and the Son, and is, as such, to be understood 
in the present as the power of the representation of the 
history of Jesus, since he (the Spirit) is already in 
himself, as the vinculum pacis or caritatis, the relation 
between God the Father and Jesus in history. The Spirit 
thus brings about what Jüngel calls an eternally new 
beginning of God with himself and a temporally new
as Webster himself notes, Jüngel does not claim to have 
produced anything more than a sketch of how God is defined 
in the cross in his Trinitarian reality.95 Nor, indeed, has 
Jüngel produced to date a single work developing a 
Christology at any length. The apparent lack of a specific 
Pneumatology is therefore rather deceptive; indeed, from 
this point of view the absence of a developed Pneumatology 
is due as much to the terms in which Jüngel's doctrine of 
the Spirit is cast as it is to any neglect of the subject 
on his part. In his Trinitarian theology, Jüngel 
understands the doctrine of the Holy Spirit explicitly in 
terms of the question of the relation between the Father 
and the Son, and employs the language of the Spirit as
QZ Q7vinculum caritatis (or vinculum pacis ) in this context. 
However, consistent with his Barthian understanding of the 
Son as the eternal man, and with his staurocentric 
understanding of the Christ-event, Jüngel's treatment of 
the Trinitarian relation between the Father and the Son is 
developed in terms of the relation between the Father and 
the crucified Jesus. From this point of view, the doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit can be seen both to be hidden within the 
discussion of this relation, and also, as such, to be vital 
to Jüngel's theological programme. Given that the Holy 
Spirit is seen as the vinculum caritatis. and given the 
centrality of the cross in Jüngel's theology, it is 
precisely Pneumatology which allows Jüngel to maintain the 
unity between the Father and the crucified Jesus, and thus 
to develop his theology of the cross in a Trinitarian way.
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beginning of God with humanity in Christ (ibid., § 12.862). 
This, however, adds nothing to what has already been said 
of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity, except to work out 
certain of its ecclesiological implications.
95Webster, op. cit. . p. 73.
96See above, footnote number 94.
97Jiingel, God as the Mvsterv of the World, p. 3 88.
The role of the Holy Spirit in this conception is to 
overcome the threat of the dissolution of the unity of the 
Father with the crucified Jesus, i.e., as the bond of love 
between the Father and the Son who is delivered over to
98death. In this sense, it is the doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit which must be taken to underlie and to emerge from 
the whole discussion of the self-identification of the 
Father with Jesus on the cross. The Spirit in Jiingel 
maintains the unity of the Father and the Son in the event 
of the cross; in that God survives, as it were, the ordeal 
of the cross, he is to be defined precisely as Spirit:
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In that God differentiates himself, and 
thus. in unity with the crucified 
Jesus, suffers as God the Son being 
forsaken by God the Father, he is God 
the Reconciler. God reconciles the 
world with himself in that in the death 
of Jesus he encounters himself as God 
the Father and God the Son without 
becoming disunited in himself. On the 
contrary, in the encounter of God and 
God, of Father and Son, God reveals 
himself as the one who he is. He is God 
the Spirit, who lets the Father and Son 
be one in the death of Jesus, in true 
distinction, in this encounter. The 
'chain of love' (vinculum caritatis) 
emphasizes God's eternal being in the 
death of Jesus. Thus God is 
differentiated in a threefold way in 
his unity: in the encounter of Father 
and Son, related to each other as 
Spirit. But in the fatal encounter, God 
remains one God. For he remains as 
Father and Son in the Spirit the onego"event God."
It is therefore the doctrine of the Trinity, and 
specifically the doctrine of the Holy Spirit within this 
doctrine of the Trinity, which enables Jiingel to articulate
98Ibid. . p. 346.
" ibid., p . 368.
the truth that "God is love" in the context of the 
Christian gospel of the cross. It allows Jüngel, in his 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity, to understand 
the relation between the Father and the Son to be given in 
the cross by preventing this relation from issuing in a 
contradiction within God.100 The unity of God thus survives, 
and God himself survives with it, but precisely as Spirit. 
In Jüngel's terminology, God is love, "the event of the 
unity of life and death for the sake of life,"101 but he is 
this as the Holy Spirit who unites in love the Father and 
the crucified Jesus.
At the beginning of this study, I argued that the 
general approach to the immanent Trinity which emerges from 
the contemporary development in Trinitarian theology can be 
characterized as the attempt to construct a doctrine of the 
immanent Trinity sub specie temporis. Jüngel's doctrine of 
the immanent Trinity, being constructed from the standpoint 
of the crucified Jesus, is clearly orientated along these 
lines. With reference to the traditional position and to 
his own reformulation of Trinitarian theology, Jüngel 
writes:
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The immanent trinitarian doctrine 
understands God himself with no regard 
for his relationship to man; the 
economic trinitarian doctrine, by 
contrast, understands God's being in 
its relationship to man and his world.
But [this distinction] is 
legitimate only when the economic 
doctrine of the Trinity deals with 
God's history with man, and the 
immanent doctrine of the Trinity is its 
summarizing concept. Here careful 
corrections to the traditional form of 
trinitarian doctrine are absolutely
100Webster, o p . cit. . p. 72.
101Jüngel, op . cit. , p. 317.
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Jiingel's basic argument concerning the immanent Trinity, 
therefore, is not that the concept itself is to be 
abandoned, but rather that the doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity must not be allowed to be structured by the 
dictates of classical theism. Fundamentally, the point he 
makes is a radical version of the Barthian thesis that God 
is in himself "for" humanity, that God has eternally chosen 
men and women for fellowship with himself, and therefore 
that the economy of salvation is properly to be conceived 
as interior to God himself.105 In this context, however, the 
doctrine of the immanent Trinity does not survive as 
traditionally understood; it is rather conceived in the 
closest possible connection with the economic, so that the 
two appear no longer as separable, but rather as aspects of 
a single immanent-economic reality. In the key passage 
already cited, Jungel writes:
Where the economic doctrine of the 
Trinity speaks of God's history with 
man, the immanent doctrine of the 
Trinity must speak of God's 
historicity. God’s history is his 
coming to man. God's historicity is 
God's being as it comes (being in 
coming) . 04
The language of God's being in "coming" (Kommen) used 
here in the context of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity 
expresses the idea that God is in himself a movement of
called for.102
102Ibid. . p. 346.
105See Jiingel's treatment of Barth's doctrine of 
election in The Doctrine of the Trinity, pp. 68-83, and 
footnote number 79 above.
104Jungel, God as the Mvsterv of the World, pp. 346- 
347. Cited above, p. 159.
himself to himself in his Trinitarian being,105 a divine 
self-relation of the Father to himself, through the 
crucified Son and in the Holy Spirit.106 The divine being is 
not something which exists apart from this self-relation; 
rather, it is. this self-relation in the sense that, as we 
have seen, God is love, a passing beyond himself to the 
other, so as not to be himself without the other. The 
divine self-relation, for this reason, cannot be taken to 
be self-absorbed, but is inclusive of the finite and sinful 
creation.
It is thus that the immanent and the economic Trinity 
are taken by Jungel to constitute a unity. While Jungel, 
therefore, together with the theological tradition, 
characterizes the Father as origin,107 he also argues that 
the very "originality" of God as Father precludes the idea 
of isolation; not only does the idea of the Father involve 
the idea of the Son as its correlate, but to think of God 
as Father is to think of God as a "social essence," open to 
otherness in the form of the creation. In the case of the 
immanent Son, we are concerned not with the Father as 
primordial originality, but as the divine goal: God not
only "comes from God" as Father, but God "comes to God" the 
Son.108 But the Son of God is not the "goal" of a divinity 
which exists solely in and for itself; rather, the eternal 
Son is, as such, the one in whom God has as his goal not 
only himself, but also the creation drawn into fellowship 
with himself. Finally, according to Jungel, God "comes as 
God" in this self-relation, as the Holy Spirit who unites
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105"The statement God's being is in coming implies . . . 
that God's being is the event of his coming to himself." 
Ibid.. p. 380.
106Ibid. . pp. 380-389.
107Ibid. . pp. 381-382.
108Ibid. . pp. 382-387.
the Father and the Son in love. However, just as the Son 
is begotten eternally with the creation already in view - 
there is, for Jungel as for Barth, no Logos asarkos - so 
the Holy Spirit is eternally the unity in love of more than 
the Father and the Son in and for themselves; the Spirit is 
the unity in love of the eternal Father and the Son who is 
eternally given over to death, and so also the basis of the 
inclusion of the perishing creation into the unity of God 
with himself. As such, the Holy Spirit is eternally in 
himself the power of the resurrection and of the 
eschatological transformation of the whole creation.
The atonement model of the Trinity, in which the Holy 
Spirit is held to be the " at-one-ment" of the Father and 
the crucified Jesus, and so also of the Father and the 
perishing creation, presupposes the view that the cross is 
the single point at which the being of God is defined. This 
presupposition is both the strength and the weakness of the 
position: the strength, because it enables a systematic
understanding of the Trinity as the event of the self- 
identification of the Father with Jesus, in the Holy 
Spirit; the weakness, because, like many other systematic 
principles, it prematurely restricts the subsequent content 
of the theological position. To the extent that the whole 
of the systematic conception is concentrated in this one 
article, the result is a relative loss of, for example, the 
idea of God as Creator, or again, of God as Sanctifier. 
Indeed, the typical Christological restriction of 
filioquist Pneumatology appears here as more than a simple 
Christological restriction; the theological position as a 
whole is staurocentric rather than Christocentric, so that 
even the wider content of Christology is telescoped into 
the cross, and so that Christology suffers as well. It can, 
of course, be said in defence of the position that the 
phrase, "the word of the cross" is meant to encompass more
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than simply the bare event of the crucifixion, but this at 
the same time does nothing to move the theology towards a 
more nuanced approach. It rather reaffirms the fact that 
the more comprehensive content of the gospel is forced into 
focus at this one, albeit decisive, point.
This criticism could be illustrated in a number of 
ways, but it would be best in this context to refer 
specifically to Jiingel's doctrine of the Holy Spirit. It 
is surely a telling sign of the limitations of Jungel's 
position that, despite all the emphasis that is placed on 
the unity of the immanent with the economic Trinity, so 
little is made of Pentecost or of the Church in his 
Trinitarian Pneumatology. Jungel does argue, certainly, 
that God's unity with himself in the Holy Spirit is an 
inclusive unity, and so a redemptive unity; this is clear 
from the fact that the point of the divine unity which is 
appropriated to the Holy Spirit as vinculum caritatis is 
the self-identification of God with the creature, in such 
a way as to draw the creature into the life of God. Jungel 
is able also, as we have seen, to develop certain of the 
ecclesiological implications of this thesis.110 The divine 
love is therefore quite clearly not a function of divine 
egoism; in a way clearly reminiscent of Barth, Jungel does 
not allow that God should will to be God without man.111 But 
to draw such Pneumatological conclusions from the event of 
the cross as such is not the same as to draw them from the 
actual Pneumatological events which, in the New Testament 
witness, reveal it to be the case. This is a crucial 
problem not only in Jungel's treatment of the doctrine of 
the Holy Spirit, but also, potentially, in any treatment of 
the doctrine which is to be based explicitly on the 
theology of the cross.
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111Eberhard Jüngel, "...keine Menschenlosigkeit 
Gottes...", Evangelische Theologie, 31 (1971), 376-390.
Closely related to this problem is the general
difficulty involved in making the personal character of the
Holy Spirit dependent on the relation between the Father
and the Son. The difficulty here is one shared by most, if
not all, theologians in the Western, filioquist tradition:
it is the problem of the personal character of the Holy
Spirit. When the Holy Spirit is conceived as the bond of
love between the Father and the Son, the role of the Spirit
in the doctrine of the Trinity appears to be effectively
confused with that of the one divine essence, which is
likewise to preserve the divine unity by reconciling the
plurality of Trinitarian relations with the unity of God.
Indeed, it must be asked if Jiingel's common
characterization of both the divine essence and the Holy
Spirit as love is not in some sense a function of this
confusion. The vinculum caritatis idea tends to lead,
furthermore, to a deficient view of the personal agency of
the Holy Spirit. In Jiingel's theology, as in the Western
Trinitarian tradition, there is no doubt that both the
Father and the Son are personal agents of some sort, having
a genuinely interpersonal relationship; in the case of the
Spirit, by contrast, it is difficult to resist the
conclusion of R. D. Williams that the vinculum caritatis
tradition reduces the role of the Spirit in the Trinity to
112that of a quality linking two agents.
This problem is exacerbated, in the end, by the 
attempt to think of the immanent Holy Spirit sub specie 
temporis, and by a restricted, staurocentric understanding 
of the scope of the latter. In concentrating the temporal 
economy into the single datum of the cross, in other words, 
the atonement model in effect excludes from the theological 
system the possibility of an understanding of the role of 
the Holy Spirit in, for example, creation and in the
172
l12Williams, o p . cit. . p. 182; so also Webster, op^ 
cit.. p. 77.
eternal generation of the Son from the Father; instead, the 
Spirit is necessarily cast in the singular role of the bond 
of unity overcoming the disjunction of Father and Son in 
the cross. There is unquestionably something extremely 
profound about the role the Spirit is given in such a 
dereliction theology, but it is at the same time a role 
that is very much pared down, and even simplistic, over 
against the wider possibilities for Pneumatological 
development given in the biblical witness and the 
theological tradition.
3. The Anointing Model 
We consider thirdly the theme of the anointing of 
Jesus Christ with the Holy Spirit as the basis of a 
possible Trinitarian theology of the Spirit. The potential 
of such a development seems in some ways rather obvious, 
and, in keeping with this, a number of theologians have 
recently attempted to construct such a theology.112 The other 
models considered in this Chapter are generally somewhat 
more familiar than the anointing model, however, while the 
possibilities for Trinitarian theological development are 
here also slightly greater; for this reason, a more 
expansive treatment of the anointing theme, covering a 
range of theological positions, will be provided. In order 
to deal with the various positions which have emerged in 
this context, we shall be concerned in what follows with 
two problems: first of all, the question of the
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1120ther theologians, however, have argued that the 
Christology of anointing with the Spirit is inconsistent 
with the doctrine of the Trinity. Geoffrey Lampe, for 
example, in his God as Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977), attempts to develop a Spirit Christology to 
replace Logos Christology, and argues in this connection 
that the doctrine of the Trinity must be abandoned. Cf. 
also the similar, more elaborate position of Paul W. 
Newman, A Spirit Christology (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1987).
Christological basis of the contemporary discussion, and 
secondly, the question of the specific claims made on this 
basis in contemporary Trinitarian theology.
(a) The Christological Basis
In The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Hendrikus Berkhof 
noted the fact that on the strength of the Old and New 
Testament witness it would be possible and even obvious to 
design Christology from a Pneumatic standpoint, and that 
such a development would undoubtedly have wider Trinitarian 
implications.114 In such a theology, he argued, Jesus might 
be seen as the centre of God's life-giving presence as 
Spirit in and with the creation, and as the focus and 
starting-point of a new and redemptive work of the Spirit 
in the world. Berkhof, however, was convinced that any 
attempt to develop such a theology would have to proceed 
without any real theological precedent. He noted, for 
example, the fact that some of the earliest Christologies 
down to the middle of the second century were broadly 
Pneumatic (citing, for example, Ignatius, Ep . Eoh., 7, 2; 
2 Clem.. 9, 5; and Hermas, Sim.. V, 6, 5), but viewed the 
understanding of Christ's Sonship and of the Holy Spirit 
involved in these early theologies as problematic.115 These 
conceptions were, in any case, abandoned in the later 
theological tradition. The result, Berkhof argued, is that 
we lack a developed understanding of the manner in which 
the Spirit might be conceived to be uniquely united with 
Christ, and thus a clear starting-point and basis for 
discussion.116
Unfortunately, Berkhof did not provide the kind of 
detailed treatment of these problems which was needed, but
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115Ibid. . p. 20.
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his Pneumatology anticipated the development which was to 
follow.117 This was to occur, significantly, not in Berkhof's 
own (Protestant) theological tradition, but rather in the 
Roman Catholic tradition, through a critical reappraisal of 
the scholastic doctrine of the habitual, or accidental 
sanctification of Jesus, a doctrine which Protestant 
theology has largely neglected.118 The scholastic tradition
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117Berkhof's position also prefigures that of more 
recent theologians in other respects - e.g., in its
insistence that the eschatological character of New 
Testament Pneumatology is of Trinitarian significance, in 
the sense that the role of the Spirit in the final 
consummation involves a Pneumatologically orientated 
history of the Trinity itself. See ibid.. pp. 94-121. This 
theme will be treated in some detail below in Chapter III, 
section 4.
118This distinction was developed above all in Western 
scholastic theology, but it has its real root in the 
development of Christology in the patristic era, by which 
it was established that the humanity Jesus has no 
independent existence, but exists hypostatically only in 
the Logos. In keeping with this, the accidental 
sanctification of Jesus, his anointing with the Spirit, is 
virtually made a function of his substantial sanctification 
in the hypostatic union. According to A. Michel, "Jésus- 
Christ," Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. VIII, col. 
1277, the scholastic tradition went so far as to assert 
that the "unction" of Christ, or the anointing which makes 
Jesus "Christ," is the anointing of human nature with the 
divine in the incarnation. Over against this, the 
accidental or habitual graces of Christ appear as logically 
distinct from the grace of union in the sense that they do 
not involve a hypostatic union, and logically posterior in 
the sense that they flow from the grace of union. These 
include Jesus' habitual grace and infused virtues, together 
with the gifts of the Holy Spirit by which he healed the 
sick, etc., all of which are appropriated to the Holy 
Spirit's work in his human nature (ibid., cols. 1279-1281) . 
According to Thomas Aquinas, o p . cit., 3a. 7, 1; la. 43, 3, 
for example, one must acknowledge the fact that Christ 
possessed habitual grace for the simple reason that 
scripture teaches that the Spirit of God rested upon him; 
since the distinctive mission of the Holy Spirit is to 
bestow habitual grace, he argues, Christ must have 
possessed it. Thomas also, however, attempts to comprehend 
the dogmatic necessity of habitual grace in Jesus through 
the doctrine of Christ's true human nature (ibid., 3a. 7, 
1, ad 1) . As man, therefore, because the human nature is
differentiates between the relation of the Spirit and the 
Logos to the human nature of Christ by means of the 
doctrine of the "accidental," or "habitual" sanctification 
of Jesus, as distinct from his "essential," or 
"substantial" sanctification. (The distinction can also be 
expressed in terms of "created grace" on the one hand over 
against the "grace of union" on the other.) Of particular 
importance in this respect has been the seminal work of the 
Roman Catholic theologian Heribert Mühlen.119 Not only does 
Mühlen provide an answer to Berkhof's query concerning the 
unique manner of the union of the Spirit with Christ 
through his re-examination of the doctrine of accidental 
sanctification,120 but, more importantly for our purposes, 
his work has set the theological agenda for subsequent 
Trinitarian theologies of the anointing of Jesus.
In his theology, Mühlen adopts the scholastic doctrine 
that the role of the Holy Spirit in the life of Christ was
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not confused with the divine even after the union, Jesus 
had to participate in the divine nature in the way 
characteristic of all creaturely reality under grace. Thus 
the human nature of Jesus must have received, by the work 
of the Spirit, habitual graces like all other human beings 
- graces which enabled him to live a life of godliness by 
the characteristically human acts of knowledge and will. 
Thomas represents the whole of the scholastic tradition in 
this respect, the only important exception being Duns 
Scotus, who apparently identified substantial sanctity with 
the uncreated sanctity of God, and therefore refused to 
attribute substantial holiness to Christ on the grounds 
that such an attribution would imply a monophysite denial 
of Christ's human nature (Michel, o p. cit.. cols. 1275- 
1276) .
119Mühlen has pursued this theme through a variety of 
works; Congar, op. cit., I, pp. 22-25, provides a summary 
of his position from this point of view. In what follows, 
reference has been made to Heribert Mühlen, Der Heilige 
Geist als Person (Münster: Aschendorff, 1963; references 
are to the 5th ed. , 1988) ; and his "Das Christusereignis
als Tat des Heiligen Geistes," in Johannes Feiner and 
Magnus Löhrer, eds., Mysterium Salutis (Einsiedeln: 
Benziger Verlag, 1969), III/2, pp. 519-524.
120Mühlen, Der Heilige Geist als Person, pp. 206-214.
a secondary implication of the hypostatic union. Because 
the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and 
because the Son assumes human nature in the incarnation, 
the Spirit, according to Mühlen, rests upon him also.121 Thus 
Mühlen’s Pneumatic Christology appropriates the anointing 
of Jesus ultimately to the Logos rather than to the Spirit 
- not, however, in the sense that the humanity is anointed 
by the Logos in the hypostatic union, as in some scholastic 
theologies,122 but in the sense that the anointing of the 
humanity with the Spirit to make Jesus the "Christ" derives 
from the assumption of flesh by the Logos.
At the same time, however, Mühlen attempts to overcome 
the limitations of the scholastic conception, which derive 
from its inability to conceive of the humanity of Christ in 
a fully historical way, and thus also of the relation of 
the Spirit to Christ in terms adequate to the historicity 
of human nature. According to Thomas Aquinas, for example, 
there was no increase in the habitual grace of Christ 
throughout his life; rather, since he had already reached 
the goal of creaturely union with God from his conception, 
through his substantial sanctification in the grace of 
union, the accidental graces of the Holy Spirit must also 
have been present in their fullness from the moment of his 
conception.123 This view is required, for Thomas, by the very 
concept of the hypostatic union; the humanity of Christ 
must have received perfect and complete habitual grace from 
the very beginning of its existence, inasmuch as the union 
of divine and human natures in the hypostasis of the Son 
means that the Holy Spirit who comes forth eternally from 
the Son can never be separated from the humanity of the 
Son, but is of necessity communicated to the humanity
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122See above, footnote number 118.
123Thomas Aquinas, o p . cit. , 3a. 7, 12.
Within this theological conception, accidental 
sanctity or habitual grace is still necessary for Jesus as 
man, precisely on the basis of the Chalcedonian doctrine 
that the hypostatic union does not obliterate the 
distinction of natures. However, over against the 
incarnation of the Logos, this work of the Spirit in the 
humanity of Christ appears to be of incidental 
significance; above all, it is in no sense the ground of 
the divine Sonship of Christ, but is rather the result or 
"crown" of the Sonship which is already presupposed, and 
which is conceived as the result of the hypostatic union 
within the established tradition of Logos Christology. The 
Sonship being thus established by the Logos, the work of 
the Spirit was to endow the humanity assumed by the Logos 
with the created sanctifying graces and charisms by means 
of which Jesus lived in a holy manner.125 There is no doubt 
that the intention of the medieval tradition in this 
respect was to acknowledge the true humanity of Christ and 
to provide a distinctive role in Christology for the Holy 
Spirit in its relation to that humanity. However, just as 
the conception of human nature involved appears defective, 
since there is no growth or movement in its relation to 
God, so the Pneumatological determination of the humanity 
of Christ which results is minimized. The problem is that, 
in the end, the doctrine of the hypostatic union (and its 
interpretation through the idea of enhypostasia) does not 
permit the humanity of Christ to be considered apart from 
the Logos; in the medieval conception, therefore, even the 
accidental sanctification of the humanity of Jesus by the 
Holy Spirit becomes a species of Logos Christology, 
inasmuch as those graces which are thus given to the human 
nature by the Spirit flow ultimately from the hypostatic
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124Ibid. . 3a. 7, 5 ad 2; 7, 13.
125Congar, The Word and the Spirit, p. 86.
union.
This is a weakness which shows up most critically,
perhaps, in less subtle versions of the scholastic
position, in which the hypostatic union is of such
importance that the Holy Spirit in effect has no place in
Christology at all. In the later medieval period, for
example, the tendency was to ascribe everything of positive
importance to the hypostatic union as a result of an anti-
Scotist concern to reassert the importance of Christ's
126substantial sanctification. The result, however, was that 
Jesus' habitual grace, deriving from the work of the
127Spirit, appeared to be superfluous. This is a tendency
which is not limited to the medieval period; it can be seen
also, for example, in the nineteenth century in the
theology of M. Scheeben, who argues that biblical and
patristic references to the anointing of Jesus by the
Spirit are to be understood in the sense that Jesus is
128anointed by the Word, who is the principle of the Spirit. 
Here literally everything in Christology must be 
appropriated ultimately to the Word, while the 
Christological importance of the Holy Spirit is effectively 
eliminated.
Miihlen attempts to overcome the deficiencies of this 
idea by developing at some length the salvation-historical 
importance of the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of 
Christ. In his essay, "Das Christusereignis als Tat des 
Heiligen Geistes," for example, Miihlen distinguishes 
between the salvation-historical framework of the 
Christology of anointing and the ontological Christology of
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127Liam G. Walsh, in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theoloaiae. trans., with introduction and notes by Liam G. 
Walsh (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, and New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 1974), XLIX, pp. 46-47, note a.
128So David Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit 
(Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1979), pp. 93-95.
the theological tradition, arguing that the particular 
significance of the Christology of anointing lies in its 
salvation-historical dimension. It is thus salvation 
history which provides Mühlen with a theological horizon in 
which to discuss the place of the Holy Spirit in 
Christology. He is aware, for example, that the biblical 
Christology of anointing, in particular as it was later 
developed in the early theological tradition by the 
Ebionites,129 was inadequate and that the doctrine of Christ 
required an ontological elaboration through the development 
of Logos Christology.130 Nevertheless, the salvation-
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1290n Ebionitism, see Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Jewish 
Christianity, trans. Douglas R. A. Hare (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1969), pp. 59-73, who argues that the 
Ebionites held at least initially to what can be
characterized as a prophet Christology in which Jesus 
appears as the prophet like Moses who was promised in Deut. 
18: 15. Their Christological view appears to have been that 
Jesus, as man rather than as the divine Son, perfectly 
fulfilled the Law of Moses in his earthly existence, and as 
a result of his obedience was consecrated Messiah and
endowed with the power of God through the gift of the
Spirit at his baptism. The Messianic office for which he 
was thus equipped chiefly comprised his dual role as the 
new lawgiver and as the eschatological Son of Man (ibid.. 
p. 61). The position of the Ebionites is, however,
notoriously difficult to reconstruct. The Fathers' 
characterization of the Ebionite sect, for example, goes 
beyond Schoeps' reconstruction; Tertullian, De carne 
Christi. 14, and Epiphanius, Haer. 30, 16, 3-4, speak of a 
group which held that at the baptism of Jesus, an archangel 
named Christ descended upon him, as he had also upon the 
earlier prophets (Schoeps, o p . cit.. p. 64; Pelikan, op. 
cit.. p. 24). Jean Danidlou, following the Fathers, argues 
in The Theology of Jewish Christianity, trans. and ed. J. 
A. Baker (London: Darton, Longmann & Todd, 1964), pp. 55- 
64, that the angelic theme is primitive. Schoeps, however, 
regards this as a later Ebionite doctrine, current at the 
time of the early Fathers. As Danidlou's analysis is less 
extensive than that of Schoeps, who enters into the 
historical and theological problems in some detail, 
Schoeps' characterization of the Ebionites in terms of a 
relatively straightforward Christology of anointing is 
probably to be preferred.
130Mühlen, "Das Christusereignis," pp. 519-524.
historical aspect of Christology, grounded as it is in 
biblical revelation and related as it is to the historical 
humanity of Jesus as the God-man, needs to be reaffirmed 
and systematically reappropriated.
While maintaining the basic distinction between Logos 
Christology as ontological and Pneumatic Christology as 
salvation-historical, Mühlen argues that it is possible to 
draw an analogy between the sending of the Son and the 
sending of the Spirit, so that just as the former is 
designated the Menschwerdung of the Son of God, so the 
latter can be spoken of as the "Zeitwerdung" of the Holy 
Spirit.131 The point of this is not, of course, to claim that 
the Spirit "became time" in a sense parallel to Jn. 1: 14, 
and much less to claim that this "becoming time" was 
analogous to the Word's assumption of flesh in the 
developed Christological doctrine of the hypostatic union. 
It is rather that in anointing Jesus, first of all, and 
also in the Spirit's continuing role as the mediator of the 
risen Christ to the Church, the Spirit is bound up 
inexorably with the temporal existence and mission of Jesus 
Christ, and thus assumes a role in the economy of salvation 
which he did not have before.132
Mühlen unfortunately fails to limit his term to the 
Holy Spirit, as, according to Mühlen, the Menschwerdung of 
the Logos too can also be called a Zeitwerdung.133 In the 
incarnation, the Logos indeed "became" something which he 
had not been from "the beginning." The crucial point, 
however, for our purposes is that the Holy Spirit, in his 
activity in the life of Jesus, also becomes what he was not 
before. Mühlen develops this thesis in two ways. In the 
first place, he presupposes the doctrine of the accidental
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sanctification of Jesus, arguing from it, however, that the 
Spirit created in him those graces which were required for 
his Messianic office, and that, through time, these graces 
increased and developed in his personal history. This 
grace, for Mühlen as for the scholastics, was derived 
ultimately from the hypostatic union, but immediately from 
the "unction" of the Holy Spirit - according to the infancy 
narratives, from the beginning of his existence. The total 
history of grace in Jesus’ life, according to Mühlen, from 
his conception to his death, resurrection and exaltation, 
must be understood as a history also of the Spirit who 
bestowed the grace.
Secondly, however, Mühlen takes up the Johannine 
theology of the Spirit as expressed in particular in Jn. 
7: 39; 16: 7; and 20: 22f., and as developed, again, in the 
scholastic doctrine of the gratia capitis of Christ, 
whereby the accidental sanctification of Christ is 
orientated a priori to the plurality of persons he 
represents as the incarnate Word.134 In his development of 
the doctrine of the gratia capitis, however, Mühlen again 
emphasizes the stages of the work of the Spirit in the 
historical humanity of Christ; in particular, he argues 
that is was only through the earthly obedience of Jesus 
unto death that the Spirit became in time the gift given 
also to the Church, and not only to Jesus, for ever.135 The 
Zeitwerdung of the Spirit continues, therefore, beyond the 
Christ-event itself into the time of the Church. Mühlen's 
wider Pneumatological thesis is thus orientated as much to 
ecclesiology as it is to Christology, and can be seen, in 
fact, in general terms as an attempt to relate the two 
together in a single systematic, Pneumatological
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conception.136
In this conception, however, Miihlen gives both 
temporal and logical priority to the Christological over 
the ecclesiological aspect of Pneumatology.137 His central 
point is that the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit, 
from the first moment of his existence through to his
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136Consistent with this, the basis of the whole 
development lies in the activity of the Holy Spirit in the 
Christ-event as such on the one hand, while, on the other, 
Mühlen refers to the characteristic work of the Holy Spirit 
in the economy as the Spirit's "corporeality" 
(Leibhaftigkeit) in the Church (ibid.. p. 518). The 
connection between the two is that the continuing work of 
the Spirit in the Church is the continuation of the 
salvation-historical anointing of Jesus with the Spirit 
(ibid.. p. 533) . This reflects Mühlen's primary formula for 
the Spirit's economic function: "One Person in many
persons," i.e., in Christ and in the Church (ibid.. p. 518; 
Mühlen, Der Heilige Geist als Person, p. 168). The point, 
however, is that the Spirit must be understood in his 
presence and activity in the Church as the same Spirit who 
anointed Jesus, the incarnate Son of God, and as the Spirit 
through whom this same Jesus now makes himself present to 
us (Mühlen, "Das Christusereignis," p. 533). Two points 
follow from this. First of all, for Mühlen, the key 
difference as far as the Church is concerned between the 
Christ-event, and the Spirit-event which has its origin in 
the Christ-event, is the "then" of temporal completion 
which attaches to Jesus' earthly saving work, and the "now" 
of his present activity through his Spirit, though in the 
concrete economy of salvation these are aspects of a single 
divine work. Secondly, the Spirit does not mediate to us a 
heavenly Christ, abstracted from his history and ours, but 
rather makes possible a contemporary salvific participation 
in the historical Christ-event - or rather, to be more 
precise, Christ himself allows such participation in 
himself through his Spirit (ibid., pp. 540-543) .
137Like many theologians, Mühlen treats the Holy Spirit 
in terms of his present role as the mediator between Christ 
and the Church; according to Mühlen, we do not stand over 
against the Holy Spirit or in relation to the Spirit, but 
rather we stand over against Christ, or in relation to 
Christ, in the Spirit. In this sense, the Spirit is to be 
understood literally to be that relation by which we 
encounter Christ, so that in fact the Spirit's role in the 
economy subsequent to the Christ-event itself is as the 
condition and the material of the experience of Christ by 
the Church (ibid.. pp. 514, 525-526).
baptism by John and finally in his death and resurrection, 
is to be understood as a profoundly soteriological event. 
It is, in other words, the Spirit's activity in the life of 
Jesus that is the presupposition of the Spirit's further 
role in the economy of salvation in giving life to the 
Church.138 Much of Mühlen's theological work, indeed, is 
concerned to establish this, and to determine in what sense 
the latter would not have been possible without the former.
In Mühlen's development of the doctrine of the Trinity 
- where the emphasis falls on the personal character of the 
Father, Son, and Spirit, in contrast, clearly, to a more 
ontological conception of the Trinity139 - the understanding 
achieved of the Holy Spirit is built on the older Western 
model of the Trinity, in which the Spirit proceeds from the 
Father and the Son as from one principle; Mühlen thus 
defines the Spirit as the subsistent We-act between the 
Father and the Son, i.e., as their We-relation or mutual 
love.140 In the immanent Trinitarian life, the Father appears
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138Sabbas J. Kilian, "The Holy Spirit in Christ and 
Christians," American Benedictine Review. 20 (1969), 99-
121.
Mühlen holds that the older ontologically-conceived 
doctrine of the Trinity is inadequate, in that it needs to 
be supplemented by a Trinitarian language and conceptuality 
which can express more fully the mysterious life of God, 
and show how the divine life is the ground of the saving 
acts of God in history.
140Mühlen's theology here is a radicalized version of 
the Augustinian trinitarian theory of relational 
predication, and thus of the traditional Western relational 
understanding of the Persons, by means of what he 
understands to be a synthesis of the Trinitarian theologies 
of Augustine and Richard of St. Victor (Mühlen, Der Heilige 
Geist als Person, pp. 81-82, 167). The new "personological" 
vocabulary, however, enables Mühlen to make one advance in 
particular upon the older tradition. He characterizes the 
relation between the Father and the Son on the one hand and 
the Holy Spirit on the other as a "We-You" relation, from 
the point of view, as it were, of the Father and the Son, 
and as an "I-You (plural)" relation, from the point of view 
of the Spirit (ibid.. p. 168).
in Mühlen as the "I relation," the Son as the "Thou 
relation," and the Spirit as the "We in person."141 According 
to Mühlen, the Holy Spirit is thus eternally orientated to 
a plurality of persons, and can be seen in his salvation- 
historical function both as related to the person of the 
incarnate Son (rather than to the human nature assumed) and 
to the whole of the mass of humanity whom the Son came to 
redeem: as the "We in person," the Spirit is thus in his 
salvation-historical function the personal bond between
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Coffey, o p . cit.. pp. 35-37, provides an incisive 
critique of Mühlen, in which he notes certain basic 
problems inherent in this conception, not the least of 
which is the designation of the Holy Spirit as the "We in 
person," whereas the "We" is the Father and the Son, from 
whom the Spirit proceeds. (Coffey's critique of Mühlen's 
Christology, ibid.. pp. 91-119, is more elaborate and 
sustained. I have chosen to omit it in this context, since 
in the treatment of Coffey which follows, Coffey's positive 
Christological position is developed in some detail.) 
Similar difficulties occur in the Augustinian model, of 
course, where the Father and the Son appear as the persons 
in relation, whereas the Spirit appears as their relation, 
i.e., more as an operation of the Father and the Son rather 
than as an personal agent in his own right. Furthermore, in 
Mühlen's adaptation of this model, the personal pronouns 
which attach to the Father, Son, and Spirit are necessarily 
ambiguous, according to the particular relation with which 
we are concerned. Both the Son and the Spirit can be 
designated "Thou," for example, while the Spirit can appear 
even in relation to the Father as "I." It is, however, 
difficult to agree with Coffey's basic criticism of 
Mühlen's doctrine of the Trinity, ibid.. p. 37, where he 
asserts that Mühlen's understanding of the person in terms 
of the concept of a relational subject is foreign to the 
Trinitarian tradition. It is certainly true that Mühlen, 
op. cit.. pp. 26ff., is critical of the definition of the 
"person" in the Western Trinitarian tradition as a 
spiritual subsistent relation, over against the idea of the 
self-consciousness of the Trinity as belonging to the 
divine essence, in which the three persons share. However, 
Mühlen's doctrine of the Trinity also appeals explicitly 
to the theologies of Augustine and Richard of St. Victor 
at this point (see above, footnote number 140), and 
appears, in addition, as a version of the social doctrine 
of the Trinity which, in outline at least, carries 
authority from the Eastern Trinitarian tradition.
Christ and all of those baptized into Christ.142
While Mühlen’s theology has set the agenda for 
contemporary discussion of the anointing of Jesus, however, 
his Trinitarian theology cannot be considered to be itself 
of direct relevance to the problem with which we are 
concerned here. The reason is that Mühlen's doctrine of the 
Trinity does not begin with the economy of salvation, or 
involve the contemporary Trinitarian thesis we have in 
view, that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, 
and vice versa. Rather, Mühlen, above all in Der Heilige 
Geist als Person, moves in his treatment of the Trinity and 
of the Holy Spirit from the immanent Trinity, and indeed 
from the immanent Trinity of scholastic theology (which, 
however, he reinterprets in "personological" terms143) to the 
economic problems of incarnation, anointing, and 
ecclesiology. While he argues that the salvation-historical 
modes of appearance of the Son and the Spirit can be taken 
to be confirmations of his theology of the immanent 
Trinity,144 and indeed tacitly assumes that the reverse 
procedure would be possible,145 his Trinitarian theology as 
such cannot be considered in the present context. Thus his 
understanding of the Holy Spirit as the innertrinitarian 
"We in person" derives, not from the economy of salvation 
as such, but rather from his basic treatment of the 
innertrinitarian processions.
(b) Trinitarian Theology
The claim was made above that Mühlen's theology sets 
much of the agenda for the subsequent development of the 
anointing theme in Trinitarian theology. To say this is
186
142Ibid. . pp. 195-197.
143Ibid. . pp. 44ff.
144Ibid. . p. 214.
145Ibid. . p. 196.
not, however, to imply that subsequent theology has 
followed Mühlen in detail. On the contrary, while Mühlen's 
treatment of the salvation-historical significance of the 
anointing of Jesus is generally assumed, a much more 
critical stance is adopted towards his broader position. 
Above all, over against Mühlen's movement from the theology 
of the immanent Trinity to the economy of salvation and the 
question of the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit, 
subsequent anointing theologies are characterized by a 
reverse movement, from the anointing of Jesus with the 
Spirit to the problem of the Holy Spirit in the immanent 
Trinity. Perhaps for this reason also, the theologians 
concerned - and here I shall restrict discussion to Kasper, 
Coffey, von Balthasar, and Congar - also adopt a more 
critical attitude towards the Christological doctrine of 
accidental sanctification. Mühlen was effectively prevented 
from this by his original acceptance of the Western 
Trinitarian paradigm, according to which the Holy Spirit 
proceeds from the Father and the Son, so that in the 
economy, he saw the Holy Spirit as poured out upon Christ 
by virtue of the hypostatic union. It appears, however, 
that the economic datum with which we begin in the question 
of the anointing of Christ with the Holy Spirit is 
fundamentally the passivity of Christ in relation to the 
Holy Spirit, which, on the basis of the contemporary 
Trinitarian thesis, makes possible a very different view of 
the relation between the Holy Spirit and the Son than 
Mühlen's.
The theology of Walter Kasper is representative in 
this respect. Kasper's theology of the Spirit begins with 
Mühlen's understanding of the salvation-historical 
significance of the anointing of Jesus, but attempts to 
develop its Trinitarian implications more consistently from
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the economic starting-point.146 Kasper, therefore, develops 
a more radical Spirit Christology than Mühlen, in 
particular in that, unlike Mühlen, he challenges the older 
Trinitarian taxis upon which Mühlen's position is 
ultimately based, arguing that the hypostatic union is not 
the presupposition of Jesus' anointing with the Spirit, but 
rather its consequence.147
As our sonship by adoption is the work of the Spirit, 
therefore, so Jesus' Sonship can also be regarded from a 
Pneumatic point of view - without, however, thereby 
excluding the idea of the assumption of flesh by the Logos. 
The question here concerns the sense in which Jesus 
receives grace by the work of the Spirit as the Son of God 
in his historical humanity. For Mühlen, the anointing of 
Jesus is an implication of the hypostatic union; for 
Kasper, on the other hand, Jesus can only be the Son of God 
in his concrete history of obedience by virtue of the 
unction of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit both created and 
sanctified his human nature at his conception, and provided 
the temporal, creaturely humanity assumed with continuing 
and increasing graces of love for and obedience to the 
Father, thus enabling Jesus to be the Son of God in his 
concrete human history. Here the "accidental 
sanctification" of the humanity appears as the 
presupposition of the hypostatic union in the sense that 
the temporal work of the Holy Spirit in the humanity of 
Christ mediates in a dynamic and temporal manner the union 
of the human with the divine nature of the Logos. The Holy 
Spirit, in other words, constantly mediates the 
incarnation.
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146Kilian McDonnell, "The Determinative Doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit," Theology Today, 39 (1982), 156.
147Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green 
(London: Burns & Oates, 1977), pp. 230-274.
Kasper’s understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit 
in Christology is a response to what he takes to be the 
central problem of Christology: how Jesus Christ can be the 
Word made flesh, or, in Kasper's terms, the self- 
communication of God in history. To account for this, the 
Nicene-Chalcedonian axis in Christology posits the 
homoousion of the Father and the Son on the one hand, and, 
on the other, the doctrine of the hypostatic union. 
Kasper's basic argument is not that the tradition was wrong 
to develop these ideas, but rather that the resulting 
doctrine of the hypostatic union in particular was overly 
static and metaphysical and too little concerned with 
Jesus' historical, human relation, not to the Son, but to 
the Father. The traditional account of Jesus as the 
incarnate Son separates the status of Jesus as the divine 
self-communication of the Father from his history of 
obedience and love to the Father. But this, Kasper argues, 
threatens the total witness of biblical revelation that the 
God of history is revealed in Jesus Christ in such a way 
that this historical human being, Jesus of Nazareth, is the 
Word made flesh.
Kasper thus accepts the homoousion in his Christology, 
but at the same time argues that under the conditions of 
the incarnation, and in view of the true human nature of 
Christ, it is necessary to understand it in "relational" or 
"personal" terms, thus taking up into Christology the
149existential dynamic of human historical existence. For 
Kasper, the whole character of God's revelation and of the
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K8Ibid.. pp. 236-238. Cf. also David Coffey, 'The 
"Incarnation" of the Holy Spirit in Christ,' Theological 
Studies. 45 (1984), 473. This thesis mirrors Pannenberg's
reappropriation of the historical Jesus, by which the 
consciousness of the human Jesus is understood to have been 
orientated to the Father (Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus - God 
and Man. trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe 
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1968), pp. 334-337).
U9Kasper, o p . cit., p. 238.
incarnation in itself above all demands that Jesus' history 
of obedience to the Father be of fundamental Christological 
importance.150 His thesis is that, as man, Jesus Christ, like 
all men and women, is. his history, and therefore that it is 
precisely in his history that Jesus is the Logos or 
self-communication of God.
The starting-point of Kasper's whole conception is 
thus the humanity of Jesus, since it is in his humanity, 
according to Kasper, that he is the Son of God.151 For 
Kasper, Jesus as man is to be understood as a historical 
human being like other human beings, and to be defined like 
other human beings in terms of a subjective ego which 
itself is to be conceived as an openness to others and 
ultimately to God. From the New Testament, we know that 
Jesus' openness to God takes the form of obedience to and 
love of the Father. Kasper builds his Christology on these 
anthropological presuppositions. On the one hand, Jesus' 
obedience to the Father, which in his case is absolute, 
presupposes that he relates to the Father as one from whom 
he is distinct, and yet his being as a human ego is defined 
relationally, being wholly determined by his relation to 
the Father and to others. On the other hand, his very 
obedience in love can only be the direct result of God's 
turning to him in love, for it is only God who can bridge 
the chasm between himself and humanity to fulfil the 
transcendent potentiality of his creatures. The obedience 
of Jesus is thus, for Kasper, to be understood as the 
result of the Father's perfect self-communication to him, 
the complete human response to the complete divine turning 
of the Father to him in love. It is therefore precisely 
because Jesus is nothing other than the Father's 
self-communication that he is also nothing other than his 
historical obedience to the Father in love: the two do not
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151Ibid. . pp. 245-248.
merely imply one another, they are intensified
proportionate to one another, so that in him they are
completely one: Jesus Christ is true God, the Father's
Word, and true man, the perfect human response to God.
Kasper's position here presupposes the transcendental 
Christology of Karl Rahner. In Rahner's reconstruction of 
the Christological tradition, the basic strategy is to ask 
what are the conditions for the possibility of the 
incarnation of the Word in Jesus of Nazareth. Rahner 
himself does not develop Christology from the point of view 
of Pneumatology; indeed, on the contrary, for Rahner the 
humanity of Jesus is related primarily to the Word who
assumed it rather than to the Spirit or, indeed, to the 
Father.152 However, as we shall see, his position lends 
itself quite obviously to a Pneumatic development, and in 
a certain sense can be seen to require such a development.153
Rahner's position is indebted to modern existential 
and phenomenological thought as well as to the wider 
philosophical and theological tradition, and is, as Rahner 
himself says, an attempt to re-state in relational or 
"ontological" terms the truth expressed in the "ontic"
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152Karl Rahner, "Current Problems in Christology," in 
Rahner, Theological Investigations, trans. Cornelius Ernst 
(2nd ed.; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1965), I, pp.
149-200.
153This is a possibility which is also suggested by 
Wilhelm Thüsing in conjunction with Rahner himself in Karl 
Rahner and Wilhelm Thüsing, A New Christology, trans. David 
Smith and Verdant Green (London: Burns & Oates, 1980), pp. 
60 and 108ff. Thüsing argues that Rahner's transcendental 
Christology must be interpreted in the light of the 
biblical understanding of Pneuma as that power by which the 
human openness to God is possible, and appeals in 
particular to the Pauline Pneuma Christology of 2 Cor. 3: 
17 and 1 Cor. 15: 45 (cf. also Gal. 4: 6 and Rom. 8: 15)
(ibid.. p. 60) . Unfortunately, however, Thüsing does not 
develop his suggestion in detail.
categories of classical Christology.154 In particular, 
however, Rahner's Christology is a Christological 
reinterpretation, in these relational terms, of the older 
idea of the capax dei.155 Rahner thus understands the 
hypostatic union in terms of the anthropological 
potentiality for obedience to God which Jesus, as man, 
shares with the rest of humanity.156 Christology thus, in a 
certain sense, becomes a function of anthropology; insofar 
as the potentiality for obedience to God which is given in 
human nature can only be actualized by a divine self­
communication, and insofar as the divine self-communication 
with which we are here concerned is fundamentally to be 
understood as the Word of God, Rahner understands human 
being as such as a potentiality for the hypostatic union.157
Following Rahner, the basic Christological problem 
posed by Kasper is thus how it is that the divine Son can 
be man in such a way that the Father's self-communication 
can literally be the history of Jesus Christ. The problem 
is one of mediation, of how it is possible for the divinity
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154Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," 
in Rahner, Theological Investigations, IV, pp. 105-120.
1550n what follows, see Rahner, "Current Problems in 
Christology."
156 "Human being is ... a reality absolutely open 
upwards; a reality which reaches its highest ... 
perfection, the realization of the highest possibility of 
man's being, when in it the Logos himself becomes existent 
in the world." Ibid.. p. 183.
157The claim is not that there have been many hypostatic 
unions, of course, for there has only ever been one 
complete self-communication of God to humanity, Jesus 
Christ. However, at the same time the doctrine of the 
incarnation of the Word cannot be understood in abstraction 
from its anthropological presuppositions. Human nature as 
such is oriented to the divine self-communication, so that 
at the very summit of its potentiality it is entirely 
appropriate to find that it has its hypostasis in the 
hypostasis of the Word, as the older Christological 
tradition maintains.
and the humanity, though distinct, to be one in him.156 It 
is here that Kasper goes beyond Rahner, and here that his 
theology is of particular Pneumatological significance, for 
his argument is that it is the Holy Spirit, and a 
Pneumatologically orientated Christology, which alone can 
provide the answer.159 Kasper formulates his Christological 
position as follows:
By wholly filling Jesus' humanity, the 
Spirit endows it with the openness by 
which it can freely and wholly 
constitute a mould for God's 
self-communication. ... The Spirit is 
thus in person God's love as freedom, 
and the creative principle which 
sanctifies the man Jesus in such a way 
as to enable him, by free obedience and 
dedication, to be the incarnate 
response to God's self-communication.160
It is fundamental to Kasper's argument, furthermore, 
that if sacred history is not to be emptied of its content, 
and theological metaphysics made meaningless, then the 
doctrine of the Trinity must be understood as the 
"transcendental condition" for the possibility of the 
self-communication of God the Father to Jesus.161 The 
question is basically what kind of Trinity must be 
postulated in order to make this historical 
self-communication possible. Kasper argues that only a 
model of the Trinity in which the Spirit has a central role 
to play in God's reaching out to the world can be adequate 
to this requirement. He therefore adopts a view of the Holy 
Spirit in the Trinity in which the Spirit is not to be
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159Ibid. . p. 249.
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conceived only as the love between the Father and the Son, 
according to the Augustinian paradigm, but in which also 
the Spirit is the "surplus and effusion of freedom in the 
love between the Father and the Son." As this surplus of 
love, the Spirit is to be understood as the personal agent 
within the Trinity itself in whom the Father, through the 
Son, reaches outward in love. As such, it is the Spirit who 
is the transcendental possibility of the divine self­
communication to the creation: "The Spirit as mediator
between Father and Son is at the same time the mediation of 
God into history."163
To this extent, the basis of the Christ-event is 
Pneumatological, in the sense that the love by which God 
in himself loves the world, so much so that he gave his 
only-begotten Son, is ultimately the Holy Spirit. The 
Spirit thus serves a mediating role between God the Father 
and his self-communication in history in Jesus Christ. More 
than this, however, in Kasper's Pneumatic Christology it is 
in the Spirit that Jesus is the self-communication of the 
Father; for Kasper, Jesus is the Logos in his history of 
obedience and love precisely because the Spirit dwells 
fully within him. It is the activity of the Spirit, 
therefore, in the humanity of Jesus which makes him that 
perfect response of obedience and love to God and love of 
neighbour which constitutes him the Father's self­
communication and thus the Son of God. This is so, however, 
because in the Spirit God eternally in himself "has the 
possibility of producing something outside, that is, a 
creature, and while maintaining its creaturely
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162Ibid. . p. 250. Cf. also John Milbank, "The Second 
Difference: For a Trinitarianism Without Reserve," Modern 
Theology. 2, No. 3 (1986), 216-222. Like Miihlen, Kasper's
theology draws heavily on the Trinitarian Pneumatology of 
Richard of St. Victor at this point. See above, footnote 
number 140.
163Kasper, loc. cit.
independence, to draw it into his love."166
In Kasper's doctrine of the Trinity, therefore, the 
Spirit is the love in which the Trinity is in itself 
impelled outward, and not simply, as in the Augustinian 
model, the bond of love between the Father and the Son. 
Thus, for Kasper, the immanent Trinity is eternally 
orientated ad extra through the Holy Spirit. As it is in 
the Holy Spirit, therefore, that the self-communication in 
love of the Father through the Son to the world takes 
place, so in the immanent Trinity the Holy Spirit is to be 
understood as the overflowing love of God in person, in 
whom God is eternally the gift of himself. Kasper argues 
that this is the irreducible minimum which both Eastern and 
Western Pneumatology, divided as they are by the filioaue. 
must be able to affirm.165 This leads him to a critique of 
both East and West, who are equally unable to affirm the 
presence of the Holy Spirit in the economy as the gift of 
God himself as uncreated grace: the East because of its
doctrine of the divine eneraeia. and the West because of 
its doctrine of created grace. For Kasper, by contrast, the 
Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation is the economic
realization, as it were, of the eternal "Giftness" of the
Triune God.166
Various questions might be raised about Kasper's 
Trinitarian theology, for example, concerning his 
presupposed idea of the divine self-communication. In 
Chapter II, however, I have already provided a critique of 
this idea in connection with the theology of Rahner. The 
primary question which must be addressed in Kasper's 
theology concerns the way in which the idea of the
anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit is to be taken up
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into the doctrine of the Trinity. For Kasper himself, the 
economic and the immanent Trinity are clearly not literally 
identical. The "transcendental theological deduction" 
involved in his theology in Jesus the Christ leads at best 
to the idea of an immanent Trinity which contains in itself 
the economic relations in question only in an eminent 
sense, a fact confirmed by Kasper's argument in The God of 
Jesus Christ that the idea of the unity of the economic and 
the immanent Trinity must be carefully circumscribed in 
terms of the kenotic character of the economic Trinity and 
the apophatic character of the immanent Trinity.167
The implications of this question extend well beyond 
Kasper's theology and the theologies associated with the 
anointing model as a whole, into the area of the overall 
philosophical and theological context within which 
contemporary Trinitarian theology is located. As always in 
contemporary Trinitarian theology, two central questions 
arise: "What economic starting-point?" and "What relation 
between the economy and the Trinity in itself?" In the 
latter case, Kasper's theology shows that the idea of the 
unity of the economic with the immanent Trinity is capable 
of being sustained while a clear ontological distinction 
between the two is still in view; as we have already seen 
in connection with Barth's theology, however, sometimes 
more than one understanding of the unity involved can be 
implicit in a single theology. The confusions which result 
can obscure the serious points being made, and even make 
the entire position problematic. It is therefore important 
to note the fact that different views of the unity of the 
economic and the immanent Trinity are often presupposed.
Even in the anointing model, therefore, while there 
is relative agreement concerning the question, "Which 
economic Trinity?" the question of the nature of the unity 
asserted between the economic and immanent Trinity remains
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a disputed point. On the whole, however, the fact that this 
model has been developed for the most part in Roman 
Catholic circles has meant, as in Kasper's theology, that 
traditional metaphysical distinctions have survived to a 
much greater extent than they have in much Protestant 
Trinitarian theology.
This can be seen again in the Trinitarian Pneumatology 
of David Coffey, whose position again takes its rise from 
a critical reappraisal of Mühlen's theology and of the 
doctrine of accidental sanctification, carried out through 
a reinterpretation of the caoax dei as employed in Rahner's 
Christology.168 Like Kasper, Coffey attempts, on the basis 
of his broadly Rahnerian view of the incarnation, to 
understand the anointing of Christ as the presupposition of 
the hypostatic union. This understanding was traditionally 
impeded, he argues, by the belief that the divinity of
169Christ must be sharply distinguished from his humanity.
In Coffey's Christology, however, the way is opened to what 
he terms a Christology of ascent, in which the Holy Spirit 
plays the decisive economic role:
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In the one act of nature and grace the 
humanity of Christ was created by the 
triune God and so radically sanctified 
by the Holy Spirit ... that it became 
one in person with the eternal Son, and
168Coffey, Grace: the Gift of the Holy Spirit; Coffey, 
'The "Incarnation" of the Holy Spirit in Christ'; Coffey, 
"A Proper Mission of the Holy Spirit," Theological Studies, 
47 (1986), 227-250; and Coffey, "The Holy Spirit as the
Mutual Love of the Father and the Son," Theological 
Studies. 51 (1990), 193-229.
169Coffey, 'The "Incarnation" of the Holy Spirit in 
Christ,', p. 469; see also ibid. . p. 467, where Coffey 
argues that the divinity of Christ is not something other 
than his humanity, but rather that, "...it is the humanity, 
i.e., human nature at the peak of its possibility, which is 
the achievement of God's grace..."
so Son of God in humanity.170
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In keeping with this, Coffey places a great deal of 
emphasis on the doctrine of enhvoostasia. interpreting it 
with Rahner, though in a more radical sense, as an 
extension of the capax dei idea. At the same time, however, 
he both attacks dualistic interpretations of Chalcedon in 
order to maintain his basic position, and upholds the 
distinction between the two natures of Christ in order to 
avoid monophysitism and retain the possibility of a 
Christological development of the capax dei idea.
Coffey's Trinitarian theology of the Holy Spirit is 
developed from this Christology, again by taking the 
implications of the economic role of the Spirit in the 
Christ-event back into the doctrine of the Trinity. Here 
Coffey’s position is based on the familiar thesis that the 
only way to give proper content to the doctrine is to begin 
with the economy and to move from there to the immanent 
Trinity.171 The reverse order, which begins with the 
immanent Trinity and moves to the economic, for example, in 
the proposition that the missions of the Son and Spirit are 
prolongations of the processions, is legitimate, he argues, 
only as a secondary deduction from the Trinitarian theology 
which has already been developed from the economy. We are 
justified, in other words, in moving from what has already 
been established of the Trinity in itself back to the 
economy, insofar as such a procedure renders the two levels 
of Trinitarian discourse more intelligible, and helps to
17?order the relation between them. This reflects the fact 
also that God is who he is in himself before he is what he 
is in the economy; the movement from the immanent to the
170Ibid. . p. 469.
l71Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, p. 2.
172Ibid. . p. 2.
economic Trinity in theology is thus finally justified by 
the lordship and freedom of God. The unquestioned 
presupposition of the whole, however, is the conviction 
that God has revealed himself in the Christ-event, and 
therefore that he can be known in himself from his 
revelation.
In his Trinitarian theology, Coffey draws a basic 
distinction between what he calls the "bestowal model," or, 
later, the "model of return," and the "procession model" of 
the doctrine of the Trinity.173 Both are, according to 
Coffey, essentially attempts to read back into the Trinity 
in itself certain truths from the economy of salvation, and 
each is legitimate, but the content of the two differs. 
Coffey is primarily concerned in his theology with the 
bestowal model, since in his view it is derived more 
immediately than the procession model from the basic 
phenomenon from which the Christian religion as such is 
derived, namely, from the human history of Jesus in his 
relation of love for and obedience to the Father.174 In the 
case of the procession model, by contrast, the point is 
more strictly the essential unity of the Son and the Spirit 
with the Father, which has to do with the subsistence or 
personhood of the Son and Spirit with the Father rather 
than with their mutual relations, and which therefore rests 
on a more abstract and ontological approach to the economy 
of salvation.175
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Although there are difficulties involved in this 
position, it would be useful to pursue Coffey's distinction 
further; we begin, therefore, with the procession model. 
In Coffey's understanding, the procession model establishes 
that the Son and the Spirit, who are the agents of the 
economy of salvation, have an eternal origin in the Father 
and are one with him in divinity. By means of the 
procession model, therefore, we arrive at the idea of three 
consubstantial persons in one God, although beyond that 
basic conclusion there are various differences of approach 
between, for example, Eastern and Western theology.176 
Epistemologically, the procession model takes its rise from 
the missions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, these 
being, in turn, ontologically expressed in their original, 
foundational form as Jesus' own consciousness of being 
sent, on the one hand, and the Church's past and present 
experience of the Holy Spirit, on the other.177 The 
procession model is therefore the result of an inference 
made from the economy to the Trinity. Coffey does not 
himself discuss the nature of this inference, but he 
assumes that it is valid and that, at least in its 
fundamental features, the result can be sustained.
The real question, however, which Coffey has in view 
is not the methodological origin of the two Trinitarian 
models, but rather their final form. The decisive point 
here is that it is from the procession model that the 
understanding of the missions of the Son and Spirit as 
prolongations of the generation and procession of the Son 
and Spirit derives. This understanding arises, clearly, 
from the fact that the model has its origins in the 
missions; having posited a unity of substance between the 
Son and Spirit on the one hand, and the Father on the
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other, the procession model, as it were, returns to its 
foundations in the economy with new insight. Coffey thus 
repeatedly refers to the procession model as the 
"descending" model of the Trinity, in the sense that, 
though taking its rise from the missions, it is ultimately 
concerned with the eternal derivation of the Son and Spirit 
from the Father, and with the continuation of that 
movement, by grace, into creation in the redemptive work of
178Christ and his Spirit.
In the case of the bestowal model, according to 
Coffey, the content of Trinitarian doctrine corresponds to 
the question of the manner of these processions rather than
179to the fact of the processions themselves. The difference
between it and the procession model has its root in the
economic basis from which the two develop. In the case of
the bestowal model, we begin, according to Coffey, not with
Jesus' consciousness of being sent, but rather with Jesus'
180consciousness of being united with the Father. In fact, 
for Coffey, Jesus' consciousness of union with the Father 
must take precedence over his consciousness of mission; it 
is because of his Sonship that he is obedient, in short, 
rather than vice versa, so that the latter is a corollary 
of the former.181 Referring to the basis of the bestowal 
model, Coffey writes:
The phenomenon is Jesus’ experience of 
being uniquely close to God, which he 
expressed in the prayer formula "my 
Father," and which he knew placed on 
him a responsibility for others, which
201
1/8Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, pp. 54-
71.
179Coffey, 'The "Incarnation" of the Holy Spirit in 
Christ,' p. 470.
180Coffey, "A Proper Mission of the Holy Spirit," pp.
233-234.
181The reverse would involve adoptionism.
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came to expression chiefly in his 
preaching of the kingdom of God, to be 
entered by faith. The experience of 
Jesus was one of being uniquely loved 
by God, and this love evoked from him 
a love of the Father which was a love 
faithful unto death, and the sole and 
consuming motivating force of his 
life re2
Coffey's bestowal model of the Trinity is an attempt 
to read back into the immanent Trinity this feature of the 
economic basis of the Christian faith. The result 
corresponds to the older "mutual love theory";183 what is 
new, however, is the distinction between it and the 
Trinitarian ideas of generation and procession, and the 
peculiar Christological position to which it is attached. 
In the Trinitarian model constructed from this economic 
basis, the Holy Spirit is conceived as the love which the 
Father bestows on the Son and the "answering love" which 
the Son, in turn, bestows on the Father; we are concerned 
here, therefore, not with the hypostatic qualities of the 
persons as consubstantial, but rather purely with their 
relatedness.184 Here, therefore, just as Jesus' Sonship in 
humanity is expressed in this love, i.e., in the Holy 
Spirit, so in the immanent Trinity the Son is relationally, 
or personally (as opposed to essentially, which is the 
concern of the procession model) one with the Father in 
love, i.e., by virtue of the love bestowed on him by the 
Father, and by virtue of the love which he then returns to 
the Father. The Holy Spirit, therefore, appears here to be 
the relatedness of the Father and the Son in love. The
182Ibid. . p. 233.
183Ibid. . p. 232, and Coffey, "The Holy Spirit as the 
Mutual Love of the Father and the Son," pp. 201-219.
184As such, Coffey's bestowal model, again, builds upon 
the theology of Augustine and his theory of relational 
predication.
personal character of the Holy Spirit is established in the 
procession model, according to Coffey, so that there is no 
danger of a renewed relegation of the Spirit to a personal 
status effectively less than that of the Father and the 
Son, while in the bestowal model, the Spirit can appear as 
the love bestowed by the Father upon the Son and by the 
Son, then, upon the Father in return, without danger to the 
personal character of the Holy Spirit. The entire scheme, 
however, has its origin in the basic event of the 
incarnation of the Son of God, which Coffey understands as 
a Pneumatological event.
The primary problem with Coffey's Trinitarian 
theology, however, is that the distinction drawn between 
the procession and bestowal models threatens the unity of 
the doctrine of the Trinity as such. Coffey argues, of 
course, that the concerns of the two models are distinct, 
and thus that there is no conflict between them. However, 
his distinction is grounded in such fundamental aspects of 
Trinitarian doctrine that by that very fact it threatens to 
produce two Trinities rather than one. Precisely because 
the two models deal with differing problems which are not 
to be confused - the one with the fact of the processions 
and the other with the relations of the persons, one must
ask whether or not the two Trinitarian models themselves
can be reconciled. If they are not to be confused, in 
short, as Coffey maintains, can they be unified?
This problem can be illustrated by reference to
Coffey's discussion of the mutual love theory, which he
distinguishes sharply from the Augustinian psychological
analogy. According to Coffey, the former pertains to the
185bestowal model, and the latter to the procession model. 
The latter, he argues, understands the generation of the 
Son and the procession of the Spirit analogically from the
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two characteristic acts of a spiritual nature, knowing and 
loving: thus, the Son proceeds by knowledge and the Holy 
Spirit by love.186 In keeping with his general understanding 
of the procession model, Coffey maintains that the 
psychological analogy as such posits only the fact of the 
processions, and does not address the question of the 
relations of the persons; the question of the relations of 
the persons is answered in the bestowal model, through the 
idea that the Father and the Son relate to one another in 
the Spirit, who is. their loving relation in person.
The distinction which Coffey thus draws between the 
psychological analogy and the mutual love theory, however, 
conflicts sharply with the Augustinian position, in which 
the two clearly constitute a unified conception. Indeed, 
the whole point of the Augustinian analogy is to show that 
the three persons are related to one another as the knower 
to the known, who are not distinct, but are united in love: 
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Within the terms 
of the psychological model, the Holy Spirit appears as the 
unity between the Father, as knower, and the Son, as the 
one known: already, in other words, the Spirit appears as 
the relation of mutuality between the first two persons, a 
relation which in the Augustinian conception is one of ek- 
stasis towards the other, or of love. The Father is other 
than the Son, and yet he knows himself in the Son, his 
image, and in knowing himself thus in his other, he loves 
the other, his Son; the Son, likewise, cannot be other than 
the one of whom he is the image, and is thus bonded to the 
Father in that same love, the love which is, for Augustine, 
the Holy Spirit.187 Even in its scholastic expression in the 
theology of Thomas Aquinas, from which Coffey's formula 
concerning the two characteristic acts of a spiritual 
substance seems to be derived, the point is not simply that
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there are two spiritual acts which correspond to the two 
processions, but rather that the Holy Spirit proceeds from 
the Father and the Son as the love uniting them.188
Coffey's position, of course, is that the older 
theology wrongfully confuses the proper content of the 
psychological analogy and the idea of the Spirit as the 
mutual love of the Father and the Son. I do not propose to 
examine the traditional standpoint here in any detail; for 
our purposes, it will suffice, in order to refute this 
claim, to examine briefly Coffey's own alternative to the 
traditional position. The basic point which has to be 
raised here is the problem of how it is possible to speak 
of the generation of the Son or of the procession of the 
Spirit from the Father without speaking at the same time of 
the relation of the Son and Spirit to the Father. Would it 
be possible to conceive of the processions as non­
relational, i.e., to think of the Son as begotten of the 
Father before all worlds and yet as unrelated in that very 
conception to the Father, or of the Holy Spirit similarly? 
Whatever the idea of begetting, or of spiration, might 
mean, it certainly involves the relation of the two persons 
involved. This, in fact, can be seen even in Coffey's 
position, despite his best efforts, where, for example, he 
speaks of the procession model as concerned with the 
outward movement of the Son and Spirit from the Father, and 
of the bestowal model as concerned with the return of the 
Son to the Father in love.189 The language used itself
reveals the ultimate inseparability of the two models, 
since, clearly, there can be no "return" without an
"outward movement."
Instead of distinct Trinitarian models, it would be 
better to argue more simply that we have in Coffey's
distinction merely two aspects of a single Trinitarian
205
188Thomas Aquinas, o p . cit. , la, 36, 4; 37, 2.
189Coffey, o p . cit. . p. 232.
position. In this way, we avoid the danger of the loss of 
the unity of the Trinity by explicitly holding both aspects 
of Trinitarian theology together in a unified conception.
This is the view taken by Hans Urs von Balthasar in 
his Trinitarian theology of the Holy Spirit, which, on the 
whole, deals with this problem with greater sensitivity and 
insight. In his theology, Balthasar draws attention to what 
he calls the "Trinitarian inversions" of the economy of 
salvation, and specifically to the fact that, in his 
relation to Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit appears in the 
New Testament both as the Spirit who is "over" and "in"
190Jesus. According to Balthasar, the economic distinctions
here are to be explained in terms of the Trinitarian
relations of the Spirit, which Balthasar understands in
basic continuity with the Western theological tradition.
Thus, according to Balthasar, as the Spirit of the
Father in the economy, the Holy Spirit is "over" Jesus,
anointing and empowering him for his mission, as well as
leading him in his path of obedience according to the
Father's will. Here the economic activity of the Spirit
corresponds to the innertrinitarian understanding of the
Spirit in terms of the relation between the Father and the
Son, only here on its "Fatherly" side: the Spirit is the
objective fruit of the subjective love which the Father is.
191in his self-giving in the generation of the Son. As the 
Spirit of the Son, by contrast, the Holy Spirit is "in" 
Jesus, moving him constantly to obedience, and determining
192his whole personal character in terms of obedience. In an
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Johannes Verlag, 1978), II/2, pp. 167ff.; and Balthasar,
Theoloqik (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1987), III, pp.
158, 167-168, 176.
191Balthasar, Theoloqik. Ill, pp. 144-150; 166.
192Balthasar, ibid. . p. 166, and Theodramatik, II/2, 
pp. 167-168, draws a distinction between the 
Selbstverfügunq and Gehorsam of the Son, the first 
referring to the free self-humbling of the Son in the
analogous way, the Holy Spirit in the immanent Trinity is 
understood in terms of the loving relation of the Son to 
the Father in his reciprocal response of devotion.193 Here 
the Son's love for the Father in the Holy Spirit 
corresponds to and reflects the fact that, in the 
innertrinitarian taxis. the Son is in his very hypostatic 
reality the result of the Father's own eternal self-giving 
in the generation of the Only-Begotten.
Balthasar's focus throughout this discussion is on the 
event of the incarnation, understood in terms both of its 
inception and in terms of the whole incarnate history of 
Jesus.194 His specific approach is to raise the question of
195the incarnation as the work of the whole Trinity. Thus, 
for example, the incarnation involves the Father through 
his sending of the Son, and the Holy Spirit also in that 
the Father, according to Balthasar, entrusts his own 
"sperma theou" to the Spirit in the divine condescension to
196the womb of Mary. Throughout the entire incarnate life of 
the Son, furthermore, there obtains a reciprocal relation 
between the Son and the Spirit which varies with the
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incarnation, and the second to the incarnate Son's concrete 
obedience to the Father unto death. The role of the Holy 
Spirit in Christology is developed by Balthasar in
connection with this obedience unto death; it is, for 
Balthasar, in the power of the Spirit that Christ abandons 
himself to the will of the Father, and thus in the power of 
the Spirit that he goes ultimately to the cross. Thus also, 
for Balthasar, the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father 
and the Son can be said to mediate the event of the
incarnation insofar as it consists, in the concrete life of 
Christ, in perfect obedience to the Father. See also Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, Pneuma und Institution (Einsiedeln:
Johannes Verlag, 1974), pp. 222-229.
193lbid.
194Balthasar, Theoloqik, III, pp. 161-162.
195Ibid. . p. 166.
196Ibid.
necessities of the economy. It is thus necessary, 
Balthasar argues, to come to terms theologically with the 
fact that the Father is always "with his two hands" in his 
saving work.
Balthasar, like Kasper and Coffey, is critical in this 
context of the older view which distinguishes sharply 
between the action of the Logos, who becomes flesh in the 
gratia unionis. and that of the Holy Spirit, who is 
understood to provide the human nature with the accidental
198grace required for the incarnate work of the Logos. 
Balthasar, rather, refers to the hypostatic union and to 
the anointing of the incarnate Logos as two simultaneous 
acts, in the sense that the two are complementary aspects 
of a single Trinitarian event. But, significantly, he also 
understands both in Pneumatological terms: it is the
Spirit, as the Spirit of the Father, who carries the soerma 
theou into Mary's womb, and the Spirit, as the Spirit of 
the Son, who enables the incarnate Son to obey to the end
199the command of the Father.
The idea of Trinitarian inversion as employed here is 
intended to explain how it is that, for example, the Spirit 
is on the one hand given to Jesus, and on the other is 
given by Jesus, while at the same time precluding the 
possibility of internal contradictions in the immanent 
Trinity. It is significant that while Balthasar holds that 
the Holy Spirit can thus be both in and over the Son in the 
innertrinitarian sense, he does not hold that the economic 
Trinitarian inversions as such imply corresponding 
inversions within the immanent Trinity. Rather, his 
position is that the innertrinitarian reality is such that
208
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it provides the inexhaustible, eternal basis of the diverse 
economic taxis. It is not, therefore, that the economic 
inversions in the relation between the Spirit and the Son 
given in the dynamic of Jesus' history in any sense reflect 
or even less bring about immanent inversions, but that the 
eternal Trinitarian relations must be such as to explain 
how the economic inversions are themselves possible. The 
point is, therefore, that the Holy Spirit can be conceived 
both as the Spirit of the Father, directing Jesus on his 
way of obedience, and as the Spirit of the Son, moving 
Jesus as Son to his total love for and dedication to the 
Father, just as the Spirit is also eternally the Spirit of 
the Father and the Son.
At the same time, the idea of Trinitarian inversions 
enables Balthasar to understand the events of the economy 
of salvation in a unified and fully Trinitarian sense. Not 
only, therefore, does his conception not force the doctrine 
of the Trinity into contradiction, but it allows the 
economy of salvation to be appropriated as a fully 
Trinitarian event. The anointing of Jesus by the Spirit is 
understood with Miihlen as the anointing of the person of 
the Son, and not simply as the anointing of the humanity of 
the incarnate Son. The formal cost of this approach, 
however, as Balthasar repeatedly emphasizes, is that it is 
impossible to argue that each economic taxis corresponds, 
in and of itself, to an eternal taxis in the immanent 
Trinitarian being; rather, insofar as it is a reflection of 
the Trinitarian relation, it represents only one aspect of 
that presupposed, but more complex, eternal reality.
Balthasar himself clearly holds that there can be no 
theological access to the immanent Trinity apart from that 
provided by the economy of salvation. 200 At the same time, 
however, his approach suggests that the solution to the 
question, "Which economic Trinity?" cannot be found in the
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economy itself. Balthasar rejects the idea that each 
economic Trinitarian relation has a corresponding immanent 
Trinitarian basis on that grounds that, once granted, this 
principle would imply that the contradictions in the 
economy should be taken to require contradictions in the 
immanent Trinity itself - something which Balthasar, for 
undisclosed reasons, does not admit. But the basis for that 
judgement would not appear to be the economy of salvation 
itself; given the evident inversions of relation within the 
economy, a strict reading of the principle that the only 
access to the immanent Trinity is from the economy would 
appear to require precisely the innertrinitarian inversions 
which Balthasar is anxious to exclude.
We turn finally to Yves Congar, who makes the
intriguing suggestion in his study, The Word and the
Spirit. that Barth's doctrine of election might provide the
link between the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of
Christ and the doctrine of the Trinity. The suggestion
arises in the context of a discussion of the question
whether or not the biblical Christology of anointing
requires a Trinitarian doctrine of the Son proceeding "a
201Patre Spiritucrue" m  the immanent Trinity.
Congar's argument is based on the observation that 
Jesus appears in a number of New Testament documents as the 
bearer of the Spirit, and that the Christological 
importance of the Spirit in his life in these traditions 
is indicated by the fact that the Spirit is related by the 
writers to his Sonship (Lk. 1: 35 and Mk. 1: 9-11 par.). To 
explain this, Congar argues on the one hand that 
Adoptionism must be avoided, and on the other that the 
humanity of Jesus as Son of God must be taken with full 
seriousness. 202 Jesus, in short, is the Son of God in two 
ways. He is the Son of God by eternal begetting, but he is
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also Son of God in his humanity according to the historical 
stages by which his Sonship is realized: in the
annunciation, in the baptism, and in the resurrection.
Congar conceives Jesus here not only as the Only Begotten,
but also as the Prototokos. the Firstborn among all those 
predestined to be conformed to him. Congar writes: "I would 
say that the Word was conceived incarnandum and even 
crucifiqendum qlorificandum. caout multorum Dei filiorum - 
that, at his conception, he had to be made flesh, crucified 
and glorified as the head of many sons of God."203 These 
historical stages, he argues, for Jesus and for us, are the 
work of the Holy Spirit. 204 It is in this sense, according 
to that aspect of historical Christology by which Jesus 
becomes. for us, the Son of God, the Saviour, and the
Messiah, that it can be said that the Son or the Word
proceeds "a Patre Spirituaue." The Spirit is to be seen as 
intervening in "all the acts or moments in the history of 
the Word incarnate. "205
Congar, like Balthasar, argues in the end that we are 
not obliged to refer every event in the life of Christ to 
the immanent Trinity, and thus that the case for a 
spirituaue doctrine is weak on that particular basis. 
While, for Congar, there is indeed a clear and close 
relationship between the economic and the immanent Trinity, 
this is not a relation of identity. Citing Rahner's axiom, 
and Lafont’s critique of Rahner, he argues that the 
economic Trinity "is" indeed the immanent Trinity, but 
that, at the same time, the immanent Trinity cannot be 
reduced to the economic. 206 Nevertheless, he argues, the
203Ibid.
Z04Ibid. . and Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 
III, pp. 165-173.
205Congar, The Word and the Spirit, loc. cit.
206Ibid. p. 93, and Congar, I Believe in the Holy 
Spirit. Ill, pp. 11-18.
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theme of the anointing of Jesus by the Spirit must be
susceptible to a Trinitarian development, precisely because
it is a Trinitarian event. It is here that the significance
of Barth's doctrine of election for Congar appears, as
Congar goes on to suggest specifically that Barth's
doctrine of Jesus Christ as the eternally elected man might
provide the key to such a Trinitarian development of the
207anointing theme, and thus make possible a more 
thoroughgoing Trinitarian interpretation of the anointing 
than Barth himself, and the mainstream Christian tradition, 
hold to be possible.
Congar's argument, following Mühlen's, is that the 
particular strength of such a Pneumatic Christology is 
precisely its potential for a salvation-historical approach 
to Christology and so to the mystery of salvation. His 
point is that the nature of God's saving work, which takes 
place in history through events situated in time bringing 
about something temporally new, is fundamentally at odds 
with the traditional view that the whole of the grace of 
Christ was given in the hypostatic union from the moment of
pno ,his conception. This is particularly clear, he argues, m  
the light of the witness of the New Testament to historical 
stages in the life of Christ, governed by successive 
comings of the Spirit to him in his role as Messiah, from 
which there seemed to result a genuine growth of grace in 
him in his human obedience to the Father and in his 
Messianic work. 209 Congar argues that the fully historical 
character of the economy of salvation commits us, in the 
end, to the view that there were historical stages, or 
kairoi, in the life of Christ which are to be seen as
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"authentic qualitative moments in which God's communication 
of himself in Jesus Christ and in a very real sense also to 
Jesus Christ was accomplished. There were successive 
comings of the Holy Spirit over Jesus in his quality as 
'Christ the Saviour'."210
Here, then, the reason for Congar's reference to 
Barth's Christological doctrine of the eternal man becomes 
clear. According to Barth:
. . .we do not have to reckon with any 
Son of God in Himself, with any fLogos 
asarkosl , with any other Word of God 
than that which was made flesh.
According to the free and gracious will 
of God the eternal Son of God is Jesus 
Christ as He lived and died and rose 
again in time and none other.211
If, in accordance with Barth's Christology, there really 
is no Word other than Jesus Christ, and thus if Jesus 
Christ in this sense belongs to the doctrine of the
Trinity, then the history of Jesus Christ belongs to the 
doctrine of the Trinity and therefore also his anointing 
and a form of spiritucrue doctrine. Since there is no Son
but Jesus Christ the eternal man, in this sense, the
immanent Trinitarian relation between the Spirit and the 
Son must also eternally contain within itself this
historical event of anointing.
Congar's thesis here illustrates one of the many ways 
in which Barth's doctrine of election might be developed, 
although quite contrary, there can be little doubt, to 
Barth's own Christological and Trinitarian use of the 
doctrine. The whole scheme, however, clearly rests upon the 
presupposition that the Barthian view of Jesus Christ as 
the eternally elect man, belonging to the doctrine of the
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Trinity, can indeed be sustained. In Barth’s own theology, 
the doctrine of election is derived from his basic 
Trinitarian thesis that there is no "other" God lurking 
"behind" his revelation, in the sense that that God should 
be unrevealed and unknown. God has indeed spoken, Barth 
argues, and that sheer fact, which operates in his theology 
as a constant (and largely unquestioned) presupposition, 
determines the resulting course of his theology.
As we have seen, however, the idea of election as 
Barth employs it in the context of Trinitarian theology 
involves problematic assumptions and implications, not the 
least being the extent to which it can lend itself to a 
view of God as capricious both in himself and towards us. 
It would be better to say that the very thing which God 
could not have done, if he is indeed in himself the love 
from which the economy of salvation flows, was to "choose" 
in a literal sense either for us or against us. If indeed 
the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and vice 
versa. and if it is true that God cannot be other than who 
he is in the economy, then it would appear that God was 
determined by himself as love to be God in Jesus Christ, 
and that there is a divine necessity to the incarnation and 
the entire economy of salvation.
Despite the fact that Congar appeals to Barth's 
problematic doctrine of election, his account directly 
raises the underlying question of the Trinitarian theology 
of anointing: "What does the human experience of Jesus
Christ in relation to the Holy Spirit have to do with the 
doctrine of the Trinity, and what does the doctrine of the 
Trinity have to do with Jesus' experience of the Spirit?" 
If Rahner's axiom as it stands were to be translated into 
these terms, we could simply say that the one "is" the 
other and vice versa, although, on the whole, advocates of 
the anointing model tend to maintain also that the identity 
thus posited is qualified by the kenotic character of the 
economy and the apophatic character of discourse concerning
214
the immanent Trinity.
In the "anointing model," therefore, the problem of 
the Holy Spirit's place in the Trinity is discussed in the 
context of Christology. It is significant not only that 
here the work of the Holy Spirit comes to be of importance 
for the divine Sonship of Jesus, but also that here the 
divine Sonship of Jesus is understood in terms of the 
historical obedience of Jesus to the Father. It is the 
humanity of Christ, in this sense, which has particular 
theological significance for this Trinitarian theology. For 
it is not enough here that human nature be taken on by the 
Logos, so that by the sheer fact of its once-for-all 
assumption it is redeemed; what is affirmed instead is that 
the Logos in his divinity is none other than the Logos who 
was made flesh, who, in Barth's words, "lived and died and 
rose again in time and none other," and who, it is added 
here, was anointed with the Holy Spirit and thus lived a 
life of perfect obedience to the Father. It is not, in 
short, merely the humanity of Jesus, but also his human 
history under the power of the Spirit, which is taken up 
into the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus the Trinitarian 
relation which obtains between the Holy Spirit and the Son 
of God, on this understanding, is in principle and 
eternally inseparable from the question of the anointing of 
Jesus with the Holy Spirit, while the anointing, likewise, 
cannot be considered in its full significance apart from 
the immanent Trinitarian relation between the Spirit and 
the Son.
4. The Eschatological Model
The fourth and last of the approaches to the problem 
of the doctrine of the Trinity in contemporary theology 
with which we shall be concerned is what I have called the 
"eschatological model," in order to reflect its basic 
thesis that the Trinity is in itself orientated, like the
215
economy of salvation, to the future consummation of the 
kingdom of God. As we have seen, the temporal character of 
the economy is also taken up into Trinitarian theology in 
the revealedness, atonement, and anointing models through 
the idea of the unity of the economic and immanent Trinity. 
Temporal aspects of the economy thus assume Trinitarian 
significance - the epistemological aspect of the work of 
the Spirit, the crucifixion, and the anointing of Jesus 
with the Spirit. In the eschatological model, the temporal 
aspect which comes to the fore is the anticipation of the 
coming kingdom of God, and thus the essential element of 
futurity in the Christian hope. To the extent that the 
unity of the economic and the immanent Trinity has been 
presupposed in recent theologies of the Trinity, this has 
been an obvious development, since, on this basis, the 
question of the immanent Trinitarian significance of the 
fact that the economy of salvation is not yet complete was 
bound to arise.
The origins of this position extend back also,
however, to the "rediscovery" by biblical scholars such as
Weiss and Schweitzer at the end of the nineteenth century
of the central significance of eschatology in the message
212of Jesus and in the thinking of the primitive Church. As 
a result, eschatology became one of the crucial issues of 
twentieth century theology, and can, indeed, be traced back 
to the foundations of the tradition of Trinitarian theology 
which we have in view to the theology of Barth. T. F. 
Torrance notes that the attempt to recognize the importance 
of eschatology is one of the factors marking the shift from 
the early Barth of the commentaries on Romans to the
213theology of the Church Dogmatics. The earlier
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characteristically dialectical opposition of eternity and 
time, transcendence and immanence, thus gives way to the 
idea of the God whose very eternal transcendence is his 
freedom to be temporal and immanent, and in whom, through 
the concrete realization of this freedom in the 
incarnation, there exists for us the eschatological "new 
time" of reconciliation through Christ, over against the 
"old time" of sin.214 For Barth, therefore, the significance 
of eschatology is related to the freedom of God in his 
divine decision to be God in Jesus Christ, which determines 
what God eternally is. As the one who does not choose to be 
God except in Jesus Christ, therefore, he is in himself, in 
effect, the new time of redemption, and thus the ground of 
the eschatological tension between it and the old time of 
sin. As such, the significance of eschatology for Barth is 
related to the very concept of the freedom of God which 
leads to the idea of the unity of the economic with the 
immanent Trinity.
In his Theology of Hope. Moltmann rejected Barth's 
assumption of eschatology into the being of God, 
essentially on the grounds that simply to deny the polarity 
of divine eternity and creaturely temporality does not yet 
yield a true theological eschatology; for Moltmann, this 
can only be achieved if Jesus Christ himself is understood 
to have a genuine future, and if, indeed, God himself has
?15 •"future as his essential nature." In Moltmann's view, 
since for Barth the Christ-event is ontically complete and 
cannot be transcended, the supposedly "eschatological" 
aspect of his theology still refers only to the eternal 
presence of God in time, rather than to the true presence 
of time, and so of the eschatological future, through
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Christ in God. This key criticism of Barth has wide 
repercussions in Moltmann's theology, and relates, in the 
end, to differing views of the relation of the economic and 
the immanent Trinity in Moltmann and in Barth.
Although Moltmann's Trinitarian theology has been 
cited briefly in connection with the atonement model of the 
Trinity in the previous section by reason of his position 
as expressed in The Crucified God. Moltmann's Trinitarian 
theology, I have suggested, is best understood in 
connection with the problem of eschatology. Here the wider 
result is quite different from that achieved in the 
approach based on the theology of the cross alone. In the 
latter, as we have seen, the inner-divine relation is 
understood to be given in the event of the cross, and 
specifically in the relation between the Father and the 
crucified Son, in the Holy Spirit. The Pneumatological 
result of the procedure is a doctrine of the Holy Spirit 
akin to that in the Western filioquist tradition, in which 
the Spirit is understood as the vinculum caritatis. 
Moltmann develops this view in The Crucified God:
In the cross, Father and Son are most
deeply separated in forsakenness and
at the same time are most inwardly one
in their surrender. What proceeds from
this event between Father and Son is
the Spirit which justifies the godless,
fills the forsaken with love and brings
217the dead alive.. .
However, in the context of Moltmann's wider theology, the 
Trinitarian event of the cross is to be understood as 
opening up an entire eschatological, Trinitarian process, 
and not as a self-contained event.218 The cross is thus seen
218
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as an event within the whole eschatological history of the 
Trinity, which is yet to be completed.
Along with Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg has also 
developed a theology of the Trinity from the standpoint of 
eschatology. In several works, Pannenberg sketches the 
Trinitarian implications of his more developed doctrine of 
God, according to which God's being is historical and
• ?19orientated towards his future kingdom. Building on an
analysis of the biblical idea of God's lordship, he begins
with the argument that "God's being and existence cannot be
conceived apart from his rule," that to have power over the
creation is "intrinsic to God's nature," and that, in view
of the fact that the kingdom of God belongs to the future,
"God's being is still in the process of coming to be." In
his development of this theme, Pannenberg somewhat
idiosyncratically gives ontological priority to the future
over the past, so that what God will be is nevertheless in
221a retroactive sense what God is now. William Hill 
summarizes Pannenberg's position well: "God will reveal
Himself at the end as always having been what He has become
219
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historically. "222
I do not propose at this point to enter into a 
discussion of the coherence of Pannenberg's position, but 
only to survey briefly its Trinitarian implications, in 
order to pass on then to a more detailed treatment of 
Moltmann1s theology. The latter has produced a more 
sustained eschatological model of the Trinity through a 
series of books, while his treatment of the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit outweighs in scale and importance Pannenberg's 
work on the subject. Nevertheless, Pannenberg's outline 
treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity from the point of 
view of eschatology precedes much of Moltmann's recent 
work, and broadly anticipates many of its results.
In his essay, "Der Gott der Geschichte," Pannenberg 
argues that the older doctrine of the immanent Trinity, 
which developed for various understandable historical and 
theological reasons, nevertheless threatens to make the 
realm of creation and of historical redemption
pp /theologically redundant. The presupposed dualism of the 
older conception, by which the Trinity in itself is sharply 
differentiated from the Trinity of the economy of 
salvation, the former being complete in and of itself and 
the latter being the outworking of sheer grace, is 
obviously inconsistent with Pannenberg's own presupposed 
view that God's intrinsic being is in some sense temporally 
incomplete, awaiting final realization in the coming 
kingdom. Pannenberg argues, therefore, that the traditional 
view is called into question by the biblical thematization 
of the Godhood of the Trinitarian persons in salvation
220
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history, and in particular in the cross of Jesus. 225 In
Jesus - God and Man. Pannenberg had argued that the
divinity of Jesus Christ is decided retroactively from the 
226resurrection; now he argues in a more fully Trinitarian 
sense that the Godhood also of the Father is likewise 
placed in question by the crucifixion, and only affirmed
227with the resurrection. The Godhood of the Father, as well 
as that of the Son, therefore, is mediated through the 
history of Jesus Christ (although at the same time it must 
also be said that the present is here determined by the 
future228). All of this, however, is the work of the Holy 
Spirit; he raises Jesus from death, and thus certifies the 
Godhood of the Father and the Son as well as their unity in
229the self-differentiation of the two m  the cross. For 
Pannenberg, therefore, the eternal Godhood of the Father 
is dependent on the reality of his kingdom as realized
230economically through the work of the Son and Holy Spirit.
The main representative of this position in 
contemporary theology is, however, Moltmann, whose work on 
Pneumatology and the doctrine of the Trinity in The Church 
in the Power of the Spirit and The Trinity and the Kingdom 
of God, which have already been cited, will serve as the 
basis for what follows. In the earlier book, The Church in 
the Power of the Spirit, Moltmann takes up the thesis of 
the Theology of Hope that eschatology is the decisive 
element in Christianity and that futurity is the very mode
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of the being of God. Moltmann had by this time already 
argued in The Crucified God that this eschatology is 
focused in and springs from the cross, and is not simply a 
function of a universal world-historical process; The 
Church in the Power of the Spirit developed the latter 
aspect further, by seeing the Church as set in the context 
of this continuing "Trinitarian history," contributing 
actively and passively to its fulfilment in the future
231kingdom of God.
Early in this work, Moltmann makes the observation 
that it is through the work of the Holy Spirit that the 
Church is determined by the divine future:
the whole eschatology of the 
history of Christ .. . can also be 
described as the history of the Spirit, 
a result of the workings and 
indwellings of the Spirit through which 
the future that is hoped for enters
232into history.
From this, it would be reasonable to assume that without 
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit Moltmann's future- 
orientated theology would be inconceivable. Consistent with 
this, Pneumatology assumes enormous importance in his 
theology as a whole and in his Trinitarian theology in 
particular. Of key importance in this respect is what might 
be called Moltmann's Pneumatological deepening of the 
Barthian doctrine of election. For Barth, the fact that God 
sent his Son into the world in the incarnation led to the 
idea of Jesus Christ as the eternally elect man; for 
Moltmann, the fact that God sent his Son and Spirit into 
the world, thus opening himself to it, means that God is in
222
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himself open to his creation, and allows himself to be
233determined by its history. In both conceptions, the 
freedom of God is held to be of central importance: for
Barth, the divine decision to be God in Jesus Christ, and 
not to be God without mankind, leads to a free self- 
determination of God to be eternally who he is in himself 
in Jesus Christ; for Moltmann, God eternally and freely 
threw himself open to be determined by the 
Pneumatological, eschatological history which springs from 
the cross.234 The openness to the creation which this 
involves is not one born of deficiency, therefore; as for 
Barth, it is an openness which derives from the fulness of 
divine being, from the "self-communicating livingness of
235God which overcomes death."
In this context, Moltmann argues that the work of the 
Holy Spirit must be understood in terms of the lordship of 
God: his indwelling in everything and his glorification in 
the renewing of creation:
The eschatological meaning of the 
messianic mission of Christ and the 
Spirit lies in the glorifying of God 
and the liberation of the world, in the 
sense that God is glorified through the 
liberation and healing of creation, and 
that he does not desire to be glorified 
without his liberated creation.236
What is appropriated to the Spirit economically, however, 
is also true of the Spirit immanently: the unification of 
the creation with the Father and the Father's glorification 
through that saving work is at the same time, therefore,
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the role of the Spirit in the unification of God and the 
glorification of the Father within the immanent Trinity. 
Since God is in himself open to the creation, he can only 
be unified and glorified together with the creation. Hence 
the unity and final glory of God will only come about with 
the eschatological goal of salvation history - indeed, it 
is the eschatological goal of salvation history - and hence 
too the history of the kingdom of God is itself the history 
of the unification and glorification of the Trinity. 238 God 
is thus, for Moltmann, not simply God in Jesus Christ; 
rather, he is God in history, and not without history, in 
the precise sense that he has chosen not to be God apart 
from the ongoing historical process which has yet to be 
completed "in the power of the Holy Spirit."
The Church in the Power of the Spirit thus appears as 
an extension and outworking of Moltmann's earlier ideas in 
his Theology of Hope and The Crucified God. In one respect 
in particular, however, The Church in the Power of the 
Spirit made a decisive advance over his earlier theology, 
in that here Moltmann clarified his view of the relation 
between the economic and the immanent Trinity. Whereas, in 
The Crucified God. Moltmann's treatment of this question is
239ambiguous at best, he spells out his position in The
Church in the Power of the Spirit in some detail in terms 
which are by now familiar:
Is the mission of Jesus a chance 
historical event or does it find its 
foundation in God himself? If its 
foundation is in God himself, does it 
then correspond to God, or does God 
only appear in this manner, a manner 
which perhaps does not correspond to 
him at all? If we push our question
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further back like this, then we cannot 
find anything in God which is 
antecedent to the sending of Jesus and 
in which this sending was not 
included. . . . The relation of the one 
who sends to the one sent as it appears 
in the history of Jesus thus includes 
in itself an order of origin within the 
Trinity, and must be understood as that 
order's historical correspondence.
Moltmann, however, as we might expect from the above, puts 
a radical interpretation on this traditional, indeed, 
ultimately patristic, line of reasoning. Departing from the 
older language of the Trinitarian processions as the ground 
of the economic missions, he signals his desire to take up 
the historical, eschatological economy into the doctrine of 
the immanent Trinity by speaking of immanent and economic 
missions: "The missio ad extra reveals the missio ad intra. 
The missio ad intra is the foundation of the missio ad
p/iextra." Because God has quite literally opened himself 
to history in the economy of salvation, the eternal 
processions are eternally in themselves also the missions; 
the Son is eternally the Son who was sent and who died on 
the cross, and the Spirit likewise eternally the Spirit who 
raised him from death and continues his work in the 
glorification and unification of the creation in him.
Moltmann's The Trinity and the Kingdom of God in 
general mirrors his earlier position, but is again a more 
mature expression of his theology as well as a 
comprehensive synthesis of his earlier Trinitarian thought. 
For this reason, it will serve as the main focus for our 
discussion. The starting-point of Moltmann's doctrine of 
the Trinity here is his argument that Christian theology 
has never, in fact, thought the Trinitarian content of the
2A0Mo 1 tmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit, p .
54.
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gospel with sufficient rigour. According to Moltmann, the 
tendency throughout Christian history has always been for 
theologians to reduce the Trinity to either an explicit or 
implicit monadic monotheism. 242 He examines, for example, 
the two classical Trinitarian heresies of Arianism and 
Sabellianism, and argues that both are dominated by the 
notion of the one God and of the universal monarchy of this 
one God as a single subject.243 Equally, according to
Moltmann, the "orthodox" positions of both West and East -
the Western emphasis on the una substantia of the Godhead 
and the Eastern view that the Father's monarchy is the 
principle of unity of the Trinity - effectively evade a 
thoroughgoing doctrine of the Trinity in favour of
differing versions of monadic monotheism.244
In The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. Moltmann is 
also highly critical of the Idealist thesis that the 
Trinity is to be understood in terms of God as Absolute 
Subject, relating himself to himself by passing over into 
his opposite so as to be all reality. 245 In Chapter IV, I 
shall argue that Moltmann's Trinitarian theology is itself, 
in fact, of broadly Hegelian and so Idealist provenance, 
inasmuch as Moltmann understands God to freely define 
himself in relation to the creation. For the moment, 
however, Moltmann's claims can be taken seriously, since 
they have to do with a different question, that of the need 
for a genuine Trinitarianism as opposed to a latent 
modalism. According to Moltmann, the Idealist thesis is
simply another monadic reduction of the three divine 
persons to a logically prior and overridingly important
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basic unity. Both Barth and Rahner, Moltmann argues, fall 
prey to the Idealist view of God,246 and, in adopting its 
view that God is Absolute Subject, effectively degenerate 
in their Trinitarian theologies into a form of
p/7Sabellianism. The problem here, Moltmann argues, is that 
the Son and the Spirit do not appear as full-fledged 
persons in the Trinity: in the reflection logic of the
Absolute Subject, the Son is simply the other in whom the 
Father contemplates himself, while the Spirit is a 
correlation of the Father as thinker and the Son as image 
of thought, and not a distinct third person. The Absolute 
Subject, which serves in the Idealist tradition as the 
principle of the unity of the one God, logically precedes 
the self-differentiation of the Absolute Subject into the 
three persons, and therefore, for Moltmann, obliterates the 
persons, reducing the doctrine of the Trinity to 
Sabellianism.248
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revelation. Because he speaks of the one God as the Lord 
who reveals himself through the Word and in the Holy 
Spirit, Barth rejects the language of three persons and 
adopts, rather, the language of the divine "modes of 
being." Moltmann argues, ibid.. pp. 144-148, that Rahner 
similarly makes God the supreme individual, whose one 
essence becomes the sameness of the self-related, Absolute 
Subject. Moltmann notes that Rahner does not allow the 
problem of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity to be elucidated 
in terms of the mutual love of the Father and the Son, 
since that would presuppose two centres of consciousness. 
All we have is a differentiated self-communication of the 
Absolute, which does not admit any real threefoldness in 
God himself as Trinity. For Moltmann, Rahner's theology is 
effectively a denial of biblical revelation, an obscuring 
of the history of the Father, Son, and Spirit to which the 
Bible testifies.
248This explains why Moltmann is, on the whole, 
sympathetic to the idea of the good diffusing itself, via 
the idea of the love of God, but not to its Idealist 
equivalent; in Moltmann's view, we begin with the
In his positive treatment of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. Moltmann 
deals first of all with the threefoldness of the God of 
revelation and secondly with the question of the divine 
unity. Thus he begins his doctrine of the Trinity with the 
three divine persons as given in the biblical history, and 
moves from this "Trinitarian history" to the unity of the 
three. In this way, the unity of the persons is again from 
the beginning made formally dependent upon their history, 
as Moltmann understands it, in the biblical witness, and 
comes to be seen explicitly in terms of "the eschatological 
question about the consummation of the Trinitarian history 
of God. "249
It is the New Testament itself, according to Moltmann, 
which witnesses to the history of the Father, Son, and 
Spirit, so that this fundamental datum of revelation cannot 
be by-passed in dogmatic theology. Moltmann is critical of 
nineteenth century liberal theology for holding that the 
Trinity has no place in the proclamation of Jesus or in the 
original Church's gospel, just as he is also critical of 
the implicit monotheism of the theological tradition. 250 For 
Moltmann, the history of Jesus is already understood in the 
New Testament in terms of the history of the relations 
between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Thus 
Moltmann apparently assumes that the "Jesus" of the 
synoptic gospels is already understood as the eternal Son 
of God, and that the Holy Spirit likewise can be understood 
in a fully Trinitarian sense throughout the New Testament; 
accordingly, he treats the baptism narratives of the 
synoptics, for example, and the declaration of Sonship
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embedded in these narratives, as having a fully Trinitarian 
structure, in that here the Father empowers the Son for his
251Messianic office through the Spirit. In the sending motif 
of New Testament Christology, similarly, Jesus is presented 
as the Son of the Father who sent him, and the Father as 
the Father who sent Jesus. 252 As in the baptism narratives, 
this happens "in the Spirit", in a Trinitarian structure in 
which (1) the Father sends the Son through the Spirit; (2) 
the Son is sent by the Father in the power of the Spirit; 
and (3) the Spirit brings people into the fellowship of the
ptTTSon with the Father.
Moltmann extends this understanding of the Trinitarian 
history of Jesus to Jesus' death and resurrection, and 
finally to his future as the risen and ascended Son of God. 
In the passion, the Father is the Father who forsakes the 
Son and thus loses his Fatherhood, while the Son is the Son 
forsaken by the Father who thus loses his Sonship.254 In the 
New Testament, the cross is thus an event within the 
history of the Trinity, as the Trinity here takes the form 
of (1) the Father who gives up the Son; (2) the Son who 
gives himself up for us; and (3) the Spirit who unites the
255Father with the Son even in his forsakenness. Again, the 
Son who appears to Saul of Tarsus is none other than the 
crucified and risen Son, the Son who has precisely this 
history of being raised by the Spirit into the glory of the
229
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According to Moltmann, furthermore, in being raised 
from the dead into the glory of the Father, Jesus was also 
made the Lord of the kingdom and of the Spirit. 257 He now 
appears as the divine sender of the Spirit, whereas the New 
Testament had earlier presented him as the sent Son who was 
acted upon by the Spirit. The Trinitarian relations here 
undergo another change. Here (1) the Father raises the dead 
Son through the Spirit; (2) the Father enthrones the Son as 
Lord of the kingdom and of the Spirit; and (3) the risen 
Son sends the Spirit from the Father to renew creation. The 
Trinity itself appears here again as open to the world, as 
something which integrates people into its own history, and 
as something which has this history precisely so that 
people can be integrated into it.258
The New Testament, finally, presents Jesus as the Son 
who is to come again at the oarousia. and Paul in 
particular, according to Moltmann, presents the 
consummation of salvation history at the parousia as an 
event within the history of the Trinity (1 Cor. 15:
pern ,22f f) . Death is not yet destroyed, so that the history 
of the Son is not yet complete. When finally death has been 
destroyed, says Paul, the Son himself will be made subject 
to the Father. Moltmann argues that the divine rule given 
to Christ at the resurrection is here to be turned over to 
the Father once more, that the Son's obedience to the 
Father will only be complete once this has been achieved. 
The kingdom of Christ is therefore, according to Moltmann, 
provisional. When the final consummation occurs, then, and 
the Son is made subject to the Father in this way, the form
230
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of the Trinity will again be changed. Eschatology, we can 
see once again, is something which "takes place in God's
pZQessential nature." The form of the Trinity seen here is
(1) the Father subjects everything to the Son; (2) the Son
transfers the consummated kingdom to the Father; (3) the
261Son subjects himself to the Father. But the Son himself
receives this kingdom, which he transfers finally to the
Father, from the Spirit, who draws the whole of creation
26?into the fellowship of the Son with the Father.
A distinction can therefore be drawn between three 
main stages in the saving work of Jesus Christ, while three 
Trinitarian forms or structures can be discerned in these 
three stages. These stages are the sending, delivering up, 
and resurrection of the Son; the Lordship of the Son at the 
right hand of the Father; and the future of the Son in the 
parousia. These give rise to three central Trinitarian 
structures which can be differentiated as stages in the 
eschatological history of the Trinity: (1) in the sending,
the delivering up, and the resurrection of the Son: Father 
— Spirit - Son; (2) in the Lordship of Christ and his 
sending of the Spirit: Father — Son -» Spirit; and (3) in 
the eschatological consummation: Spirit - Son - Father.263 
Moltmann's point is that the Father, Son, and Spirit act in 
various concrete ways within each stage according to these 
basic paradigms, while their mutual relations actually 
change as salvation history passes from one stage to 
another.
Moltmann enumerates the following conclusions 
concerning the threefoldness of the God of revelation, 
which amount to a summary of his overall Trinitarian
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position as it reflects on the question of the 
threefoldness of God.264 (1) The rule of Christ has a
Trinitarian structure. (2) The Father, Son, and Spirit do 
not work by only one pattern. (3) The doctrine of the 
Trinity must be drawn from Scripture and reflect it. 
Scripture reveals that there is more than one Trinitarian 
structure in the relations between the Father, Son, and 
Spirit. Up to now, however, dogmatic theology has 
predominantly worked with only one such pattern, Father -*• 
Son - Spirit. (4) The common denominator of the changing 
patterns is the rule of God; what we are seeing in 
salvation history is the history of the kingdom which is 
not only an earthly one but which is itself the history of 
the Trinity. (5) This history of God is open to creation, 
and inclusive of it. (6) The unity of the Trinity 
presupposes the three divine subjects which are active 
here, so that a monadic unity of one substance or subject 
is excluded; the unity must therefore be a fellowship 
rather than an identity, or a union as opposed to a 
numerical unity.
The divine fellowship which is the unity of the 
Trinity, to which we now turn, is the second central theme
265in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. Western theology 
has attempted to secure the unity of the Trinity in a 
separate, special doctrine of the divine substance or in 
the idea of the divine subjectivity. Moltmann's argument is 
that no such separate, special doctrine is needed; rather, 
for Moltmann the divine unity "is already given with the 
fellowship of the Father, the Son and the Spirit."266 His 
thesis is that the divine unity is social, and therefore 
grounded precisely in the threefoldness of God. Personal
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and social character are aspects of the same reality, so 
that just as the three divine persons are distinguished by 
their character as persons, so their unity or at-oneness is
267secured by their character as persons.
Moltmann appeals at this point to the Trinitarian
doctrine of perichoresis (John of Damascus) by which it is
understood that each of the divine persons interpenetrates
268and dwells in the other two. What is distinctive about 
Moltmann's doctrine of the divine unity through 
perichoresis. however, is the fact that this unity is not 
static, but that because it is relational, a function of 
the mutuality of the three persons, it is also 
eschatological, or still to be realized in all its fulness. 
Again, Moltmann wants to proceed from the biblical 
testimony to his doctrine of God, but the biblical 
testimony, in his view, speaks about a consummation of the
269Trinitarian history of God. Moltmann writes:
The unity of the Father, the Son and 
the Spirit is then the eschatological 
question about the consummation of the 
Trinitarian history of God. The unity 
of the three Persons of this history 
must consequently be understood as a 
communicable unity and as an open, 
inviting unitv. capable of inte­
gration.
The biblical testimony to the triune God speaks of a God 
who unites others with himself, who even sunders himself 
from himself in the cross in order to reconcile all things 
to himself. God is thus in himself open to creation in such 
a way that his own unity will only be complete when all
267Ibid. . pp. 148-150.
268Ibid. . pp. 150, 174-176.
269Ibid. . p. 149.
270Ibid.
things are united with him in the consummated Trinitarian 
relations of Father, Son, and Spirit. The divine unity is 
therefore not only eschatological, but also soteriological: 
eschatological because it is integral with salvation 
history and the parousia: soteriological, because God has 
opened himself to his creation in the incarnation and the 
sending of the Spirit, precisely in order to draw creation 
itself into the fellowship of his own divine life.
Moltmann's Pneumatology has several particular 
strengths. In the first place, through his understanding 
of the development of the Trinitarian relations themselves 
through salvation history, Moltmann is able to provide a 
Trinitarian explanation for the fact that the Holy Spirit 
is not sent to the Church until after the resurrection of 
Jesus from the dead; until then, the Spirit was not in the 
strict sense the Spirit of the Son. Through the Trinitarian 
history of the Christ-event, the Spirit has become, for
271Moltmann, the Spirit of the risen Christ. Moltmann is
thus able to find room within the doctrine of the Trinity
itself for the fact that Pentecost succeeds Easter, and the
fact that the Spirit of the Father is also the Spirit, not
272just of the Son, but of the risen Jesus Christ.
Secondly Moltmann is able to represent the Holy Spirit 
successfully as a personal agent within the Trinity.2'' 
Moltmann thus effectively overcomes the standard problem of 
traditional Trinitarian Pneumatology; he condemns, for 
example, its understanding of the Spirit's personal 
character as a function of the relation between the Father 
and the Son, or else as an "energy" by which the divine
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personal understanding of the Spirit as the power of
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outreach to the world is effected, as preventing the 
recognition of the Spirit’s equality with the Father and 
the Son. In Moltmann's social Trinity, by contrast, the 
Spirit is not only something which the Father and the Son 
share in common, or a power of God by which the creation is 
liberated (although the Spirit is both), but is actually
275the agent of acts which affect the Father and the Son. 
The Spirit glorifies the Father and the Son by bringing the 
creation back to the Father through the Son and by unifying 
it with the Father and the Son. The Spirit therefore has a 
distinct role of his own to play in the divine life, at 
once economic and immanent, and appears as the glorifying 
and unifying God.276
Thirdly, Moltmann's social Trinity is 
Pneumatologically significant also for the dogmatic problem 
of the relation between the Son and the Spirit. I have 
already pointed out that Moltmann's doctrine of the Trinity 
comprehends New Testament material which on the one hand 
places the Son within the overarching sphere of the power 
and presence of the Spirit, and the Spirit within the 
overarching sphere of the saving work of the Son on the 
other. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have a 
history of mutual relations which are variable rather than 
eternally static. But Moltmann is able to take us beyond 
this again in his treatment of the dogmatic and ecumenical
277problem of the Western filioaue doctrine. Because we know 
the Father concretely as the Father of Jesus Christ rather 
than as the Father in a general sense, and that same Father
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as the one from whom the Spirit proceeds, we need to speak
of the Spirit's procession from the Father as in fact from
the Father of the Son. This helps to clarify the relation 
of the Son to the Spirit: the Spirit proceeds from the
Father in the eternal presence of the Son. For Moltmann,
this theological conclusion is bound up with the divine 
unity. The Father is not the cause of the other two Persons 
and hence the principle of the divine unity, for the divine 
unity is a concrete, inner-Trinitarian matter of the 
relationships of the Persons. 278 It is as the Father of the 
Son and not as the Father who is the patriarchal monarch of 
the Godhead that the Father breathes forth the Holy Spirit, 
while the Holy Spirit for his part is no longer conceived 
along Western lines as the modalistic bond of unity between 
the Father and the Son in the one divine substance. Rather, 
the Spirit proceeds from the Father, receives his "form"
279from the Father and the Son, presumably through the 
economy of salvation, and also glorifies the Father and the 
Son by drawing the redeemed creation into the life of God.
There are, however, a number of inherent weaknesses 
in Moltmann's position, the first and most obvious, 
perhaps, being the notion of eschatology underlying his 
"eschatological model" of the Trinity. Moltmann presupposes 
that the development of thought in the modern era must be 
taken up into theological thinking as well, so that there
2ft Dcan be no return to earlier modes of thought. However, 
the question arises whether or not eschatological thinking 
also should be abandoned; for Albert Schweitzer, for 
example, the thoroughly eschatological message of Jesus 
which historical criticism recovered at the end of the
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nineteenth century means that Jesus is "a stranger to our
2ft 1time." Leaving aside the question whether Schweitzer 
correctly understood the nature of Jesus' own 
eschatological thinking, or that of the primitive Christian 
communities which produced the New Testament, 282 there is 
still room to ask whether Moltmann's apparently quite 
literal understanding of the coming kingdom of God283 can be 
sustained, or whether it is not also, in Schweitzer's 
words, "a stranger to our time."
In practice, Moltmann employs two languages and two 
conceptualities concerning eschatology in his theology, the 
first, that of a literal divinization of the creation in 
the Trinity itself at the eschaton. and the second, the 
conceptuality of the freedom of men and women which 
"corresponds to it," and into which it can be
2&4"translated." Perhaps this is unavoidable, to the extent 
that the final consummation, our divinization and God's 
glorification and unification, is by definition beyond our 
present experience. Good Friday, Easter, and Pentecost may 
well provide the vital clue to what will be in the end, but 
Moltmann is naturally unable to articulate the nature of
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the divinization to which he points in concrete terms. On 
the other hand, the present implications of his idea of the 
future glorification of the children of God are spelled out 
in considerable detail; here the constant impulse is to 
offer a utopian vision of human existence, indebted, 
perhaps, more to the various philosophical traditions on 
which he draws than to the biblical idea of the coming
pockingdom of God. This distinction is important, inasmuch 
as it indicates that the concrete economic basis of his 
eschatological model of the Trinity may be less well 
defined than Moltmann himself realizes.
Were the whole idea of eschatology in the original 
Christian proclamation to be understood as mythological, 
and accordingly "de-ontologized," it might be possible to 
argue that Moltmann would be left with a cipher for the 
utopianism he espouses, but it would also follow that he 
would be without a detailed economic basis for his 
elaborate Trinitarian theology. This reflects perhaps the 
central problem in Moltmann's position, for it is arguable 
that biblical eschatological categories belong to an age 
and religious culture that is long past and which cannot be 
recovered, and, moreover, that they were never intended to 
function in Moltmann's rather literal, ontological sense. 
If Moltmann's understanding of the nature and significance 
of Christian eschatology cannot be sustained, however, then 
the Trinitarian superstructure erected on it must also be 
abandoned.
According to Rudolf Bultmann, for example, "The real 
point of myth is not to give an objective world picture; 
what is expressed in it, rather, is how we human beings
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understand ourselves in our world."286 Thus I have used the 
word "de-ontologized" above as opposed to Bultmann's own 
"demythologized" in order to criticize Moltmann's overly 
ontological reading of biblical eschatology. Whereas, 
therefore, Moltmann condemns patristic theology for 
developing the idea of the epiphany of the eternal in time, 
as opposed to the biblical, eschatological mode of thought, 
and therefore for corrupting the biblical message, 287 it is 
equally arguable, on precisely the same grounds, that in 
developing biblical eschatology into a theology of the 
divine being, Moltmann himself goes well beyond biblical 
categories and the original function of eschatological 
language.
The limitations of Moltmann's argument also appear 
when his underlying understanding of the relation between 
the immanent and the economic Trinity is considered. This 
is nowhere more true than in The Trinity and the Kingdom 
of God. Moltmann's thesis here, as in his earlier work, is 
that in the economy of salvation, the Trinity is revealed 
both to be open to the world and to have, in consequence,
OOQa genuine history. In itself, therefore, the economy of 
salvation is taken to reveal that the Trinity spans the gap 
between the finite and the infinite falsely posited in the 
theological tradition; God cannot be, for Moltmann, who he 
is in himself without the fellowship of his creation. At 
one point, Moltmann alleges that the older doctrine of the 
immanent Trinity is purely the product of metaphysical
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dualism, 289 but as he examines neither the basis for this 
dualism in the philosophical and theological traditions, 
nor the metaphysical presuppositions on which his own 
positive position rests, his argument at this point must be
290taken to be overly simplistic.
If the philosophical basis of Moltmann's rejection of 
the traditional idea of the immanent Trinity is 
questionable, there remains the ostensibly non-metaphysical 
basis for the distinction, developed in The Trinity and the 
Kingdom of God, based on the theological idea of divine
291grace. The idea of divine grace, it is often argued, 
requires a distinction between the immanent and economic 
Trinity in order to preserve the freedom of God in his 
saving activity in the economy. The underlying assumption 
here is that the notion of grace presupposes divine 
freedom. If God were in some sense bound by external 
necessity to save humanity, then the category of grace 
would be inappropriate; as the gospel is the gospel of 
grace, however, the divine freedom must be maintained, and 
thus a distinction must be posited between God in his 
intrinsic freedom, and God in his economic condescension. 
Moltmann, however, rejects this argument as ill-founded. 
We do not, he argues, face the alternatives of the freedom 
of God on the one hand and necessity in God on the other; 
rather, the correct understanding is bound up with the
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evangelical truth that God is love. 292 Moltmann's point is 
that because the economy of salvation proceeds from the 
love which God is, the notion of an external necessity in 
some sense determining the action of God is inappropriate. 
It is out of himself, i.e., out of the love which he 
himself is, that God loves the world, so that in loving the 
world God is being true precisely to himself. Rather than
this introducing an element of determinism into the
activity of God, Moltmann argues, God is here free: he is 
true to himself, self-determined, so that as such, his love
?Q7is his freedom and his freedom is his love.
The material content of the argument here is of
particular significance for the doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity insofar as it posits an identity between the love 
which God is in himself and the love by which he saves the 
world. The point is that the immanent Trinity cannot be 
conceived apart from the love which communicates salvation. 
In a reversal of considerable importance, Moltmann thus 
argues that the older doctrine of the immanent Trinity, in 
differentiating God in himself too sharply from God as he 
is for us, in fact endangers the very concept of grace 
which, it would appear, it is intended to protect.294 The 
distinction, he argues, effectively makes God in himself 
unknown and his hidden nature potentially arbitrary, 
whereas in the Christian revelation, God is love, and is 
known in himself to be such.
Moltmann therefore rejects the classical metaphysical 
basis for the older distinction between the immanent and 
the economic Trinity on the one hand, and its chief
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theological justification on the other. What he proposes 
instead is that we understand the immanent and the economic 
Trinity in terms of a continuity in which the two "merge
295into one another." This does not mean, however, that 
Moltmann rejects all differentiation between the two. With 
his rejection of the classical distinction in The Trinity 
and the Kingdom of God. Moltmann proposes a new 
understanding: the immanent Trinity is to be understood in 
the context of doxology, in which the Church praises God 
for what he is in himself, whereas the economic doctrine of 
the Trinity speaks of God soteriologically. 296 The idea of 
the doxological Trinity, however, has serious shortcomings, 
not the least of which is that it fails to address the 
ontological question of divine transcendence. What is 
proposed is not in the first place an ontological 
distinction, but a nominal or linguistic one: it is based 
not on the difference between the essential nature and the 
activity of God ad extra, but rather is grounded in the 
consciousness of the intending subject and in the nature of 
his or her linguistic acts. No direct attempt is made to 
investigate the possible ontological basis of this 
linguistic differentiation. In this way the distinction is 
minimalized, to say the least, but it survives in its 
minimalist form - and even beyond it, as we shall see - and 
continues to shape in certain respects the content of 
Moltmann's treatment.
Here Moltmann's formal statement of his own mature 
position on the relationship between the immanent and the 
economic Trinity is important. What he proposes is a 
variation on Rahner's axiom as his own Trinitarian 
principle:
Statements about the immanent Trinity
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must not contradict statements about 
the economic Trinity. Statements about 
the economic Trinity must correspond to 
doxological statements about the 
immanent Trinity.29
The content of Moltmann's doctrine of the Trinity surveyed 
above helps us to understand what he means here. The 
ontological notion of God in himself is to be replaced by 
the praise of God for what he is in himself - for example, 
for his goodness rather than for his particular opera ad 
extra which are deemed good - while the content of the 
"doxological" doctrine of the Trinity, what God is praised 
for. is to be determined by the content of the economic 
doctrine.
It is questionable, however, whether the idea of 
praising God for what he is in himself without a prior idea 
of God in himself is in fact coherent: does not the entire 
scheme in fact depend upon a presupposed, and perhaps 
hidden, ontological distinction underlying the linguistic? 
Were Moltmann consistently to adopt the view that no 
metaphysical distinction can be posited, there would be no 
basis on which it could be judged that God is anything else 
or other than, literally, his opera ad extra: the Trinity, 
in consequence, would be (to adopt a term from recent 
Christology) entirely functional rather than ontological. 
Were this the case, there could be no possible basis for a 
real linguistic distinction, since the question of what 
lies behind the activity of God could not arise in the 
linguistic sense, or in any other for that matter, given 
that the possibility of that ontologically-grounded 
linguistic step has been eliminated.
One therefore has to conclude that Moltmann's 
reformulation of Rahner's axiom, at least as stated, cannot 
be sustained, and that, insofar as he continues (as he
297Ibid. , p. 154, italics deleted.
does) to speak of an immanent or ontological Trinity, 
certain hidden metaphysical presuppositions are 
presupposed. Nor does this militate, necessarily, against 
Moltmann's wider theological enterprise; as Donald 
MacKinnon says in one place, there is something 
intellectually frivolous about any aversion to the concern 
with "what is" in the metaphysical sense, and so too in
p g  atheology: "theology is ontological, or it is nothing." It 
does, however, raise questions about the allegedly non­
metaphysical character of Moltmann's Trinitarian theology, 
for it clearly indicates that a metaphysics of the immanent 
Trinity is implicitly in view.
The character of this metaphysics can best be seen 
through Moltmann's discussion of the idea that the economic 
and the immanent Trinity form a continuity in which the two 
merge into one another. As we have seen, Moltmann is highly 
critical in this context of the traditional distinction, 
according to which it can be said that the economic Trinity 
in some sense reflects or reveals the immanent. His main 
point, however, is not so much to do away with the idea of 
the revelation of the immanent Trinity in the economic as 
it is to introduce the more important idea, foreign to the 
tradition, that the economic Trinity also has a
299"retroactive effect" on the immanent Trinity. Moltmann, 
in rejecting the metaphysics of Western dualism, and in 
arguing that the economy of salvation affects the immanent 
Trinity, thus introduces the metaphysical possibility that 
the immanent Trinity can be conceived as at least a partial 
product of the historical events of salvation-history. 
Moltmann's position, as such, approaches the kind of
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explicit metaphysical view given in process philosophy, 
although it cannot, admittedly, be likened to it in 
philosophical subtlety.300
The basis of this retroactive effect of the economy 
on God in himself lies, of course, for Moltmann in God 
himself, who opens himself to the creation and who does not 
will to be himself without the creation. It is, in other 
words, grounded in the twin ideas that God is free and that 
God is love. Thus, for example, in discussing the immanent 
Trinity, Moltmann argues that the immanent Trinitarian love 
of the Father for the Son - i.e., the Holy Spirit - reaches 
out beyond the Son himself and is only fulfilled with the 
return of the love of the Son and of those who are united 
with the Son.301 God thus freely makes himself dependent on 
the creation for his own fulfilment; he is not who he is 
without us.
This means, however, that historical events become 
determinative of the immanent, eternal being of God. This 
thesis, of course, is not peculiar to Moltmann, but appears 
more clearly in his theology than others, perhaps, because 
of his distinctive idea of the Trinitarian history of God. 
It is therefore difficult, as we have already seen, to 
resist the conclusion that the doctrine of the Trinity in 
Moltmann reduces God in himself to his particular acts ad 
extra. As one commentator writes:
Although Moltmann does not wish it, one 
seems forced to picture the scheme 
outlined in his book as a linear one 
with a temporal process culminating 
teleologically in a future state which 
is entirely determined by the process's 
cumulative history.302
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If the Trinity in the economy of salvation is in process, 
in other words, then by Moitmann's own Trinitarian logic 
the immanent Trinity must also be in process, and, as such, 
will only come to completion at the eschaton. One thus has 
to ask whether or not Moitmann's theology threatens to 
reduce the immanent Trinity to the economic, and to make 
God in himself a product of the historical process. 
Moitmann's claim is that the concept of the immanent 
Trinity must be retained as the concept distinguishing the 
God who reveals himself from the economy as such. If, 
however, it is really the case that the immanent Trinity is 
in process, and that it is a product of its successive 
historical determinations, then it is doubtful that the 
concept of such a revealer underlying the revelation can be 
sustained. The case is, rather, more likely the reverse, 
where the "revelation," as it were, underlies the 
"revealer," and the "interaction" between the immanent and 
the economic Trinity is in fact less an interaction than a 
one-way determination of the immanent by the economic 
Trinity.303
William J. Hill criticizes Moitmann's theology at this 
point more sharply. According to Hill, the idea of 
eschatology, in which the eschaton will one day be reached 
and God will be all in all (1 Cor. 15: 28), is itself
irreconcilable with Moitmann's view of God; referring 
primarily to Moltmann’s Trinitarian theologia crucis, he 
writes:
The pronounced emphasis upon 
historicity as even the mode of divine 
being leaves unexplained why suddenly 
it all comes to an end. ... Again, if 
the content of divine history, as 
trinitarian, is death as a phenomenon 
within God (so that suffering is not in 
contradiction to love but its
303Ibid.
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condition; and thus God is to be found 
in his opposite) , then how does God any 
longer remain a God of love once 
suffering and death are overcome?304
The question Hill thus poses is whether or not Moltmann, 
within his understanding of the Trinitarian history of God 
and his conception of the being of God as found in his 
opposite, is able to allow that the eschaton will ever 
come, since once it does, the historical process in 
relation to which God is intrinsically defined will be 
brought to an end. Moitmann's Trinitarianism may well be 
consistent with the idea of an eternally and infinitely 
unfolding process, but not, it would seem, with biblical 
eschatological ideas, in which the consummation will 
finally come.
The final difficulty which can be mentioned is the 
problematic character of Moitmann's attempt to construct 
the doctrine of the immanent Trinity from the economic, in 
view of the sheer diversity of the New Testament material 
he attempts to appropriate. Moltmann attempts to unify this 
material through a history of the Trinitarian structures 
given in the economy of salvation according to the New 
Testament witness. His attempt, however, is arguably bound 
to failure from the beginning, since his confidence that 
the various Trinitarian structures can be unified into one 
whole appears to presuppose an almost fundamentalist 
conviction that the various New Testament theologies can be 
unified - that they are all speaking about the same thing 
in a non-contradictory sense. Moitmann's attempt to 
construct a single history of the Trinitarian relations has 
been shown to be problematic on grounds of philosophical 
superficiality and because of its implications for the 
doctrine of the immanent Trinity as such; it could, 
however, be criticized at the outset as an impossible
304Hill, oo. cit. . p. 17 5.
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attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable by imposing a 
single historical schema upon what are clearly disparate 
materials. This problem will be taken up again below, in 
the context, however, of a more general assessment of the 
standpoint adopted in contemporary Trinitarian 
Pneumatology, and thus in the light of all four Trinitarian 
models outlined.
PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS
1. Dialectical Trinitarianism 
In Chapter II, we saw that the idea of the unity of 
the economic with the immanent Trinity in contemporary
theology must be understood in relation to the wider 
development of modern thought, and not simply as a pure 
return to revelation. This applies both to the theologies 
of Barth and Rahner, in which a partial critique of the 
metaphysical presuppositions of traditional Trinitarian 
theology appears, and to post-Barthian and post-Rahnerian 
Trinitarian theology, where increasingly the doctrine of 
the Trinity has been developed in the light of the
philosophical problem of the "death" of the God of
classical theism. Having provided a survey of the dogmatic 
content of recent Trinitarian Pneumatology in Chapter III, 
we can now return to this question, in order to assess the 
Trinitarian theologies examined in a more general way. 
Since the central principle of this theology is that of the 
unity of the economic with the immanent Trinity, this will 
involve pressing the question of the nature of the unity 
thus asserted, and of the extent to which, in principle, 
this idea of unity can be sustained.
In this section, I shall argue that the contemporary 
Trinitarian thesis presupposes a doctrine of the 
"subjectivity" of God, and that the unity affirmed here of 
the economic and the immanent Trinity is a form of
"dialectical" unity-in-difference. The theologies surveyed 
in Chapter III will thus be characterized as versions of 
"dialectical Trinitarianism." I have hesitated over this
IV
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expression, since the terminology derives from the 
philosophy of Hegel, in which, however, the stage of 
dialectic is understood to be transcended with the 
affirmation of unity-in-difference. Hegel's logic, contrary 
to what is often asserted, is not dialectical, but rather 
"speculative," the speculative stage of reason being that 
in which the unity-in-difference of terms is apprehended, 
their original opposition being a function of dialectic.1 
However, in contemporary Trinitarian theology, where the 
unity-in-difference of the economic and the immanent 
Trinity is affirmed, Hegel's speculative logic is expressly 
renounced. Contemporary Trinitarian theology is perhaps 
speculative in the sense that it affirms a unity-in- 
dif ference of the economic and the immanent Trinity, but it 
is so entirely without involving speculative logic. I have 
thus adopted the more conventional term "dialectical."
Part of the problem involved in characterizing 
contemporary Trinitarian theology in this way is that 
theology in our age has been influenced so profoundly by 
"anti-metaphysical" philosophical systems on the one hand, 
and has become so much a matter of sentiment or activism on 
the other, that the attempt to face up to the ontological 
questions implicit in theological claims is often regarded 
with suspicion. In The Nature of Doctrine, for example, 
George Lindbeck argues that doctrine in general is best 
understood simply as a set of rules or regulative 
statements for the life, worship, and confession of the 
Christian community.2 Following Bernard Lonergan's more 
differentiated account,3 he contrasts this with a
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1G. W. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, trans. William 
Wallace (2nd ed. ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892), 
§ 82.
2George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (London: 
SPCK, 1984), pp. 73-90, 104-108.
3Cf., e.g., Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology 
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971), pp. 308-309.
"propositional" view of doctrine, in which theological
statements are taken to refer ontologically to, for 
example, the immortality of the soul or to the triune being 
of God. Lindbeck's thesis is that Christian doctrine, in 
common with other shared truths and values in particular 
societies, operates within an essentially social context 
which informs it and within which it has a practical 
function of some sort (meaning as use) . Thus different 
theologies of the Trinity are best understood as
functioning within different communities and serving 
various liturgical and practical uses, rather than as 
theological positions having genuinely ontological 
implications.4 A particular theory becomes normative, 
according to Lindbeck, and so, strictly speaking, a 
doctrine. when it becomes useful as a common basis for the 
life and worship of the specific community in which it has 
a function.
The problem with Lindbeck's position, of course, is 
that the said propositional theory itself only "functions" 
as it does when the conditions of Lindbeck's regulative
theory are not met, i.e., when the believing community
which makes ontological claims of various sorts, however 
hesitantly, understands itself not merely to be organizing 
the data of scripture and tradition with a view to life and 
worship, but to be stating what is ontologically the case. 
To the extent that a particular propositional doctrine 
functions precisely as a propositional doctrine, therefore,
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4Thus, according to Lindbeck, o p . cit., p. 106: "...
theological theories that tend to identify the economic and 
immanent trinities ... may or may not correspond better to 
the triune reality of God than do the Augustinian and 
Thomistic theories ... which stress the immanent trinity of 
psychological analogies and substantial relations. That 
question is unanswerable this side of the Eschaton. It is 
also irrelevant to theological assessment. Which theory is 
theologically best depends on how well it organizes the 
data of Scripture and tradition with a view to their use in 
Christian worship and life."
it does so on the basis of the conviction that a
propositional or ontological statement can be made. In this 
way, the whole enterprise is intelligible only if the 
doctrinal statement in question is regarded as something 
more than merely functional in Lindbeck's sense, and if, 
contrary to his claim, it can indeed be evaluated on the 
basis of the claim it makes. If a propositional view of 
doctrine is to be criticized on the basis of the
presupposition that meaning is use, therefore, then the 
genuine "use" of various propositional claims about God or
creation in Christian theology must be taken seriously. If
it is not, then one has to assume that, in fact, it is not 
meaning as use which underlies the "regulative" critique of 
such propositional statements, but rather a reductionist 
metaphysics implicit in the position - which is, in the 
end, something quite different.
Against Lindbeck, and against the anti-metaphysical 
theological impulse his position represents, I shall argue 
that just as classical Trinitarian theology makes 
ontological claims in the light of which it must be 
assessed, so contemporary Trinitarian theology must be 
judged in relation to the theological ontology it involves. 
The fact that such an assessment of the classical position 
is required is explicitly recognized in contemporary 
Trinitarian theology, where the criticism repeatedly 
appears of older forms of Trinitarian theology as 
presupposing dualistic conceptions of God as impassible, 
infinite, and eternal over against the creation as 
passible, finite, and temporal. What is, perhaps, not so 
clear in contemporary theology is that the alternative 
Trinitarian theology advanced must also itself be 
susceptible to ontological analysis and criticism. In 
Chapters II and III, we have seen that the central 
principle in relation to which this theology is developed 
is that of the unity of the economic with the immanent 
Trinity. In this section, this unity will be further
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defined, as has been stated, as a unity-in-difference, and 
contemporary Trinitarian theology, in consequence, as 
dialectical.
The idea of "dialectical Trinitarianism" is analogous 
to John Macquarrie's conception of "dialectical theism," 
developed in his 1983-84 Gifford Lectures, In Search of 
Deitv. According to Macquarrie, dialectical theism appears 
repeatedly in the theological tradition as an alternative 
to "classical" Western theism, and has come to new 
prominence since the nineteenth century.5 He thus locates 
the development of recent theological thought within a 
wider history which includes thinkers from Plotinus and 
Pseudo-Dionysius to John Scotus Eriugena and Nicholas 
Cusanus, and in more recent times, to Hegel, Whitehead, and 
Heidegger.6 To this extent, Macquarrie’s study constitutes 
an advance on the positions encountered earlier, in which 
such historical connections are not drawn in any detail. 
His main argument, however, is already familiar. According 
to Macquarrie, a dialectical theism has distinct advantages 
over traditional ways of conceiving God; in particular, 
according to Macquarrie, it avoids the one-sidedness of 
classical theism, in which God's transcendence, for 
example, is emphasized at the expense of his immanence.7. 
This comes to be of particular importance, for Macquarrie, 
in the light of the problem of the atheisms of freedom and 
protest. The argument is that a dialectical concept of God 
overcomes the metaphysical isolation of God from the world, 
so that the world does not need to be emptied of 
significance in acknowledging the absolute significance of 
God alone (the problem of the atheism of freedom), nor the
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5John Macquarrie, In Search of Deitv: An Essay in
Dialectical Theism (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1984), pp.
59ff., 125ff.
6Ibid.. pp. 59ff.
7Ibid., p . 31.
old impassible God denied in face of human suffering (the 
problem of protest atheism).8 In dialectical theism, rather, 
God cannot be conceived to be who he is without the world, 
so that the world itself is given an intrinsically divine 
significance and so that suffering is no longer seen to be 
something alien to God.
Macquarrie thus outlines his concept of God under a 
series of dialectical oppositions: God is being and God is 
nothing, God is infinite simplicity and yet embraces the 
plenitude of the many, God is incomprehensible and 
knowable, transcendent and immanent, impassible and 
passible, and so on.9 In this conception, the categories of 
Western dualism, by which the infinite and the divine were 
opposed to the finite and the creaturely, are self­
consciously transcended. Unfortunately, however, it is not 
always clear from Macquarrie's treatment that a dialectical 
theism goes beyond a simultaneous affirmation of opposites, 
as in the following definition:
When I speak of 'dialectical theism',
I am not thinking of some weak 
compromise. 'Dialectic' is to be 
understood in the strong sense of the 
clash of opposites; for instance, God 
is not half transcendent and half 
immanent, but wholly transcendent and 
wholly immanent.10
Although in the detail of Macquarrie's argument, where he 
deals with the concrete content of a number of dialectical 
systems of theology, this weakness is largely overcome, the
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8Ibid.. pp. 30-42, 171ff.
9Ibid.. pp. 171-184. Macquarrie, however, ibid.. pp. 
27-28, 54, notes that one does not have to give equal
emphasis to each side of the opposition in such a 
conception, a qualification which is, as we shall see, 
quite important to remember.
10Ibid. . pp. 14-15.
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precise sense in which, in principle, dialectical opposites 
can be asserted to be one remains to be specified. Merely 
to state, as Macquarrie does, that for a classical divine 
attribute x, a dialectical theism asserts both x and -x, is 
clearly insufficient. Indeed, the whole point of the 
dialectical conception (or, in Hegelian language, of a 
"speculative" conception which goes beyond dialectical 
opposition) is that the opposition of the two is 
relativized in a higher unity.
The fact that such a unity is asserted in contemporary 
Trinitarian theology vis-à-vis the economic and the 
immanent Trinity, while speculative reason has been 
rejected, is of central importance to our discussion. The 
key question in all of this concerns the principle of the 
unity of the two terms, by which dialectical opposition 
becomes dialectical unity-in-difference. Despite the fact 
that Hegel's specific doctrine of speculative reason has 
been rejected in contemporary Trinitarian theology, and 
especially in the German tradition with which we have for 
the most part been concerned, Hegel's philosophy has 
nevertheless been of particular importance in this respect 
- or rather, one particular aspect of his philosophy, taken 
up and isolated from the Hegelian position as a whole. This 
is due not so much to the strictly philosophical content of 
the Hegelian position, as it is to the thesis in 
contemporary theology that the older Christian metaphysical 
conception of God as "statically" immutable and impassible 
is inadequate to the God of Old and New Testament 
revelation, since, in revelation, God appears as the God of 
history, intensely involved in the history of his people.11
110n the question of Hegel's significance for 
contemporary theology, see, e.g., Hans Rung, The 
Incarnation of God, trans. J. R. Stephenson (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1987), pp. 382ff. Alister McGrath, The Making 
of Modern German Christoloqv (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1986), p. 213, makes the point, with reference to the 
question of the importance of history in modern theology, 
that Hegel was one of the few philosophers to construct a
What is of particular importance here is the shift 
from the idea of God as substance to that of God as 
subject; whereas one is able to conceive of God as 
substance in abstract isolation from created or non-divine 
substance, the concept of God as subject involves the idea 
of relationality, and thus a dialectical conception of the 
self and its other, in relation to which it is the self. 
This involves not so much the idea of a gradation in 
various separate levels of existence, along the lines of a 
chain of being, as it does the idea of God as the divine 
subject and the world as his other, over against which the 
divine subjectivity is in part, at least, defined.12 The 
argument is that only an understanding of God as subject, 
or as free in his relations to himself and to the created 
order, is adequate to the God of history, who is who he is 
and who is true to himself precisely in his historical 
relation to the world. It is at this point that Hegel's 
philosophy has been of decisive importance for contemporary 
theology. According to Hegel:
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. . . everything turns on grasping and 
expressing the True, not only as 
Substance. but equally as Subiect. ... 
Further, the living Substance is being 
which is in truth Subi ect. or, what is 
the same, is in truth actual only in so 
far as it is the movement of positing 
itself, or is the mediation of its 
self-othering with itself. This 
Substance is, as Subject, pure, simple 
negativity, and is for this very reason 
the bifurcation of the simple; it is 
the doubling which sets up opposition, 
and then again the negation of this
philosophy of history, and that, "It may well be that the 
years ahead will witness the re-emergence of Hegel as the 
philosophers to whom theologians appeal, for precisely this 
reason." There is no doubt that McGrath's judgment is well- 
founded, but Hegel's importance already has to be assumed 
in contemporary theology. See the discussion below.
12Hill, op . cit. . pp. 149-155.
257
indifferent diversity and its 
antithesis [the immediate simplicity].
. . . Thus the life of God and divine 
cognition may well be spoken of as a 
disporting of Love with itself; but 
this idea sinks into mere edification, 
and even insipidity, if it lacks the 
seriousness, the suffering, the 
patience, and the labour of the 
negative.13
This passage shows that Hegel's philosophy not only lays 
the foundation for a metaphysics of God as subject or 
person, but also for a specifically Trinitarian metaphysics 
in which the logic of the divine subjectivity itself leads 
over into a real incarnation of God, a philosophy of the 
suffering and death of God, and of the reconciliation of 
the "negative" to God. As such, the fundamental shape of 
subsequent Trinitarian theology is already given in Hegel's 
philosophy, although, as we shall see, there are also basic 
differences.
Taking up this Hegelian theme, for example, Walter 
Kasper argues that the older theological tradition 
attempted, within the limits of its philosophical tools, to 
be faithful to the biblical concept of God.u The great 
problem, then as now, was to understand how it was possible 
for the eternal Son of God to become flesh and to die a 
human death. In some ways, classical theology attempted to 
acknowledge this mystery, but, according to Kasper, it also 
tended towards the view that such involvement with the 
creation is something foreign to God.15 Kasper cites various 
historical attempts to understand God in this 
Christological sense as the God of history. The primitive
13G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V.
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), Preface, §§
17-19 .
uKasper, Jesus the Christ, pp. 176-181.
15Ibid. . p. 179.
Christologies of Ignatius of Antioch and Tertullian, for 
example, attempted to state in something of its paradoxical 
force the fact that the eternal God for our sake subjected 
himself to suffering and death in Jesus Christ.16 Kasper 
also has particular praise for Luther's theologia crucis. 
which was an attempt to break through the medieval system 
of metaphysical theology in which, as Luther thought, God 
was not found in the cross.17 But for Kasper, the key 
attempt to understand God in this Christological sense is 
the philosophy of Hegel. In Hegel, it belongs to the
concept of the Absolute that it empty itself into its
opposite; for Hegel, only in this way is the Absolute in 
fact the Absolute - i.e., only thus is it wholly free or 
self-determined. The important point here for Kasper is 
that in Hegel God's very being is thus conceived in terms 
of the idea of a freedom which is mediated through 
self-surrender and self-emptying.18 This leads to the
concept of God as "subject," or, as Kasper prefers, 
"person," as opposed to a more self-enclosed, abstract 
concept of the divine essence, and provides the conceptual 
tools by which theology can relate God to history and
specifically to the suffering of Jesus.19 Like others, 
however, Kasper argues that Hegel's insistence that the 
logic of the Absolute is accessible to speculative reason 
is entirely misplaced; according to Kasper, it is love 
rather than logic which leads to the movement from the 
immanent to the economic Trinity, a love which is known 
exclusively from the concrete events of revelation.20
While the Hegelian philosophy as a whole is not
16Ibid.
17Ibid. . pp. 179-180.
18Ibid. , pp. 181-185.
19Ibid. . p. 183.
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20Ibid. . pp. 182-183.
embraced, therefore, in its general outline it provides a
basic conceptuality according to which the immanent and the
economic Trinity can be understood to be both distinct and
yet one. Since God is subject, or "person" as in Kasper's
theology, and since the subjectivity of God involves God's
relation to his other, otherness is not something added
externally to the life of God but is to be regarded as a
moment within it. What God is in the economy, therefore, in
relation to the creation, cannot ultimately be isolated
from what he is in himself. It is this Hegelian idea which
provides the starting-point for the idea of the unity of
the economic with the immanent Trinity in contemporary 
21theology, and which renders the relation of unity between 
the two, in Pannenberg's words, something which "belongs to 
the concept of the divine essence itself."22
It would be worthwhile briefly to pose the question 
whether there is in fact any clear alternative to this 
characterization of the contemporary Trinitarian position. 
As we have seen, the idea which is central to the 
development of contemporary Trinitarian theology is that of 
the unity of the economic with the immanent Trinity. 
However, despite the fact that this principle is 
universally affirmed, the logic of the assertion is seldom 
discussed. If, for the sake of argument, we restrict 
ourselves to Rahner's axiom that the economic Trinity is 
the immanent Trinity, and vice versa, it is already clear 
that the logical complexity of the copula "is" in general 
is such that its meaning is bound to be ambiguous. The fact 
that the unity of the economic and immanent Trinity is 
generally affirmed in contemporary Trinitarian theology, 
therefore, does not mean that the idea of unity involved
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21Robert P. Scharlemann, "Hegel and Theology Today," 
Dialog. 23 (1984), 257-262.
22Pannenberg, "Problems of a Trinitarian Doctrine of 
God," p. 254.
here can be taken to be transparently obvious, not only 
between theologies but even within a single theology.
There are, in short, a number of ways in which two 
things can be said to constitute a unity, so that the 
nature of this unity remains to be specified even when the 
contemporary Trinitarian thesis is explicitly affirmed. The 
most literal reading possible would take the economic and 
the immanent Trinity to be identical, in the sense of 
referring to precisely the same reality, as in the 
tautologous statement that 1+3 "is" 2 + 2, and vice versa, 
where the copula is to be taken in the sense of "is 
equivalent to." One could not, by contrast, reverse the 
order of subject and predicate in the proposition "Socrates 
is a man" in this way, since by the "is" here a universal, 
"man," is asserted to pertain to a particular, "Socrates." 
To attempt to apply the vice versa in this case would 
simply be to confuse the proper sense of the particular and 
the universal terms involved; the meaning of the two terms 
themselves prevents such a reversal, while the sense of the 
"is" in the two propositions is quite different.
The reading, "is equivalent to" would appear to be 
precluded by the historical distinction between the 
economic and immanent Trinity, since none of the theologies 
considered explicitly attempts to invalidate it.23 However, 
several obvious alternatives remain. Rahner's axiom might, 
for example, be read as a reductionist thesis of a sort, 
although in this case, again, the vice versa would have to 
be dropped. The statement that the economic "is" the 
immanent Trinity here would mean that the one reduces to
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23This argument relates to that of Ghislain Lafont 
concerning Rahner's axiom, already encountered in Chapter
II. To begin with, since Rahner's idea of the identity of 
the economic and the immanent Trinity does appear to 
presuppose a prior distinction taken from the theological 
tradition, the reading "is equivalent to" has to be 
excluded. It follows, therefore, as Lafont argues, that the 
axiom as stated is not fully justified, and, in particular, 
that the vice versa of the formulation is problematic.
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the other. In the context of contemporary thought, a 
theological reductionism is bound to be a temptation 
because of the prevalence of philosophical and theological 
movements which are "anti-metaphysical" in character, in 
the sense of asserting the finality of the world of finite 
experience, and which thus implicitly or explicitly oppose 
the idea of a God who is metaphysically transcendent to the 
created order.24 In Trinitarian theology, the tendency which 
would follow from this would be to reduce what is called 
the immanent Trinity to the economic reality with which 
Christian theology is concerned, and to make the latter the 
one absolute reality. As in all reductionism, however, the 
effective result of this would be to do away with what has 
been "reduced," so that, in this case, what used to be 
called the immanent Trinity would now effectively be 
treated as an illusory, illegitimate theological category.
This standpoint is adopted by none of the Trinitarian 
theologies surveyed above. It is, in fact, an extremely 
radical position, argued most consistently, perhaps, in the 
nineteenth century by Ludwig Feuerbach.25 As Marx argued of
24Any broadly reductionist position, of course, 
paradoxically depends upon a philosophical standpoint which 
is as "metaphysical," in the strict sense, as any other: 
the attempt to assert the "absoluteness" of the empirical 
world of finite human experience, for example, at the level 
of individual subjectivity, as in certain forms of 
existentialism, or at the level of human societal 
existence, as in certain forms of socialist thought, both 
rely on an implicitly metaphysical claim about what is 
ultimately real, even if the resulting positions are not 
"metaphysical" in the usual sense of the word. The same 
applies to other forms of reductionism, such as the cruder 
forms of scientific materialism.
25Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. 
George Eliot (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957). Cf also, 
Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," IV, in David McLellan, 
ed., Karl Marx (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 
157: "Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self­
alienation, of the duplication of the world into a 
religious world and a secular one. His work consists in 
resolving the religious world into its secular basis." In 
addition to Feuerbach, reference might also be made to the
Feuerbach, however, a consistent reductionism would abandon 
the realm of theological discourse altogether;26 this, 
clearly, is not the route taken in contemporary Trinitarian 
theology, where theological discourse concerning the 
economic and the immanent Trinity has rather been 
revitalized. As the implicit tendency towards which a 
particular theology may tend, however, reductionism is an 
important factor in contemporary theology - the assertion 
that there is no God "up there" at all, and that the 
concrete "economic" reality with which we have to do in our 
finite lives is the only meaningful field of human 
discourse, including theological discourse.27
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more recent "death of God" theology of the 1960’s, in which 
a similar reductionism was sometimes advanced, e.g., by 
Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism 
(London: Collins, 1967).
26It was fundamental to Marx's polemic against 
Feuerbach that the human essence is not an abstract entity 
(for Feuerbach, the historical idea of God, particularly as 
manifested in the Christian religion) residing outside the 
world, but a totally this-worldly reality; the human 
species being is, for Marx, the nexus of social relations 
(Marx, o p . cit.. VI) .
27This, e.g., is the criticism of liberation theology 
provided by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of 
Liberation. trans. Vatican Polyglot Press (London: Catholic 
Truth Society, 1984) , which insists that liberation 
theology is to be understood as "a real system, even if 
some hesitate to follow the logic to its conclusion," (IX, 
1) and which characterizes this system explicitly as a 
"reductionism" (IX, 8; cf. also VIII, 1-9; IX, 1-7). The 
document argues, for example, that the theology of 
liberation tends to develop an extreme historical 
immanentism, with the result that God is effectively 
identified with history, and faith with fidelity to history 
(IX, 3-5). Christology here, it asserts, tends toward a 
rejection of the teaching of tradition in the name of 
class, while '...one claims to meet again the "Jesus of 
history" coming from the revolutionary experience of the 
struggle of the poor for their liberation. ..' (X, 9, 11).
The result, it argues, is that faith in the incarnate Word, 
dead and risen for all men, and whom "God has made Lord and 
Christ" is denied, while in its place is substituted "a 
Christology in which Jesus appears as a symbol who sums up
Another superficially obvious possibility would be to 
read Rahner's axiom as an affirmation of an analogical 
relation, or a relation of proportional similarity, between 
the economic and the immanent Trinity. As we shall see, 
this view has much to commend it, since, in the end, the 
identity asserted in Rahner's axiom must be qualified 
analogically. The idea of analogy, however, cannot 
ultimately account either for the specific form of Rahner's 
axiom, or for the fact that it has been taken up almost 
universally in contemporary Trinitarian theology. A 
straightforwardly analogical statement such as "God is 
good," first of all, cannot be reversed by the addition of 
a vice versa, while secondly, the idea of analogy as such 
contains not the slightest suggestion of the idea of the 
divine subjectivity which pervades the Trinitarian 
theologies we have examined.
Once, however, we concede that contemporary
Trinitarian theology is of a broadly Hegelian provenance, 
Rahner's axiom can be taken to mean, not that there is no 
immanent Trinity, or that the distinction between the 
economic and the immanent Trinity in the theological 
tradition was illegitimate, or that there is a proportional
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in Himself the requirements of the struggle of the 
oppressed" (ibid.). The Church is then understood in this 
light as 'a Church of the oppressed people whom it is 
necessary to "conscientize" in the light of the organized 
struggle for freedom', (IX, 12) while the central ecclesial 
event of the Eucharist tends to be "transformed into a 
celebration of the people in struggle, even though the 
persons who participate in these practices may not be fully 
conscious of it." (IX, 1.) Many of the criticisms of the 
document appear to be exaggerated, and in particular it 
clearly fails to condemn the ecclesiology and theology 
which implicitly and explicitly sanctions political abuses. 
What is important for our purposes, however, is the claim 
made that there is an underlying reductionism in the 
philosophical sources of liberation theology which, when 
thought consistently, leads inevitably to a reductionist 
theology. Whether or not liberation theology itself can 
show that it is not reductionist and that it can refute 
this challenge remains, of course, an open question.
similarity between them, but rather that the distinction 
between them is at once valid and sublated in a higher 
unity in a revised, more "concrete" concept of the 
Trinity.28 Here the economic and the immanent Trinity are 
understood as separate aspects of or abstractions from one 
concrete whole, God as subject, who is, as the immanent 
Trinity, self-determining precisely in relation to the
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poClearly, however, we cannot restrict the line of 
influence solely to Hegel's philosophy, even if his thought 
has been of crucial significance in the respects indicated. 
Macquarrie, e.g., on. cit.. pp. 153ff., suggests that the 
philosophy of Heidegger must also be included here, in 
particular in view of Heidegger's polemic against the 
"onto-theology" of the theological tradition. Also of 
importance is the process theology which stems from 
Whitehead, to which Macquarrie, pp. 139ff., also draws 
attention. Here the old dualist categories of God and the 
world, of the infinite and the finite, etc., are thought 
together in a manner analogous to the economic and the 
immanent Trinity in contemporary Trinitarian theology. 
Hartshorne's development of a dipolar concept of God in 
particular might be cited; the two poles correspond to the 
old dualist categories, but in Hartshorne's conception, 
neither God nor creation can be divorced as in the older 
conception, nor absolutely identified as in pantheism, but 
must be thought together in their distinction in what 
Hartshorne calls "panentheism": everything is "in" God. In 
theologies of the Trinity which draw on process philosophy, 
this attempt to think the Trinity as the unity-in- 
difference of the economic and the immanent Trinity is 
likewise associated with a new effort to conceive the being 
of God in a way which transcends older metaphysical 
categories, by resolving the older dualistic separation of 
the immanent and the economic Trinity. See, e.g., David A. 
Pailin, "Process Theology," in Richardson & Bowden, op. 
cit. . pp. 467-470, and his, God and the Processes of 
Reality: Foundations of a Credible Theism (London and New 
York, 19 89) . For a treatment of the relation between 
process thought and the Trinitarian theologies surveyed 
above, see also Colin E. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The 
Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), passim, and Fiddes, o p .
cit.. pp. llOff. For a "process" theology of the Trinity, 
see Schubert M. Ogden, "On the Trinity," Theology, 83 
(1980) , 97-102; Joseph A. Bracken, "Process Philosophy and 
Trinitarian Theology," Process Studies, 8 (1978), 217-230; 
and Bracken, "Process Philosophy and Trinitarian Theology 
- II," Process Studies. 11 (1981), 83-96.
other, i.e., as the economic Trinity, involved with and in 
the creation. The distinction and the validity of the 
distinction are thus maintained, but are at the same time 
relativized by the holding of the two together in a higher 
unity. Such a "dialectical Trinitarianism," therefore, does 
not simply posit contradictory assertions simultaneously, 
as if the Trinity were to be understood without further ado 
as both economic and immanent, but a genuine unity of the 
two, in which, however, the relative distinction of the 
economic and immanent Trinity is at the same time 
preserved, a unity-in-difference founded in the intrinsic 
relationality of the Trinity itself.
The idea of a dialectical unity-in-difference of the 
economic and the immanent Trinity offers a clear advance 
over other ways of understanding the contemporary 
Trinitarian thesis. In the Trinitarian models considered 
above, the economic Trinity is identified in some sense 
with the immanent Trinity, but in a way which maintains the 
distinction. The expression "dialectical Trinitarianism" 
denotes the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity is here 
understood to comprise both the economic and the immanent 
Trinity, the two being at once identical and yet distinct 
within the logic appropriate to Trinitarian theology. At 
the same time, dialectical Trinitarianism can also be seen 
as a more precise expression of the general phenomenon of 
dialectical theism noted by Macquarrie, since it involves 
the claim, not simply that God and the world must be 
thought together in some sense, but that the dialectical 
unity-in-difference in God explicitly involves the Trinity 
of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so that the moment of 
"otherness" involved is given a Christological definition, 
and so that the triune God is quite specifically defined in 
his immanent Trinitarian being in the economy of salvation. 
The introduction of the idea of the Trinity into the 
dialectical concept of God, in other words, makes for a 
more differentiated conception than does the more general
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idea of God, while the economy of salvation, as we have 
seen, gives this conception its concrete content.
The importance of the Hegelian position in this 
respect extends even to the theology of Moltmann, who 
otherwise attempts to distance himself from the Idealist 
tradition.29 In his discussion of the modern doctrine of the 
Trinity in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. Moltmann 
notes that the general concept of God as Absolute Subject 
in three modes of being, which he condemns as unable to 
secure an adequate doctrine of the Trinity, and which he 
associates particularly with the theologies of Barth and 
Rahner, derives particularly from Hegel.30 Later in the same 
book, however, we clearly see Moltmann's own indebtedness 
to Hegel's philosophy, and indeed, the idea of the 
subjectivity of God taken up explicitly and acknowledged 
as fundamental to Moltmann's entire Trinitarian 
conception.31 Moltmann here relates Hegel's understanding of 
the subject to Richard of St. Victor's understanding of the 
persons, according to which being a person means not only 
subsisting, or subsisting in relation, but existing in the 
light of another by virtue of love. According to Moltmann, 
however:
Hegel . . . picked up this idea and 
deepened it. It is the nature of the 
person to give himself entirely to a 
counterpart, and to find himself in the 
other most of all. The person only 
comes to himself by expressing and 
expending himself in others. ... This 
adds a third term into the doctrine of 
the Trinity, in addition to the concept 
of person and the concept of relation; 
and this makes it possible to perceive
29In contrast to Moltmann, Jiingel's debt to Hegel, like 
Kasper's, is more openly-acknowledged. See Jungel, God as 
the Mvsterv of the World, pp. 63-100.
30Moltmann, o p . cit. . pp. 16-20.
31Ibid. . pp. 173-174.
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the living changes in the trinitarian 
relations and the Persons which come 
about through the revelation, the self­
emptying and the glorification of the 
triune God. We have termed it the 
history of God, which takes place in 
the Trinity itself, and we have in this 
sense talked about God's self­
limitation, about God's pain, and also 
about God's joy and his eternal bliss 
in the final glorification.32
Hegel's understanding of the subjectivity of God, in other 
words, which in Hegel's words "sinks into ... insipidity 
... if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the 
patience, and the labour of the negative,"33 is here 
understood by Moltmann to provide the foundation for his 
own characteristic doctrine of the Trinitarian history of
God. . . .  ....
As was stated earlier, the fact that the idea of the 
unity-in-difference of the economic and the immanent 
Trinity is maintained without reference to Hegel's 
speculative logic is of key importance. It is significant 
in this respect that the emergence of dialectical 
Trinitarianism in contemporary theology is closely related 
to the development of the idea of God as event. Barth's 
theology has been particularly influential at this point.34 
We have already seen that, for Barth, the living God of the 
Bible must be understood in dynamic terms, as having 
movement, life, and even decision in himself: "To its very- 
deepest depths God's Godhood consists in the fact that it
32Ibid. . p. 174.
33Hegel, loc. cit.
3A0n the relation between Barth and Hegel, cf., e.g., 
Moltmann, o p . cit.. pp. 139-150; Pannenberg,"Die 
Subjectivitat Gottes und die Trinitatslehre, " pp. 98ff.; 
and Timothy Bradshaw, "Karl Barth on the Trinity: A Family 
Resemblance," Scottish Journal of Theology, 39 (1986), 145- 
164.
is an event...."35 Barth's doctrine of God, however, rests 
upon the further qualification of this event as the event 
of revelation in Jesus Christ: God is in himself eternally 
open to fellowship with men and women, since, in himself, 
he has eternally decided to be "for us" in Christ. In this 
conception, therefore, God is not who he is without 
mankind. Barth's developed doctrine of God reflects this 
systematically in the doctrine of election.
In his essay on Hegel in Protestant Theology in the 
Nineteenth Century. Barth also, significantly, 
characterizes Hegel's philosophy as centred in the idea of 
God as event.36 According to Barth, in Hegel's philosophy:
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... the key to everything ... [is] that 
reason, truth, concept, mind, God 
himself are understood as an event, 
and, moreover, only as an event. They 
cease to be what they are as soon as 
the event, in which they are what they 
are, is thought of as interrupted, as 
soon as a state is thought of in its 
place. Essentially reason and all its 
synonyms are life, movement, process. 
God is God only in his divine action, 
revelation, creation, reconciliation, 
redemption; as an absolute act, as 
actus Purus.37
Barth argues here that theology should let itself be 
reminded by Hegel that God can only be known in truth as
35Barth, Church Dogmatics. II/l, p. 263.
36Karl Barth, "Hegel," in his Protestant Theology in 
the Nineteenth Century, trans. Brian Cozens and John Bowden 
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1972), pp. 398-402, 413, 415-416, 
419-420.
3/Ibid., pp. 398-399. Bradshaw, o p . cit., pp. 159-160, 
on the other hand, claims that the theme of God as actus 
purus in Barth represents the existential, non-Hegelian 
element in Barth’s theology. Bradshaw's point, however, 
rests upon a misunderstanding both of Hegel himself and of 
Barth’s understanding of Hegel, as the above quotation 
shows.
the living God who presents himself to us, and that, on 
this basis, a Hegel renaissance would not necessarily be a
38bad thing for theology. However, a pivotal criticism of 
Hegel also appears in the essay, that although Hegel 
understood truly that God is event, he also made that event 
a function of the logical dialectic rather than of free 
grace: for Barth, the "weightiest" problem in Hegel's
philosophy is his "failure to recognize that God is free."39
In fact, Hegel's intention in his philosophy is 
precisely to conceive of God as free, so that, from this 
point of view, Barth's criticism is rather strained. The 
point is, rather, that instead of failing to recognize the 
freedom of God, Hegel understands this freedom differently 
than Barth, arguing that freedom is both negatively the 
absence of dependence on an other, and positively a 
relating of self to self, or a self-determination. 
According to Hegel, the very substance of spirit is 
freedom, understood in this precise sense.40 Freedom, 
therefore, is a living process which proceeds necessarily 
from the very logic of spirit or Geist. Hegel's entire 
position depends on the confidence that this logic not only 
determines the divine life, but that it is also accessible 
to us insofar as the human and the divine Geist are not 
qualitatively different in this sense. Barth,-on the other 
hand, understands the freedom of God as his lordship in 
revelation; this, as we have seen, is developed in his 
theology as God's existential freedom, which, in the end,
41ultimately has priority over God's essence.
In Church Dogmatics II/l, Barth discusses the idea of
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38Hegel, o p . cit. . pp. 416-417.
39Ibid. . p. 420.
40Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, § 382.
41See above, Chapter II, section 2.
God as actus Purus in similar terms to those above, a 
discussion which is important in this context as an 
elaboration of his own positive theology, rather than of
/ pHegel's. Barth argues here that the idea of event which he 
has in view in his doctrine of God must be understood 
specifically as the event of his revelation, and so not as 
an event like any other, but as an utterly unexpected act 
which derives from the lordship of God. He writes:
...the action of God that takes place 
in revelation is a particular action, 
different from any other happening, 
even in contradiction to it. Actus 
purus is not sufficient as a 
description of God. To it there must be 
added at least "et sinaularis.1,43
Thus for Barth, the livingness of God, or what Hegel calls 
the divine subjectivity, is apprehended solely in 
revelation. God is event, not in a general sense, but in 
the sense that he is who he is precisely in his act of 
revelation.
Barth's understanding of God as event, together with 
his associated criticism of Hegel, which is summed up in 
his idea of God as actus purus et sinaularis. can be said 
to be fundamental to subsequent Trinitarian theology. It 
is, in effect, what allows the conception of the unity-in- 
difference of the economic and the immanent Trinity to be 
developed without a speculative logic. It is significant in 
this context that this conception amounts to a complete 
redefinition of the concept of God as actus purus over 
against its original Aristotelian and scholastic 
definition. The latter depends upon the Aristotelian 
distinction between form as actuality, and matter as
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42Barth, Church Dogmatics. II/l, p. 264.
43Ibid.
potentiality.44 To say that God is pure act here, therefore, 
is not simply to say that God is immaterial, which was 
axiomatic to Aristotle and the scholastics, but that he is 
fully actual in himself, in the precise sense that he is 
eternally what he is, without intrinsic capacity for change 
or limitation because he is already, by definition, the 
infinite plenitude of all possible perfection.45
The clearest opponent of this older position among the 
contemporary Trinitarian theologians we have encountered is 
Jürgen Moltmann, whose theology is a development of the 
idea of salvation history itself as the Trinitarian history 
of God. Just as salvation history is not yet complete, so 
the Trinity, which out of love is eternally open to 
creation, is likewise in via. As we have seen, however, the 
ultimate implication of such a position is not only that 
the Trinity would have to be conceived as a potentiality 
developing through particular actions to ever new forms of 
actuality, but that without the problem of the unredeemed 
creation upon which the Trinity acts ad extra, the very 
process by which the Trinitarian life is defined would 
cease. If, in short, the historical process whereby God 
acts ad extra in the world for the overcoming of suffering 
and death were actually to come to an end in a final 
consummation, then the problem would arise how God could 
still be self-constituting in his actions ad extra.
In the end, however, Barth's position is no less 
problematic. We have already seen the difficulties involved 
in maintaining in a literal sense that God "chose" to be 
who he is in Jesus Christ; now we can take up the other 
side of the same problem, the particularity of the event, 
not only in which the revelation of God takes place, but in
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44Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (London: 
Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1 9 5 9 ), II, pp. 1 9 2 , 1 9 7 ,
3 2 9-3 3 2 .
45Thomas Aquinas, op. cit.. la, 3-4 , 7 ; Summa Contra
Gentiles. 1 .1 6-1 8 , 2 8 , 4 3 .
which the being of God himself consists. This is the 
ultimate implication of Barth's idea of God as actus purus 
et singularis. that God in a quite literal sense determines 
himself to be God in the particular history of this man, 
Jesus of Nazareth. This means, however, that God has 
determined himself only to be who he is in unity with the 
realm of potentiality, the creation. The thesis involved 
here is that God expresses his divinity precisely in the 
event by which he unites himself with the finite, and that 
he is, therefore, only fully actual or free in his self­
limitation - in short, that he is who he is sub specie 
temporis.
Barth's position at this point not only involves a 
strong affirmation of the identity of the economic and the 
immanent Trinity, through the idea of the event of 
revelation by which God is defined as actus purus. It also 
has other radical implications for theology, above all 
concerning the manner in which revelation becomes a 
systematic necessity for the knowledge of God. In the 
theological tradition, revelation is necessary for the 
simple reason that the human mind is finite and the Trinity 
infinite; the apophatic qualification which attaches to all 
knowledge of God in Christian Platonism, for example, is 
simply a function of this more general dualism. Revelation 
is a systematic necessity here only from our point of view, 
in the sense that without it, the truth of God would be 
inaccessible, since the human mind cannot reach up to 
comprehend what is to it by definition incomprehensible. 
Even in revelation, therefore, God is made known to us in 
a way which befits our limitations, in sensible form and in 
images which are self-consciously understood by way of 
analogy.
In a Trinitarian theology such as Barth's, by 
contrast, in which the Trinity can be said to define itself 
in the economy, the systematic requirement for revelation 
runs much deeper. Because the Trinity is here conceived as
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event, or as actus purus in the sense outlined above, 
revelation is not simply necessary because our minds are 
limited, but rather because the Trinity itself is 
determined in its own being by the concrete reality of the 
economy of salvation. This determination is understood 
fundamentally as a free existential self-determination, a 
result, as Barth understands it, of divine choice. This, 
however, means that even if the human intellect were such 
that it could comprehend the divine infinity, it could not 
do so without looking to see who God has determined himself 
to be in the concrete economy. In this sense, the economic 
Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and vice versa. Revelation 
here becomes a systematic necessity, not in the sense that 
God must, as God, pass over into otherness according to the 
logic of his own being, as in the philosophy of Hegel, but 
in the sense that, as it happens, God has chosen to be who 
he is in Jesus Christ, so that the divine being is itself 
contingent upon revelation. Without reference to it, even 
God, as it were, could not know who he is in himself, since 
at the level of the ontology underlying the epistemology, 
he is not who he is without it. In principle, therefore, 
according to this view, God can only be known a posteriori, 
since he is who he is in revelation: God has determined 
himself eternally to be God only in Jesus Christ.46
273
46The argument here can be illuminated by reference to 
M. B. Foster, "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the 
Rise of Modern Natural Science," Mind, 43 (1934), 446-468;
44 (1935), 439-466; 45 (1936), 1-27, a series of articles 
concerning the development of the empirical method in early 
modern science. Foster's argument is that key elements of 
the philosophy of nature underlying the development of the 
modern science of nature stem from the Christian doctrine 
of creation. In ancient Greek science, the intelligibility 
of a natural object, its essence, is formal rather than 
material, or sensible; what is comprehended in the form is 
known a priori as the logos of the object. The 
intelligibility of the object is therefore not derived from 
empirical experience as in modern science; rather, the 
Greek scientist uses the objects of sense experience much 
as a geometrician uses drawn figures as examples. Essences, 
therefore, are comprehended apart from sense experience,
The problem with this conception can best be seen by 
a more detailed comparison with the Trinitarian theology of 
Hegel, to which it is closely related. Hegel too adopts the 
idea of God as actus purus. but again reinterprets it 
completely, moving beyond the Aristotelian metaphysics of 
potentiality and actuality in which it was originally 
located, and understanding it instead in terms of his wider
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even though sense experience may be required initially. 
Foster's argument is that such a science of nature is 
incompatible with a doctrine of creation, on the grounds 
that in the former, essences are intelligible in 
themselves, apart from God, since both form and matter are 
eternal principles, whereas in the latter, form and matter 
are created by divine will. In Greek science, therefore, 
the intelligibility of the world is in principle 
independent of God. Even in the Greek doctrine of the 
Demiurge, which bears the closest superficial resemblance 
of any Greek theological teaching to the doctrine of the 
Creator, the work of the divinity is restricted to the 
uniting of form and matter, and cannot extend to the 
bringing into being of either element. Since the world is 
eternal, its total intelligibility, or its set of all 
possible formal essences, must also be given eternally. In 
the doctrine of creation, on the other hand, both 
creaturely form and matter are temporal and contingent, 
being the product of divine will rather than eternal 
principles in their own right. For this reason, Foster 
argues, the doctrine of creation requires a science of 
nature in which natural objects can only be known by 
empirical observation, since it is only by actually looking 
to see what God has done in creation that what is created 
can be known. The doctrine of creation, therefore, makes an 
empirical science of nature necessary, since a posteriori 
knowledge is the condition of the possibility of 
understanding the contingent, created essences of the 
natural world.
Foster's contention that a Christian doctrine of 
creation requires the contingency of the form of the 
created world, in the sense that it might have been created 
otherwise by sheer fiat, may perhaps be questioned. 
However, once a voluntarist view of creation such as 
Foster's is granted, in which the intelligibility of the 
creation might just as well have been otherwise, the force 
of his position is difficult to resist. The world can no 
longer be said to be intelligible a priori, and empirical 
science becomes necessary. By extension, a similar argument 
can be formulated for the systematic necessity of 
revelation in contemporary Trinitarian theology.
philosophy of subjectivity.47 Barth, clearly, follows Hegel 
in understanding God as actus purus in terms of the 
concrete actuality of his economic outreach. Where Barth 
differs from Hegel most decisively, as we have seen, is in 
his view that this outreach is not the outworking of 
speculative logic, or, as Hegel puts it, of the "inward 
force" of Geist.48 but rather of the existential freedom of 
God in the act of election. This view, however, leads to 
fundamental problems in the Barthian and post-Barthian 
position, inasmuch as the assertion that God chooses to 
redeem his creation involves also the idea that God chooses 
who he himself will be; the denial of any sort of 
identifiable rational imperative lying behind this choice, 
however, means that not only this choice, but also the 
being of God himself is seemingly rendered arbitrary, and 
threatens to reduce to the finitude of its economic 
manifestation.
Hegel's treatment of the Trinity, by contrast, can be 
said to preserve the "absoluteness" of God precisely by
49means of its characteristic claim to rational necessity.
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47Hegel, The Logic of Hegel. § 34, and Hegel, Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion. Ill, pp. 275ff.
^Hegel, The Logic of Hegel. § 34.
49Hegel's understanding of human rationality plays a 
key role in the logic of his treatment of the doctrine of 
the Trinity. It is first of all fundamental to the Hegelian 
philosophy that reason can know the Triune God, precisely 
because God has given himself in history to be known: God, 
in Hegel's famous phrase, is not envious (Hegel, Philosophy
of Mind. § 5 64); in the supreme sense, God is the truth,
which it is the business of thought to grasp (Hegel,
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Ill, p. 246). 
Secondly, the fact that, for Hegel, there are not two kinds 
or reason or spirit, but only one - the divine, in which 
the human shares - is of crucial significance, in that it 
reveals why it is that the truth of the doctrine of the 
Trinity can be known in speculative philosophy. According 
to Hegel, ibid.. I, p. 130., reason is the divine in
humanity: "Human reason, human spiritual consciousness or
consciousness of its own essence, is. reason generally, is 
the divine within humanity. Spirit, in so far as it is
One of Hegel's fundamental presuppositions is that 
philosophical thought presupposes religious consciousness, 
but raises it to philosophical comprehension.50 With respect 
to the doctrine of the Trinity, which is for Hegel the 
fundamental truth posited by the Christian religion, 
Hegel's express thesis is that philosophy (i.e., 
speculative philosophy, his philosophy) grasps the truth of 
the doctrine of the Trinity in its necessity. The doctrine 
of the Trinity is, indeed, for Hegel what is true as such; 
it is the truth of speculative reason, the truth of
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called divine spirit, is not a spirit beyond the stars or 
beyond the world; for God is present, is omnipresent, and 
strictly as spirit is God present in spirit. God is a 
living God who is effective, active and present in spirit. 
Religion is ... not an invention of human beings but an 
effect of the divine at work, of the divine productive 
process within humanity." Thirdly, Hegel understands spirit 
as self-consciousness, as an innermost relation of the self 
to the self. Thus, in all knowing, I am ultimately 
conscious of myself. Hegel does not mean this, however, in 
any solipsistic sense; rather Hegel's position is that the 
structure of all consciousness of truth is one in which 
spirit knows itself. As such, spirit is a self- 
determination in which the self distinguishes itself from 
the self (the objective) but then overcomes this
distinction to arrive at a new unity, in which the two
poles are held together. Self-determination, for Hegel, is 
freedom, being at home with oneself in this sense, and 
freedom, Hegel teaches, is the principle of spirit. The 
"absolute philosophy," therefore, is that philosophy in 
which this principle of freedom has risen to philosophical 
comprehension, the philosophy, in short, in which spirit 
knows itself to be all reality (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 
§§ 572-577) .
50Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. I, pp. 
151-153. In religion, therefore, the truth is already at 
least partially present, and in the "absolute" or 
"consummate" religion, Christianity, the truth is already 
completely present, although in an inadequate form.
Philosophy comprehends the truth of religion in its
necessity, and the absolute philosophy, the truth of 
Christianity in its necessity. Cf. also Hegel, Philosophy 
of Mind. § 573.
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spirit.51 Hegel writes:
God is thus grasped as what he is for 
himself within himself; God [the 
Father] makes himself an object for 
himself (the Son); then, in this 
object, God remains the undivided 
essence within this differentiation of 
himself within himself, and in this 
differentiation of himself loves 
himself, i.e., remains identical with 
himself - this is God as Spirit. Hence 
is we are to speak of God as spirit, 
we must grasp God with this very
definition which exists in the church 
in this childlike mode of 
representation as the relationship 
between father and son - a 
representation that is not yet a matter 
of the concept. Thus it is just this 
definition of God by the church as a
Trinity that is the concrete
determination and nature of God as 
spirit; and spirit is an empty word if 
it is not grasped in this
51Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Ill, 
pp. 276, 279, 289. Hegel's position, as such, involves a
polemic against the theology of the Enlightenment, the 
categories of which are limited to the finite understanding 
(as opposed to speculative reason - the proper domain of 
philosophy - even, implicitly, of the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment), and which consequently holds that while it 
may be possible to know that God is, it is not possible to 
know what God is. According to Hegel, o p . cit.. I, p. 126, 
the rational theology of the Enlightenment thus issued in 
a "negative tendency toward any content at all in regard to 
the nature of God." But Hegel’s position is also, by 
implication, a polemic against the received theological 
standpoint of the medieval world, in which the truth is 
given by revelation and received on the basis of authority. 
Whereas medieval thought surrenders its freedom (the 
freedom it had in pagan philosophy) in order to attain this 
truth, Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to reconcile this 
truth of the doctrine of the Trinity with the reassertion 
of the freedom of thought in modern philosophy. As such, 
Hegel seeks to take us beyond the confines of 
ecclesiastical dogma in order to present the truth in all 
its purity and necessity as self-grounded and self- 




As such, the Trinity is the universal truth of reason -
and, as such, is both the truth in the absolute sense and
the truth of finite spirit in its own sense as well. Or, as 
Hegel puts it, the fundamental idea of the Trinity is also 
the universal idea.53 Whereas the one-sided representation 
of reason in Enlightenment thought lead to a denial of this 
universal idea, and whereas the orthodox Christian 
tradition has resisted it as a universal idea even while 
maintaining its truth vis-à-vis God, Hegel, by contrast, 
stands with, for example, Jacob Boehme in holding that the 
Trinity is in everything and everywhere.
In this context, the question of Hegel's concrete view 
of the relation between the economic and the immanent
Trinity is important. What needs to be repeated here first 
of all is that for Hegel as much as for the theological 
tradition, there could be no question of a rise in thought 
to the immanent were it not for the givenness of the
economic Trinity in revelation.54 For Hegel is quite clear 
that there is nothing in thought which has not first become 
objective to us (at the same time, there is nothing 
objective that is not also a product of thought in the
absolute sense) .55 But this does not answer the question
put, which concerns the relation of the immanent to the 
economic Trinity on the divine side, sub specie
aeternitatis. This is a controversial point in Hegelian
52Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I, pp. 
126-127.
53Ibid. . Ill, p. 289.
54Ibid. . I, pp. 411-412; III, pp. 251-253.
55Hegel, The Logic of Hegel. §§ 6-12.
scholarship,56 since Hegel is often misrepresented as a 
pantheist (a charge which he himself refutes),57 but, as I 
shall attempt to argue, Hegel's position requires that the 
older distinction between the immanent and the economic 
Trinity be clearly maintained.
Characterizing the immanent Trinity in one place, 
Hegel writes that here the act of differentiation issues in 
a relation of God merely to himself, so that the otherness 
posited here by spirit is only "a play of love with itself, 
which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of 
separation and rupture."58 While this is an isolated 
statement, it is nevertheless to be taken seriously (though 
certainly not too seriously, since, as Hegel argues 
elsewhere, the doctrine of the Trinity is concerned with 
the self-unfolding of spirit in itself, while the 
demonstration of its truth is the task of logical 
exposition,59 and certainly logic is not undervalued in the 
Hegelian system). However, the nature of spirit itself is 
such that it must distinguish itself from itself in 
otherness, in order thereby truly to come to unity with 
itself. As the eternal play of love grasped by speculative 
reason, therefore, the immanent Trinity rests within 
itself, but contains already the principle of unity-in- 
difference. The basis of the economic Trinity is thus
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"Hegel's Absolute: Transcendent or Immanent?" The Journal 
of Religion. 56, no. 1 (1976), 61-87; and Min, "The Trinity 
and the Incarnation: Hegel and Classical Approaches," The 
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57Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I, pp. 
374ff. ; and Hegel, Philosophy of Mind. § 573. For a
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Hegel's Concept of God (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1982), pp. 243-282.
58Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Ill,
p. 292.
59Ibid. . p. 290.
already here, for it is an expression of the inner movement 
of spirit itself which leads first of all to the creation 
of finite reality and then to the reconciliation of that 
finite reality to God in Christ and in the Church. In the 
incarnation in particular, God suffers the pain of death in 
order thereby to negate the finitude of the finite, and 
thereby to overcome its otherness and reconcile it to 
himself.60 But since it is a moment within the divine life 
itself to pass over into otherness and then to attain unity 
with itself in that otherness, and so to be self­
determining, this reconciliation of finitude to the divine 
appears as much a divine self-reconciliation as a 
reconciliation of the finite realm to God.
Emil Fackenheim discusses the problem of the immanent 
and the economic Trinity in his study, The Religious 
Dimension in Hegel's Thought, and poses the question 
whether the Trinitarian life "achieves its bliss" by 
indifference to the finite world or by coming to itself 
through the finite. Fackenheim argues that it is only as 
the immanent Trinity and the reconciliation of the finite 
in the Christian revelation are distinguished yet held 
together by the notion of divine love that Hegel's position 
becomes meaningful.61 If the divine were indifferent to the 
finite, and the Trinity rested complete in itself, then the 
story of the divine activity in the world in the Christian 
religion would be merely mythical; on the other hand, 
according to Fackenheim, Hegel holds that a divinity which 
came only to itself through its incursion into the finite 
would not warrant serious consideration from the human 
standpoint.62 Fackenheim argues that it is only by affirming
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the love of God for finite humanity, and thus by preserving 
the distinction between the immanent and the economic 
Trinity through the concept of love, that the dilemma can 
be overcome. The divine love is not merely a self-love; it 
is a genuine love for the other, an inclusion of the other 
into itself, and is thus, in this concrete sense, a 
gratuitous ultimate affirmation of the finite in the 
infinite love of God.
As Fackenheim argues, the point hinges on the extent 
to which the concept of a genuine "otherness" of creation 
is possible within the Hegelian system. God does, for 
Hegel, create an other to himself. Arguably, this other, 
the finite creation, must be granted actual independence if 
the inner logic of spirit is to find fulfilment; already in 
himself, God has an other, which means that here God is 
already in relation to himself and in unity with himself in 
the spirit which is the divine play of love with itself. 
The logic of the position would then be that because 
genuine otherness is posited in creation, any divine 
Trinitarian incursion into this finite realm of genuine 
otherness will be distinct from the immanent level of 
divine being, even though having its basis there.
At the same time, however, it remains the case that in 
Hegel's thought, the moment of economic outreach to that 
other is itself part of the concrete whole apprehended in 
the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus the higher truth is the 
truth of the unity-in-difference of the immanent and the 
economic Trinity, a unity, however, in which the doctrine 
of the immanent Trinity takes definite precedence. It is 
the inner logic of spirit, which is freedom, which leads to 
the creation of the other, and then to the divine 
reconciliation of itself to itself in the other; for Hegel, 
it is this truth precisely which is the ultimate content of
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speculative philosophy.63
To this extent, the Hegelian lineage of much 
contemporary Trinitarian theology is unquestionable. In 
both cases, the Trinity in itself is not what it is without 
the other; being intrinsically open to the creation is held 
to be of the divine essence. Thus the man Jesus Christ 
becomes the crucial locus of Trinitarian theology, as the 
mediator not only between mankind and God, but also, and 
perhaps more significantly, between God and mankind. It is 
in Jesus Christ first of all, and then also, as we have 
seen, in the continuing economic activity of the Spirit of 
Christ, that the openness of God to the creation is 
concretely realized. The Trinity itself, therefore, in both 
cases in a certain precise sense comes to fulfilment, in 
that because the Trinity is in itself orientated to the 
economy, it can not, in the end, be what it is in itself 
without the world.
The implication of this is that in both Hegel and in 
the contemporary Trinitarian theologies surveyed above, the 
Trinity is regarded as essentially knowable.64 According to 
Hegel, the Trinity is the truth of speculative reason, the 
truth in the ultimate sense, which is intrinsically capable 
of being understood. The Trinity has, furthermore, given 
itself to be known in the finite, and, indeed, comes to 
self-consciousness itself through the knowledge thus gained 
in the finite world. In the contemporary Trinitarian 
tradition, similarly, we have encountered the assertion 
that there is no God hiding behind his revelation who is 
unknown and unknowable. What the Trinity is in itself is 
what it is ad extra, and what it is ad extra is also what 
it is in itself.
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Although the two positions thus both maintain that the 
Trinity can be truly known, it is nevertheless in this 
question of the knowledge of the Trinity that the 
differences between the two emerge most clearly. Most 
obviously, perhaps, in recent theology the "Vorstellunaen" 
or images of religious representation are still employed, 
to the extent that finite economic events are taken to be 
adequate to the problem of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Unlike Hegel, contemporary Trinitarian theology makes no 
attempt to apprehend the truth of revelation, i.e., of the 
Trinity, in its logical necessity. For Hegel, on the other 
hand, such a step is necessary in speculative philosophy, 
and therefore constitutes an essential element in the 
overall systematic philosophical perspective from which 
alone the detailed treatment of the Trinity provided can be 
understood.65 In the transition from religious consciousness 
to speculative philosophy, Hegel argues, the religious form 
of consciousness with its concrete, objective apprehension 
of the truth of spirit as alien to the self must be left 
behind so that, in particular, consciousness can know its 
content as none other than itself, i.e., so that 
consciousness becomes self-consciousness and so that the 
form and content of consciousness can be identical and be 
known to be such.66 Thus, for Hegel, in knowing the Trinity 
in its necessity in speculative philosophy we know also 
that we participate in the Trinity and that the Trinity 
knows itself through us: spirit, in the absolute
philosophy, knows itself to be all reality in this precise 
sense. In this form of consciousness, the time-bound 
Vorstellunaen of religious representation are taken up and 
transcended in the speculative necessity of the self­
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Contemporary Trinitarian theologies which affirm the 
identity of the economic and the immanent Trinity, on the 
other hand, apprehend the truth of the doctrine of the 
Trinity as a sheer datum, as something given in the
facticity of revelation itself. It is for this reason above 
all that the language of religious representation is 
sustained; here, in contemporary theology, the form is 
already adequate to the content, since the Trinity in
itself is none other than the Trinity ad extra. While this 
approach has the possible advantage of taking with utter 
seriousness the actual revelatory content of the economy of 
salvation, it also leads directly to many of the
characteristic weaknesses of the contemporary approach to 
Trinitarian theology which we have already seen. These 
relate, not simply to theological epistemology, but also to 
what is actually affirmed of the Trinity in the ontological 
sense in particular theological propositions.
First of all, the givenness of the content of
Trinitarian theology means that confusions about what is in 
fact given or revealed can easily arise. Once the economy 
becomes the source and content of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, the de facto unsystematic character of the 
economic basis poses enormous problems for an attempt at a 
systematic treatment. This can be seen from the four models 
discussed in the previous Chapter, all of which appeal 
directly to the content of the economy of salvation, but 
none of which is strictly consistent with the rest. I shall 
return to this question shortly in the next section. 
Secondly, the tendency of contemporary theologians from 
Barth onwards to adopt the Hegelian idea that God opens 
himself to the world, without, however, adopting the 
underlying Hegelian logic of freedom, leads to the idea of 
the sheer original free choice of God to be self­
determining only in relation to the world. Such an idea of 
the divine choice, however, necessarily raises the question
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whether God might not, in principle, have chosen something 
else and so have determined himself, in his own intrinsic 
essence, to be something else.
This is a weakness that has already been developed in 
some detail in connection with Barth's doctrine of 
election, but it applies, by implication, to later
adaptations of that doctrine. The problem is that in this 
way, the finitude of the economic aspect of the unity-in- 
difference of the economic and immanent Trinity comes to 
prominence. In Hegel's own philosophy, there is no danger 
of this, for the simple reason that the whole is
apprehended from the ultimate standpoint of speculative 
reason, in intention at least, in its rational necessity. 
In Hegel, in fact, the danger is that the contingent world 
is conceived too closely as an outworking of the logic of 
divinity (or spirit), to the extent that the finite world 
can effectively appear to be divinized.67 The problem 
involved in contemporary Trinitarian theology, on the other 
hand, is precisely the converse: here the divine appears 
to be in danger of being "finitized," rather than the 
finite divinized, as, without the logical necessity of a 
divine outreach, and in view of the total givenness of God 
in revelation, the very finitude of the mode of God's
givenness in revelation intrudes upon the being of God in 
himself. The result is a doctrine of immanent Trinitarian 
suffering and temporality, in which, admittedly, the 
immanent Trinity is the ground of the economic, but in 
which also, in the end, the proper distinction between the 
two, whereby the infinite freedom proper to the immanent 
Trinity is preserved, and whereby the finite freedom proper 
to the sphere of the economy of salvation is understood as 
secondary and derivative, is not maintained with sufficient 
clarity.
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this reading of it, is not of pantheism, as is often 
alleged, but of acosmism.
The basic problem associated with the contemporary 
tradition of Trinitarian theology would appear to lie, 
therefore, in the immediate appeal to the economy of 
salvation, the presupposition of which, as we have seen 
repeatedly, is that the triune God is who he is in his 
revelation. A theology building on this foundation, 
however, is in principle unable adequately to distinguish 
the immanent Trinity from the economic. Whereas in the 
Hegelian position, for example, the economic Trinity can be 
regarded from the standpoint of an immanent Trinitarianism 
to be distinct and derivative, and yet to be one with the 
immanent in a speculative unity, contemporary dialectical 
Trinitarianism apprehends the unity-in-difference of 
immanent and economic Trinity to be given in the pure 
particularity of the mode of revelation. The result, 
however, is that the freedom of the immanent Trinity and 
the whole immanent life of the Trinity, which is thus 
asserted to be truly known, is rendered finite, like the 
economic starting-point.
The ontological problem involved here could, in 
principle, be pursued at great length. The question arises, 
however, whether or not such a position can be sustained, 
not simply from the point of view of theological ontology, 
but from the point of view of the very economy of salvation 
itself. To what extent, in other words, does the latter 
lend itself to the contemporary Trinitarian thesis? Already 
above, it has been noted that the unsystematic character of 
the economic basis of contemporary Trinitarian theology 
poses specific problems for the attempt to develop a 
systematic Trinitarian conception. This is the question to 
be taken up in the next section, where again the idea of 
the unity-in-difference of the economic and the immanent 
Trinity will be in view. Such an approach from the economy 
of salvation is also in keeping with the character of 
contemporary Trinitarian theology as, in intention at 
least, representing a turn to the economy of salvation. To
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this extent, indeed, by questioning the approach of 
contemporary Trinitarian theology to the economy, we not 
only question its more problematic ontological 
implications, but the very reorientation of Trinitarian 
theology to revelation on which the position as a whole 
claims to rest.
2. The Problem of Economic Diversity
If the first and basic problem in contemporary
Trinitarian theology concerns the idea of the unity of the
economic with the immanent Trinity, then the second
concerns the economic starting-point from which particular 
systematic Trinitarian conceptions are developed. In 
Chapter III, four distinct models of Trinitarian
Pneumatology were discussed, all of which presuppose the 
general idea of economic-immanent Trinitarian identity, and 
all of which are ostensibly developed from the economy of 
salvation. The four models, however, themselves show how 
varied the economic Trinitarian taxis is, and how many 
paradigms in the economy are available, in principle, for 
development. This reflects a fundamental problem in 
Trinitarian thought, the sheer diversity, not only of the 
possible Trinitarian interpretations to which the economy 
of salvation is susceptible, but of the actual economic 
basis of Trinitarian theology itself.
Although this diversity can be enriching from the 
standpoint of Christian spirituality, the range of economic 
themes in question presents a considerable challenge to the 
attempt to formulate a systematic Trinitarian conception. 
In the theological tradition, for example, conflicting 
views of the Trinitarian taxis can thus emerge, despite the 
relatively stable Trinitarian conception developed in the 
classical Creeds, all of which can appeal for support to
different aspects of the economy of salvation.68 As we have 
seen, much of the controversy surrounding the procession 
of the Holy Spirit in the history of theology derives from 
ambiguities inherent in the biblical witness, ambiguities 
reflected also in the wider spiritual and theological
69tradition.
To the extent that the unity of the economic with the 
immanent Trinity is explicitly affirmed in contemporary 
Trinitarian theology, however, the difficulties which arise
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6ftThree examples can be cited briefly. First, there is 
the Trinitarian taxis of Father -* Spirit - Son, which is 
indebted to the biblical, messianic tradition of the 
synoptic gospels. Excluding the adoptionists, the chief 
theological representatives of this position include the 
Syrian Fathers Aphraates and Ephrem (W. Cranmer, Der Geist 
Gottes und des Menschen in frühsvrischer Theologie 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1979), and, as recent ecumenical
research has shown, the medieval Byzantine writers Gregory 
of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas (Staniloae, o p . cit.. and 
Markos A. Orphanos, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit 
According to Certain of the Later Greek Fathers," in 
Commission on Faith and Order, Spirit of God. Spirit of 
Christ, pp. 21-45). Secondly, there is the more familiar 
Trinitarian taxis of Father - Son - Spirit, which on the 
whole predominates in Eastern Christian theology and which 
also has important Western advocates. The paradigm here is 
clearly derived in part from the Middle and Neo-Platonic 
traditions, but also gains support from those biblical 
texts which speak of the Son as mediator and giver of the 
Holy Spirit. The third paradigm is that of the Western 
filioquist tradition, which is more difficult to represent 
schematically, but in which the Father and the Son together 
breathe forth the Spirit as their common bond of love. Here 
the Augustinian psychological analogy is undoubtedly of 
fundamental importance, but the paradigm depends also on 
various New Testament texts which associate love and unity 
with the Holy Spirit.
69The various spiritual, liturgical, and theological 
traditions which appear in the wider history of the 
Christian Church once again represent different economic 
conceptions, and potentially different starting-points for 
theologies of the Trinity. Recently Yves Congar, op. cit., 
I, pp. 65-173, and Louis Bouyer, Le Consolateur (Paris: Les 
Éditions du Cerf, 1980), pp. 61-336, have provided 
extensive surveys of the Pneumatological tradition from 
this point of view.
from the diversity of this economic material are clearly 
intensified. Since the doctrine of the Trinity here becomes 
a quite literal development of the idea that the Trinity in 
itself is none other than what it is economically, the 
question of its economic basis obviously becomes of 
fundamental importance. As we have seen, the diversity here 
has yielded a number of mutually inconsistent Trinitarian 
positions in contemporary theology. Moreover, since the 
relations between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as given in 
the economy do clearly differ and even conflict, it is 
difficult to see how, in principle, such a result can be 
avoided on the basis of the contemporary Trinitarian 
thesis.
The question which we have to address, therefore, is 
how the diversity of the economy can be reconciled with a 
systematic conception of the Trinity. Such a systematic 
conception must by definition be self-consistent over 
against the apparently self-contradictory character of its 
economic basis. The problem is thus a matter of reconciling 
diversity with unity. Three possible responses to this 
problem emerge from the theologies encountered in earlier 
Chapters. The first is to attempt to deny the inconsistency 
of the original body of economic data by treating the 
various economic paradigms in question as stages in an 
overall development. The second is to attempt to argue that 
the contradictory nature of the economic data must be 
presupposed, but that the differing data must be understood 
in a way which does not grant equal importance to its
separate elements. In either case, the attempt is to 
qualify the diversity of the economy, although the first 
approach does so more radically than the second. The third 
is to attempt to qualify the idea of the unity of the
economic with the immanent Trinity itself in such a way
that the diversity of the economic basis can no longer pose 
a threat to the development of a systematic conception. It 
is this third approach, I shall argue, which offers the
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most persuasive alternative.
The first approach, of course, is that taken by 
Moltmann, while the second is typified by Jungel in his 
"atonement" model of the Trinity, and, to a lesser extent, 
in the "revealedness" and "anointing" models of Barth and 
theologians such as Kasper respectively. Of the first two 
approaches, the second is the only one worth taking very 
seriously, since the attempt to unify the economic data in 
themselves in a single development, as in Moltmann's 
theology, rests on questionable exegetical and theological 
foundations. In Chapter III, I have already provided a 
critique of Moltmann's position, so that there is no need 
here to repeat criticisms already made. Briefly, however, 
there is no doubt that such a procedure in this case might 
be possible, if the economic data in question were 
susceptible to such a synthesis. One decisive 
consideration, however, counts against this view. 
Historical-critical study has shown that while some New 
Testament documents did directly influence the development 
of others (for example, the compilers of Matthew and Luke 
knew Mark) , the broad traditions of thought in the New 
Testament were developed for the most part in isolation. 
Thus, for example, Paul, with one or two possible 
exceptions, apparently did not know the material 
represented in the synoptic narratives. For this reason, it 
is necessary to understand the different streams of 
tradition as representing different theologies, within 
certain limits, of course, since for the most part they 
were not written with the others in view.70 The question of
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Themes. trans. W. J. Montague (London: SCM Press Ltd,
1964), pp. 95-107. Käsemann writes, ibid.. p. 103: "We now 
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theological positions in primitive Christianity (a 
phenomenon going beyond the horizon of the New Testament); 
(c) the incompatibility between some of these
the mutual compatibility of these traditions belongs to a 
later stage of the formation of the New Testament, that of 
the establishment of the canon. The variety of the 
theologies represented in the canonical documents is a 
problem of this second formative stage, but not of the 
stage of writing. We must therefore assume that the 
different theologies of, for example, Paul and the 
synoptists, is a basic feature of the original documents 
and therefore irreducible.
Not only, therefore, must we judge that the different 
New Testament traditions cannot be unified artificially in 
a single "Trinitarian history of God," but also that the 
attempt to do so does violence to their own proper 
significance. One has to ask, in fact, if it is not an 
uncritical a priori presupposition concerning the unity of 
the economic and the immanent Trinity, rather than the 
economic data themselves, which has resulted in this 
economic synthesis. In practice, therefore, the thesis that 
the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa 
appears in this case to militate against its original 
intention, which was to relate Trinitarian theology 
directly to the economy, and to allow the internal dynamic 
of the latter to shape the form and content of the former. 
Instead, in this approach to the diverse economic basis, 
quite the opposite occurs.
A stronger case can be made for the second approach, 
which can be said in general to arise from a theological 
assessment of the relative theological significance of 
different aspects of the broader economy of salvation, and 
an appropriation into Trinitarian Pneumatology of those 
deemed to be of central importance. Here, however, one must 
still pose the question on what grounds the choice of the 
central economic paradigm is made, and whether or not the
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positions...." Kasemann concludes that the New Testament 
canon does not constitute a basis for theological unity, 
but rather for theological pluralism.
resulting restriction of economic Trinitarian taxis can be 
justified. The problem, as we have seen, is that the 
biblical economy represents the relations between Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit in differing ways. If, therefore, we 
attempt in some sense to relativize this diversity, we 
appear to contradict the initial purpose of the turn to the 
economy, which was precisely to ground the doctrine of the 
Trinity more fully in it.
In the theological tradition, the difficulties which 
arise from the diversity of the economy are not so severe; 
since the idea of the unity of the economic and the 
immanent Trinity in the contemporary sense is not asserted, 
the problem of the diversity of the economic basis can be 
said from the beginning to pose no immediate threat to the 
unity of the Trinity. Moreover, because the immanent 
Trinity is by definition hedged about with apophatic 
qualifications, the various concrete Trinitarian theologies 
which appear in the tradition are arguably to be seen less 
as contradictory representations of the Trinity than as 
competing images of an ultimately hidden mystery.
More importantly, perhaps, the traditional 
understanding of the fundamental economic event of 
revelation in Jesus Christ, mediated through the 
Chalcedonian two natures doctrine, makes it possible to 
deny that every aspect of the economy needs to be taken up 
into Trinitarian theology in the first place. On the basis 
of the two natures doctrine, for example, one can logically 
argue that Christ received the Spirit in his human nature, 
but gives the Spirit in his divine nature, just as he 
suffered on the cross as the incarnate Son of God, and 
therefore in his human nature, but was and is strictly 
impassible in his divine nature. The idea that one can thus 
begin with an economic distinction between what refers to 
the relation between the divine nature of Christ and the 
Holy Spirit and between his human nature and the Spirit can 
serve as a useful tool in resolving the theological problem
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of the diversity of the economy. The problem here is a 
relative loss of the unity of Jesus Christ rather than of 
the doctrine of the Trinity, as the varied aspects of the 
economy are to be referred to the two natures of Christ 
rather than to the Trinity itself.
The latter strategy is employed at times by, for
example, Karl Barth among recent Trinitarian theologians.
Thus, in his treatment of the conception of Jesus by the
Holy Spirit in Church Dogmatics 1/2, Barth argues that just
as it is only through the activity of the Spirit that men
and women believe, so the work of the Spirit in the
conception of Jesus is to be understood as miraculously
enabling human nature to be assumed by the Word.71 The role
of the Holy Spirit in the conception of Jesus is to make it
possible for the humanity to be there for the Word when the
Word becomes flesh: the Word works in the work of the
Spirit to unite the humanity with himself. In this sense,
Barth writes, "The very possibility of human nature’s being
adopted into unity with the Son of God is the Holy Ghost.
... Through the Spirit it becomes really possible for the
72creature, for man, to be there and to be free for God." 
The role of the Holy Spirit as active in relation to Christ 
is thus restricted by Barth to the human nature assumed by 
the Word in the incarnation.
In Church Dogmatics 1/1, the same point is made even 
more clearly; Barth asks here, in connection with his 
defence of the filioaue. if the fact that Jesus can be said 
in some sense to have received the Spirit at his 
conception, baptism, and resurrection indicates that an 
innertrinitarian relation between the Holy Spirit and the 
Son, which is neither begetting nor procession, should be
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postulated.73 Barth's response is again that because the 
Spirit's work here is related to the human nature of Christ 
and to its assumption by the Word, it is relevant only to 
our adoption as children of God, rather than being directly 
revelatory of an eternal work of the Spirit on the Son of 
God himself.
It is questionable, however, how far Barth's doctrine 
of election, consistently thought through, can be 
reconciled with this earlier conception; as we have seen, 
the idea that there is no Logos asarkos makes the attempt 
to distinguish in this way between the human and divine 
natures of Christ problematic. Barth, of course, did not 
formally abandon the two natures doctrine after developing 
his doctrine of election. On the contrary, as late as 
Church Dogmatics IV/2, Barth maintains that the 
Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures of Christ must be 
affirmed: the divine and human natures are on the one hand 
without confusion or change, and on the other without 
division or separation.74 At the same time, however, though 
only with reference to the latter, he writes:
We do not have here a divine and 
eternal and heavenly Christ who is not 
wholly of human essence, nor a human 
and temporal and earthly Jesus who is 
not wholly of divine. We do not have 
here a dual, but the one Jesus Christ, 
who is as such of both divine and human 
essence, and therefore the one 
Reconciler, Saviour and Lord. He pre­
existed as such in the divine counsel.
He was born and lived and died as 
such.
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Barth's reference to the doctrine of election here raises 
the question how the divine and human natures can indeed be 
ultimately separated; if Jesus Christ is the eternal man 
in Barth's sense, then the human nature properly belongs to 
his divinity, according to the eternal divine choice, and 
is not simply an "extra" assumed externally. If this is the 
case, however, then it is difficult to see how the whole 
range of human experience, including his experience of the 
Spirit and finally his suffering and death, does not belong 
to his intrinsic being as the eternal Son of God, and so to 
the doctrine of the Trinity.
The issue in fact turns upon the sense in which one 
understands the unity of the economic with the immanent 
Trinity, which is, in a sense, what is at stake in the 
doctrine of election. In Barth's own theology, as we have 
seen, this is a somewhat controversial point, but in 
subsequent Trinitarian theology, the issue becomes very 
clear indeed. The problem is that the older form of 
Christological dualism represented by the two natures 
doctrine is held in check by the idea of the unity of the 
economic with the immanent Trinity; indeed, the more the 
latter unity is emphasized, the less the former duality can 
be maintained.
In Rahner's theology, for example, the immediate 
Christological extension of his Trinitarian Grundaxiom is 
the affirmation of a "more essential and more intimate" 
relation between the divine and human natures of Christ 
than was previously posited in the tradition.76 In
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76Rahner, The Trinity, pp. 32-33: 'Human nature in
general is a possible object of the creative power and 
knowledge of God, because and insofar as the Logos is by 
nature the one who is "utterable" (even into that which is 
not God); because he is the Father's Word, in which the 
Father can express himself, and, freely, empty himself into 
the non-divine; because, when this happens, that precisely 
is born which we call human nature. In other words, human 
nature is not a mask ... assumed from without, from behind 
which the Logos hides to act things out in the world. From 
the start it is the constitutive, real symbol of the Logos
subsequent theology, this thesis is developed further; 
according to Moltmann in The Crucified God, for example, a 
Trinitarian theology of the cross must abandon the doctrine 
of the two natures altogether in order to avoid evacuating 
the cross of deity.77 Moltmann, probably correctly, 
understands the doctrine of the two natures as interpreted 
in the context of the problem of the suffering of Jesus to 
be a function of the doctrine of divine aoatheia. According 
to Moltmann, however, if we take our concept of God from 
the event of the cross, the suffering of God on the cross 
becomes essential to a Trinitarian doctrine of God:
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...if one begins by leaving on one side 
any concept of God which is already 
presupposed and taken from metaphysics, 
one must speak of the one whom Jesus 
called 'Father' and in respect of whom 
he understood himself as 'the Son'. ... 
What is in question in the relationship 
between Christ and his Father is not 
his divinity and humanity and their 
relationship to one another but the 
total, personal aspect of the Sonship 
of Jesus. This starting point is not 
the same as that to be found in the 
tradition. It overcomes the dichotomy 
between immanent and economic Trinity, 
and that between the nature of God and7 Qhis inner tri-unity.
Although Hill argues that Moltmann here sets aside the 
doctrine of the hypostatic union,79 Moltmann's position is 
perhaps better understood as a Trinitarian intensification 
of the doctrine of the hypostatic union: because the
himself. So that we may and should say, when we think our 
ontology through to the end: man is possible because the 
exteriorization of the Logos is possible.1
^Moltmann, The Crucified God, p. 245.
78Ibid.
79Hill, oo. cit. , pp. 169-170.
economic Trinity "is" the immanent Trinity, and vice versa, 
the human nature of Christ "is" his divine nature, and vice 
versa. Moltmann1s point is not to deny the divinity, but to 
affirm its unity with the humanity, on the basis of his 
understanding of the unity of the economic and the immanent 
Trinity. We have, likewise, seen the same broad argument 
put explicitly by David Coffey, for example, in Chapter III 
in connection with the anointing model, while Jiingel's 
position could be similarly understood on the basis of his 
more explicit adaptation of Barth's doctrine of election.
The problematic nature of the two natures doctrine in 
face of the idea of the unity of the economic with the 
immanent Trinity means that another way must be found to 
reconcile the diversity of the economic basis with the 
unity of the Trinity. One could, for example, attempt to 
reconcile the two by effectively restricting consideration 
to a single consistent economic Trinitarian taxis. The one­
sidedness of Barth's revealedness model might even be 
mentioned in this context, despite his adoption of the two 
natures doctrine, since in Barth's theology the idea of the 
outpouring of the Spirit who bears witness to Christ after 
the resurrection and ascension does appear in the end, as 
Rosato maintains, to be isolated from the total work of the 
Spirit in the economy. More clearly, perhaps, Jiingel's 
Trinitarian Pneumatology is based on a procedure in which 
everything is made to rest on the event of the cross.
In either case, the approach is to exclude certain 
aspects of the wider potential economic basis of a 
Trinitarian Pneumatology, in favour of a single aspect, 
which is then taken to constitute the economic foundation 
required for subsequent development. There can be little 
doubt, of course, that given the original economic 
restriction, a coherent view of the Trinity can thus be 
generated. This, however, is precisely the problem, for the 
fact that the various Trinitarian positions which can thus 
be developed are equally dependent on the economy and at
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once in themselves complete and mutually exclusive means 
that the question of the basis of the original economic 
restriction must be raised.
Excluding the two natures doctrine, it is clear that 
there are both theological and, to a lesser extent, 
historical grounds for some such restriction of the 
relevant economic data. It is possible, first of all, to 
speak of an internal canon in the scriptures themselves 
which raises certain theological themes to prominence.80 The 
idea of the covenant has been developed in this way as the 
central theme of the Old Testament by Walther Eichrodt,81 
while the death of Christ can arguably be said to be the 
centre of the New Testament, as, for example, Jungel 
maintains. This could be argued on grounds internal to 
scripture, for example on the basis of such Pauline texts 
as 1 Cor. 1: 18ff., which speaks of the centrality of the 
cross, or in keeping with a more general theological thesis 
concerning the atonement. Alternatively, either on the 
basis of the Fourth Gospel or on various theological and 
philosophical grounds, the incarnation might be posited as 
the central economic event, the total economy of salvation 
being sustainable only if it is accepted as of primary 
significance. A number of other alternatives, such as the 
idea of the kingdom of God, as in Moltmann's overall 
theology and in some forms of liberation theology, are also 
possible, on similar grounds.
The limitation of this approach is that the judgment 
as to what the centre of the economy of salvation is can 
always be disputed; indeed, as we have seen, there is an 
internal debate about this in scripture itself. Clearly, 
certain definite conclusions can be reached, such as that 
the fact that Jesus might have slept or ate at such and
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80James D. G. Dunn, Unitv and Diversity in the New
Testament (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1977), pp. 374-376.
81Eichrodt, oo. cit.
such a time, or that he lived for so many years, is of no 
particular significance over against the fact that he was 
crucified under Pontius Pilate and the claim that he was
opraised from the dead. In the wider sense as well, some of 
the more searching passages from Paul or the parables of 
Jesus must be taken more seriously than, let us say, the 
apocalyptic expectations peculiar to Jude. However, more 
weighty questions of biblical interpretation and Christian 
theology such as how one reconciles the teaching of Jesus 
and of Paul, or the Christologies of the synoptics and of 
John, are destined to be matters of permanent dispute. In 
this sense, the supposed simplicity of the turn to the 
economy which characterizes contemporary approaches to the 
doctrine of the Trinity appears merely superficial, 
particularly in view of the fact that, in its inception, 
the doctrine of the Trinity developed over a long period of 
time out of complex biblical, theological, and 
philosophical considerations.
A second possible justification for this approach 
would be the search for what is historically most 
primitive, on the grounds that what is closest to the 
original revelatory Christ-event should serve as the 
foundation for subsequent theology. Thus, for example, the 
search for the iosissima verba of Jesus, or again for the 
"Christology" of Jesus himself or of the earliest Christian 
community, could be conceived as a way out of the dilemma 
of economic diversity. It might be argued, therefore, that 
the Jesus of the synoptics, who is more the Jesus of living 
memory, rather than the Pauline or Johannine Jesus of 
theological interpretation, should serve as the foundation 
for Christology, and thus, for example, that the original 
preaching of the kingdom is of primary theological 
importance. The weakness of this approach, however, is
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8zDavid F. Wright, " 'Incidentalism' in theology - or a 
theology for thirty-year-olds," Themelios, 11 (1986), pp.
88-90.
again obvious: what is later historically cannot be taken 
a priori, as it were, to be less adequate theologically or 
even, necessarily, less accurate historically.
By way of summary, let us take the case of the 
crucifixion of Jesus, where there is no doubt that we are 
concerned with something more theologically central and 
more historically certain than, for example, his conception 
by the Holy Spirit. On both grounds, it would be plausible 
to argue that as an economic basis for Trinitarian 
theology, the former must take precedence over the latter. 
The problem, however, arises in connection with the idea of 
the unity of the economic with the immanent Trinity, on the 
basis of which one would apparently have to insist not only 
that the economic basis be prioritized in this way, but 
that those economic paradigms which conflict with the one 
chosen be effectively excluded from consideration. This 
appears to be necessary for the simple reason that all the 
relevant economic paradigms, taken in themselves, are 
susceptible to Trinitarian development, and as we have 
seen, with mutually inconsistent results. From the economic 
starting-point, therefore, not simply one doctrine of the 
Trinity can, in principle, result, but a number of distinct 
doctrines of the Trinity.
Such a restriction of the relevant economic material 
is certainly possible, as we have seen, but in practice, 
the result of this procedure again appears to thwart the 
original purpose of the turn to the economy in contemporary 
Trinitarian theology. Whereas the intention here was to 
relate the content of the doctrine of the Trinity more 
explicitly and immediately to the economy of salvation, the 
cost of the methodology involved appears to be a selective 
focus on one aspect of the economy and an effective 
exclusion of the rest. This results in what must appear as 
a rather arbitrary restriction of the economic material in 
relation to which the Trinitarian theology in view was 
originally intended to be developed.
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The only way which appears to offer an escape from 
this dilemma is the third possible approach mentioned at 
the outset, which represents a more minor tendency in 
contemporary Trinitarian theology to loosen the relation 
between the economic and the immanent Trinity by 
emphasizing the distinction of the two even in their unity. 
This tendency is particularly associated with the positions 
of Roman Catholic theologians such as Kasper, Lafont, and 
Congar, although it also appears, as we shall see, in Barth 
(though undifferentiated from his doctrine of election), 
and cannot be taken to be foreign, in itself, to Protestant 
theology. With reference to Rahner’s axiom as the rallying 
cry of contemporary Trinitarian theologians, for example, 
one commentator has recently written:
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Interpreters of [Rahner's axiom] have 
tended to divide into two camps: those 
who believe in a strong identity of 
immanent and economic Trinity and those 
who would qualify that identity by 
positing a prior actuality of the 
immanent Trinity. Moltmann [and] Jiingel 
... seem to hold to the strong sense of 
the identity. That is, each in his own 
way represents the innertrinitarian 
life of God as a salvation-historical 
process. ... Kasper holds to a weaker 
sense of the identity in The God of 
Jesus Christ. While agreeing that the 
economy of salvation must not be seen 
as merely a temporal manifestation of 
an eternal and immutable immanent 
Trinity, he wishes to avoid the 
opposite misinterpretation which would 
dissolve the immanent Trinity in the 
economic Trinity....
This passage recognizes a distinction between two basic 
senses in which the idea of the unity of the economic with
830lson, "Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Doctrine of the
Trinity," pp. 197-198, referring to Kasper, The God of
Jesus Christ, p. 276.
the immanent Trinity has been affirmed, although perhaps 
the language of a "strong" versus a "weak" identity of the 
economic and the immanent Trinity is too imprecise.
Balthasar's development of the idea of "Trinitarian 
inversion" is particularly important in this context. 
Balthasar's thesis is that the "inversions" of Trinitarian 
taxis seen in the economy of salvation are only economic, 
and to that extent apparent, in that the conflicting 
economic paradigms in question are explicable in terms of 
the deeper and eternal innertrinitarian taxis. An attempt 
is thus made to refer particular events in or aspects of 
the economy of salvation to different aspects of 
Trinitarian doctrine. Thus, for Balthasar, the fact that 
the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of both Son and Father 
explains how Jesus Christ can be both active and passive in 
relation to the Spirit. His argument, however, depends upon 
the presupposition that the unity between the economic and 
the immanent Trinity does not obliterate their clear 
distinction, and that the immanent Trinity in particular is 
not to be too closely identified with the content of 
revelation. As we have seen, Balthasar himself makes the 
point that in his theology, not every aspect of the economy 
can be taken in and of itself to have an immanent 
Trinitarian referent; rather, we catch merely a glimpse of 
the hidden depths of the immanent Trinity in the economy, 
so that the economy of salvation must not only be taken as 
a whole, in its various differentiated moments, but so that 
the economic Trinity must also be taken as the Trinity by 
way of kenosis. accommodating itself out of love to 
creaturely need.
Balthasar's approach assumes that the economic data 
are varied, that they can neither be artificially unified 
or reduced in number, and yet that the Trinity is truly 
revealed. The various aspects of the economic activity of 
the Spirit must all be susceptible to Trinitarian 
development, therefore, if the economic Trinity is the
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immanent Trinity, and must at the same time be susceptible 
to development into a single theology of the Trinity, 
without thereby relativizing their own proper differences. 
Balthasar's approach in his theology of the Trinitarian 
inversions thus begins with the whole body of economic data 
and constructs a Trinitarian theology to interpret those 
data. In this sense, it reflects a more genuine concern for 
the whole of the diverse content of the economy than do the 
approaches discussed above.
What this approach also implies, however, is a certain 
loosening of the relation between the economic and the 
immanent Trinity. It could be said that there is indeed 
here a clear and close relation of identity between the 
economic and immanent Trinity, but a relation which is best 
understood as analogical, according to the traditional 
theological conception, and which thus lays emphasis upon 
their unitv-in-difference. rather than as a radical 
sublation of distinction through the idea that the Trinity 
in itself is what it is in the economy as such. Analogy, in 
short, can be defined as a method of predication in which 
concepts relating to something known are referred to 
something relatively unknown, on the basis of some
84presupposed similarity between the two objects. In 
Balthasar's theology, the attempt is to unite the two in 
their distinction without, at the same time, relativizing 
that distinction, by positing as the principle of their 
unity the analogical principle of proportionality, or of
Orproportional similarity.
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MOn the history of the idea of analogy and its 
theological use, see Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between 
God and the World (Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln 
and Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1953), passim.
85Hans Urs von Balthasar, Elucidations. trans. John 
Riches (London: SPCK, 1975), pp. 18-25; also in Balthasar, 
The Von Balthasar Reader, ed. Medard Kehl and Werner Löser; 
trans. Robert J. Daly and Fred Lawrence (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1982), pp. 181-187.
From this point of view, Rahner's axiom can be 
understood to assert that "the economic Trinity contains, 
in a mode appropriate to its representation in the created 
order, the reality of the heavenly, or immanent Trinity," 
and, in a corresponding sense, that "the immanent Trinity 
is the reality contained in the economic." The idea of the 
unity of the economic and the immanent Trinity can thus be 
understood as an attempt to formulate the thesis that the 
divine mystery is indeed disclosed to us in Jesus, without 
at the same time minimizing the importance or the reality 
of the kenotic mode under which that mystery is given in 
Jesus. The mystery, in this case, would be disclosed, but 
not completely disclosed. It is for this reason, and only 
for this reason, that any particular aspect of the economy 
does not in and of itself have to contain the whole of the 
Trinitarian mystery; not only do the separate moments of 
the economy not contain the whole of that mystery, but 
neither even does the economy as a whole.
I have already indicated that this is the position 
assumed by a number of other contemporary Roman Catholic 
theologians vis-à-vis Rahner's axiom. It is, clearly, a 
fairly traditional view, which rests on the idea that the 
immanent Trinity is at once to be differentiated from the 
economic, and yet that it is a mystery which is disclosed 
to us - though only by way of kenosis - in the economic. It 
is also significant that although the implications of 
Barth's doctrine of election are ultimately inconsistent 
with such an analogical view, it is nevertheless the 
position he adopts in Church Dogmatics II/l in his 
discussion of the "primary" and "secondary objectivity" of 
God, which in fact prefaces his discussion of election in 
Church Dogmatics II/2.86 This distinction arises in the 
course of a discussion of the reality of the Church’s 
knowledge of God in faith, which is the presupposition of
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86Barth, op . cit. , II/l, pp. 16ff.
theological discourse according to Barth's understanding of 
Anselm's central theological principle of faith seeking 
understanding. In the revelatory act of God on which faith 
and, out of faith, Christian dogmatics, is based, God 
objectifies himself to us in such a way as to reveal 
himself as the loving God who demands the obedience of 
faith as our response to his self-revelation.
It is this presupposed reality of the knowledge of God 
in faith which raises the further theological question of 
the nature of the knowledge of God thus given. The problem 
Barth addresses is how the mediate knowledge of God, given 
through those finite events and objects in history by which 
God has chosen to reveal himself, represents a true
Q Jknowledge of God. It is here that the distinction between 
the "primary" and "secondary" divine objectivity is 
introduced. Barth maintains that God's givenness to us in 
revelation, his secondary objectivity, cannot be understood 
to be identical with God in himself because of the 
introduction of creaturely reality into his secondary 
objectivity in revelation:
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We call this the primary objectivity of 
God, and distinguish it from the 
secondary, i.e., the objectivity which 
He has for us too in His revelation, in 
which He gives Himself to be known by 
us as He knows Himself. It is 
distinguished from the primary 
objectivity, not by a lesser degree of 
truth, but by its particular form 
suitable for us, the creature. God is 
objectively immediate to Himself, but 
to us He is objectively mediate. That 
is to say, He is not objective directly 
but indirectly, not in the naked sense 
but clothed under the sign and veil of 
other objects different from Himself.
87Ibid. , p . 16.
^ Ibid.
Nevertheless, as Barth says, "His secondary objectivity is 
fully true, for it has its correspondence and basis in His
, agprimary obDectivity."oy Barth proceeds to argue that the 
principle of the "correspondence" in question here is a 
sacramental one: God gives Himself to be known by men and 
women "in, with, and under" the finite objects which serve 
as the vehicles of his self revelation.90
This sacramental correspondence is itself, for Barth, 
rooted in and based on the act of God in revealing
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90 Ibid. , p. 52. Reference might also be made at this 
point to the idea of Christ as the "primordial sacrament" 
of God in recent theology: he is the "exegesis" (Jn. 1: 18) 
of the Father, in flesh, both as a visible sign of grace 
and as the reality of that grace itself (to which our own 
sacraments in the narrower sense point back). The word
"sacramental," as we have seen, is used in this sense by
Barth, but it is Eduard Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament 
of Encounter with God (London and Melbourne: Sheed and
Ward, 1963), pp. 15-16, who has perhaps stated the position 
most clearly: "...the saving activity of Jesus is
sacramental. For a sacrament is a divine bestowal of 
salvation in an outwardly perceptible form which makes the 
bestowal manifest; a bestowal of salvation in historical 
visibility. The Son of God really did become true man.... 
The man Jesus, as the personal visible realization of the 
divine grace of redemption, is the sacrament, the
primordial sacrament, because this man, the Son of God
himself, is intended by the Father to be in his humanity 
the only way to the actuality of redemption. . . . Human 
encounter with Jesus is therefore the sacrament of the 
encounter with God." Since limiting this conception of 
sacramentality to Jesus would appear to be a "Christo- 
monistic" restriction, however, a more comprehensive 
alternative might be justified, involving the idea that the 
whole of the saving work of the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit is the "sacrament" of the immanent Trinity, which is 
given in it in a manner appropriate to its accommodation to 
the creation in the economy. This term has the advantage 
that it connotes the specific events of Christian 
revelation with which we are necessarily concerned in 
Trinitarian theology, whereas historically "analogy" has a 
long history as a technical term in the doctrine of God. 
"Analogy," however, as a technical term cannot finally be 
abandoned, even in the context of the theology of the 
economic and the immanent Trinity, in particular because of 
its recognized logical status.
himself. It is thus to God's gracious act of condescension 
in revelation that appeal must finally be made to find the 
real basis of our knowledge of God. God has graciously made 
himself accessible to sinful men and women, so that the 
knowledge of God given in faith has a divine and not an 
anthropological basis. Fundamentally, God is not in himself 
something other than what he is in revelation, precisely 
because it is God who has acted. It is God himself who is 
present in the creaturely signs, which for that reason 
serve as sacramental objects taken up and used by God for 
his own purpose:
Revelation means the giving of signs.
We can say quite simply that revelation 
means sacrament, i.e., the self-witness 
of God, the representation of His 
truth, and therefore of the truth in 
which He knows Himself, in the form of
92creaturely objectivity....
It is this sacramental correspondence between God's 
objectivity ad extra and ad intra which, according to 
Barth, provides the possibility of a real knowledge of God. 
The fundamental sacramental reality in question is, of 
course, the man Jesus Christ, who is the Word made flesh.93 
From this primary sacramental reality there stretches 
forward and backward in time a sacramental continuity in 
the existence of the Church and of I s r a e l . T h i s  
Christological basis introduces, finally, the knowledge of 
the Trinity as such:
. . .the heart of it all is that it is He 
Himself, the one, supreme and true
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Lord, who thus unveils Himself to us; 
that in revelation we have to do with 
His action as the triune God, and 
therefore with Himself in every 
creaturely work and sign that He uses. 
On this basis and only on this basis 
can there be real knowledge of God.95
Within this conception, a sacramental correspondence 
obtains between the economic Trinity and the immanent 
Trinity, founded not on the ontological identification of 
the two, but solely on the grace of revelation.
Barth also speaks here, significantly, of the "analogy 
of faith," finding such language unavoidable.96 Barth's 
argument is that as long as we allow God's revelation 
itself to dictate the terms of the proportionality involved 
in analogy, rather than the idea of an essential 
proportionality of being which can then be developed in a 
natural theology, analogy is a necessary and valuable tool 
for theological discourse. The position here is that the 
principle of the similarity between God's revelation and 
God in himself is not a general similarity of being, but 
purely God's truthfulness in his self-revelation.97
It is this aspect of Barth's theology which needs to 
be drawn out more clearly in contemporary Trinitarian 
theology. The resulting approach could, in principle, 
constitute a via media, on the one hand between the
95Ibid. . p. 51.
96Ibid. . pp. 225-228.
97Evidently, if such a position were consistently 
maintained, then despite the Christological doctrine of 
election, and the idea of Christ as the eternal man, a 
basic distinction between the economic and the immanent 
Trinity would have to be maintained as well. Here, Barth's 
theology differs sharply from that of certain of his 
followers - and among those surveyed above, from Jiingel's 
and Moltmann's in particular. Curiously, Roman Catholic 
theologians such as Balthasar appear closer to his thought 
at this point than do many Protestants.
theology which seeks to exclude all but one consistent 
economic Trinitarian taxis from consideration, and the 
theology which seeks to unify the diverse elements 
artificially, and on the other between the contemporary 
affirmation of the unity of the economic with the immanent 
Trinity and the older distinction between them. Such an 
approach would preclude the necessity of an arbitrary 
restriction of the economic data to a single aspect of the 
diverse economy as the basis of a Trinitarian theology, so 
that the diversity of the economy could be maintained 
without the imposition of an artificial unity, and a 
doctrine of the Trinity developed from all the relevant 
economic data. This would allow a certain flexibility in 
the treatment of the economic data; because the unity of 
the economic and the immanent Trinity would be qualified 
analogically, not every aspect of the economy would need to 
be taken in itself to be of Trinitarian significance. An 
adaptation of the two natures doctrine, for example, would 
still be possible on this view, while, on the other hand, 
even a Christology in which the emphasis lay on the unity 
of Christ's person, like Balthasar's, could still be 
developed, consistent with an integral Trinitarian theology 
affirming the passivity and activity of Christ in relation 
to the Spirit.98
In both sections of this Chapter, therefore, 
fundamental problems have appeared in connection with the 
turn to the economy in contemporary Trinitarian theology. 
We have seen first of all that the theological ontology
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98It is noteworthy that, unlike Barth, Balthasar, on 
the basis of his analogical view of the relation between 
"economy" and "theology," does not appropriate passivity to 
the human nature and activity to the divine nature of 
Christ. This would have been a possibility, given the idea 
of the unity involved in Balthasar's theology. Balthasar, 
however, does not take this route - a point concerning 
which no real criticism can be made, but which, it is 
clear, has important implications for his theology of the 
Trinity.
involved in contemporary versions of "dialectical 
Trinitarianism" is problematic, precisely because an 
adequate distinction between the economic and the immanent 
Trinity is not always drawn, and because the contemporary 
approach from the economy threatens to reduce the latter to 
the finite form of the former. Secondly, we have seen that 
in view of the diversity of the economic basis of 
Trinitarian theology, it is necessary to qualify the idea 
of the unity between the economic and the immanent Trinity 
analogically, in order to make it possible both to build on 
the whole of the economy and to preserve the integrity of 
the Trinity. The problems which emerge from the diversity 
of the economy, therefore, again suggest that the 
contemporary Trinitarian thesis that the economic Trinity 
is the immanent Trinity and vice versa requires careful 
qualification.
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TOWARDS A TRINITARIAN PNEUMATOLOGY
It is clear from the argument of previous Chapters 
that the potential for growth in Trinitarian theology in 
general and Pneumatology in particular which was mentioned 
at the beginning of this study has still to be realized, 
and that the claim of contemporary Trinitarian theology to 
a more adequate Pneumatological position than the tradition 
can be exaggerated. The doctrine of the Trinity today 
remains a crucial area of theological controversy, and 
Pneumatology in many ways its weakest link.
What remains to be done is to bring the discussion to 
a close by outlining the more positive results which emerge 
from this study for Trinitarian Pneumatology. In this 
Chapter, I shall take up this question in two brief 
sections, the first concerned with the economic basis for 
a future development of Trinitarian theology, and the 
second with possible directions for the theology of the 
Holy Spirit in the immanent Trinity, and an associated 
social doctrine of the Trinity. Although the results in 
each case are somewhat tentative, and can only be presented 
here in outline, they nevertheless indicate the course 
which a further development of Trinitarian Pneumatology 
might follow.
1. The Economic Basis: Reciprocity
Throughout this study, we have met with reasons for 
conceiving the economic basis for a Trinitarian theology of 
the Holy Spirit in a Pneumatology conceived in close 
connection with Christology. The very attempt to develop a
V
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Trinitarian Pneumatology, of course, implies that such 
connections must at some point be drawn, even if this means 
that the relation between the Spirit and the Father must 
also feature prominently in such a theology, as indeed it 
has in the theological tradition.1 A number of factors 
arising in recent theology, however, suggest that a 
specific relation of reciprocity might obtain between the 
Spirit and Christ. In what follows, the case for developing 
a Trinitarian Pneumatology around this idea will be stated 
briefly, drawing on arguments adduced in previous Chapters. 
If Trinitarian Pneumatology is to be sensitive to the 
results of modern scholarship and relevant to the needs of 
the Church, it will be argued, it will need to be developed 
with this question in view.
In Chapter I, three factors raising the question of 
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in recent theology were 
outlined. Modern biblical scholarship concerning the Spirit 
was considered first of all, and in particular the 
recognition among exegetes of the importance of both Spirit 
and Logos Christology (to use the later terms) in New 
Testament thought. These not only appear to reflect the 
differing concerns of distinct New Testament theologies, 
but are to be found as parallel emphases within single New 
Testament traditions. The connection between Pneumatology
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^he relation between the Father and the Spirit has 
traditionally been given ontological priority over the 
Spirit-Son relation, in view of the doctrine of the Father 
as the "first" person of the Trinity and as "source" of the 
other two persons which prevails in Eastern theology and 
also in Western theology in its own way as well. At the 
same time, however, the connection between the Spirit and 
Christ in the economy is of primary importance in the 
epistemological sense, since it is only in the light of the 
latter that the former is truly known. Not only is the Son 
revealed in the Chris t-event, but also the Father and 
Spirit as well. The idea of the Soiritus Redemptor, in this 
sense, precedes the Trinitarian doctrines of homoousion and 
procession as understood of the Spirit. The relation of the 
Spirit to the Son, therefore, can never be neglected in 
Trinitarian Pneumatology.
and Christology which thus appears in New Testament thought 
itself is already two-sided, involving apparent reversals 
of the line of dependence between the Spirit and Christ, 
sometimes between different New Testament traditions, and 
sometimes within the same traditions.2
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The work of Schweitzer, Hermann, Dunn, and others on 
the Pauline view of the Spirit has been of particular 
importance in this respect, showing the extent to which 
even Paul, who was formerly understood to advocate an 
"incarnational" Christology in the usual sense of the term, 
is able to adopt a version of Spirit Christology as well. 
Cf. Rom. 1: 3-4; 1 Cor. 15: 45; 2 Cor 3: 17; and Chapter I, 
section 1 above. Elsewhere, the two-sidedness of the 
relation also appears: cf., e.g., Luke 3: 22 versus Acts 2: 
33; and John 1: 32-34 versus 20: 22, etc. The Johannine 
material in particular deserves comment. The Fourth Gospel, 
as is well known, attains a level of Pneumatological 
sophistication which takes it well beyond the thought of 
the synoptics, and has as a result been used as much as a 
quarry for Pneumatological as Christological proof texts. 
The first mention of the Spirit in the Fourth Gospel,
however, found in the Johannine baptism narrative, appears 
to be problematic from this point of view: "And John bore 
witness, saying, 'I saw the Spirit descend as a dove out of 
heaven and remain upon him. And I did not know him, but the 
one who sent me to baptize with water, this one said to me, 
"The one upon whom you see the Spirit descend and remain, 
this one is the Baptizer with the Holy Spirit." I have seen 
and I bear witness that this one is the Son of God.'" (Jn.
1: 32-34.) What is unexpected about this is its setting in
the chapter which contains the most impressive list of
"high" Christological titles in the New Testament. It is of 
the Logos (1: 1), God (1: 1, 18), the True Light (1: 9),
the Messiah (1: 41), the Lamb of God (1: 29, 36), the
Baptizer with the Holy Spirit (1: 33) , and the Son (the
"Chosen One" in several MSS) of God (1: 34) that the
Baptist speaks. The tension between the Jesus who appears 
in the later sections of the gospel as the Lord of the 
Spirit and this Jesus who receives the Spirit from the 
Father is evident. Rudolf Bultmann's comment in The Gospel 
of John, ed. R. W. N. Hoare and J. K. Riches, trans. G. R. 
Beasley-Murray (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), p. 92,
footnote 4, is representative of the problem as it is 
usually understood: "The Evangelist has clearly not thought 
out the relation between the Spirit which Jesus receives in 
his baptism and his character as the Logos; in the rest of 
the Gospel Jesus appears not as the bearer but as the giver 
of the Spirit. The imparting of the Spirit to Jesus is 
taken from the tradition and has, in the Evangelist's 
interpretation, no longer any importance for Jesus; it is
In the contemporary theological context, secondly, we 
have seen how ecclesiological problems and ecumenism have 
brought the question of the relation between the Spirit and 
Christ to prominence. The pentecostalist and charismatic 
movements, first of all, challenge the domestication of the 
Spirit to institutional structures and the practical 
subordination of the Spirit to the Word. Ecumenical 
discussions of ecclesiology, secondly, have also focused 
attention on the crucial importance of Pneumatology for the
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significant for the Baptist only as a sign of recognition." 
Bultmann's position is that there is an inconsistency 
between Jesus' character as the Logos and his reception of 
the Spirit in the vision of the Baptist, since in the rest 
of the Fourth Gospel, Jesus appears not as the bearer but 
as the giver of the Spirit. He therefore argues that the 
descent of the Spirit is of no Christological significance. 
Against Bultmann, however, the Johannine baptism narrative 
can be shown not only to be consistent with Johannine
Christology and Pneumatology, but to be required by it. The 
argument against the position represented by Bultmann is 
simply that it involves a misreading of Johannine
Christology. In fact, the Father bestows an impressive 
array of "gifts" upon the Son in the Fourth Gospel.
Bultmann himself, ibid., p. 165, footnote 1, cites the
following: "...everything 3. 35; 13. 3; (17. 7); his name
17. 11; [glory] 17. 22, 24; [authority over all flesh] 17. 
2; [to have life in himself] 5. 26; works, or the work 5. 
36; 17. 4; words 17. 8; the [judgment], or the [authority] 
for the [judgment] 5. 22, 27; everything that he asks for
11. 22; the believers 6. 37, 39; 10. 29; 17. 2, 6, 9, 12, 
24; 18. 9." Since, however, the divine qualities thus
possessed and exercised by Christ are precisely those he 
receives from the Father, Johannine Christology cannot be 
conceived to preclude the idea that he should also be both 
the recipient and giver of the Holy Spirit. The gift of the 
Spirit is akin to all the others given by the Father to the 
Son in the Christology of the Fourth Gospel, and indeed, it 
would be highly inconsistent with the Christology of the 
Fourth Gospel if the Spirit the Son gives were not the 
Spirit he first receives, in the same way that he receives 
everything else. We are dealing, therefore, in Jn. 1: 32- 
34 with a Johannine theme, although the qualification must 
be, in view of the parallel (though more difficult) text 
found in the context of another Baptist discourse (Jn. 3: 
34-35; cf. 3: 27), that it appears only in the context of 
Baptist discourses (so also C. H. Dodd, Historical 
Tradition in the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1963), p. 300).
theology of the Church. A number of theologians have 
concluded that a recovery of the two-sidedness of the 
relation between the Spirit and Christ which appears in the 
New Testament would be an attractive theological option 
from the ecumenical point of view, since it provides a 
theological ground for the diversity also of the different 
theological traditions. According to Congar, for example,
the central differences between the West and the East can
be seen to be focused in eucharistic theology, where, in 
the West, the decisive role is accorded to the words of 
institution, the verbum. whereas in the East the eoiclesis 
is of central significance.3 Congar maintains both that the 
two approaches are complementary, and that for the good of 
the Church they require integration/
Thirdly, we saw in Chapter I how the filioaue doctrine
has emerged in recent years as one of the key dogmatic
problems of the ecumenical movement. The most constructive 
suggestion which has been made in recent theology 
concerning the filioaue has again been that a recovery of 
the reciprocity between the Spirit and Christ is needed. 
Thus, for example, it has become clear that exaggerated 
attacks of West against East and East against West, to the 
effect that the one detaches Pneumatology entirely from 
Christological control, and that the other completely 
subordinates Pneumatology to Christology, must be rejected, 
on the simple grounds that both traditions have clear 
theological mechanisms for avoiding such extreme 
conclusions. Despite the rather different conceptualities 
employed in the two traditions, therefore, it is already
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3Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, III, pp. 228-
274.
4In the same way, but from the standpoint of Eastern 
Orthodoxy, John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985), pp. 123-142, maintains 
that an adequate "synthesis" of Christology and 
Pneumatology is the prerequisite to a resolution of the 
ecumenical problems of ecclesiology.
arguable that the two are not as far apart as is often 
alleged.5 It is in keeping with this view that the formal 
recommendation of the Faith and Order memorandum, "The 
Filioque Clause in Ecumenical Perspective," is that the 
reciprocal relationship between the Spirit and Christ which 
obtains at the level of the economy of salvation in the New 
Testament witness be seen to be of central importance to 
the ecumenical enterprise, and be formally taken up into 
the doctrine of the immanent Trinity.6
The question of the relation between the Spirit and 
Christ, finally, is also clearly of central importance in 
contemporary Trinitarian Pneumatology, in the sense that 
the material differences between the four models 
encountered above derive from their different economic
starting-points, each of which involves a different view
of that relation. The diversity of the four Trinitarian 
models surveyed, therefore, can largely be taken to be 
rooted here. The Trinitarian Pneumatology orientated to the 
problem of revelation and faith, and which understands the 
Spirit as the Spirit who reveals Christ, for example, 
differs fundamentally from that drawn from the synoptic 
Christology of anointing, and indeed, contradicts it. The
same could be said of the other Trinitarian models
examined.
In Chapter IV, it was argued that these material 
tensions in the economic data upon which contemporary 
Trinitarian theology is ostensibly based ought to determine
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5Congar, for example, argues that the Pneumatological 
positions of the East and West must be understood to be 
complementary expressions of the one Trinitarian faith, 
although admittedly in terms of their different, more basic 
overall Trinitarian presuppositions. See, e.g., Congar, op. 
cit.. Ill, pp. 174ff., esp. 213-214, which is a survey of 
recent developments, and the account above, Chapter I, 
section 3.
Commission on Faith and Order, "The Filioque Clause in 
Ecumenical Perspective," §§ III-V.
more precisely than has hitherto been specified what should 
be the formal limits of the argument that the economic 
Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and vice versa. The 
conclusion was that the diversity of the economic basis 
itself requires that the idea of unity involved be 
qualified by a kenoticism regarding the economic Trinity 
and a recognition of the analogical character of all 
knowledge of the immanent Trinity. Otherwise the diversity 
of the economic basis leads to a series of premature 
restrictions of the relevant economic data, and to a number 
of one-sided Trinitarian positions, none of which can 
easily be reconciled with the rest. Since it is one and the 
same Christ who is anointed with the Spirit, who suffers on 
the cross, who sends the Spirit to the Church after the 
resurrection, and who mediates the new creation and final 
glorification of the children of God, such contradictions 
cannot ultimately be sustained in a systematic theology. 
The unity of the Christ-event itself demands that the one­
sidedness of the four models examined in Chapter III be 
modified in such a way that the diversity of the economy on 
the one hand is maintained while, on the other, the unity 
of the Trinity in itself is preserved.
Following the suggestions of Faith and Order and 
Congar noted above, therefore, and in keeping with the way 
in which the question of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit 
has been raised in contemporary theology, the possibility 
of bringing the idea of a reciprocity between the Spirit 
and Christ to formal expression in Trinitarian theology can 
be considered. The starting-point for such a conception 
must obviously be the diversity of the biblical material, 
in which the mission of Christ is presented as dependent 
upon the work of the Spirit on the one hand, and the 
mission of the Spirit as dependent upon the work of Christ 
on the other. More than this, however, what is arguably 
required is a developed and integrated Pneumatological 
Christology and Christological Pneumatology which can be
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taken up in their reciprocity into Trinitarian theology. 
Historically, the doctrine of the Trinity did not develop 
simply out of reflection on scripture, or from a 
consideration of isolated economic events as such, but out 
of the Christological and Pneumatological controversies of 
the first four centuries of Christian theology. The 
economic basis for the doctrine, in consequence, was an 
already highly "theologized" understanding of the events of 
the economy of salvation, expressed in patristic 
Christology and Pneumatology. Recent Trinitarian theology, 
similarly, has relied upon a complex series of theological 
presuppositions concerning the economy of salvation. 
Barth's and Rahner's doctrine of divine self-communication, 
Jiingel's theology of the cross, the Pneumatological 
"Christology of ascent” developed by Kasper and Coffey, and 
Moltmann's understanding of eschatology as a Trinitarian 
history are all essentially economic doctrines which ground 
their respective Trinitarian theologies of the Spirit.
What has not been developed in contemporary 
Trinitarian theology so far, however, is a treatment of 
this problem in terms of the role of the Holy Spirit in 
Christology and of the role of Christ in Pneumatology as 
related problems in the wider theological sense. If the 
idea of Christological and Pneumatological reciprocity is 
to be developed formally in Trinitarian theology, however, 
then such a treatment will first be needed. Much of 
contemporary Trinitarian Pneumatology can be of use in this 
respect, since it is characterized by an increased interest 
in the Trinitarian significance of the role of the Holy 
Spirit in the life of Christ. To date, however, no 
systematic, comprehensive account of the wider theological 
framework within which this question should be discussed, 
drawing on relevant patristic, medieval, and modern 
theology, has been written. The nearest one comes to such 
a treatment is Muhlen's work on accidental sanctification, 
which itself, however, represents only one side of the
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entire question. The fact that Miihlen's work has generated 
such interest in the Trinitarian significance of the role 
of the Spirit in the life of Christ, however, itself 
suggests that a wider treatment of the problem might give 
rise to an even more fruitful discussion.
Theologically, therefore, a great deal of work remains 
to be done in this area. Very little historical study has 
been done on the role of the Holy Spirit in Christology in 
the theological tradition, for example, while likewise, and 
perhaps in consequence, no attempt has been made to discuss 
the wider Trinitarian implications of the question in the 
light of a comprehensive survey of the tradition. While, 
for example, the rise of Logos Christology in patristic 
theology has been treated in intimate detail, little 
historical or systematic work is available on the 
alternative tradition of Christology stemming from the 
synoptics to which it was originally opposed, and over 
which it was certainly victorious, but which still 
possesses canonical authority and which nevertheless 
persists as a minor theme within the wider Christological 
tradition.7 It may be that we can look forward to the
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7The Christological theme of anointing survives in much 
altered form, as we have seen, in the Western scholastic 
doctrine of accidental sanctification. It also appears, 
clearly, in recent Spirit Christologies such as Lampe, op. 
cit. Very little, however, has been written of the 
Pneumatic Christology which appears in certain traditions 
of Eastern theology, in, for example, Irenaeus, who speaks 
of the work of the Spirit in the life of Christ in the 
context of his doctrine of recapitulation (Irenaeus, Haer..
Ill, 9,3; III, 17, 1-2; III, 5, 6-11; V, 20, 2). Although in 
Irenaeus the Spirit's work is mainly to mediate and perfect 
in us the image and likeness of God which was obscured by 
sin and restored by the incarnation of the Logos (ibid., V, 
8, 1) , his argument is that this sanctifying work of the
Spirit was itself made possible by the work of the Spirit 
in Jesus Christ himself. Recapitulation, therefore, is not 
simply the work of the Logos. The recapitulation of 
humanity which occurs in Christ involves also, for 
Irenaeus, the restoration of the fullness of the Spirit to 
human nature, through his presence in Christ, the "anointed 
one." Thus the Holy Spirit has a vital role in Irenaeus'
Seventh Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 
Canberra, February, 1991 to build on the recommendations 
of the Faith and Order document, "The Filioque Clause in 
Ecumenical Perspective," in this respect, at least by
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Christology and soteriology. The Spirit restores the glory 
of the original creation in human nature, through Christ; 
because he has anointed Christ, who recapitulated all
things in himself, we also can receive the Spirit as well 
(ibid. . Ill, 9, 2; Hi, /'7, 3). In the subsequent theological 
tradition, Irenaeus' view of the place of the Spirit in 
Christology was taken up in the Antiochene school of 
Christology, which emphasizes the importance of the 
humanity of Christ in his free response of obedience to the 
Father. (See, e.g., Swete, op. cit.. pp. 255-273, who
provides a brief account of the Antiochene position in this 
respect.) Thus Theodore of Mopsuestia speaks of Christ's 
need of the Spirit in order to fulfil his ministry; 
Theodore, in a way characteristic of the Antiochene 
tradition, emphasizes Irenaeus' idea of the obedience of 
Christ as the pioneer of our salvation, and for that, 
according to Theodore, the Spirit was required (Theodore of 
Mopsuestia, In Ev. Jo.. I, 16). The Nestorian controversy, 
however, effectively brought this tradition, which made the 
role of the Spirit in the humanity of Christ central to
Christology and soteriology, to an end. In its place, the
doctrine of the hypostatic union appeared, which 
effectively precluded the possibility of such a treatment 
of Christ's human nature apart from the Logos. In Western 
theology, this leads to the doctrine of accidental 
sanctification.
The idea of anointing survives, however, in altered 
form in the Cappadocians Basil the Great and Gregory of 
Nyssa, who speak of the Spirit as resting on the Son or as 
the "Unction" of the Son in a Trinitarian sense (Basil, De 
Spir. Sanct.. 3, 1; 16, 39; 19, 49; Gregory of Nyssa, Adv. 
Maced.. 92-94, 102, 103. See also Boris Bobrinskoy, 'The
Indwelling of the Spirit in Christ: "Pneumatic Christology" 
in the Cappadocian Fathers,' St Vladimir Theological 
Quarterly. 28 (1984), 49-65.). The same view is found in
John Damascene I De. feie crtit. . I, S') and the medieval 
Byzantine tradition of Pneumatological Christology surveyed 
by Staniloae, op. cit. As Staniloae maintains, this 
Christology is still alive in the Eastern tradition, but it 
is a Christology which very much remains to be integrated 
into a contemporary Trinitarian theology. From the point of 
view of Western Pneumatology, and even Western ecumenical 
theology, Congar’s work, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 
e.g., is typical in this respect, in that he does not 
discuss this tradition in his otherwise comprehensive 
survey.
recommending such a study. Since this problem is not in 
view in the assembly theme, however, such a result is 
unlikely.8 In any case, detailed historical and theological 
work in the future will be required.
The implications of a theology of reciprocity between 
Pneumatology and Christology developed along these lines 
would be considerable, not just for Trinitarian theology as 
such, but also for wider questions of the economy of 
salvation, as expressed, for example, in ecclesiology and 
spiritual theology, to which Trinitarian theology is also 
implicitly or explicitly related. For example, the 
practical subordination of the work of the Spirit to the 
Word in a theology such as Barth's can be justified to some 
extent from scripture, and has a systematic basis in his 
Trinitarian theology of the Revealer, his Revelation, and 
its Revealedness, and thus in the priority he gives to 
Christology over Pneumatology. In Barth's theology, 
however, as in most Protestant theology, this has wider 
implications for ecclesiology and the spiritual life, which 
are thereby focused not only by, but also to a great extent 
in. the proclamation of the Word. The "ontic" role of the 
Soiritus Creator, together with the importance of religious 
experience of the Spirit, the role of the affective life in 
the approach to God through art and the senses, as well as 
the illuminative role of the mystic, can very easily be 
diminished in this way, while ecclesial life, the liturgy, 
and spirituality are thereby impoverished. On the other
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8This can be seen, e.g., from recent editions of The 
Ecumenical Review devoted to Pneumatology: vols. 41 (1989), 
no.3; and 42 (1990), nos. 2-4. Among all the material
represented here, including, significantly, the report of 
an Orthodox consultation held in 1989 in preparation for 
Canberra ("Orthodox Reflections on the Assembly Theme," The 
Ecumenical Review. 42 (1990), 301-312), no treatment of the 
relation between Christology and Pneumatology has been 
forthcoming, with the single exception of an unremarkable 
article by the Orthodox theologian John Breck, '"The Lord 
is the Spirit": An Essay in Christological Pneumatology,' 
The Ecumenical Review. 42 (1990), 114-121.
side, the one-sidedness of ecclesial life which can arise 
from a priority of Pneumatology over Christology is well 
documented in the excesses of the Montanists, for example, 
or of the radical reformation and the charismatic and 
pentecostalist movements. Ecclesiology can be one-sided 
here as well, with even worse results.
If, however, a theology of the reciprocity of the 
Spirit and Christ in the economy and in the Trinity were 
to be developed, as the Commission on Faith and Order has 
suggested, it would follow that such one-sidedness in 
ecclesiology and spirituality could no longer be sustained 
systematically. In Pneumatology, progress towards such a 
position can arguably be taken to be of the utmost 
importance. At the same time, perhaps, an increasing 
encounter of the various traditions of ecclesiology and 
spirituality in the concrete life of the Church is also 
important as the soil from which such systematic reflection 
is likely to grow. Ecclesiology and spirituality are 
admittedly founded on a tradition of Trinitarian thought, 
so that the latter has logical priority over the former, 
but we should not for that reason neglect the importance of 
the ecclesial praxis and culture in which theology and 
theologians have their roots. An enrichment of the scope of 
Pneumatology in this sense can be seen to be one of the 
practical promises held forth by ecumenism, and the latter, 
in turn, to be a focus of promise for the former.
2. The Holy Spirit in the Immanent Trinity
We turn finally, therefore, to consider possible 
directions for the theology of the Holy Spirit in the 
immanent Trinity. Even if our main theological emphasis 
were to fall upon the doctrine of the economic Trinity, we 
could not ultimately avoid this question, since an adequate 
understanding of the economic Trinity requires a 
satisfactory doctrine of the immanent Trinity. The function
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of the doctrine of the Trinity since patristic times has 
been to ground the saving work of the triune God in the 
being of the triune God himself. In interpreting the 
economy in this way, however, Trinitarian theology has to 
concern itself precisely with the immanent Trinity, since 
otherwise it cannot, by definition, succeed in its desire 
to provide an absolute ground for salvation in the being of 
the triune God himself.9 Thus the point was made early in 
this study that Trinitarian theology historically has been 
overwhelmingly concerned with the doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity.
It is commonly observed that the difficulties involved 
in developing a Trinitarian theology of the Holy Spirit are 
in many ways greater than those we encounter in connection 
with the other two persons. The problem, in fact, is as 
basic as the very terms in which the doctrine of the Spirit 
is conceived. Even the name "Holy Spirit" itself, for 
example, unlike "Father" and "Son," is not a relative, but 
an absolute term, which could in itself be used as 
appropriately of the divine essence, or even of the Father 
and Son, as of the Spirit himself in the Trinitarian
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historically, as we have seen, it was the Arian 
controversy above all which forced Christian thought beyond 
the question of the oikonomia to confront the question of 
what the God of Christian revelation is in himself. The 
Nicene Fathers who adopted the homoousion as an anti-Arian 
measure thereby ensured that the economy of salvation was 
not understood in terms of the deficient ontology of the 
divinity which was maintained by the Arians. By their 
adoption of the homoousion, however, they also effectively 
accepted that an ontology of the divinity could 
nevertheless not be avoided: thus, according to the Creed 
of Nicea (325), the "one Lord Jesus Christ," "begotten of 
the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father," is 
"of one substance with the Father." In this way, the 
eternal relation of the "pre-existent" Logos to the Father 
became the central theological theme of the Nicene era, and 
transformed the character of subsequent Trinitarian 
theology. The Trinitarian theology of the Holy Spirit which 
finally emerged in patristic theology was therefore, like 
that of the Son, a theology of the Spirit sub specie 
aeternitatis.
sense.10 Thus Thomas Aquinas notes that the third person, 
unlike the Father and the Son, has no proper name.11 In the 
same way, the term "procession," or "spiration," cannot be 
said to have the relative precision of the corresponding 
terms "filiation" and "sonship." The Father, likewise, 
cannot be understood as the Father of the Holy Spirit, but 
rather only as his "Spirator," so that even the phrase "who 
proceeds from the Father" is misleading. Even our most 
basic terminology here is thus problematic in a way not so 
of the Father and the Son, and has to be deliberately 
accommodated to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.12
As Congar suggests, the limitations of our language 
here can be seen as something of an advantage as well as a 
disadvantage, in the sense that it keeps us from presuming 
that our knowledge can extend too far into the mystery of 
the Trinity.13 Terms such as "Spirit" and "spiration," like 
the terms "Father" and "Son," or "filiation" and "sonship," 
are all ultimately only analogies, so that an apophatic
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10Lossky, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit in the 
Orthodox Triadology," pp. 34-35 ; and Congar, o p . cit. , III,
p. 6.
11Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloaiae. la. 36, 1.
12This problem appears to be less severe, however, in 
the East than it is in the West. Staniloae, e.g., o p . cit.. 
pp. 176-177, argues that one of the reasons the East is 
unable to admit that the Spirit proceeds from the Son is 
that "spiration" is proper to the Father, so that accepting 
the doctrine of double procession would imply that the Son 
was a Father as well. Staniloae refers to a number of 
patristic sources for this argument, and goes on to state:
'It would be preferable to use the word "procession" for 
the relation of the Spirit to the Father, and for his 
relation to the Son, the term "goes out from" doubled with 
other terms like "shines out from" or "is manifested by", 
terms which have been used by the eastern Fathers.' As was 
pointed out in Chapter I, Eastern Pneumatology generally 
employs a more specific and differentiated terminology in 
its Pneumatology than does the West. See also the account 
of the divine eneraeia below, pp. 328ff.
13Congar, op. cit. , III, p. 5.
qualification is written into the very structure of our 
discourse. However, it remains the case that the analogies 
employed in Pneumatology are particularly problematic, for 
the reasons indicated. To this extent, one of the primary 
problems to be overcome in a Trinitarian theology of the 
Holy Spirit is the limitation inherent in the terminology 
we begin with, because of the limitation which attaches to 
all theological analogy, indeed, but also because of the 
particular weakness inherent in the analogies which are 
used in Pneumatology.
It is precisely here, however, that the potential 
contribution of contemporary theology to the task of a 
future Trinitarian Pneumatology can be most significant. 
The economic categories employed in contemporary 
Trinitarian theology provide a number of specific analogies 
which take us well beyond the limitations of terms such as 
"procession," or even "Spirit" itself. At the same time, 
these categories carry us back to the ultimate basis of 
Trinitarian theology in the economy of salvation, and serve 
as a check against a doctrine of the Trinity which is 
unrelated to the economy of salvation. At the centre of 
Christian theology stands the conviction that the 
Trinitarian life has truly been shared with us in Jesus 
Christ. In the salvation-historical events with which we 
have to do, a genuinely salvific Trinitarian "history" took 
place. If Trinitarian theology, therefore, is not 
immediately orientated to salvation history in the 
interests of soteriology, it loses its proper theological 
function and becomes irrelevant to the primary concern of 
Christian theology, which is precisely the saving work of 
God in Jesus Christ. Once this happens, however, it also 
tends to fruitless speculation, since it is then no longer 
controlled by the economic events it is intended to 
interpret. As Rahner writes in the passage so often cited:
325
The basic thesis which . . . presents the 
Trinity as a mystery of salvation (in
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its reality and not merely as a
doctrine) might be formulated as 
follows: The "economic" Trinity is the 
"immanent" Trinity and the "immanent"
Trinity is the "economic" Trinity.
In the previous section, it was suggested that the 
basic reciprocity which obtains between the Spirit and
Christ at the economic level might profitably be taken up 
into the theology of the immanent Trinity. In this section, 
therefore, the possibility of a theology of immanent 
Trinitarian reciprocity will be considered more fully. I 
shall argue that such a theology is able to claim a rich 
inheritance from both Eastern and Western theological 
traditions. The idea of reciprocity in this sense has
already been taken up in a number of ways in recent
theology, drawing on the older theological tradition. At 
least three possibilities for further exploration can thus 
be considered: firstly, the idea of Spirit-Son reciprocity 
as taken up in Balthasar's adaptation of the f iliocrue 
doctrine; secondly, the attempt by a number of Eastern 
Orthodox theologians to deal with the question of the 
innertrinitarian relation between the Spirit and the Son in 
terms of reciprocity and the Orthodox doctrine of the 
divine eneraeia; and thirdly, the idea of oerichoresis in 
Trinitarian theology. I shall argue, however, that none of 
these is entirely adequate to the notion of 
innertrinitarian reciprocity, that the idea of reciprocity 
involves a broadly "social" understanding of the Trinity, 
and that in this respect, recent Trinitarian theology on 
the whole offers the possibility of a genuine advance 
beyond the achievement of the older theological tradition.
First of all, therefore, there is the option of a 
theology of reciprocity as developed in Balthasar’s 
treatment of the f iliocrue doctrine. As we have seen,
14Rahner, o p . cit.. pp. 21-22, italics deleted.
Balthasar's theology of Trinitarian inversion is an 
explicit attempt to deal with the problem of economic 
diversity in view of his presupposed idea of the unity of 
the economic with the immanent Trinity. Balthasar's 
position has proved to be particularly illuminating in this 
respect, in that his theology of Trinitarian inversion 
demands an analogical qualification of this unity. Where 
Balthasar's theology is deficient, however, is precisely in 
the thoroughly filioquist understanding of the two- 
sidedness of the relation between the Spirit and Christ 
which results; according to Balthasar, the Spirit is given 
economically to the Son as the Spirit who proceeds from the 
Father, and given by the Son to the Church as the Spirit 
who proceeds from the Son. The inversion of taxis is 
therefore economic only, inasmuch as the various moments 
with which we are concerned in the economy as a whole have 
their ultimate ground in different aspects of the 
innertrinitarian life.
In Balthasar's theology, therefore, the apparent 
reciprocity between the Spirit and Christ is understood in 
terms of the doctrine of double procession: on the one
hand, the Spirit is the Spirit who proceeds from the Father 
and is bestowed on the Son; on the other, the Spirit is the 
Spirit who proceeds from the Son, the response of the Son 
in love to the Father, and the Spirit who is thus also by 
definition the Son’s to give. Undoubtedly, this 
interpretation of the filiocrue has a great deal to be said 
for it as far as the problem of Spirit-Son reciprocity is 
concerned. It might be argued, for example, and with some 
justification, that the "Fatherly" side of the procession 
of the Spirit has been underemphasized in the West, and 
that many of the deficiencies of Western filioquist 
Pneumatology might be overcome if this side of the 
procession were to be given more sustained treatment. 
However, the fundamental problem remains that here the Holy 
Spirit does not truly appear as a Trinitarian agent in his
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own right; it is not so much the reciprocity of Spirit and 
Son which is thus made thematic as it is the relation
between the Son and the Father. The reciprocity involved in 
the theology of Balthasar, in consequence, is more a matter 
of the Father and Son relation than of that proper to the 
Spirit and the Son as such. In terms of the economic
problem of reciprocity as outlined above, therefore, 
Balthasar's approach appears to confuse the activity of the 
Spirit in relation to Christ with the Father-Son relation. 
A true theology of reciprocity, on the other hand, would 
allow the Spirit to be an innertrinitarian agent in his own 
right, truly "of one substance" with the Father and the 
Son, whose agency in this sense has never been in doubt.
This criticism, of course, reflects the wider Eastern 
criticism of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in Western 
theology which was outlined in Chapter I in connection with 
the filiocrue dispute.15 If, however, one were to accept the 
Western view that the Spirit can truly be understood in his 
hypostatic quality as the relation of love subsisting 
between the Father and the Son, and admit the implied
limitation of the personal agency of the Spirit, 
Balthasar's position could be adopted. This wider
implication of his position is, however, not one which I 
have been prepared to support, for the reasons specified.
Secondly, the Eastern doctrine of the Trinitarian 
eneraeia can be considered as a possible locus of Spirit- 
Son reciprocity. In Chapter I, it was pointed out that this 
concept is of crucial importance for the Eastern theology 
of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as at least one prominent 
Eastern view is that the Spirit proceeds from the Father 
alone at the level of the divine essence, but "comes forth" 
from the Father and the Son at the level of the eternal 
divine energies. Staniloae points out that in the medieval 
Byzantine tradition, after the filioaue had become the
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15See also, e.g., Evdokimov, oo. cit.. p. 65.
official cause for schism with the West, the doctrine of
divine eneraeia became the central focus of Eastern
Pneumatological development, inasmuch as it enabled the
East to relate the Son and Spirit at the eternal,
innertrinitarian level without recourse to the filioaue.16
From the Western point of view, it must be remembered,
particularly because it so seldom is, that in Eastern
theology the divine eneraeia are as eternal and truly
"innertrinitarian" as the community of divine essence;17 the
difference, according to Eastern thought, is that the
energies make God "participable," or communicable, whereas
18in the divine essence God is radically inaccessible. 
Gregory Palamas, indeed, can even employ the Augustinian 
analogy of love feros) in this sense.19 According to 
Palamas, the Spirit can be understood as the love of the 
Father for the Word and of the Word for the Father, both 
immanently and economically, but only with reference to the 
eternal divine energies; in his ousia. the Spirit is the 
Spirit of the Father alone.
On the basis of the Eastern theology of the eneraeia. 
a number of Eastern theologians have recently advocated a 
theology of reciprocity in Trinitarian Pneumatology. 
Staniloae, for example, attempts to take this theme up from 
the point of view of a social doctrine of the Trinity,
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lbStaniloae, oo. cit.. . pp. 178-184.
17This is a point often missed in Western theology. 
Cf., however, Gregory Palamas, Triad. . Ill, ii, 5ff. (ET 
The Triads, ed. John Meyendorff and trans. Nicholas Gendle 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1983), pp. 93ff.); Vladimir
Lossky, The Vision of God, trans. Asheleigh Moorhouse 
(Clayton, Wisconsin: The Faith Press, 1963), pp. 124ff.; 
and Congar, o p . cit.. Ill, pp. 61ff., who also provides an 
extensive bibliography.
18Evdokimov, o p . cit.. pp. 61-62.
19Gregory Palamas, Cap. Phvs. Theol. 36-37 (PG 150,
1144-1145), referred to by Evdokimov, pp. cit.. p. 59, and 
Orphanos, o p . cit.. p. 33.
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arguing that while the Spirit receives his hypostatic 
existence from the Father alone, his personal character is 
constituted also by his network of relations with both the 
Father and the Son which exists eternally in the divine 
enerqeia. 20 Staniloae writes:
There is a reciprocity of infinite 
richness in its complexity between the 
Three Persons of the Holy Trinity, and 
it is this which gives them their fully 
personal character. But there is a 
special reciprocity between the Son and 
the Spirit which is reflected in their 
contact with the world.21
In L'Esprit Saint dans la tradition orthodoxe, 
similarly, Paul Evdokimov maintains that while the question 
of the procession of the Holy Spirit has dominated 
Pneumatology for a thousand years, the reality must be 
judged to be more complex than the inflexible filioquism on 
the one hand and monopatrism on the other which have 
predominated in traditional polemics.22 The alternative, he 
argues, is to recognize that the Trinitarian relations are 
indeed fully Trinitarian, i.e., that in the divine life, 
there is a relation of interdependence and mutuality among 
the three persons, including between the Spirit and the
20Staniloae, op . cit.. pp. 184-186. Staniloae here 
attempts to take up one side of Moltmann's suggestions in 
his essay, "Theological Proposals Towards the Resolution of 
the Filioque Controversy," to the effect that the Spirit 
receives his existence from the Father but his "image" or 
"relational form," i.e., his personal character from the 
Son (Moltmann, o p . cit.. pp. 164-173). Staniloae argues 
that Moltmann is right to posit a clearer distinction 
between the Father and the Son in their relations with the 
Spirit than is possible on the filioque paradigm, but wrong 
to distinguish between the existence and personal character 
of the Spirit in this way. The proper distinction, he 
argues, is between the Trinitarian ousia and enerqeia.
21Staniloae, o p . cit. , p. 186.
22Evdokimov, o p . cit. , p. 69.
Son.23 Building on the theology of the divine enerqeia. 
Evdokimov goes so far as to argue that the term filioque 
might be acceptable from the Eastern point of view if the 
technical term "procession" were abandoned when the
filioque is affirmed, and also, significantly, if a 
reciprocity of the Spirit and Son were recognized by the 
simultaneous affirmation of a parallel soirituque formula.2A 
The argument is that each person must be understood in his 
simultaneous relations to the other two. Evdokimov suggests 
that the Trinity can be represented pictorially as a 
triangle inscribed in a circle, with the Father at the top 
and the Son and Spirit at its base angles; while generation 
and procession are represented in the triangle, the
reciprocal "energetic" relations of the persons are
represented in the circle, in which movement occurs in both 
directions.25
From the standpoint of contemporary theology, it is 
difficult to make a judgement about this Eastern view. It 
is clear, as has already been argued, that the standard 
criticism that the distinction between essence and enerqeia 
in this form threatens to reduce the Spirit-Son 
relationship to a second, inferior level of the Trinitarian 
being cannot really be sustained, since the enerqeia are as 
irreducibly eternal as the divine essence. It would appear 
in any case that if such an obvious criticism could be 
made, Eastern theology would have seen the point long ago. 
The question is rather a matter of the foreign 
conceptuality employed in the Eastern distinction, in the 
sense that this conceptuality, and indeed, much of the 
Trinitarian theology it presupposes, is alien to Western 
theology.
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23Ibid. . p. 48.
24Ibid. . p. 71.
25Ibid. . p. 48.
The third doctrine from the tradition which relates 
to the problem of reciprocity is closely related to the 
previous discussion, and comes very near to what is meant 
by reciprocity: the doctrine of oerichoresis.
Etymologically, the term connotes mutual involvement or 
interchange; as such, it initially came into theological 
use in the Christologies of Gregory Nazianzen and Máximos 
Confessor in connection with the two natures doctrine.26 It 
is, however, very rare before John Damascene, who took the 
term from Gregory and Máximos and reinterpreted it 
primarily in a Trinitarian sense.27 In his theology, 
perichoresis refers to the mutual interpenetration or 
eternal circulation of divine life among the persons. 
Perichoresis in this sense is of central importance in John 
Damascene's Trinitarian thought, indeed, so much so that it 
is put on a level with the unity of the divine nature as
pQthe ground of divine unity. As such, it is apparently
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26L. Prestige, " rPerichoreol and fPerichoresisl in the 
Fathers," Journal of Theological Studies. 29 (1 9 2 8 ), 2 4 2 - 
2 4 4 ; and A. Chollet, "Circuminsession, -cession," 
Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. II, cols. 2 5 2 7 -3 2 .
27John Damascene, De fide orth., 1 .8 ; 1 .1 4 ; 4 .1 8 ; cited 
by Prestige, loc. cit. The idea of mutual interchange 
between the persons, however, is found earlier. It appears, 
for example, to be supported by scriptural texts such as 
Jn. 1 0 : 3 8 , 1 4 : 1 1 , and 1 7 : 21 (vis-à-vis the Son and the 
Father) and perhaps 1 Cor. 2 : 10 (vis-à-vis the Spirit and 
the Father) . The idea of mutual interchange is also 
particularly important in the Trinitarian theology of the 
Cappadocians, with their strong pluralism, and in 
particular in Gregory of Nyssa (ibid., p. 2 4 4 ). It was in 
the theology of John Damascene, however, that perichoresis 
was first used as a technical term in Trinitarian theology.
28John Damascene, Nat, comp. 4 . Prestige, op. cit., p. 
2 4 9 , having surveyed the use of the term perichoresis in 
John Damascene's thought, draws the following conclusions: 
"fPerichoresisl is not a consequence but an equivalent of 
unity. ... It has drawn to itself the adjectives denying 
confusion, which in earlier writers were associated with 
fhenosisl. ... It represents an attempt to define the
nature of this unity.... It is illustrated negatively by 
being treated as incompatible with separation in substance,
intended as a measure against tritheism on the one hand and 
modalism on the other: the persons are indeed one in their 
hypostatic interpenetration, and yet three since this 
interpenetration presupposes a genuine plurality.
Through the influence of John Damascene, the doctrine 
of perichoresis came to be accepted de fidei in both 
Eastern and Western Trinitarian theology. However, like 
other Trinitarian doctrines, it is understood differently 
in the two traditions. In the East, where the primary datum 
of Trinitarian theology are the hypostaseis rather than the 
ousia. perichoresis remains, as in John Damascene, a 
doctrine of Trinitarian unity. Eastern theology is more 
dynamic than that of the West on this point; each 
hypostasis is drawn to the other two, while the three are 
one precisely because they are completely outward-looking 
in this sense. In Latin theology, on the other hand, the 
divine substantia is logically prior to the persons, and 
serves as the fundamental ground of Trinitarian unity. 
Perichoresis (circumincession) here is conceived as a 
function of substantial unity, since on this basis there is 
a perfect fusion of relational activity in the one divine 
life.29
The idea of the reciprocity between the Spirit and 
Christ arising from our study of contemporary Trinitarian 
Pneumatology is clearly closely related to the traditional 
doctrine of perichoresis, particularly in its Eastern 
expression. The contemporary Trinitarian tradition in this 
sense arguably leads to a broadly Eastern view of the 
Trinity, which begins with the three persons and their 
work, and moves from there to the question of Trinitarian 
unity. It is only when the priority of the persons is thus
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in place, or time, in power, operation, or will."
29Thomas Aquinas, o p . cit. , la. 42, 5. See also
Chollet, o p . cit.; and A. M. Bermejo, "Circumincession," 
New Catholic Encyclopedia, III, p. 880.
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accepted, in other words, that the idea of reciprocity can 
be developed.
We have seen that in the social doctrine of the 
Trinity advocated by Eastern theologians such as Staniloae 
and Evdokimov, the idea of the perichoretic relations of 
the three persons at the level of the divine enerqeia is 
put forward as the way ahead for ecumenical reasons. We 
have also seen in Chapter III that Moltmann, who speaks of 
the mutual relations of the persons in a similar way, 
develops both a strong doctrine of the priority of the 
persons and a strong view of oerichoresis in his 
Trinitarian theology, relying on it as the sole principle 
of Trinitarian unity. Moltmann thus attempts to avoid the 
obstructions which the priority of substance in Western 
theology, and the monarchianism of Eastern theology, 
present to his radical social doctrine of the Trinity. 
According to Moltmann:
The unity of the trinitarian Persons 
lies in the circulation of the divine 
life which they fulfil in their 
relations to one another. This means 
that the unity of the triune God cannot 
and must not be seen in a general 
concept of divine substance. That would 
abolish the personal differences. But 
if the contrary is true - if the very 
difference of the three Persons lies in 
their relational, perichoretically 
consummated life process - then the 
Persons cannot and must not be reduced 
to three modes of being of one and the 
same divine subject. The Persons 
themselves constitute both their 
differences and their unity. ...through 
the concept of perichoresis, all 
subordinationism in the doctrine of the 
Trinity is avoided. It is true that the 
Trinity is constituted with the Father 
as starting point, inasmuch as he is 
understood as being 'the origin of the 
Godhead' . But this 'monarchy of the 
Father' only applies to the 
constitution of the Trinity. It has no 
validity within the eternal circulation
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of the divine life, and none in the 
perichoretic unity of the Trinity. Here 
the three Persons are equal; they live 
and are manifested in one another and 
through one another.20
Undoubtedly, the doctrine of oerichoresis will assume 
new importance if the idea of innertrinitarian reciprocity 
is to be developed, as in Moltmann's theology, into a 
broadly social doctrine of the Trinity. We can expect in 
this context both that the precedent of previous doctrines 
of oerichoresis can and will be drawn upon, and that the 
idea of oerichoresis will be developed further. It is 
questionable, however, whether the doctrine of oerichoresis 
itself can bear all the weight necessary for the 
development of the idea of reciprocity in the 
innertrinitarian sense, since it was not originally 
developed with this problem in mind. Indeed, in general, 
oerichoresis is a derivative and secondary doctrine which, 
in its classical expression, could be deduced from 
Trinitarian doctrines already developed, without any 
reference to the economy of salvation or even, strictly 
speaking, to the problem of Trinitarian taxis. The mutual 
indwelling of the persons is in this sense a corollary of 
the idea that the three are one and the one three. The 
problem of reciprocity as defined here, on the other hand, 
involves the idea of the interpersonal Trinitarian 
relations deriving from the economy, and, on this basis, 
genuine reversals of the economic Trinitarian taxis. 
whereas the doctrine of oerichoresis. even when affirmed 
strongly in particular theologies in the older tradition,
20Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, p. 175. 
This, however, is a thesis which neither the West nor the 
East can strictly accept. The former point is obvious; on 
the latter, see, e.g., Evdokimov, op. cit., pp. 48, 71-72, 
where he argues that the energetic oerichoresis in the 
divine life involves a reciprocity between the Son and the 
Spirit which, however, has its ultimate source and goal in 
the Father.
was never taken to abrogate the (generally one-sided) 
doctrines of Trinitarian taxis held in the particular
traditions. Thus the doctrine of oerichoresis has not 
generally been taken by Eastern or Western theologians to 
overcome the differing view of the Trinitarian taxis with 
respect to Pneumatology which separates the two traditions.
The question which has to be faced in this context, 
therefore, has wider implications for the structure of 
Trinitarian theology than can be expressed in a simple 
reaffirmation of the doctrine of oerichoresis. reflecting 
not only the assumptions of the Eastern and Western 
Trinitarian traditions, but also of contemporary
Trinitarian theology.21 One problem here is how oerichoresis 
is to be defined, of course, in the sense that it makes all 
the difference whether it is taken to occur, for example, 
as an expression of the unity of divine substance, or as a 
more genuine expression of interpersonality at the level of 
the eneraeia. We have seen from the doctrine of the divine 
eneraeia that Eastern theology is able to differentiate 
between the sense in which the Spirit is related to the 
Father alone as the "source" of the Trinity, and the sense 
in which he is eternally related both to Father and Son in 
a reciprocal relationship in the "energetic" life of the
Trinity. This distinction makes a more nuanced approach to
the problem possible in Eastern than in Western theology. 
This points, however, to the fundamental question which is 
at issue, concerning the idea of the person or hypostasis 
itself and in particular concerning the nature of its 
hypostatic relations, which the doctrine of oerichoresis as 
such presupposes. The question is whether or not it is 
possible to conceive of the persons in such a way that an 
innertrinitarian relation which is not ultimately a 
procession is possible.
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21This is, of course, recognized by Moltmann as well, 
whose position as a whole is similar in this respect to the 
one about to be developed.
A great deal depends upon the answer which is given 
to this question. In Eastern theology, the energetic 
hypostatic relations are distinguished from the 
processions, making possible a doctrine of energetic 
Trinitarian relationality; indeed, in Eastern theology, the 
processions themselves are not understood primarily in a 
relational sense, but rather as differing modes of origin 
(tropos hvoarxeos),32 In Eastern theology, consequently, the 
relations are held only to express the prior absolute 
diversity of the persons.33 This does not mean, however, 
that the innertrinitarian relations become merely 
accidental. Rather, in Eastern theology, as we have seen, 
the threefold relations of the persons is of enormous 
importance: the relations, not just, as in the Western-
Augustinian tradition, between the Father and the Son on 
the one hand and, on the other, between the Father and the 
Son as one principle and the Spirit (deriving from eternal 
generation and double procession), but the relations 
between each person and the other two persons in 
distinction. According to Evdokimov, for example, "Le plus 
important pour comprendre la théologie trinitaire de 
l'Orient, c'est le caractère toujours ternaire ou triple 
des relations. "3A This is one of the reasons the East is 
unable to adopt the Western view of the relations of 
opposition: one can really only oppose two principles,
whereas the relations of the persons are triple; with 
regard to the Spirit and the Son, therefore, Eastern 
thought has it that the Spirit proceeds from the Father 
conjointly and together with the begetting of the Son upon 
whom he rests, while the Son is begotten by the Father 
conjointly and together with the procession of the Spirit
32Lossky, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit in the 
Orthodox Triadology," pp. 37-38.
33Ibid. , p . 38.
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3AEvdokimov, o p . cit.. p. 42, italics deleted.
who manifests him.35 Each has a relation of origin to the 
Father, a relation of procession, in other words, and a 
relation to the other person which is not of origin or 
procession. In the latter case, the relation is not causal, 
but one of interdependence within the perichoretic life of 
the three.36
In the Western-Augustinian tradition, by contrast, all 
innertrinitarian relations are understood as qualities 
logically consequent upon the actions of generation and 
spiration, while it is these relations which distinguish 
the persons. The doctrine of relations is thus immediately 
implied by the doctrine of the processions. According to 
Thomas Aquinas, for example, there are only four real 
relations in the Trinity: fatherhood, sonship, spiration, 
and procession, corresponding to the two acts of generation 
and spiration on their active and passive sides.37
The idea of a true innertrinitarian reciprocity 
between the Spirit and the Son such as we have in view can, 
however, only be said to be possible if there are relations 
which are not immediately derivative of the processions in 
this sense. From the standpoint of the Western tradition, 
one could not, for example, maintain the filioaue together 
with a parallel soirituaue doctrine, affirming that the Son 
is begotten of the Father and the Spirit together. In the 
semi-causal conceptuality of Trinitarian procession, such 
a reversal of the natural order or taxis of the persons 
could never be sustained. Within the terms of Western 
theology, therefore, if the Spirit and the Son are to be 
related at all in the innertrinitarian life, it will have 
to be through either a filioaue or soirituaue doctrine, but 
not through both, since in Western theology the processions
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35Ibid. . p. 43.
36Ibid. . p. 48.
37Thomas Aquinas, o p . cit., la. 28, 4.
are the sole grounds of the personal relations. Equally, 
however, within the terms of the Western view that the only 
real innertrinitarian relations are rooted in the 
processions, the Eastern doctrine of the procession of the 
Holy Spirit from the Father alone would mean that the 
Spirit has no relation to the Son, or vice versa. A 
distinction between the processions and some other
innertrinitarian relations is therefore an absolute 
prerequisite for a theology of innertrinitarian 
reciprocity.
It is here that the social doctrine of the Trinity 
begins, and not simply, as is sometimes alleged,38 with a
simple assertion of the priority of the plurality of the
persons over the unity of the one God. (These are perhaps 
best seen as antinomies in all Trinitarian theologies.) The 
social doctrine of the Trinity undoubtedly presupposes the 
irreducible plurality of the persons, but it is more
immediately concerned with a rather different problem: not 
with plurality for its own sake, as it were, but rather 
with innertrinitarian relationality. More specifically, the 
social doctrine of the Trinity begins with the idea of the 
Trinity as a community of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 
whose relations are conceived to be genuinely personal, in 
the nature of love rather than relational in the more 
abstract, ontological sense of the "relations of 
opposition." In this sense, its economic basis in the 
concrete relations of the persons in the economy is strong, 
far stronger, it must be said, than the economic basis of 
the idea of self-communication underlying the semi- 
modalistic Trinitarian theologies of Barth and Rahner. The 
development of a Trinitarianism grounded in the concrete 
relations of the persons in the Christ-event must in this 
sense be reckoned to be one of the major achievements of 
post-Barthian and post-Rahnerian Trinitarian theology, even
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38So, e.g., Hill, op. cit. , p. 217.
if the theologies which have thus emerged have rested on 
questionable appropriations of the relevant economic data.
There is, significantly, a major Western Trinitarian 
tradition which can enrich our understanding at this point, 
that inaugurated in the twelfth century by Richard of St. 
Victor. William Hill, citing Michael Schmaus, notes that 
there are only two significant Trinitarian traditions 
within the medieval Western tradition: the Augustinian,
which is mediated by Anselm and Peter Lombard and which 
culminates in Thomas Aquinas, and that begun by Richard of 
St. Victor, which continues in the Franciscan tradition in 
Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure.39 In contrast to the 
mainstream tradition of the West, Richard's Trinitarian 
theology, like those of Jüngel, Mühlen, Kasper, and 
Moltmann more recently, begins with the Johannine idea that 
God is love.40 His argument is that God, who is love, is 
necessarily41 a community of persons, and indeed a Trinity, 
since love cannot exist where there is only one, and is 
incomplete when it is not open to more than a selfish
42possession of a single other. He writes:
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39Hill, o p . cit. . p. 226, with reference to Michael 
Schmaus, Per liber proouanatorius des Thomas Anqelicus und 
die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Acruin und Duns 
Scotus. vol. 2, Die trinitärischen Lehrunterschiede 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1930).
40Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, III, 2, 6.
41Richard's theology is intended to provide "necessary 
reasons" for what faith believes (ibid. . I, 5; III, 1) ; 
this does not mean, as Copleston, op. cit. , II, p. 179 
points out, that we can discern the necessity fully, but 
only that there must be necessary reasons for what 
necessarily exists, so that, as God is necessarily a 
Trinity, there must be a necessary reason for this fact. 
The "necessary reasons" adduced, therefore, are not fully 
comprehended, but approached by way of the analogy of human
love. See, e.g., Richard of St. Victor, pp. cit,, III, 13.
42Ibid.. Ill, esp. 2, 11, 14, and 15.
341
...the most excellent level of charity, 
and therefore the fullness of goodness, 
cannot exist where a defect of will or 
a defect of a faculty excludes a sharer 
of love and a sharing of most excellent 
joy. Therefore it is necessary that 
each of those loved supremely and 
loving supremely [i.e., the Father and 
Son] should search with equal desire 
for someone who would be mutually loved 
and with equal concord possess him. 
Thus you see how the perfection of 
charity requires a Trinity of persons, 
without which it is wholly unable to 
subsist in the integrity of its 
fullness ,43
According to Richard, therefore, love is not to be 
appropriated in the technical sense to the Holy Spirit as 
the third person of the Trinity, as in the dominant 
tradition of the West, but is rather to be understood in 
terms of the divine being itself, in which the three 
persons subsist. Because God is love, God is a community 
of love, a Trinity.44
45Ibid. . Ill, 11, as translated in Richard of St.
Victor, Book Three of the Trinity, in Richard of St.
Victor: The Twelve Patriarchs. The Mystical Ark. Book Three 
of the Trinity, trans. Grover A. Zinn (London: SPCK, 1979), 
p. 385. Cf. also ibid.. Ill, 19
440ne question which might be raised concerning
Richard's argument concerns the limitation of the
innerdivine fellowship to three; on the analogy of human 
relationships, the mutual love of two is not full until it 
is open to the wider community, and not just to a third. In 
human terms, the third person introduces the possibility of 
a love which is fully shared, but if this is so, and in God 
it should be infinitely so, then the question arises why it 
is limited to a triplicity. Of course, the Trinity is open 
to the creation, out of love, so that the divine love does 
diffuse itself beyond even itself. But this, Richard argues 
at the beginning of Book III of the De Trinitate (III, 2), 
is not the kind of strictly innerdivine love with which we 
are concerned in Trinitarian theology as such. Richard does 
not fully address this question of the limitation of love 
to triplicity, but the point seems to be that the divine 
community, having gone on to a fourth, would require a 
further "infinite progress" to ever more divine
The spirit of the Anselmian dictum "credo. ut 
intelliqam" is evident in Richard's Trinitarian theology, 
and his position can perhaps be said to offer a rational 
account of plurality and indeed of the triunity of God 
which is at least as persuasive as any other. Richard's 
theology also shows that a social doctrine of the Trinity 
is not based simply on a movement from the plurality of the 
persons to the unity of the three; indeed, his De Trinitate 
begins with a treatment of the unity of the divine 
substance,45 and his attention only then turns to the idea 
that there is "true plurality in that true and simple 
Divinity," since its highest perfection is love.46 Rather, 
we see again in the theology of Richard that the central 
presupposition of the social doctrine of the Trinity is 
simply the possibility of a discussion of the persons as 
related in love, without immediate reference to the 
doctrine of the processions. In the whole of Book III of 
the De Trinitate. where his argument for the plurality of 
the persons in God appears, Richard does not once develop 
the Augustinian relational doctrine of the persons, nor 
does he use the (Anselmian) phrase "relations of 
opposition." His argument rather follows a different 
course.
Thomas Aquinas himself notes this fact several times 
with reference to the theology of Richard (and his 
theological successors among Thomas' Franciscan 
contemporaries) in his discussion of the Trinitarian
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hypostaseis. This, however, would lead to absurdity, in the 
sense that God would thus have to be conceived as an 
infinite process of self-replication, which could never, 
by definition, be called to a halt. On this view, the love 
which God is could never be sated. There is, therefore, a 
certain rationale for the triadic structure of the 
argument. What remains is only the possibility of a sharing 
of the divine love with the created universe.
45Ibid. . I, II.
46Ibid. . Ill, 1.
relations in the Summa Theoloaiae.47 Thomas notes, with 
reference to his view that the persons are their relations, 
that a different view has been taken, to the effect that 
the relations are merely a sign of personal distinction, 
which is itself based in the mode of origin, i.e., 
begetting and spiration. His response essentially 
represents the Augustinian view that there are only three 
ways in which one might be able to distinguish the persons: 
according to either substance, accidents, or relations; 
since the substance is identical and there are no accidents 
in God, we are left with the relations as the sole basis of 
personal distinction. These, furthermore, are simply 
logical expressions of the acts of filiation and spiration: 
fatherhood and sonship, on the one hand, and active and 
passive procession on the other.
Thomas' criticism, however, points to the limitations 
of his own position as much as to those of Richard's. 
William Hill's critique of Richard, which follows in the 
Thomist tradition, raises the problem well:
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[Richard’s] emphasis seems to fall, not 
upon love as a dynamism giving rise to 
the Word and the Pneuma. but upon the 
very nature of love as presupposing an 
inner relationality that is personal in 
kind. This is his primal and dominating 
principle to which the doctrine of the 
processions is subordinate. The 
universal tradition on the invariant 
order among the Persons demanded that 
he give consideration to the 
processions. But there his system 
reaches an impasse, because while love 
may well require a plurality of persons 
as its condition, it does not explain 
the origin of such a plurality. If the 
processions also constitute a structure 
indigenous to love, then it is
47Thomas Aquinas, o p . cit.. la. 40, 2; 40, 3. Thomas, 
ibid. . la. 32, 1, ad 2, also disputes the Victorine view
that the nature of love requires that God, being love, is 
a Trinity.
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difficult to explain that the Father is 
without origin, that the Son arises 
from the Father alone, and that the 
Spirit's origin is from the Father and 
the Son (at least in the Western 
tradition that Richard represents).
That is, it is difficult to maintain a 
distinct personal identity for each of 
the Three.
This criticism can only be justified, however, so long as 
the only real Trinitarian relations are the processions; 
Richard's position is not that there are no processions, 
to be sure, nor is it that there is no Trinitarian taxis 
flowing from the natural order of the processions. Rather, 
his position is analogous to that of the East on this 
point: the three persons are constituted as distinct by
origin, and not by relation; the relations only express the 
distinction.49
Richard's conception can be seen to offer a coherent 
alternative within Western theology to the Augustinian 
position represented by Thomas, once its presupposition 
that relations in the Trinity need not necessarily be 
relations of origin or processions is admitted. On this 
basis, the Son and Spirit can indeed be eternally related 
while not having their eternal origin in one another. There 
can be little doubt that outwith the Augustinian theory of 
relational predication, such a presupposition is perfectly 
intelligible. To use another social analogy, a natural 
brother and sister have the same origin, whereas the 
possibility of an interpersonal relationship between them 
is not based on this, but on their own individual 
personality. From the point of view of origin alone, an 
abstract relation could be established in an ontological or 
causal sense, while if the two had never met, their
48Hill, op . cit. . pp. 230-231.
49Richard of St. Victor, op. cit., IV, 15, 20, 23-4.
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relation would be non-existent from the standpoint of 
interpersonal reality. The Trinitarian relations Richard 
has in view similarly depend upon whether or not the 
Trinitarian persons as persons are capable, in themselves, 
of genuinely interpersonal relations of love. In the other 
main Trinitarian tradition of the West, the persons are not 
strictly conceived as such; for Richard, on the other hand, 
the persons are, and in this respect, his position is 
entirely representative of the social doctrine of the 
Trinity. 50
What Richard's theology does not do, however, is to 
develop this thesis from the point of view of the economy 
of salvation. His theology rather regards the persons as 
abstract divine beings capable of loving relationships 
within the one substance of the God who is love, but beyond 
this it is unable to take us. There is in this sense a good 
case for the traditional criticism of Richard's position 
cited above, that while he regards the immanent Trinity as 
an eternal life of relationality and love, the relations 
themselves are left empty of content. Thus the very 
relationality of the Trinitarian terms "Father" and "Son," 
if not "Holy Spirit" as well, is effectively lost. The 
psychological analogy, by contrast, which lies at the heart 
of the other main Western Trinitarian tradition, specifies 
the character of the two processions in terms of the 
characteristic acts of a spiritual nature, memory, 
knowledge, and will. In this, without question, lies its 
particular strength.51
50According to Evdokimov, e.g., o p . cit.. p. 48: "La
relation entre le Fils et l"Esprit n'est pas causale, mais 
c'est une relation d'interdépendence et de condition car 
toute relation interdivine est toujours triple dans la 
circumincession éternelle de l'Amour divin."
51Equally, however, in understanding the Trinity on 
this analogy, adequate personal distinction is arguably 
denied to the three, and their relationality, which in the 
economy of salvation is quite concrete, becomes a matter of 
the highly metaphysical doctrines of eternal filiation and
We have seen nevertheless that the idea of reciprocity 
which emerges from the economy itself cannot be reconciled 
with the semi-causal view of the Trinitarian relations 
which prevails in the West, and in particular that it 
requires a theology of innertrinitarian relationality 
beyond what is possible on the basis of the Western 
relational understanding of the persons (the relations of 
opposition). The Eastern doctrine of the divine enerqeia is 
clearly relevant here, as is Moltmann's distinction between 
the "constitution" and "form" of the Trinitarian persons, 
according to which the processions refer to the 
constitution of the persons, or to their divine existence, 
and the mutual relations in love to their personal form or 
"eidos.1,52
In a social doctrine of the Trinity, in short, the 
homoousion is understood to preclude the idea that the 
persons should be incapable of genuine interpersonal 
relationships. If these relations merely follow the order 
of the processions, genuine mutuality and reciprocity is 
no longer possible, in particular from the point of view 
of the Holy Spirit. The Eastern doctrine of the procession 
of the Spirit from the Father alone, indeed, would thus 
preclude the possibility of any relation between the Spirit 
and the Son, while in the West, no genuinely reciprocal 
relation between the two would be possible, because the 
relation following from the procession is one-sided. In a 
theology of innertrinitarian reciprocity, however, both the 
Spirit and the Son must be capable of being the subject of 
acts which relate each to the other. Thus, the idea of 
Spirit-Son reciprocity means that both the Spirit and Son 
can be active and passive in relation to the other in the
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spiration.
52Moltmann, o p . cit.. pp. 185-187, and Moltmann, 
"Theological Proposals Towards the Resolution of the 
Filioque Controversy," p. 169
immanent life of the Trinity, and not merely, as in the 
older Western paradigm, active and passive in one direction 
only, i.e., from Son to Spirit, in the immanent Trinity and 
the reverse only under the conditions of the incarnation, 
i.e., by virtue of the humanity assumed by the Son and the 
communicatio idiomatum.
If a theology of immanent Trinitarian reciprocity is 
to be developed, however, it will have to meet the 
criticism that, like Richard's social doctrine of the 
Trinity, it does not sufficiently differentiate the 
relations of the persons. If this criticism holds, then to 
the extent that the Spirit and the Son are asserted merely 
to be related reciprocally, the relations are simply 
indistinguishable. The four Trinitarian models of Chapter 
III, however, are important here. This is not, of course, 
because they always directly lend support to a theology of 
innertrinitarian reciprocity, but because the various 
aspects of the relationality of the persons which are to be 
taken up in this theology are precisely what is developed 
in the four models. A theology of immanent Trinitarian 
reciprocity can therefore draw on the differentiated 
economic data with which the Trinitarian theologies 
surveyed in Chapter III already begin.
The contribution of the contemporary Trinitarian 
tradition to the social doctrine of the Trinity can 
arguably be decisive at this point, for the images of 
revealedness, atonement, anointing, and eschatological 
fulfilment provide a wealth of specifically relational
content for Trinitarian Pneumatology, and a content which 
has already been developed in these theologies in a
systematic way. On the basis of the contemporary
Trinitarian thesis that the economic is the immanent 
Trinity, indeed, this concrete relationality has become a 
major, perhaps the major, theme of Trinitarian theology, 
since the sending of the Son and Spirit and their
salvation-historical relatedness as the "two hands of the
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Father" are constitutive of the economic Trinity. No 
Trinitarian theology which presupposes the contemporary 
Trinitarian thesis, therefore, can ultimately avoid taking 
up these relations into the theology of the immanent 
Trinity. Thus the thematization in post-Barthian and post- 
Rahnerian Trinitarian theology in particular of the 
obedience of the incarnate Son to the Father, the loving 
unity of the Father and the Son in the Spirit even in the 
event of the cross, the anointing of the Son with the 
Spirit, and so on, flows from this systematic starting- 
point.53 What we are concerned with here is not an abstract 
series of processions within the divine being, by which its 
unity is differentiated in a threefold way, but rather the 
living, historical reciprocity of the Trinitarian persons 
in the concrete events of the economy of salvation.
A future theology of Spirit-Son reciprocity in a 
social doctrine of the Trinity might thus begin with the 
concrete, economic relationality between the Spirit and 
Christ, based on an analysis of the role of the Holy Spirit 
in Christology and of Christ in Pneumatology as suggested 
in the previous section, and on the ideas of Trinitarian 
relationality as developed in the various models of Chapter 
III. In the economy, however, what the Spirit "gives" to
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53In Barth and Rahner, of course, this starting-point 
is combined with a particular thesis concerning the self­
communication of God, so that the economic Trinitarian 
relations tend to be assimilated to the self-communication 
paradigm. It is for this reason above all that both Barth, 
o p . cit. . 1/1, pp. 355f f. , and Rahner, pp. cit. , pp.
103ff., criticize the terminology of Trinitarian "persons," 
and opt instead for the term "modes of being." However, the 
deeper implication of the view that the Trinity in itself 
is both known from what it is ad extra and that it "is" 
what it is ad extra in the sense of Rahner's axiom is that 
the relations of the Father, Son, and Spirit, which are 
more complex than that given in the self-communication 
paradigm, be taken up into discussion of the immanent 
Trinity. This is precisely what has happened in post- 
Barthian and post-Rahnerian theology. In this sense, the 
positions of Barth and Rahner, contrary to their expressed 
intentions, lead to a social doctrine of the Trinity.
Christ and what Christ "gives" to the Spirit in their 
reciprocal economic relationship is not interchangeable. It 
is possible, for example, to say on the basis of the 
anointing theme that Christ is filled with the Spirit, and 
thus that the Spirit is the "unction" of Christ, but one 
would have no economic basis for the converse statement 
that the Spirit is "filled" with Christ. What the Spirit 
receives from Christ is not an anointing, but rather, as in 
the Johannine tradition, "what is Christ's" (Jn. 16: 14), 
i.e., the particular Christocentric form of his mission 
after Jesus' death and resurrection. If one were to 
abstract from this in a theology of the immanent Trinity, 
it would be possible to say, for example, that the Spirit 
and the Son relate mutually to one another in the 
fellowship of the divine Trinitarian life, but this would 
hardly be adequate to the economic starting-point. We know 
that in the economy, the Spirit rests upon the Son, and 
that the Son gives the Spirit to those who believe. Each 
has relations of activity and passivity to the other, but 
this involves more than the simple reversal of an identical 
active and passive relation. Within the Trinitarian life, 
a relation of reciprocity obtains between the Spirit and 
the Son, not a relation which is identical on each side, 
but a relation of activity and passivity which is 
appropriate to each, and which cannot be identified with 
the procession of either without serious consequences for 
the entire social model which the economy of salvation 
appears to require.
If, however, the active and passive mutual relations 
of the Spirit and the Son can be differentiated on the 
basis of the economic content of the relations, they can 
also be differentiated in a social doctrine of the Trinity 
in terms of the relations each of the two has, not to the
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other, but also to the Father in their respective relations 
to the other.5A Thus, according to Staniloae, for example:
350
The Son sees the Father not only as he 
by whom he is begotten, but also as him 
from whom the other proceeds.... But in 
his link with his other other [i.e., 
the Spirit] , or in the procession of 
this one from himself, the Father does 
not forget the Son as Son, but insofar 
as the Third Person also proceeds from 
him, all the complex richness of his 
relationship with the Son can be seen. 
... In his turn the Son knows in the 
light of his other, by whom the Father 
lives in all the richness of his love 
for the Son - the Son knows his Father 
and his love towards him more fully. 
Not only does the Father by his link 
with the Spirit live his love towards 
the Son in its fullness, that is to say 
not only does the Son shine out 
brightly towards the Father in the 
light of the Spirit cast by the Father 
on the Son, but also the Spirit is 
fully realized from the Father by the 
Son. 5
It is possible, in fact, to make the following fourfold 
distinction in the interpersonal relations between the 
Spirit and the Son. In the active relation of the Spirit 
to the Son, the Spirit is related to the Son as the Son of 
the Father; in the passive relation of the Son to the 
Spirit which corresponds to this, the Son is related to the 
Spirit as the Spirit of the Father. Similarly, in the 
active relation of the Son to the Spirit, the Son is 
related to the Spirit as the Spirit of the Father; in the 
passive relation of the Spirit to the Son, finally, the
5ZtRichard's analogy of a community of love, involving 
three persons and not just two, also requires that a 
genuine reciprocity between the Spirit and the Son should 
involve the Father as well.
55Staniloae, o p . cit. . pp. 185-186.
Spirit is related to the Son as the Son of the Father. The 
distinctions thus made in the reciprocal relations between 
the Spirit and the Son are important from the point of view 
of the social doctrine of the Trinity, since on the basis 
of the social analogy, none of the persons is what he is 
except in relation to the other two. The persons as well as 
the relations, therefore, can be seen to be genuinely 
distinct.
Clearly, any Trinitarian relation which is taken up 
from the economy into the theology of the immanent Trinity 
must be understood under a kenotic qualification, so that 
the apophatic character of the immanent Trinity is 
preserved. The task of developing a theology of the 
innertrinitarian relations from the economy has, therefore, 
to reckon seriously with the paradox which has emerged from 
our study, that an adequate doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity is only possible when an apophatic reticence about 
it is embraced. This does not mean, however, that nothing 
whatever can be said about the immanent Trinitarian 
relations. The kenotic character of the economic, and the 
ultimately apophatic character of the immanent Trinity, do 
not preclude all knowledge of the immanent Trinity; rather, 
these are simply the qualities that define the scope of our 
knowledge of the Trinity, and thus make it what it is. As 
we have seen, the terms "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit" 
themselves are analogies, as are the terms "filiation" and 
"spiration." This does not, however, prevent us from 
abstracting from the usual finite sense of the terms in 
developing a Trinitarian theology, or even in the most 
simple affirmation of Trinitarian faith. The same can, in 
principle, be said of the concrete salvation-historical 
relations of the persons as the basis for a theology of 
innertrinitarian relationality. An abstraction from the 
finite, temporal relations which are thus described is 
clearly required, but this does not mean that nothing 
whatever will be left at the end.
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In its emphasis on the economy, therefore, 
contemporary Trinitarian theology has pointed the way to a 
further development in understanding of the Trinitarian 
life of God as relational. It reveals again, if only 
through its limitations, that it is necessary to move 
beyond the kenotic form of the economy to a proper level 
of abstraction in the theology of the immanent Trinity, and 
yet correctly focuses attention on the fact that our 
knowledge of the immanent Trinity comes only by way of the 
economy. Given these qualifications, however, it would 
appear that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the immanent 
Trinity can indeed be deepened by the new appraisal of the 
concrete relationality of the persons in the economy which 
has taken place in recent theology. Although a number of 
questions have been raised about this theology, chiefly 
concerning the kenotic character of the economic Trinity, 
the apophatic character of the immanent Trinity, and the 
notions of dialectical Trinitarianism and the subjectivity 
of God, its basic orientation to the economy undoubtedly 
provides a fruitful basis for future discussion.
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